Wycliffe, John

JOHANNIS WYCLIF

MISCELLANEA PHILOSOPHICA.

VOL. I.

CONTAINING DE ACTIBUS ANIME
REPLICACIO DE UNIVERSALIBUS
DE MATERIA ET FORMA.

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BY

MICHAEL HENRY DZIEWICKI

WITH AN

ESSAY ON WYCLIF'S PHILOSOPHICAL SYSTEM

BY THE SAME.

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An Essay on Wyclif's Philosophical System.

After the publication, by the Wyclif Society, of *De Compositione Hominis*, of *De Ente Praedicamentali*, and of the three volumes of *Logica*, lately issued, enough is now known of this philosopher's general system and trend of thought to render a synopsis of his philosophy quite possible. This synopsis appears to be particularly in its place at the beginning of the works now to be published, in which he develops his principles more elaborately and in greater detail. Nor can we doubt that the synthesis of what has already appeared will be of use for what is to come — for the two volumes of *Miscellanea*, and for those, much more numerous, of Wyclif's great work, *De Ente*.

The words of Isaiah in the Revised Version: 'How art thou fallen from heaven, O day-star, son of the morning!' can alone adequately render the extremes of Wyclif's fate: world-wide celebrity in his own times, complete oblivion in ours. The man who devoted his life to stemming the then all but irresistible tide of Nominalistic philosophy; whose subtle genius drew to him at Oxford a numerous and enthusiastic band of followers, who in the first years of his Mastership at Balliol Hall elaborated a system of philosophy perhaps more daring than that of any Englishman before him, certainly as comprehensive and as surely following from his first principles as any, whether before him or after; who, driven step by step towards the natural conclusions of his system, was the first to rise up against Rome, and to inaugurate the movement which culminated in Huss, and ended with Ziska: — that man is now so utterly forgotten; what he may or may not have thought is so absolutely indifferent even to cultured minds in the present day, that his Latin works, now being published by the Wyclif Society for upwards of fifteen years, are almost unread in his own native country.

So great a fall from such a height does not in the least imply that Wyclif, whether in the past or now, has met with more or with less attention than he deserved. He was a man of his time, great in his generation: but changing times have not only taken away all savour of actuality from the work he did and the problems which he tried to solve; they have rendered him unintelligible both to the general public and to those who are not ignorant of philosophy. Out of a thousand men trained in modern Metaphysical lore, scarcely one would be able to read and understand the five volumes of Wyclif's philosophical works that have lately seen the light; and not many would care to peruse the Introductions and side-notes in which the editors have striven to set forth Wyclif's meaning. Not only the problems which interested his contemporaries are dead, but the methods and the very terminology by which he attempted their solution are dead likewise. And to all such as are not philosophers, these volumes are no better than waste paper. On looking through them — if respect for the name of the great forgotten one kept back some very natural expression of contempt — they surely would experience something of what the Arab may feel, when he pitches his goat-skin tent on the ruins of some vast city: "I wonder how anyone could undertake such gigantic and such useless work!"

Assuming that the reader who opens this volume is likely to experience some such feeling, and yet is willing to be interested in Wyclif's philosophy, if possible, my task is a very simple, though, it must be confessed, a very arduous one. I intend to state, as plainly as I can, and putting aside all technicalities that are not indispensable, the main features of Wyclif's system, as I have understood it. I shall strive to take his own point of view; and though I need hardly say that it is not mine, will do my utmost to place it in the best and most convincing light, so that the reader may at least vaguely understand how it was that he possessed such influence over his contemporaries; and also how his mind, working from point to point, from first principles to ultimate inferences, brought him finally into conflict — unwilling conflict, as I believe — with more than one dogma of the Church. Here, and with the purpose stated, I hold a brief for Wyclif.

What was that Nominalism in which our philosopher (as he tells us himself) was bred, from which he broke away early in his career, and which he afterward fought with such energy during the whole of

his life? To answer this, we must first state the problem, so famous of old (though it now sounds like a puzzle in Grammar or Dialectics) which Nominalists, Conceptualists, and the various schools of Realists set themselves to solve.

There is no doubt that the same names are not always used in the same sense. Mr. Rochester was a bear; there are many bears in the Zoological Gardens; others in the Stock Exchange; there is a Great and a Little Bear in the sky. We may call a nine-thonged whip, or a mouse-eating animal, or a spiteful woman by the name of Cat. Either a playing-card or the ruler of a nation may be a Queen. These terms are equivocal. But there are cases when the same word, applied to different objects, *means the same*. Smith is a man; Brown is a man likewise. But the word 'man' meaning the same in both cases, here comes the question: The same *what?* To this we have three principal replies. Nominalists say, 'The same *word*'; Conceptualists, 'The same *concept*, or *idea*'; Realists, 'The same *thing*'.

In the theory of extreme Nominalists (of whom the famous Ockam was the acknowledged exponent) no general term has any meaning whatever, unless applied to its singulars, and so long as it is thus applied. It is by itself a mere empty sound, — a *flatus vocis*, as he chooses to call it. We find that two or more singulars resemble each other, and we take a general term to classify them according to that resemblance. Thus used, it has meaning; not otherwise. There is nothing in the world save singulars: when taken apart from its singulars, a general term therefore signifies nothing. Smith is a man; in so far as 'man' signifies Smith (consequently a concrete being, quite diverse from 'man' taken to mean Brown) it has signification. In so far as it is taken for something that is the same in both Smith and Brown, it has none. We docket singulars with general terms, just as a shop-keeper will docket various articles with a card, bearing: 'Price $^3/_4{}^d$'. Take the ticket off the article, and 'Price $^3/_4{}^d$' has no longer any distinct meaning.

Such is the theory. It has nothing save its boldness to recommend it, and is palpably absurd. If it were true, what would become of the self-evident distinction, glanced at in the last paragraph but one, between equivocal and univocal terms? It would exist no more. There *is* a resemblance, far-fetched indeed and fictitious, between the Zoological Garden bears, those in human society, and those in the sky; between

the woman cat, the *Felis domesticus,* and the nine-tailed whip. But a consistent Nominalist would be forced to say that we docket these with names for the convenience of classification, and that equivocal terms are just as general as terms which are univocal, since the word alone is in both cases common to all the singulars! Now this distinction is the basis of all reasoning; all men agree that no inference with equivocal terms has the least value. 'Why is the Stock Exchange like the sky? Because there are *bears* in both', may be meant for a joke, never for an argument. Nominalists of course shift their ground at once, and say that they intend to exclude fictitious resemblances; those alone which are natural can be admitted. Then what are and where are these resemblances? Not in the mind alone; therefore either in the things themselves, or between them. And as they are forced to admit that the word *means* these resemblances, they are no longer pure Nominalists; for the likeness between Smith and Brown is the same as that between Brown and Smith.

This brings us to Conceptualism, which is the same error in a less virulent but more insidious form. "Something in my idea of one man", the Conceptualist would say, "is indeed identical with something in my idea of another; and therefore *humanity* is something more than a word; it is a thought. But there is nothing in the man Smith, nothing in the man Brown, which is really and truly identical in both. When we speak of their common humanity, we are speaking of an abstraction that cannot exist otherwise than mentally, not of the actual essence of the men themselves." In this doctrine, of course, a *queen* in a card-pack, on a chess board, in a bee-hive, or issuing a proclamation, is a word standing for four distinct ideas; and there is no doubt that Conceptualism gets over the former difficulty.

But there are plenty of others, which neither Conceptualists nor Nominalists can avoid. A chemist has three glass jars of hydrogen; that is, he applies one and the same idea, "hydrogen", to the contents of each jar. And his reason for doing so, the Conceptualist readily admits, is the likeness which he perceives between them. But *where* is that likeness? In his mind only? It must be so, according to the system; for if the likeness exists *in* the specimens of hydrogen — in jars No 1, No 2 and No 3 — it is identical with itself everywhere, it is a universal likeness, really existing in the things: which would contradict the Con-

ceptualistic theory. The likeness is then *only* in the chemist's mind. What we think of as hydrogen in one jar may in reality have nothing similar in nature to what we think of as hydrogen in another. We put them together, we class them under one general idea; but all our reasonings must necessarily relate, not to them, but to the idea! Between things and our ideas of things, there is an abyss. Science may tell us something about the latter; about the former, nothing. Experiments may, for example, show us that what is in jar No 1 is combustible in exactly the same way and under the same conditions as what is in jar No 2, This is therefore a property identical in each case. Yes! but the identity goes no farther than our minds: they are in fact two different combustibilities, and we can affirm nothing about *them*, everything about *our ideas* of them. Let Chemistry, Natural Science, Mathematics, all go to ruin: for most certainly, when we say, 'These gases are hydrogen,' or, 'These animals are elephants', or, 'These figures are rectangles', we do *not* mean only: 'My idea of gas in this and this case corresponds to my idea of hydrogen'; nor, 'The concept of certain animals, A, B, C... is included in that of elephants'; nor, 'These singulars, which I classify as figures, may also be classified as rectangles'. No: we mean more; we say not only that the thoughts, but also the things, have in themselves a correspondence with each other. But, perish Chemistry, Mathematics, and every science, and let Conceptualism prevail! — Can absurdity go farther?

Possibly; at least it may become more striking. You deny that, when a general term is used, anything general is meant beyond the word itself, or at best, beyond an abstract idea. Very well. Here is a man who promises to pay five pounds. He is out of cash just now, so he cannot be thinking of any particular coin or banknote in his possession. *What* then does he promise? Something identical with, and equivalent to, any existing sum of five pounds. Is what he promises, only a word? Is it an abstraction? Then what is his promise worth in either case? Business men are not likely to think highly of such a theory. And if you say that he promises to pay certain singulars, without specifying which, I reply that *A* singular, *Some* singulars, *All singulars*, are general terms, and fall under the same class as the 'five pounds', and present the same difficulty. 'A singular', not applied in thought to this or that singular, in your theory either means nothing, or nothing real.

We might easily show how such doctrines work in the fields of Law and Ethics. Obligation, punishment, goodness, virtue, and so forth, become at most the merest fabric of our brains. The Artful Dodger is not sent to prison for having picked a pocket. No, indeed: in so far as this is an abstract statement, in so far it is false. He cannot be sent to an abstraction for having picked — an abstraction! He is sent, say, to the Old Bailey for picking the right coat-tail pocket of Mr. So-and-so, on such a date. Still less can we say that picking pockets is an offence punishable by imprisonment, unless we mean this to refer to and symbolize a number of cases like the preceding case: otherwise it is a mere ideal proposition, good for nothing. Now, as a summary, merely symbolizing cases that have occurred in the past, it has no value whatever as concerns the present or the future: and the whole binding power of Law is thus swept away! The same is true as regards morality. *I ought to do this* remains indeed, if we mean thereby an individual feeling of obligation on some special occasion; but try to lay down rules of conduct — even to Nelson's famous signal: 'England expects every man to do his *duty*' — and they vanish into thin air. If duty could be done, an abstraction would be really existing in the act by which it is done. And yet English sailors did their duty at Trafalgar — let Conceptualists explain the fact how they may.

If I have exposed these absurdities at such length, it is because the reader must see all Wyclif's reasons for choosing the contrary alternative. Perhaps I shall therefore be excused if, at the close of this long investigation, I look for a moment at the humorous side of these theories. You are very sharpset, and enter a restaurant in a hurry. A waiter of the Nominalist persuasion (Heaven save the mark!) comes at your call. "I want a grilled steak, you say". "Beg pardon, sir, you don't; there is no such thing in the world. What you want is the particular grilled steak of which you are thinking". — "I am thinking of none in particular," you protest; "any steak will do for me". "Excuse me, sir," he replies; "any steak will *not* do; *any steak* is only a word". You leave the place, blessing the man, and go to another restaurant, where another waiter (a Conceptualist this time) politely assures you that what you want, not being something concrete and determined, is merely your general idea of a steak, which he regrets that he cannot supply, there being only singular steaks in the house. "Then give me a

singular one," you angrily reply, "and have done with it". *A* singular, sir?" he says; "there can be none except in your mind, sir. We have only this one, that one, and this other" (pointing to each). "This one then," you say. "Very well, sir; now you can be served. But so long as your craving was for a mere empty abstraction, the thing was impossible". — Let us trust that assault and battery would not ensue; but how far you would be excusable if it did, I leave my readers to judge.

If then both Nominalists and Conceptualists strike at the roots of science, law, morality, logical reasoning, and that plain common sense against which no man can go without making a fool of himself, there can be no doubt that any general term — *man,* for instance — means something more than the letters of the word, something more than the abstract idea of humanity that we conceive to be identical in both. The similarity between them that we perceive exists in them beforehand, or we never could perceive it. *And it is identical in both.* As the distance from York to London is absolutely the same as that from London to York, so the similarity between A and B is the similarity between B and A; and, as we have shown, it is no mere idea, but really existing in A and in B. This, when extended to all men, past, present, or future, is the Universal Man (or the real fact of their being men) identical with each individual taken *as* a man, and differing from them only in that they are the Many in One, whereas Humanity is the One in Many — one really existing, though universal, substance. To say therefore that there are only singulars in the world is a falsehood, leading to the absurdities enumerated in the foregoing paragraphs.

But we can and we must go further. Men as well as brutes are animated beings, and — by the same reasoning — there exists a universal Animation, common to brutes as to men. Animated beings and plants have in common the yet more universal Life, absolutely the same Thing in a mushroom and in a man. We must go further still, urged onward by irresistible logic. Everything we can conceive — both God and His creatures — is a being: and thus Being is really identical in all: a transcendent link, binding the whole universe together, and giving it unity and harmony.

Such is the basis of Wyclif's system; such is what he shares with other Realists. We must now see wherein he differs from them. The

early followers of that line of thought fell into a trap which he avoids with consummate skill. 'If,' argued their adversaries, 'Humanity be identical with Smith, and that *same* Humanity be identical with Brown — then Smith and Brown are identical! Two things, the same as a third, cannot but be the same as each other'. This was granted by certain Realists of old times, who averred that the distinction between two men was only apparent, they being essentially identical. More closely pressed, they were forced to admit that all animals, all living things, and finally all beings, were one and the same. Thus they not only fell into Pantheism — which in our days of free thought has not all the practical consequences which it had then — but they confused all things together, thus annihilating science and law no less completely than did those that held the contrary view.

Wyclif was not to be caught in this way. He laughs to scorn the argument brought forward. It is, he says, not a syllogism, but a monstrous paralogism. What do you mean by 'Humanity is identical with Brown?' Humanity in itself is identical with nothing but itself. Humanity, *as in Brown*, is identical with that gentleman. Granted. Humanity, *as in Smith*, is identical with Smith. Very well. But here you have two different ideas, instead of one 'middle term'. You point first to Humanity in one man, then to Humanity in another: this change in your point of view is quite sufficient to ruin the argument. I am poor from a millionaire's point of view; I am rich, from a pauper's: therefore I am both rich and poor! Anything could be proved, if we were allowed to proceed thus.

We must never forget that, though each singular is its Universal to some extent, and so is *that which* every other is, still each is different from every other. To strengthen this position, Wyclif lays great stress on the mysteries of the Trinity and the Incarnation, which serve to illustrate his doctrine. What the Father is, is the Son, is the Holy Spirit. Yet the Father is not the Son, nor is the Spirit the Father. Christ is God and man at once; but His Deity is not His human nature. Such illustrations must, in those days of faith, have rendered him incalculable service. But, setting them aside, let us choose a few instances in the purely natural field. The Union Jack is something that is at once red, white. and blue: but the red is not the white, nor is the blue the red. The same man may be a mathematician and a drunkard: but his being

the one is certainly not his being the other. You take a cup of tea, and experience a taste at once bitter and sweet; it is one sensation, and yet you distinguish the bitterness from the sweetness. Briefly, in nature we are continually meeting with instances of two things that are identical with a third, and yet differ from one another. Even the mathematical concept of the whole and its parts would be impossible, if we denied this. The whole is identical with all its parts, and to some extent, with every one of them: each part is distinct from every other, and no part is anything that the whole is not.

Thus, though humanity is every individual man, one individual is not the other. Animation is common to brutes and men; nevertheless, no brute is a man. No confusion results from the admission that the same universal Life vivifies both animals and plants. That which is God is a creature, since Being is the same in both; yet no creature, *as* a creature, is God.

Let us now, after this first glimpse at Wyclif's system, go back five hundred years and look into our young philosopher's mind, as after some sharp struggle with his life-long antagonists, the Franciscan Nominalists, he walks out into the country round Oxford to soothe his tired brain with quiet musings. The mystery of the Holy Trinity, of which his doctrine multiplies vestiges throughout creation, is everywhere and always present to him. 'Neither confounding' the individuals, 'nor dividing' their essences, his glance at once takes in the outward diversity of things, and the unity which underlies it. The sky is azure, the Isis which reflects it is azure, the forget-me-nots upon its banks are azure; and yet they are not three azures, but one azure. The plough-boy whom he sees afar has bodily existence, the oxen moving under the goad have the same corporeity, the glittering ploughshare is corporeal too: each is other, but their corporeity is One. The light which falls on the landscape is an entity, the landscape lit thereby is also an entity; so is the movement of the rolling water, and so likewise is the water that rolls: vast as the distance between them is, both phenomena and substances share one Universal in common. And this Entity is the same with that of the Most High. The truth of their present mobile existence was as real in God before the world began, as it is now; the fact that *at this point of time they exist*, never was, never will be false; He gave it being by willing that some day — this day! — they should be.

And the truth, known everlastingly by God, and the truth, known by Wyclif now, and that which exists in the things themselves, are one and the same: That They Are! All things, from first to last, are foreknown by God as existing; were they not thus foreknown, they would neither take place, nor could they be possible. — The sun sets, and the crimson clouds are fair to see; but Wyclif's mind still contemplates the eternal existence of their beauty in God, when, a few minutes later, darkness comes over the land, and he must needs return to his cell to ponder, his heart full of these things.

This, however, is a mere sketch of Wyclif's system, as it was then budding in his mind: we must now see how he afterwards developed and elaborated it in his *Logica*, giving us a complete and most original Cosmological theory. It is, however, necessary to the right understanding of what will follow, that we should note several corollaries and minor issues that proceed by logical sequence from his fundamental principles, once laid down.

Nominalists readily admitted that, whilst the number of existing singulars must be finite (for an innumerable number is absurd) that of things merely possible, which from their point of view were only fictions without reality, might be infinitely, or — if you prefer — indefinitely great. So might also possible space be indefinite in size, and for ever divisible into indefinitely smaller and smaller parts. So likewise of time. But for Wyclif, whatever is possible is really possible, and therefore real; and for him too an innumerable number was an absurdity. Realities, countless *to our minds*, may and do exist; but nothing is infinite to God — not even Himself. The number of these realities is therefore fixed and definite. A being that God might but never will create is a contradiction in terms; since its cause — God's will — is wanting, it would be something without a cause, no less impossible than coal-black whiteness. The total multitude of possible beings is all those which God eternally sees as existing at some period of time: and no others. This is the maximum number, and the minimum at the same time. Space, to us unlimited, is limited in God's sight; there is also a limit to its possible divisions, and the smallest possible part of space — the mathematical point — is an existing reality. Again, since space is real, there can be no vacuum where it exists; but on the other hand, it is absolutely unthinkable save as the whereabouts of a body; real, but depending

for its reality upon the actual presence within it of something that is not itself. It cannot be thought as non-existent; nor can it be thought as existent, unless filled at every point of its (to us) boundless extent by some corporeal substance. The world takes up all space, even to its unimaginable, yet existing limits; and within space, there is not one of its points unoccupied by a corresponding point of bodily substance: so that a vacuum, whether of real substance or of real extension, is as absolutely impossible as a vacuum of time. Time, a mode of being which implies changeable duration, also depends on the existence of the world, and is inconceivable apart from it. And as the ultimate parts of space are real indivisible points, so the ultimate elements of time are real indivisible instants.

The illustrious Pole of whom Germans — as if they had not enough great men of their own — would fain make a German, and whose name has been given to our present system of astronomy, was born 89 years after Wyclif's death. Our author, not being in such matters in advance of his time, takes the assertion that the whole universe revolves on its axis once every twenty-four hours as an established fact: and on this fact he proceeds to build a series of strange, though strictly logical inferences. Space, being the 'whereabouts of the world', is necessarily motionless; whereas the world is everywhere in motion, save along the line of the poles. It follows that both space and the world have the shape of an immense sphere, perfectly smooth, with no conceivable Beyond. For if the sphere were not a perfectly smooth and regular surface — still more, if the world had the shape of a cube or a prism — the diurnal revolution would bring the surface of the world out of space sometimes (which is impossible) and sometimes there would be empty space out of the world (which is no less absurd). The argument would, it is true, proceed just as well or a cylinder or a cone revolving on its axis; but the fact is, the idea of the universe as a sphere was then so deeply rooted in every philosophical mind that the possibility of these alternatives did not occur to Wyclif. He goes on to prove that the universe can be neither larger nor smaller than it is. If larger, and space did not expand, a portion of it would be beyond space; if smaller, and space did not shrink, there would be a vacuum: and as we cannot think away even the smallest part of space (just as we can add nothing in thought to its vastness), a simultaneous swelling or shrinkage both of

the world and of space is out of the question. In this immobile spherical space, real yet of subtle essence, made up of an immense multitude of points, each touching the other, our material universe which consists of punctal atoms in number equal to the points of space, and each fitting exactly into the point which is its site at any time, revolves in the number of instants, known to God alone, that make up the twenty-four hours. And as points are the first elements of space, atoms, of matter, and instants, of time, so the instantaneous passage of a material atom from one point to the next, is the first element of movement.

But how can we picture to ourselves indivisible points which, though touching one another, do not coïncide? When an atom passes from one site to the next, there is no distance between: how can that be called a passage? The same difficulty recurs as to time. We cannot imagine two indivisible instants without any interval between them.

These objections, which our author states and solves at great length, together with many others that I must needs set aside, had no doubt far more weight in his time than they ought to have in ours. A generation that seriously discusses a Fourth Dimension, or the possible curvature of a straight line, should be far more willing than Wyclif's Oxford contemporaries, whose mathematical education was on strictly Euclidian lines, to listen favourably to his great plea: 'What we cannot realize in imagination is not necessarily untrue'. Mathematics are based on our impressions and imaginings, both sense-born. When we reason about essences that transcend imagination, this science naturally fails to bear us out, and our conclusions may seem to contradict it, though they do not. — Compare this with the argument of such as maintain that a Fourth Dimension is possible. 'We exist in three dimensions only, and so neither sense nor imagination can realize a fourth: but that does not mean that a Fourth Dimension is absurd'. If this reasoning be tolerable, why should we think worse of the other?

Our author, moreover, is not content with solving objections: he brings direct demonstrations to prove his theory. Though modal and dependent upon substance, every volume in space is real, as has been shown; so all that really belongs to it is real too. A surface, whether interior or exterior, is therefore real; so is a line; so is a point. A line is a universal, of which its points are the singulars. Take away all its singulars from a universal: what remains? Nothing. Then how, if I suppose

all its points taken away from a line, can I maintain that the line is entire? for it is nothing more than all its points, just as the whole is all its parts. They are thus parts of the line, each touching every other, yet *no two in the same place.* This is not only not absurd, but necessary; each point stands for a certain fixed position in space: mutual contact cannot destroy their one essential property. By a like reasoning we prove that a surface consists of lines, and that a volume is made up of surfaces. A line, a surface, or a volume that is by but one point less than another, is smaller than that other.

Again, suppose that two bodies touch: where they touch, do their points coïncide? If they did, they could not belong to different bodies. Two points never can become one, however near: at the limit, therefore, they are also distinct. The surfaces of air and water touch. A stone falls into the water. Will it not first reach the bottommost surface of the air, and the topmost surface of the water afterwards? Each surface, being respectively of air and of water, cannot be the same, unless air be water.

These proofs do not satisfy Wyclif's antagonists. In their opinion, a point, a line, or a surface, is but an abstraction (if it be even that); space itself is only a fiction, if taken apart from singulars occupying space. And at any rate a point is not a part of it; according to Geometry, both points, lines and surfaces may and do coïncide. But how can they have the face to invoke the authority of Geometry, when their whole system means the utter destruction of that science? Since a line is an abstraction, how can one be twice as great as another? You can bisect a line; can you cut an abstraction in two? According to us, one line is twice as long as another when the multitude of its points is twice as great. That number, though no man — possibly no creature — is able to count it, exists, and is known to God. Such is our idea, clear and intelligible; but what of theirs? If there be no such thing as a line, how can there be, between two lines, either equality or inequality? You cannot compare two nothingnesses together. If we seem to contradict Geometry, we only seem to do so; whereas your contradiction is open and flagrant.

The composition of time, which we say consists of succesive indivisible instants, is yet more evidently demonstrable, if such a thing can be. Wyclif's opponents say that the end of one state and the

beginning of another occur at the same instant exactly, whenever change takes place. Supposing then in a moving body two degrees of speed, A and B, that succeed each other: A is a speed of 60 miles an hour only, B a speed of more than 60 miles — then the last instant at which A is truly predicated of that mobile is the first at which it is not thus truly predicated. A locomotive at the same instant goes only so fast and yet it goes faster! Surely no contradiction could be more palpable. Another example is probably yet more striking. Hardly any change can be conceived greater than that which takes place at what is called the 'instant' of death. Now, this so-called instant is in reality *two*: the last of Life, the first of Non-Life. Until and at that last moment of life, it is true that the man, though dying, is living; at that moment it is yet false to say that he is dead. But, 'He is dead', becomes true immediately afterwards. The former instant is not the latter, though there is no possible interval between them. And as it is evident that in every change — though not so apparently — there is the same succession of distinct, yet immediate, instants, and as we know that the duration of everything real is a reality, it follows that those indivisible elements of duration are also real.

How then, in this theory, are we to conceive movement as taking place? As the infinitesimal instantaneous passage uf one punctal atom from the site which it occupies to the next, its former site never remaining empty, but being at once and of necessity filled by the next punctal atom. What is called a slow continuous motion is continuous to the senses only; it consists of a multitude of instantaneous but infinitely short leaps, with intervals of more or fewer instants of rest between them. But no atom can move instantaneously through *more* than one point, since the instant corresponds to the point. The swiftest possible continuous movement is at the rate of one point per instant, when the mobile rests nowhere on its way: and this, Wyclif thinks — following his belief in the diurnal revolution of the universe — is the motion of the celestial Equator, outside of which there is no space. The slowest continuous motion possible is that of the series of four points which touch the line of the poles. These change places only once every six hours, each occupying exactly the same site at the end of the twenty-four.

It is possible that some may say: "All these notions are mere fantastic dreams, unworthy of the serious attention of anyone who thinks".

They are indeed, if we admit that Truth is nothing but the fashion of the hour — or the age; if the thinker be of those who take their thoughts ready-made from the hands of some great writer of their time, and who, sublimely trustful, see no difference between what is now acceptable to the many and what will averlastingly remain, — between Modernity and Infallibility. Such a man may well laugh at Wyclif's thoughts and doctrines, link by link and systematically evolved — though he is utterly unable to point out where the error lies. Yet even for him this synopsis, imperfect though it is, may have some sort of historical interest. But, unwilling as I am to disturb such self-complacency, I must enter a mild protest against the word *Dream*. If it means anything, it means a series of confused imaginations, incoherent one with the other, and devoid of any basis in reason. Surely what has been written shows that there is method in Wyclif's dreaming, that his strange theory of the universe is the mere development of a fundamental theorem, which itself *seems* indubitably to result from his triumphant attack upon the Nominalistic position. Where is the flaw in Wyclif's logic? You will hardly find it in the secondary deductions, welded together with no less strength than care. If it lies in the method by which he establishes the existence of Universals, then point it out. If you are unable to do this, yet cannot admit that it is true, because its developments go counter to 'Modern Thought', — then talk no longer of dreams, but confess that the Englishman who five hundred years ago raised this edifice was a mighty thinker; nay, perhaps — if I may say so without giving offence — even more intelligent than yourself, O man of the Twentieth Century!

From the present view of Wyclif's great system I have (to my great regret) omitted many a side-issue full of profound truth and quaint originality, many a foreshadowing of the most recent theories of physical and chemical science, — Wyclif's admission of atoms, for instance — many a logical disquisition that would set him far above the best dialecticians of the present day. But I was compelled to consider whether these would interest. The subject-matter bristles with such abstruse difficulties in most cases, and our author's language is so crabbed and technical all through, that I could not expect even the most indulgent readers to follow me. The connection, however, between Wyclif's philosophical system and those theological doctrines for which

he was condemned by the Church, is another thing altogether; and I may here endeavour to point out a link or two. No more: for on one hand, some of his peculiar views (those, for example, that concern Church discipline) may not have been the direct outcome of his philosophy; and on the other, so many have been condemned — 24 as erroneous by Convocation, in 1382; 365 as heretical or at least false by the Council of Constance — that we must pick and choose. I take therefore those that I think are the most important: Wyclif's doctrine of necessity, and his opinion regarding the Eucharist.

In two very different senses, a thing may be called necessary. A cube, in every imaginable case, has necessarily eight interior angles; the square of five, under any circumstances, and whatever suppositions we may make, must be neither greater nor less than 25. But it is just as necessary that, when I have waked my friend in the morning, he does not sleep any longer; or that, if you fire off a properly loaded gun, the shot will leave the barrel. However, in the two last cases we have introduced a hypothesis, without which the necessity would not exist; *if* I wake my friend, be does not sleep; *if* I fire a loaded gun, it goes off. There is no apparent necessity either for my waking the man or firing the gun. In the first two cases, on the contrary, we find necessity stripped of any hypothesis whatsoever. We have therefore two different kinds: one hypothetical, the other absolute, according to the doctrine usually accepted in the School. All truths that deal only with facts that take place in time, belong to the former sort; those based upon generalities which do not imply actual existence, and also such as refer to the existence of God, the absolutely Necessary Being, belong to the latter.

Now Wyclif's adversaries accused him from the first of confounding these two distinct species of necessity. According to him, if he were consistent, everything in the world, human actions included, must be reduced to the class of things absolutely necessary. At the outset of his career, our philosopher denied this accusation, and drew a sharp line of demarcation between the two categories: he was no doubt doing his best to keep within the limits of orthodoxy. Later, he admitted that all things must inevitably occur in their time, arguing however that this did not imply the truth of the accusation. At last, forced by consistency and his enemies' unanswerable arguments, he granted simply that all

was necessary, without specifying any distinction; though to the end he upheld — whether nominally or with sincere intention, it is hard to say — the dogma of free-will, and our duty to act according to the law of God.

It is easy to see how his theory leads to this consequence, however slow and unwilling he was to go on so perilous a path. As we have already noticed, nothing is possible — in Wyclif's sense of the word — except that which is, at some period of time. actually to occur, and is therefore from all eternity foreknown by God as a future truth. All other so-called possibilities are in reality impossible, since it is God's everlasting will that they shall never be. In this view, since it was eternally true that I shall at this instant be sitting here, writing this article, and *since the contrary of this is not thinkable,* how can my sitting here be aught but an absolute necessity? Wyclif at first tried to answer the difficulty by taking the usual distinction. Granted that I am sitting, it is impossible that I do not sit. This would clearly reduce the necessity to the kind termed hypothetical; but in his case it was not applicable. Other philosophers might have said without inconsistency: 'To be possible does not mean definite existence or occurrence, but merely the denial of a contradiction in terms. Of such denials the endless multitude is known to God, not as separate entities, but simply as whatever will, may, or *might* be. It is not true as a fact that I am standing, since I am seated; but it is true that I might be standing just as well.' This of course was an explanation that Wyclif could not give without self-stultification. He accordingly at a later period modified his answer. 'If', he said, 'God has willed anything to take place, it must take place of necessity. But, since God's will, though eternal, is free and untrammelled, the necessity fails to be absolute. 'He might, had He chosen, willed otherwise'. Here his opponents had him on the hip. 'That which God *might* have willed, but did not — is it something possible or is it an impossibility? If it is possible, your whole system crumbles to pieces; if not, you arrive at the absurdity of saying that He might have willed an impossible thing'. To this there was, there could be, no satisfactory answer. Wyclif in his last years stood, through his conception of possibility, committed to a doctrine of necessity as hard and fast as that to which in our days Determinists stand committed through their conception of Law and Causation.

His way of admitting Free-Will is also very similar to the sense in which Determinists admit Choice. It is an established fact, they say, that human beings are able to choose between two or more alternatives. That cannot by any means be denied. But as there must be a reason why, or a cause, for everything that goes on in the world, our choice, which we think is determined by and depends on ourselves, is in reality determined by and depends on causes other than ourselves. Without them, it could never be made; with them, it must — and in the direction towards which those causes point. Substitute the will of God — the ultimate Reason Why of everything in Wyclif's theory — for Cause; substitute Free-Will for Choice; and you have his position, which is very like theirs. "We have Free-Will, and it is God's eternal determination that at such and such a time we shall choose freely between two alternatives, though one of them is impossible, since He has willed that it shall never be chosen". How anyone can reconcile Choice with Determinism, or Necessity with Free-Will, would puzzle me to say, nor does it require to be said. Let it suffice to have pointed out that our author is here in no worse plight than a certain flourishing school of modern thinkers.

In Wyclif's doctrine of the Eucharist, there are likewise several stages, brought about by the same process. Before the publication of his philosophical works, his belief, even in the latest stage, seemed to be hopelessly inconsistent, nay, self-contradictory; and readers will think it no easy task to clear him of this charge. Whilst maintaining that the substance of bread remains after consecration, he admits Christ's Real presence, which he, in the same breath almost, affirms to be 'figurative or sacramental'; and he applies the name of Transubstantiation to the change which occurs. A figurative presence which is real! a transubstantiation that takes place, though the substance is not changed! What can this mean? Did so keen a logician really contradict himself, or did he belie his own principles on account of bodily fear?. 'How shall we find the concord of this discord?'

The generally received doctrine was that at the words of consecration the substance of bread at once ceased to exist, the sensible appearance alone remaining; whilst wherever the bread had been, and its appearance continued to be, Christ's Body was present, not extended, but entire in each smallest portion of what formerly was bread.

Now the Real Presence, in Wyclif's system, made no difficulty whatever. Christ's Words, 'This is my body', spoken by the everlasting Truth, made that Presence true for all consecrated hosts, thenceforth to the end of time. Nothing is true but what really exists at some *Now;* Christ's Presence was therefore real, and coincides with the consecration of each Host. But, according to the system that we have expounded, a material body cannot exist without occupying certain fixed points of space, and thus being extended. It is only as a Universal Reality that anything can be one in many; and it is only as figured by the bread that Christ's Body can be present entire in every part. 'This, this, this .... particle of bread is really the figure of Christ's Body', exactly corresponds to: 'A, B, C .... is a man.' Thus the bread *passes* from being a purely material substance to being a singular of the Universal 'Figure of Christ', which has real entity; and it is in this sense that Wyclif admits both the Real Presence and Transubstantiation.

But, does the bread cease to exist? That were a sheer impossibility. We have already seen that space, created together with the world, is necessary at every point of its extent. Should a single atom, at the instant when another moves out of its site into the next, fail to replace the vacated site, the site — as it must be the *site of something* — would exist no longer; which is absurd. How much more absurd is then the hypothesis that the multitudinous atoms which make up the smallest morsel of bread, can be annihilated! This is the true reason why Wyclif so strenuously denies that accidents can be separated from their substances: if they did, they would be sustained either by an impossible vacuum, or by another substance having accidents of its own.

Thus the bread remains; but we may no longer look upon it as bread, since Christ has told us what it is now. To the eye of faith, its material being is as nothing compared with the supernatural entity which has been added thereto, and which is in all truth worthy of our adoration. A bit of glass, plunged in the sun's rays, appears to our eye as a bit of light, not of glass: and such should be the attitude of our mind towards the Holy Eucharist.

Such a doctrine, notwithstanding Wyclif's masterly defence in Convocation, could not fail to be condemned as an error, unless his ecclesiastical judges had been Realists, and moreover, Realists in his sense of the word. Whether they fully understood him or not, may be

doubted; at all events they understood that the substance of the bread remained, and was the figure of Christ's body. Into the justice of the sentence I need not enter, being only anxious to show that our philosopher was neither inconsistent nor a coward; that his assertions harmonize from his own point of view with one another, and were merely the frank statement of his matured thought.

But Wyclif did not at the outset see the necessary consequences to which his system led. At first he saw nothing to hinder him from maintaining the general opinion of the School, as above set forth. Later, when he still admitted the possibility of annihilation, he held that the subtle reality of space existed where that which previously was bread had ceased to be; a *corpus mathematicum,* miraculously sustaining the accidents of shape, colour, resistance, etc. In the course of discussion, it dawned upon him that space, to be consistent with his own view, could no more exist independently of the matter which occupies it than the shape of a waxen ball can remain when the ball is destroyed. Whilst yet uncertain, and inclined to think that the subject of the remaining accidents was mere entity, or an essence concerning the nature of which 'he is not curious to enquire', he entered the third stage, as shown in a most instructive passage of *De Benedicta Incarnatione.* And at last, deciding that matter cannot be annihilated, he came to the irrevocable conclusion that 'what we see, is bread; what we adore, is Christ's Sacramental Body'.

I shall possibly be expected to draw a parallel here between Wyclif and Luther. But there is no parallel to draw. Luther may from other points of view have been far superior to Wyclif; as a philosopher, he is nowhere beside him. What attempts at metaphysical reasoning are to be found in his works clearly proceed from the necessity to buttress up some newly built theological doctrine. Wyclif's theology is the reverse; it is mostly the mere outcome of his metaphysical creed. Wyclif was above all a logician; few great men have been so illogical as Luther. And whereas Wyclif approached the door of exit from the Church with slow reluctant steps, urged onwards by necessity gradually made clear to him, Luther, exasperated by opposition as much as by abuses, went over the threshold in a few great strides. One was a philosopher; the other was not.

Having stated at the outset that I personally do not agree with the theories expounded in this article, I may be blamed for not giving

utterance to any criticisms on the subject. Yet I do not see that any criticisms of mine are worth having. Wyclif's system, and not what I think of it, may possibly interest the public. It is here set forth; let those who care, judge for themselves. I have not taken the part of a judge, but of an advocate; and of an advocate only in the hope to render comprehensible the fierce enthusiasm — fierce at times even to the shedding of blood — that so novel and yet so plausible a view of the universe excited in his days. And, to speak quite frankly, I have yet another reason.

It is true that both Nominalism and Realism have long been dead, so far as concerns the formal matter of their disputes. The issues raised by them, however, are not dead, and remain to divide — perhaps for ever — most if not all philosophers into two classes; and it is with the class to which Wyclif belongs that I am in greater sympathy.

Are things as we know them to be? That which is in our minds — does it exist in itself as it is in our minds? Answer yes, and you have not only Wyclif's Realism, but Berkeley's denial of matter, German Transcendentalism, and the various shades of thought of modern Idealists: all belong to the same class. 'To be, is to be perceived; matter exists as and when we know it; outside of the knower, it is a nonentity'. — 'The Non-Ego is posited by the Ego, and is identical therewith'. — 'We have cognizance of an external world only as a modification of ourselves; and if it is *as we know it*, it is nothing but this modification'.

To the propounded question, Wyclif's adversaries answered, No. But the same answer is implied in Locke's philosophy, in the Materialism of some XVIIIth century thinkers, and in the Empiricism and Positivism of our own times. Whilst attempting to fix the limits of the human understanding, Locke was forced to admit that certain ideas, if not all, were mere empty abstractions to which nothing corresponded in the real world; and that, reasoning by their means, however correctly, we were still liable to error, because things may exist otherwise than they are in our minds. Again, to assert that all is matter, notwithstanding our consciousness of the abyss between matter and mind — what is this but to say that what we know, how indubitably soever, may nevertheless be false? Things are not as we know them to be. And the statement (which would destroy Metaphysics if Metaphysics could be

destroyed) that at the bottom of all our enquiries into first principles we find self-contradiction on every side, and that accordingly, though we cannot really tell what Time and Space are, we should confine our investigations to what is in Time and Space: — this well-known, this world-renowned theory, is based on an implicit denial that things are as we know them. All knowledge dissolves into self-contradiction; things alone do not contradict themselves.

Is there then no answer to the question, save plain Yes or No? no middle way between the absolute affirmative of the one class, and the uncompromising negative of the other? There is; but in that very answer we see the reason why it fails to satisfy.

Do things exist as they are known to us? AS is a very short word, but it has two meanings nevertheless. Let us look closer. Are things seen in a looking-glass *as* they are in reality? Yes and no. There is a certain resemblance, more or less perfect, if that be meant; but the difference is always that between the image and the original. In like manner, — so far as any comparison can be drawn, — the human intellect is the mirror of Nature. Our thoughts are indeed in a way the images of things; but we can no more conclude that things have the same nature as our thoughts than we can infer that a nosegay *out* of a looking-glass is of quicksilver amalgam, because its image *within* the looking-glass is not a thing distinct from the silvering. Thus, things do really exist as they are known to us: that is, they giving rise to our thoughts and ideas, we have the right to reason from the latter to the former. There must be some resemblance, however vague, between representation and that which is represented. If it were totally unlike in representation, it would not be represented at all. — But, if AS is made to mean a complete identity of nature between what we know and our knowledge, then it may be boldly denied that things are as we know them. What we know of a grain of sand is not *identical* with what it is in itself; for what we know of it extends only to a few points of view, and there will ever remain infinite possibilities of more knowledge. All the sophisms in the world will never overthrow this simple yet clear distinction.

Now it is precisely because this answer, given by many great philosophers, is so very cautious and moderate, that we feel disappointed. It is the old tale of Scylla and Charybdis over again, the breakers that

wreck thought, the whirlpools which engulf it: but we philosophical mariners will not be advised, and every one steers for the rocks to keep clear of the whirlpool, or for the whirlpool to avoid the rocks. Or, to revert to our former illustration, suppose a set of looking-glasses endowed with human faculties, longing to get at the things they represent. One of them might cry: "There is no room save the room which I mirror within me; for the reflection is the room, and the reflection is identical with me". And another: "Reflection proceeds from outside, its cause cannot be within me: and therefore it were impossible to judge whether what I mirror has any likeness at all with the room, unless I could get out of myself". The former would end by denying a separate existence to the room, the latter by refusing to believe anything at all about it. In like manner do these two contrary trends of thought proceed, some philosophers going farther, others not so far, but always in two contrary directions, and both fiercely intolerant of so tame a middle course as that which has been sketched above. Wyclif belonged to the former, and these at least maintain the character and the value of human knowledge; their excesses and errors at least do not attack the foundations of thought. But the others, whatever their ingenuity and acumen in minor matters may be, strike by the very force of their first principle at the roots of the human understanding and of all truth, and their genius does but stultify itself. Against this tendency, very powerful in his time, Wyclif's system was a reaction; as such, it was certainly justified; and if, like all reactions, it went too far, it has at least a claim to be judged with leniency.

INTRODUCTION.

As Wyclif's philosophical works, though extremely voluminous, consist for the most part of treatises which he himself intended for his great work, the *Summa De Ente*, it was thought right by the Committee of the Wyclif Society (with whom I entirely agree) that *Logica* should be published first, and then, either in one volume or in two, all the other treatises which do not belong to *De Ente*. I here lay before the public the three treatises that I have been able to get ready for press in these last years. As each is widely different from the others in almost every respect, it seems better to deal with them separately.

I. De Actibus Anime.

(1). The Manuscript.

When engaged with *Logica*, I had thought that the edition of a work from only one manuscript, if it were still more difficult to understand than the one I had to work upon then, must be an impossible task. As it appears, I was wrong, since *De Actibus Anime* is now in print; but though I have managed to get through it, I scarce know how. My chief difficulty was that I had not copied the MS. myself; that had been done by the late Mr. Austin, several of whose incorrect readings (due not to his lack of palaeographical knowledge, but to the difficulties of Scholastic terminology) I was enabled to set right by a happy guess or by a close inspection of such abbreviations as he had given with the copy. Still I was afraid lest some important mistakes nught have escaped me; and it thus became necessary to review the original text It being impossible for me to do this, Mr. Matthew most kindly journeyed to Cambridge several times, and at a very great cost of time and pains, went through all the proofs. To express my full acknowledgment of this labour of his — and also of his scholarly help, bestowed throughout the

whole work — would require language that might appear far too emphatic and glowing, and perhaps out of keeping with so dry a subject as the present. And though his collation has not resulted in the discovery of any considerable mistakes, yet I think that the gratitude of the whole Wyclif Society, as well as my own, are none the less due to him; for he has established the late Mr. Austin's trustworthiness as a copier; and this was a point of great importance. If we remember that Mr. Austin copied out the whole of *De Ente* (no less than twelve long tractates), it is a relief to know that his copy of *De Anima*, a much more difficult work, is yet quite sufficiently intelligible to be edited. To Dr. Furnivall, who authorized the unusual course of having the whole tractate set up in proof at once, so that the collation could be done in a few journeys to Cambridge, my best thanks are also due. He was moreover so kind as to make an extract from the Cambridge Catalogue of Manuscripts, and to send me a description of the MS. C. C. C. 103; both of which I subjoin.

"Catalogus Librorum Manuscriptorum quos Collegio Corporis Christi et B. Mariae Virginis in Academia Cantabrigiensi legavit Reverendissimus in Christo Pater Mattheus Parker, archiepiscopus Cantabrigiensis. Edidit Jacobus Nasmith A. M., S. A. S., etc. Cantabr. 1777.

"P. 75, MS. CIII.

"*Codex membranaceus in folio, seculo xv scriptus in quo continentur,*

"1. Ernaldi (Carnotensis) abbatis de operibus sex dierum, p. 1.

"2. Tractatus brevis de materia sive substantia sacrificii corporis et sanguinis Domini contra errores hereticorum, p. 38.

"3. Sermo in illud primi capitis ad Romanos, 'Invisibilia Dei a creatura mundi per ea quae facta sunt intellecta conspiciuntur', p. 39.

"4. De Dominica in passione Domini, p. 45.

"5. Judicium Melancthonis de Wiclevo, p. 45.

* "6. Wiclevus de actibus animae, p. 47.

"7. Robertus de Kilwardely archiepiscopus Cantuariensis super tertium sententiarum, questio de passione Christi, p. 88.

"8. Questio disputata a fratre Bonaventura super mendicitate, et objectiones Mag. Guillelmi de Sancto Victore, quâ [continentur] ejusdem fratris solutiones, et solutiones Mag. Gulielmi ad ejusdem fratris objectiones; unde ubi invenies in margine Mag. Guliel '*scias hoc a Mag. Guillelmo dictum esse, cetera sunt dicta fratris; hanc questionem nullus habet Parisiis praeter unum vel duos, circa hujus acquisitionem multum laboravi,* p. 95.

"9. Epistola *ut videtur* fratrum minorum ad papam, quod injuste ab universitate Parisiensi expulsi sunt, data Parisiis 9 Oct. 1255, p. 107.

"*Desideratur pricipium et magna pars hujus epistolae.*

"10. Epistola Innocentii IV ad religiosos cujuscumque professionis et ordinis, ne infringant jura clericorum parochialium, data Neapoli IV Kal. Dec. anno pontificatus II°, p. 107.

"11. Epistola universitatis Parisiensis contra fratres predicatores, data die Mercurii prox. post festum purificationis, 1253, p. 109.

"12. Compositio inter fratres predicantes et universitatem Parisiensem facta, 1. Martii, 1255, p. 122.

"13. Appellatio Walteri de Walpole et multorum aliorum ordinis fratrum predicatorum ad sedem apostolicam de quibusdam abusionibus et enormitatibus (quorum schedula annexa est huic appellationi) per Gerengarium ordinis magistrum perpetratis et toleratis, p. 113.

"14. Excerpta ex Joanne de Bathone in prologo sententiarum de ordine Carmeli, p. 117.

"15. Tractatus Ricardi Fitzrauf Archiepiscopi Armachani de pauperie Salvatoris contra fratres mendicantes, lib. VII, p. 119.

"16. Tractatus Ushredi monachi Dunelmensis de substantialibus regulae monachalis, p. 291.

"17. Idem de perfectione vivendi in religione, p. 310.

"18. Quaedam capitula de summa [theologiae] fratris Alvari de ordine minorum, p. 331.

"19. Quaedam capitula Vincentii in speculo historiali, p. 416.

* "20. Determinatio Wiclevi contra Kyllingham Carmelitam, p. 419.

* "21. Alia determinatio contra eumdem, p. *ult.*

"*Desideratur magna pars hujus determinationis.*"

" The Corpus MS." says Dr. Furnivall, "is a vellum folio of 427 leaves in double columns containing Latin treatises in different hands, but all, I suppose, from early in the 15th century. Every page has 2 columns, 10 inches high, and nearly 3 inches broad. The writing is full of contractions. The leaves are $12^1/_2$ inches high and 9 broad. From leaf 119 to leaf 262. most of the chapter headings begin with a pennon like J (Johannes) from 2 to $3^1/_2$ inches long, blue, with a central red line in a narrow white space, tho' some J's are blue only or red only, occasionally relieved with white. The end of the MS. has gone, as Nasmith says,"

(2). Authenticity of the Treatise.

In Shirley's catalogue the only reasons given to prove that the work is Wyclif's are (1) the author's name in the MS. and (2) the title given by Bale, but with another *incipit*. The second is plainly inadequate, and so is the first, as we shall see when we come to examine the authorship of *Replicatio de Universalibus*. But there is far stronger internal evidence in favour of its authenticity. Setting apart the fact that Scripture is much less quoted here than in most of the other philosophical treatises (which may easily be explained by supposing it written at an early date) the style is Wyclif's, and the ideas are his as well; less marked perhaps, but plain to anybody who has made a study of his style and system. The writer shows, besides, the same intimate acquaintance with Gilbert de la Porée (pp. 2, 39), Alhacen (p. 12). Vitellio (p. 13, 46), Bradwardine (p. 37) and others, as Wyclif does in *Logica* and elsewhere. What is more, he speaks of himself as intending to expound his doctrine concerning truth and falschood in a certain first book De Insolubilibus'. Now this is precisely the title given by Shirley to one of the lost works of Wyclif whose first words have not been preserved; though (p. 28, note) I venture to suppose that it is one of the tractates in *Logica*. It is difficult, in presence of all these indications, to imagine that a contemporary to Wyclif existed, equal to him in talent, similar as to mental acquirements and erudition, identical in doctrines, and yet so completely unknown that his very name has not survived, and his *De Insolubilibus* has been ascribed to the other. Yet that we must assume, if we deny the authenticity of *De Actibus Anime*.

(3). Date of the Work.

Assuming the authenticity of *De Actibus*, we are at once able, not indeed to give any precise date to this work, but to place it before *Logica* to which I have (Int. to vol. I, p. VII) tried to ascribe the date of 1361 *circiter*. He combats most strongly the doctrine of absolute accidents (cap. IV), and yet he *nowhere* openly denies or seems to doubt the possibility of annihilation, as he does in *Logica*. Besides, as I point out in a note (p. 28), it is very likely that the *De Insolubilibus* he proposes to publish is a tractate of *Logica* itself. In *Logica*, besides, he goes very completely into the theory of vision, as it was then

generally accepted; if that work had been previous to this, we can hardly, with the knowledge of Wyclif's readiness to refer the reader to other tractates which had already appeared, suppose that from pp. 12 to 18, in which he treats of vision — even in one place (p. 15, l. 25) using the very same expression which recurs in *Logica* — he purposely refrained from referring to this important work, if it was already in existence. Lastly, compare his words (p. 106) "Falsum est quod ego vixi 40 annis" — which he gives as an instance, but an instance that would have no meaning unless it were a fact, — with another example (Log. I, p. 169), "Deus . . . potest . . . facere quod ego non sum nec fui futurus quadragenarius in hoc instanti;" and you will see that the antecedence here is only ambiguous in so far as *sum* may be considered to relate to *futurus*, not to *quadragenarius*. And here again, the example that supposes the infinite power of God to be requisite for Wyclif not to be 40 years old at the instant he was writing, would have no meaning if the fact were not true. We may therefore safely assign to this work a date anterior to 1361 but *not much* if *at all*, anterior to Wyclif's Mastership at Balliol College. Not much; the thought is too matured for a raw student, who began (as he tells us somewhere) by being as strong a Nominalist as any. Whether at all, depends on another question. Wyclif's views, as expounded here, are daring enough; but were they so daring as to have stood in the way of his getting the Mastership at Balliol, had they been published before? And to this question I have of course no answer. Nominalists in authority must have been annoyed by his arguments, but the talent he displayed may have pleased them. We can guess now what he was aiming at all the time, and know the last consequences to which his first principles would lead him; but his adversaries could not: and though we may suppose that the publication of the book before Wyclif's Mastership would have injured his prospects, we cannot be sure. Nor perhaps could Wyclif; and if not, who can tell whether his caution was equal to his daring?

(4). Analysis of the Contents.

The title of the work prepares us to expect a tractate on Psychology. But, though there undoubtedly is a great deal of psychological argument, we should certainly be disappointed in our expectations: the

work is purely metaphysical in its aim and in most of the questions dealt with. It is in two parts; the first (pp. 1—58) has three chapters, one of which (pp. 1—34) attacks the theory that mental acts are *things* distinct from the mind; the second (pp. 34—38) is a summary of the arguments in favour of the position that such acts are qualities (which, it would appear, some philosophers understood as being separable entities); and the third (pp. 38—58) is consecrated to the refutation of these arguments. The second part (pp. 59—128) is in four chapters, the first of which (pp. 59—87) deals with the question whether the mental act of affirmation, if relating to the past, must be either necessarily true or necessarily false. The second attacks the position that no mental act save an affirmation which implies self-contradiction can imply absolute impossibility (pp. 87—105). The third (pp. 105—116) establishes Wyclif's theory: that God's existence is the necessary truth on which both possibility and impossibility depend. And the fourth (pp. 116—128) reverting to the theory of mental acts considered as qualities, argues that even if they were, no quality can be an absolute accident, separable from its substance.

First Part, Ch. I. After enumerating various mental kinds of acts — sensations, thought, volition and emotion — Wyclif at once states his view: these acts cannot be thought as entities distinct from the mind. This discussion, of which the language is quite foreign to that of modern metaphysicians, reveals nevertheless a great deal of profound and earnest thought upon a subject closely resembling one that has much interest for philosophers in our days; and many of the arguments, if stripped of their old-world form and dressed up in the terminology of XX^{ieth} century science, would look strikingly new, and give him that used them great claims to deep and original thought; and I say this the more openly because I am perfectly aware that no one is at all likely to grub in this mine of riches or to appropriate to himself what Wyclif might justly claim as his own. We well know that many metaphysicians deny the existence of a Subject. For them there are only feelings, thoughts, volitions, &c.; the Subject is a mere 'hypostatized abstraction'. If so, they are exactly in the same position, or at least assailable by the same kind of objections, as those who in our philosopher's time gave to mental acts an entity capable of existing by itself. If there be no underlying real Subject on which the entity of

each mental act depends, then each of these acts is independent, and can be conceived as self-existing. What these philosophers take away from the Subject, they must give to the acts; it is impossible to conceive a a feeling neither independent and self-existing, nor dependent on another being distinct from it — a feeling which neither feels itself, nor is felt by a something which is not that feeling. On the other hand, Wyclif tells us (p. 2) that there was another school which asserted that the feelings, thoughts, &c. were identical with Mind; and this would correspond closely enough to the position of those who contend that Mind is the sum or series of experiences of any individual, and that the individual is not different from his experiences: which in its result amounts to the same doctrine as the one just stated. He himself, though he does not state it clearly at first, is of opinion that the mind is to its mental acts as the active thing is to its action, or as a mobile to its motion (see pp. 38—41): the second different, but inseparable from the first, and absolutely unthinkable without it. And thus the question is now as actual as it ever was; and all the advances of science, how great soever they may have been, have done nothing to solve the problem — as indeed they could do nothing, because they belong to another sphere. This question, if it can be solved, must be solved only by Metaphysical arguments. It is worth seeing what Wyclif has contributed to a discussion so important and of such actual interest.

Those who admit that thought is an action of the thinking mind, yet try to conceive it as separable therefrom and possibly existing apart, fall into self-contradiction. Admitting for the present that a quality can exist without its subject, how can *quality* be at the same time *activity* (p. 2)? We classify sensations according to their objects, which if present produce the corresponding acts: between the mind and the object no intervening quality is needed (p. 3). If the will to move, for instance, were an absolute quality, existing throughout the body, the same movement would be produced in every part of it: which is absurd. And difference in the organs cannot make the difference in the movements, since they all obey the will; and this obedience, if will were such a quality as conceived, would make a man able to do anything he chose to will (p. - 35). Then, as to the acts of the mind; they are true, false, particular, universal, etc.; but an absolute entity is a *thing*, and a thing must be true, must be concrete. If you have to posit an act distinct from the mind, to enable it to think of its object, why not posit another

by which this act also is enabled to reach it? and another again without end? or none at all? Besides, the doctrine implies that the soul creates and annihilates its own act when, after eliciting it, it passes to another. For the act is an absolute entity which does not pre-exist in matter, and is nowhere when not actually in the mind. No form but the human soul has the absolute entity of a separable thing, since no other can be conceived as existing unless actually determining a subject, and separation would be tantamount to annihilation (p. 5—8). It is said that these acts naturally depend on their subject, but that God might, by a miracle, render them independent. But that would make all dependency of effect upon cause a mere accident; for, independently of any cause but the First, any effect might take place; and this is unphilosophical in the highest degree. Better say that when these acts are produced they are created, and annihilated when they cease: though this would make substances of them (p. 8). If any act is capable of self-existence, how can it be successive in its essence? Yet many mental acts are admittedly such; sensations, for example, imaginations, and many others (pp. 9, 10).

Can it be said, to explain the difficulty, that one act suffices for the perception of successive things? or that a fresh complex act is elicited at every instant of perception? or that there are simultaneously two distinct acts, one successive, and the other not? — Students of that portion of Philosophy which lies on the border between Psychology and Metaphysics, will here recognize the interesting question, How can we apprehend succession, if there be nothing permanent in our acts? T. H. Green, for instance — I quote the words of the President of the Aristotelian Society (address, 6th Nov. 1899) — "continually reiterates the statement that the apprehension of succession cannot be itself succession; that in order to be aware of B as succeding A, we must have both A and B before consciousness at once". Wyclif, it is true, brings this question forward only by way of argument against his opponents; but the very same difficulty stands in the way of those who admit no subject, or a subject which is nothing but a series of successive acts.

One act, if it be a *thing,* cannot be successive; and if not successive, cannot represent succession. It would represent what is past or future as present, i. e. otherwise than it is, and falsely. And if we can

apprehend one instant of what is not present, why not the whole of the Past and the Future? To each successive impression an act must correspond; and thus, in the shortest possible space of time, we should have an infinite multitude of acts. This brings us to the second answer, which is worth no more than the first. There can be no act without a certain duration, and these would have none at all. On the other hand, we should have to conceive the absurdity of an infinite number of entities, perfections, — call them what you will, — welling up (from non-existence, or from the unknown, in the theory of those who deny a Subject; from the Soul, in the opinion of Wyclif's opponents) even in the shortest possible space of time. This is contrary to experience besides; our mental acts of sensation have some degree of permanence, for when we whirl a brand, we see a circle. To suppose two simultaneous acts, one successive and the other permanent, apprehending the first, does not solve the difficulty: for an instantaneous act cannot feel the successive *as* successive, and a permanent act, being of another nature, could not apprehend it at all (pp. 10—14). Most of these arguments make against such theories as, at the present day, fearing to hypostatize an abstract Subject, set up the sensation itself and hypostatize it. Perhaps I may in this connection be allowed to quote from a paper I wrote for the Aristotelian Society (*Extension as defined from the standpoint of experience,* read the 28th May, 1900). "Holding, as I do, most strongly to the principle that abstractions are not to be 'hypostatized', I say that each of these facts [of experience], as such, is absolutely concrete, or (to use a dialectical term) singular. So much so, that if we do not admit the existence of a concrete — *not* an abstract — subject with which they form a whole, they must be dealt with as separate individuals. But I as strongly object to the hypostatizing of an abstract fact as to the hypostatizing of an abstract subject. There is no such thing in reality as *a* conscious state; there are only this, that, and the other conscious states, each wholly identical with itself, and not identical with anything else . . . . . But they are *not unconnected.* Now, if I abstract from this connection, if I disregard the fact that these impressions are part of a *totum* of experience, I only view them from one standpoint; and if I then persist in calling them individuals, I hypostatize pure abstractions of my mind. They are no longer individuals, so long as I abstract from anything that they really *are*". This is the very thing

which Wyclif so strongly inveighed against in the doctrine of mental acts, considered to be absolute entities, distinct from the mind.

Wyclif goes on to prove the absurdity of the hypothesis of mental acts existing independently. Sight, for instance, depends upon its object; and this dependence renders it necessary that it should exist in a subject. We have one same sight of different objects; and this could not be, given the aforesaid dependence, were there not something underlying sight. We also see two things as different, though in the same place, as a glass and that which we see through it, but more or less distinctly; this again is inexplicable, if the sight of each is a separate thing. And to maintain such a theory we must posit utter Materialism, each act occupying a different part of space, — even the acts of reason and of will (pp. 14—16). But as a fact, we have an inextended element, even in the acts of external sense, of presentation; much more so in the others. Even intensive parts of sensation would be impossible in the opponents' theory; for, waiving other objections, to each point of space seen would correspond a certain intensity of sensation; and these being infinite, the total intensity would be so likewise! But an act, because it is elicited in matter, need not therefore be material. The colours as seen, — i. e. the act of sight, — do not exist in the external thing (pp. 16—18); and this false idea, which Locke was later to ascribe to Scholasticism, is here set aside by Wyclif in a few words, as a theory that no one believed, — the *absurdum* to which he strove to reduce his adversaries. Yet there are many who are still convinced at the present day that Locke was the first man who overthrew the doctrine that colours exist in the things, not in the eye! If he was, he was also the first reasonable philosopher that ever lived, and all those before him were fools.

There is no doubt whatever that our act of sensation is what we can know best, it being our direct experience. If it were a separate entity, it would be, not only most knowable, but most known: and this is certainly false, or the devil — and this no theologian can admit — would know our thoughts better than any material substance, which exists by itself. The whole theory depends upon the doctrine of accidents in the Eucharist; if material accidents can be absolute, so can mental acts. But what exists by itself can act by itself; and it is certain that our mental acts have influence upon the course of things, which influence ought to remain, if they were cut off from their subjects (p. 18—20). —

Note here with what care Wyclif, though he points out that the whole theory springs from the question of the Eucharist (ex quibus tota illa opinio habet ortum, p. 16), avoids any such digression as he is liable to in other tractates, concerning the Eucharist itself: this reticence is of importance in seeking the date of the work.

Starting from the Scholastic axiom: *Omne ens est bonum*, or *Ens et bonum convertuntur*, Wyclif tries to prove that, as some mental acts are essentially evil, they cannot be entities. Pain is nothing in itself but the perception of disagreement, which is nothing positive; and lying is essentially evil (pp. 20, 21). The adversaries reply that such acts are not naturally, but only morally bad: and if a given act did not belong to a subject, its wickedness would disappear. But if they, belonging to a subject, render that subject evil, it must needs be because their nature is bad. A point that Wyclif does not develop here, is that qualities which affect the will are essentially either moral or immoral, and the distinction between moral and natural badness does not hold in their case. Now the adversaries held that the same act, elicited by one man, may be moral, and immoral if elicited by another, so that this is a mere accident. But, says Wyclif, what about an act of hatred of God? Can God Himself attach merit to that? And besides, the supposition of an act elicited by no one (not belonging to any subject), of a pain that is actual yet suffered by nobody, of something which exists as a pure potentiality and like a habit — as v. g. a man may actually be a drunkard, though not actually drunk — and yet is an act, are so many absurdities. A mental act signifies something elicited by a subject, or we should have an endless series of entities by which the act is produced, one producing the other, and none of them really active. And lastly, the supposition of an act that may be inactive, or only potentially active, is utterly confusing; such an act might possibly exist before the man who elicits it is born (pp. 21—27).

The following arguments may be more summarily indicated, as presenting less actual interest in our time; and I shall throughout attempt to keep to this rule, as the side-notes are sufficiently explicit to help any one interested in old-world modes of thought.

Self-existence is contradicted by the essential attributes, at least of some mental acts. Some may be contingently false or contingently true; but if false or true *by themselves*, they would be so necessarily.

Reflection is impossible, for we cannot conceive the act knowing itself; and if we know a self-existent act, distinct from ourselves, it is only by means of a third act, which itself would have to be known by a fourth, and so on for ever. — Let me note by the way that those who have denied the existence of a Subject in modern times have been also driven to deny that we reflect upon ourselves; we only, in their theory, *seem* to do so. — Do these acts depend upon us, or do they not? If our awareness of them has nothing to do with their existence, what sort of beings are they? (pp. 27—33). — Wyclif winds up with some difficulties about pain, considered as a mental act or feeling, and bearing on the punishments of Hell and Purgatory, which he contends would in this theory become equal.

Ch. 2 need not be noticed, as it is but a short summary of the objections which he solves in the next chapter.

Ch. 3. Wyclif, in his answers, begins by assuming several different senses in which the word *action* is used, and several different species of action. In the widest or transcendental sense it may mean the very essence of a being, when the latter (God) has no accidents: but in all other senses it is something accidental to the being which acts (pp. 38—42). The opponents say: Actions make men good or bad; and what makes men good or bad must be a quality. The answer is that, not the actions themselves, but their goodness or wickedness, produce this result. The adversaries point out that whatever changes the state of the soul must be a quality, making it *qualis;* and mental acts belong to this category. But it is replied that this is true, if by quality we understand *the soul as thus or thus changed;* false, if we would make of it a subtle entity that can exist independently of the soul (pp. 42—45). Here Wyclif indulges in a short digression concerning grace, where I would note, in connection with the date of the work, a striking combination of prudence and boldness; prudence, in his confirming himself to deny the self-existence of grace; boldness in censuring only in the mildest terms those who in the face of the whole Thomist School, assert that grace is not a real entity. I believe this is now an open question among Scholastic theologians; but had Wyclif gone farther than he did, he would have set many an Oxford divine most bitterly against him (pp. 45—47). — "If", say the adversaries, "a mental act is not movement, it must be a quality; and it cannot possibly be a movement".

Here Wyclif answers that, without being a movement, it may be the cause of one; and in a more universal sense, it may be called a movement, as a tendency towards something or other (pp. 47—49). "How", it is urged, "could a man elicit the same act or commit the same sin twice, if that were not a quality, now present in the individual, now absent therefrom?" Here Wyclif simply denies that a man can commit the same sin twice; its being committed at a different time makes it another sin (pp. 49—52). Lastly, it is objected that what is in, yet different from the soul, what determines a change therein by its advent, and may come and go without the destruction of the same, must be a quality. These arguments, Wyclif shows, prove only that there is a happening by which the soul is modified; but not that the modification is something in itself (pp. 52—58).

The question discussed in the first chapter of the Second Part is somewhat out of the lines of modern thought, and requires a short explanation. Not as to its connection with the former problems; every student of Wyclif knows that he allows himself a very wide range. Thus, when writing about mental acts, he conceived himself perfectly justified in positing theses as to their truth or falsehood. The explanation concerns the essential meaning of the discussion. A proposition is *contingently* true, if, while we admit its correspondence to facts, we are able to conceive at the same time that it might not correspond to them. It is *necessarily* true, if such non-correspondence is inconceivable. The question concerning propositions as to past facts thus becomes an inquiry whether or not such propositions, if true, can be conceived as true contingently; if false, as contingently false. If, for instance, it be true as a fact that Queen Victoria reigned over England, can we conceive her as possibly not having reigned? In the preceding essay on Wyclif's philosophy, I have shown that Wyclif understands by the Possible everything that has taken place, is now, or will take place at some future time; that and that only. All the rest is impossible, inconceivable, absurd. By that means he closes the door on many a Scholastic discussion; and to ask what would have taken place if Adam had refused to eat the apple is to him the same as to ask about the mathematical consequences of the proposition $2 + 2 = 4$ being false, or of a triangle having four sides. And so far as Adam is concerned, most people would hardly trouble to contradict him. But as his view extends to *all things*

in the past, it becomes somewhat less easy to admit that if I say: "Had I not given my last penny to a beggar just now, I should be able to ride home on this tramcar," I am pointing out the consequences of an absurd supposition. There is therefore, it seems, plenty of room for debate; and here Wyclif is content to give his opponents the first innings.

"What is contingent at any time cannot become necessary. It is not necessary that I exist now; I can conceive my not existing; therefore I can conceive my 'not having existed yesterday'. What could make this necessary? what could change the nature of a contingent truth, and pass over the infinite distance which separates Contingency from necessity? The denial of such a truth in the past is false indeed, but not unthinkable, as it should be in Wyclif's theory. We can argue consistently from such a denial as a premise: it cannot therefore be absurd, for the Absurd is defined as that from which anything, true or false, may follow, if it be posited. As we say of things present that they are, so we say of things past that they are possible; and if what is *may be* otherwise so what has been *may possibly* have been otherwise. If God has infinite power over the present, he has no less over the past; if He can prevent things happening now, He can also make them not to have taken place. Even man can do that. If we say that *we might have done otherwise than we have done*, the word *might* signifies that our having done otherwise is actually (not *was*) a possibility. Besides, as a fact, our capacity for amendment and repentance exists; but we cannot do better than what we have done, nor can we sorrow for it, if it be absolutely necessary" (pp. 59—65).

Wyclif (proceeding here according to the plan of St. Thomas in his *Summa Theologica*) next gives his own arguments on the contrary side, and winds up by refuting those of the adversary. Whatever is so true that it cannot cease to be true, is necessary; and this is the case with things that have happened in the Past. God Himself cannot restore lost virginity. The Past is immutably what it is; and therefore its truth is necessary. If the *same* thing could happen again, the return of a dead man to life would be no miracle. Any singular proposition referring to a fact may be known as eternally and therefore necessarily true. Why should we take thought for the future, if we can make the past not to have been? Here the adversaries say that, speaking of possibility, they abstract from time; a man who is blind might be not blind, and may

see; but even if cured, his 'having been blind' would still be true as a contingent fact. To this Wyclif demurs, and will not admit any possibility from which the time-element is eliminated. To say that I may not have existed is to say that my non-existence is thinkable; but to me it is not, and the contrary proposition is an absolutely necessary truth (pp.65—71).

The arguments on the opposite side are now refuted, after several distinctions as to complete and incomplete necessity, the former either absolute (created or uncreated) or relative; and these distinctions show that in the whole question there is a great confusion of terms. The author understands by necessity something which is not in all cases opposed to contingency. Yet he affirms that truths in the past are of such nature that their contradictories are inconceivable (pp. 71—74). The Necessary cannot become contingent, but the Contingent becomes necessary by the fact that it has taken place: *Now* it cannot *not* have been. Whatever distance there may be between contingency and necessity, time and the concourse of God's action in the world can get over it. And each contingent truth has in it, as an essential factor, the possibility of becoming necessary. It does not follow, because God is free to give this necessity, that He is free to take it away; and this is proved by many instances. That we can admit that a thing has not happened which has happened in reality proves only that we may be wrong, or that we wish to see the result of making such an admission; and not as all that it may possibly be either true or not true. Any truth that exists is eternal; it is neither annihilable, nor capable of being created anew. We say that a man who does not yet exist is able to spend money (in the future), but that a dead man cannot possibly spend money (in the past). Why? Because *can* indicates a potentiality which in the first case exists, but in the second exists no longer. As to God's power, we cannot make it extend, though infinite, to the realization of absurdities; what is not do-able cannot be done, even by Him. This does not reduce His power; for we do not deny that He can do whatever by any possibility can be done. The knowledge of the past enables us, not to change that past, but to change the future by means of the present. Can I not have done better than I did at such and such a time? No, I cannot now; but I could then. The Past is unchangeable. Our contrition is not properly for the Past, nor does it change the Past; it is for the present state produced in us by past acts; it changes that, and

that alone. A man who has sinned is not to blame because he is now able not to have sinned, but because, when he did, he had the power not to sin. At the beginning of the world the possibility of my being born *then* existed; as time went on, it became less; at the instant of my birth it was narrowed to that instant and no other (pp. 74—87).

Chapters 2 and 3 (pp. 87—116) are perhaps the hardest to understand in the whole treatise; and it will suffice to give a short synopsis of Wyclif's theory and of those which he assailed. As a consequence of their denial of the necessity of propositions concerning the past, which has already been summarized, Nominalists were forced to take up the position that possibility or impossibility depended upon the axiom: *nothing can be and not be at the same time.* Whatever did not contradict this (and things past, no longer existing, could not contradict it) was contingently true or false, bút always possible; what contradicted it was impossible independently of any other truth. This therefore was the only criterion of the extent of God's power. Wyclif attacks this doctrine with great vehemence, attempting to show that, if things contingent in the present are contingent in the past, the proposition that *Nothing in the world exists* is admissible in that theory; whence he draws the most damaging and absurd inferences against his adversaries. A possibility independent of God is according to him the source of numberless errors which he points out in detail. He is convinced that the proposition, or rather the fact (though he seems not to distinguish between the two) *that God exists*, is the primordial truth on which the axiom of contradiction depends. It is because God exists that Nothing can at the same time be and not be; and not vice versa. All possibility and impossibility therefore proceed from God's power. We cannot say that God's power does not extend to this because it is impossible; but, This is impossible, on account of God's power not extending to it. And, though such an assertion looks extravagant, if we remember what he means by *possible* (that which at any time exists or will exist) it is in keeping with the rest of his doctrine. At the same time, whilst he was free not to admit a wider definition, his Nominalist adversaries had quite as much right to define the Possible as *that of which the existence*, no matter at what time, *does not involve contradiction.*

In the last chapter, there is a return to the preceding question of 'quality'. But whereas Wyclif argned before that no mental act was a

quality in the opponents' sense, he now argues that in that sense there is no such thing. It is, we must remember, an accident capable (at least by God's power) of existing separately from its substance. Wyclif very guardedly refrains from saying that quantity or the 'vis extensiva substantia', cannot exist alone. This was generally admitted at the time by Schoolmen. though, as I have pointed out in *De Apostasia*, it forms no part of the doctrine of the Church of Rome. On the other hand, most Schoolmen admitted that material qualities, such as colour, taste, weight, &c. were absolutely dependent upon the quantity of a substance, and could not be conceived apart therefrom. It was thus a doctrine which, to say the least, was very far from being unassailable: but he attacks it with arguments that are, most of them at least, quite as adaptable to quantity; in fact, some of them were used by Descartes when he denied the theory of absolute accidents'. But it is certain that an open attack would have raised a storm which Wyclif probably did not at the time feel it his duty to meet; and thus (possibly, as I have already said, in view of the Mastership at Balliol College) he preferred to employ arguments which attacked quantity as an absolute accident without ever naming it.

Some accidents — relations, for instance — are inconceivable as existing apart from substance. This essential distinction must be common to all. An accident existing separately would become a substance: which is impossible. If it could exist alone, and consequently act alone, it would be more perfect than material substances, which cannot act but by means of their qualities. Substance is defined as that which underlies accidents. Now, if a quality could act by itself, it could by itself be also acted upon and modified, receive movement, &c. — that is, underlie accidents, and thus become a substance. The whole world might be made up of absolute accidents, and the idea of substance thus becomes superfluous; we could not distinguish between things and appearances, and appearances would be to us as things. If this, for instance, were extended to mental acts, there might be a sensation of whiteness that could perceive a white colour, without any person to feel it (pp. 116—121). Here Wyclif examines the adversaries' reply. They naturally fall back upon a miracle, saying that an accident never has power to exist by itself; it would, in such a case, be upheld by Divine omnipotence. We infallibly know that substances underlie appearances, unless there be a miracle;

and since it has pleased God to create a world of substances, a world of accidents would be less perfect. Our author's answer to these arguments is strikingly moderate. They have, he says, but little power to persuade; the opinion is only based upon faith, and the hypothesis that God might supply the place of a substance: his own theory, he thinks, is more reasonable. He points out various flaws in the explanations, and the great confusion that would arise if they were admitted: we should grope in the dark, unable to distinguish between substance and accident. Any entity that acts just like a substance, must really be one, for we have no means of knowing that it is not. And then, God's action would tend — infallibly tend — towards making us affirm that which is false. The answer about a world of accidents is, he says with a touch of malice, though it is mildly expressed, 'quedam theologizacio'. And he ends with the remarking that the last answer 'seems to him unsatisfactory' (pp. 121—127).

It is, as I said, impossible to decide whether this treatise was written before or just after Wyclif became Master of Balliol Hall; but for those who know his usually vigourous style both of argument and of expression, the former alternative may seem not improbable.

II. Replicatio de Universalibus.

(1). The Manuscript.[1]

When I was in London, between 1889 and 1890, editing various works of Wyclif, Dr. Furnivall sent me a copy of this Replicatio, with a somewhat lengthy Introduction in English, and a title-page stating that the work was edited by 'A. Herman Lundstrom, Theol. Kand. Pastor of Helga Trefaldighet Church, Upsala, Sweden;' but without either the variantes of the Prague University MS. III. G. 10, or any marginal notes; and the Introduction was chiefly a description of the famous Stockholm MS., written 'per manus Mag. Joh. Hus'. It became my duty to complete this work for publication by the Wyclif Society; but when I examined it, I soon came to such very startling conclusions that I tried to com-

[1] That is, the Stockholm MS. As III. G. 10 of Prague University is one of the sources for the text of *De Materia et Forma,* its description comes in the Introduction to that work.

municate with Pastor Lundstrom in order to induce him to change or at least shorten part of his Introduction. It was in vain; my letter was neither answered nor returned by post; or if it was, I never received it. In short, I do not even know whether the editor is still living or not. In these circumstances, I had no alternative but to print the whole of his Introduction as he wrote it; this has of course been done with Dr. Furnivall's approval; and as this Introduction deals mainly if not exclusively with the Manuscript, its place is naturally here. What I shall have to add by way of supplement and (I regret to say) in one most important point, of contradiction, will come well enough under the heading of authenticity, date, and contents.

Pastor Lundstrom's Introduction.

Among the rich literary and bibliographical treasures in the possession of the royal Library at Stockholm, an autograph manuscript by John Huss de Hussinets, praereformer and martyr, takes a very important place. This precious Bohemian relic, now nearly 500[1] years old, was part of the rich booty of war, which the Swedes, under General Königsmark, succeeded in making at the capture of Hradschin in Prague on July 26th 1648, on which occasion the art and treasure-chamber of the royal palace, as well as its valuable library, fell into the hands of the invaders.[2] The manuscript very probably belonged to the so-called Rosenberg Library, a division of the Royal Bohemian Library, if the evidence on this point is correctly interpreted. It came — together with the rest of the booty which was sent home from Prague[3] — to Stockholm in the course of the year 1649, probably during the month of May.[4]

This old codex is in quarto size and bound in simple parchment. The lower cover has a flap which can be folded over and fastened with a string like a modern note-book. At the back of the volume are two iron studs in the form of small six-pointed stars; and next the studs are the binding-threads, six at each end.

[1] This was written before 1888. (M. H. D.) [2] Lechler: Johann v. Wiclif und die Vorgeschichte der Reformation, vol. II, p. 559. [3] Vide Proceedings of Roy. Libr. of Stockholm 7. Exhibition room catalogue. [4] Vide Dudik: Iter Romanum p. 141.

The writing is inscribed upon good firm paper of a somewhat yellowish tinge. The pagination has been done with red ink, and is evidently of the same date as the manuscript itself. The margins are not particularly wide, measuring as a rule about half an inch.[1] The volume contains five treatises, principally of a philosophical and scholastic nature.[2] The title, which is to be found at the end, is as follows: — *Wiklefi tractatus methapysici per manus Mag Joh. Hus de an. 1398.*[3]

It is very remarkable that an old note on the upper cover *apparently* assigns the authorship of three of the five treatises to Huss. On this cover we find first in more modern characters No. 9 (referring to the 1734 catalogue); and then immediately below, the following words are to be distinguished on the authority of Dudik (Forschungen in Schweden). "Magistri Johannis Hus onus tractatus de ydeis secundus replicacio universalis tercius eius de veris universalibus." That this old annotation (see pp. LIII, LIV) is not accurate seems probable, for several reasons which I will subsequently adduce.

[1] I may here record some other minor points of interest which I observed during my study of the MS. I found that the volume, as far as leaf 20, had been perforated by some sharp three-edged instrument, which, as far as I can judge. may well have been a swordpoint. The upper cover is pierced as well, but in the first leaves, which are evidently a later insertion and one of which is glued to the cover, this little triangular hole is of course wanting. Can it have been some Swedish soldier who, intoxicated with victory at the capture of Hradschin, thus wished to set with the point of his sword a conqueror's mark which should commemorate for ever the acquisition of this precious document by his countrymen? There are also one or two other small peculiarities to be noticed. On leaf 108 a coarse, but characteristic face has been drawn with black ink in a large red initial. Again, at two or three places a rather large hand pointing has been drawn, e. g. leaf 25^b, by a large red initial, and leaf 78. [2] I say "principally", for purely theological subjects are also treated of. For instance, at the end of the first treatise, *sin against the Holy Ghost* is discussed, and among other things the writer points out the absurdity of maintaining before a man's death, and without a special manifestation, that he has been guilty of sin against the Holy Ghost, and on the strength of this assumption depriving him of the resource and consolation of prayer. [3] Dr. B. Dudik wrongly states in his "Forschungen in Schweden für Mährens Geschichte", p. 185 that the MS. dates from the year 1389. Possibly this is a misprint, but it occurs both in the index and text,

The *first* of these treatises occupies the first thirty-three leaves, and has the following title: "*Tractatus de indiuiduacione*[1] *temporis et instantis quam composuit*[2] *subtilis vir Magister Joh. Wycleph.*"

The first page specifies the contents of the twelve chapters into which the essay is divided, and the treatise itself begins as follows:[3] — "Intrando de t*empor*e s*un*t ali*qua* ex dic*tis* s*trict*ius capi*en*da | pr*imu*m q*uo*d t*empu*s sit de g*ene*re acc*eptu*r*u*m | sic*ut* | (so Dudik, Stephens gives 'sicud', as the text really has it, *d* being regularly used throughout the Manuscript instead of *t* in such cases) e*n*im p*h*i*losoph*i suppo*n*unt ta*nquam* notor*ium* mot*um* e*sse* cu*m* desi*n*it illis p*r*ob*acio* ap*r*iori | vel noto*r*iori *q*ua co*n*clu*d*ent motu*m* esse | *si*c co*nvenie*nt*er* accipit to*t*um ge*nu*s ho*minu*m exmo*tus* cuiuscu*n*q*ue* notic*i*a t*em*pus esse | cu*m* tam ho*mines* *quam* bruta | ex *in* nata solercia nosc*unt* te*m*pus | ut p*atet* ex tam famosa confessione wlgarium *q*uam eciam "etc. and ends on leaf 33 with — *quod* nemini est despera*ndum* de quocu*n*q*ue* graui (*not* graue *as Stephens and Dudik have it*) peccato cu*m* qui*libe*t (*not* 'quibus' *as Stephens reads. Dudik has here omitted from* cum — *to* "patet 3°") ecia*m* dampnatus potest saluari | et ex 2do latere timendum continuare peccatum cum ad tantum (probably so; see Chassant. Stephens reads adtamen) potest continuari (quod fiat iremissibile) ed patet 3° quod stultum est sine speciali revelacione iudicare de aliquo ante mortem, quod peccat in spiritum sanctum, subtrahendo ab eo oracionis suffragia.

Explicit tractatus de individuacione temporis et instantis quem composuit subtilis vir Magister Joh. Wycleph *(from* "Explicit" *onwards the writing is in red ink*).

The second treatise extends from leaf 34 to leaf 52. It is divided into five sections and entitled "Tractatus de ydeis".

It begins — "Intrando (and written above tractando) de ydeis primo oportet querere si sint. Supponendo quam naturale sit tale, quod ydea sequitur rationem exteriorem eternam aput deum 2^m^ quam deus est productus rei ad extra. Videtur ergo quod talia (Stephens wrongly

[1] Vide Appendix. [2] Dudik here tries to correct Stephens and proposes 'apposuit'. For my part I support Stephens. In the Stockholm Codex we have in this passage the sign which is used for *co* or *con* throughout, viz. 9 which Dudik has wrongly read for *ap*. [3] In order that the reader may be able to criticise my amplifications of the abbreviations which occur in the MS., I have here underlined the letters which are wanting in the original.

reads an *h* in the word "Thalia". He has probably been misled by the peculiar form of the letter "l" in the manuscript) sint ponenda quia ipse deus intelligit omne intelligibile &c. | and ends: Alij autem tanto ampliant ydeas | quod uocant omne quod est exemplar deo deo aliud cognoscendum esse ydeam indeo (ydeam cognicionis realiter cogniti | nec est magna vis in tali variacione signorum | dum tamen sane concipitur.

Ego autem elegi mihi magis probabile quod omnis creatura et solum creatura habet ydeam propriam in deo. Explicit tractatus de ydeis, ergo laus domino.

The third treatise is divided into nine sections (not into eight as Stephens has it) and is entitled: — "Tractatus de materia et forma Magistri Joh. Wycleph." (Not as Dudik writes "Johannis Vicleph".)

It occupies twenty-three leaves, i. e. from leaf 53 to leaf 76, and begins thus: — "Cum materia et forma sint universalia (Stephen wrongly has volumina) mundi principalia restat de eis primo tam propter (here occurs a rather illegible word dotted underneath.

It seems to be 'n' acionem', and is possibly connected with the following word, and for that reason dotted) ordinacionem quam genera conueniencium disserendum et cum materia non sit anobis cognoscibilis nisi per analogiam ad formam p° philosophorum consencio s° ordo naturalis postulat primo de forma post de materia pertractare. Primo igitur supponere &c. and concludes: — et in otroque primorum graduum nullum ens dicit presens vel aliquam essentiam preter deum. Explicit tractatus de materia et forma magistri Joh. Vycleph (Joh. Vycleph is not in red ink as Dudik states, but here follow some Bohemian [Czech] words which are in red. See Appendix). The fourth treatise is short, covering only nine leaves from leaf 77 to leaf 86, and is possibly only a recapitulary abstract of the long treatise which follows and ends the series. The fourth is styled. "Replicacio de universalibus" and begins with these words: — "Presentem agrediendo [1] replicacionis materiam in 3^s partes distingo eam secundum tria puncta eiusdem replicationis fundamentalia quorum prima pars etc. and ends" quin lycet rex diuiditur in regem viuum et regem mortuum et depictum, et tamen nec rex viuus (viuus is underlined and above is written "mortuus" by the same hand as the manuscript itself) nec depictus est rex. Explicit replicacio de vniversalibus,

[1] Dudik reads wrongly 'agrediando'.

quam si quis bene perpexerit, uidebit multo meliores raciones pro eisdem quam contra eadem, prime enim ducere procedunt alie vero cum" . . . . (here two or three words are erased).

The fifth and last treatise occupies no less than forty-seven leaves i. e. from leaf 87 to leaf 134 and is divided into fifteen chapters . . . . It is entitled:

"Tractatus de veris vniversalibus Magistri venerabilis Johannis Wycleph."

The two first pages contain a summary of the contents, beginning thus: — "Libellus de vniversalibus continet 15 capitula p*rimu*m p*re*mittit p*rimo* t*ri*m*em*br*em* distinc*cione*m de v*niversa*lib*us* &c".

The treatise itself commences (leaf 88. a) "Ca*pitulu*m p*rimu*m. In purg*an*do error*es* de v*niversa*lib*us* & *circa* (not cet. as Stephens has it) v*niversa*lia s*un*t 3ª *in*troductor*ia* p*re*movenda & p*rimo* q*uod* & . . . and concludes (leaf 34 b): S*ed* nimis lo*ngum e*sse*t* ista p*er*tin*enter* p*er*t*ra*ctare / alijs itaq*ue* difficultatib*us* hui*us* m*ateri*e / & aliar*um* hic tactarum exp*e*ctantib*us* alibi suum locum / Pono fin*em* huic sup*er*ficiali t*ra*ctatui de v*niversa*lib*us* / ad alios t*ra*ctatus dereb*us* prime inten*ci*onis / ad quar*um* notic*i*am s*enten*cia ista ap*per*it agressur*us*. Explicit[1] tractatus de ver*is* v*niversa*lib*us* M*agis*tri ven*erabi*l*is* Joh*an*nis Wycleph Sacre theologie veri et magni professoris A*nn*o dom*ini* M° ccc° L xxxx vijj in die Sancti Yeronimi[2] Slawy[3] p*er* man*us* Hus de Hussynetz[4] amen tak boh day: (the four last czech words in red. (See Appendix).

I ought here to observe that it is in Wyclif's very treatise "de universalibus" that Höfler[5] and Loserth[6] discovered a passage which was formerly considered to have a particularly important bearing upon our knowledge of the personality of Huss. The words referred to are: . . "Ego autem *statui michi ipsi pro regula, quod quociescunque videro racionem*

[1] Dudik here (Vide Forsch. in S., leaf 202) wrongly gives 'explicat'. The word is certainly so written in the text that one one might be tempted to follow Dudik's reading, or rather read 'expliat'. But this may be a misprint, as on leaf 198 he has it correctly. The word has in our MS. something like this appearance 'expliat', but a = ci, not a. [2] Not Jeronymi, as Dudik has on leaf 202, though he writes it correctly on leaf 198. [3] Not Slavi as Dudik. [4] Not Hussynec as Dudik, reads. [5] Höfler: Anna v. Luxemburg in den Denkschriften der Wiener Akademie 20, 150. [6] The MS. followed by Loserth is in the University Library of Prague: Cod. Un. Prag. VIII, leaf 6, 8*a*.

(vel scripturam)[1] *prevalidam declino ab opinione priori* non obstante fama vel assercione virorum quos sequerer, considerans quod ex infirmitate nature longe plus habeo ignorancie quam certitudinis — quod si ex ignorancia vel quacunque alia causa (Hus: vel lapsu lingue) in isto defecero . . . revoco et retracto submittens me humiliter.

In Huss' treatise "*De trinitate*" we find the same thought expressed in almost the same words.

According to Dudik, this manuscript shows an excessive number of abbreviations, is somewhat indistinctly and hastily written, and is consequently especially difficult to decipher; and the experience I have gained from the study of its numerous obscurities leads me fully to endorse Dudik's opinion.

I will now record some observations on the subject of the writing itself, as it appears in the different treatises.

In the first there are 37 or 38 lines to the page. The last page has however only six lines, and of these two are in red: "Explicit tractatus etc. The initial letters of the chapters are red; as are also several marginal notes referring to the contents. Commas, stops and dividing marks occur in the text, but the words are nevertheless occasionally run together.

There are besides numerous corrections and emendations in faint writing. These alterations seem as a rule to have been made by a contemporary, but strange, hand, a few passages only showing signs of correction by a somewhat later writer. Lastly I may mention that here and there spaces are left for omitted words.

In the second treatise also corrections and omissions are to be found e. g. leaves 31 and 40. — On leaf 54 appears a phrase added by a later hand to fill up an original omission: — "a condendis nouis generibus creature".

The state of the third treatise is very much the same. For omissions I may refer to leaves 60, 71, 75, 76, (the same pages are mentioned by Dudik).

In the fourth occur only two corrections and no omissions. In this treatise, the only one in which are no Bohemian words, there is also nothing in red ink, except the numbers of the pages and the first initial letter.

[1] "Vel scripturam" is wanting in the Cod. Un. Prag. but is cited on the authority of Höfler.

With regard to the last and longest treatise I may say that the writing differs very considerably from that of its predecessors. In the first place it is much more compressed than the others, there being now (i. e. from leaf 87) from 45 to 47 lines to the page, whereas before we had ouly 37 or 38. And I must add my opinion to that of Dudik, that we should consider this fact as tending to show that this treatise is written in a different hand from that of the others. Here too we have written in red, not only the initials, but also the commas and capital letters in the text, and besides these some of the Bohemian words (for a list of which, see the appendix) and lastly the following sentence which precedes the 15th chapter: "Ponam eum super tronum meum". In great abundance too are the corrections, emendations of a later date and omissions, for examples of which Dudik refers to leaves 96, 109, 111, 119, 120, 126, 130, 132, 133.

This treatise is followed by an index, occupying two pages of three columns each and about half a column on a third page (leap 135 b), and finally come eleven leaves blank and unnumbered.

We now reach the question of the authorship of these treatises. There can scarcely be any real doubt, except as to Nos. II, IV and V, "De Ydeis", "Replicacio de universalibus" and "De veris universalibus". It will be remembered that an old note, according to the interpretation of Dudik, assigns the authorship of these to Huss. That Wyclif, as the manuscript itself states — was the author of Nos. I and III, must be considered established beyond all doubt. But that Wyclif — and not Huss, as this old note is supposed to assert, — was also the author of No. V, is evident from the concluding words of the Manuscript which I have already quoted: "Explicit tractatus de veris universalibus Magistri venerabilis Johannis Wycleph, Sacre theologie veri et magni professoris, ... per manus Huss de Hussinetz.

Dudik advances the very arbitrary, but at the same time ingenious hypothesis that this old annotation on the cover is really intended to mean that Huss was the author of only Nos. II and IV. The word 'tercius' in that case would be an error of the pen, and the treatises ascribed to Huss would be "Tractatus de Ydeis and Replicacio universalis eius de veris universalibus". But with respect to this I must observe that it may be considered quite an open question whether Dudik has correctly interpreted this old note. The words are now to a great extent

obliterated. The first: "Magistri Johannis Huss unus tractatus de ydeis" can still be seen fairly distinctly, but the following "secundus" (according to Dudik and Stephens) happens to come just on a fold of the parchment; and was, to me at least, quite indecipherable even with the aid of a powerful lens. After this word, which we may — on the joint authority of Dudik and Stephens — take to be "secundus", follow two more, which are still fairly legible "replicacio universalis". The third line begins with a word which seems to me just as likely to be 'eius' as tercius, though perhaps I should adopt the latter for preference. Then comes something illegible which falls just on the above-mentioned fold. That one of these words is 'de' may possibly be admitted, at least by any one who has been led to expect to see that word there. The upper part of one letter is quite plain and may well belong to a 'd'. The last word is still legible.

But it is clear that Dudik's statement that both 'tercius' and 'eius' are to be found here cannot be correct (Stephens reads only 'eius'). For some trace, even if it were illegible, would certainly exist, if a second word had been written there; but no such trace is to be seen. After 'replicacio universalis' these is not a sign of any other word but 'tercius' (or eius), and after it we have directly "de veris universalibus". In these circumstances it will be safest not to let this old and very obscure annotation have any preponderating influence on the question of the authorship of any of these treatises.

With regard to the second treatise, Dudik disputes, and I think with reason, the claim of Huss to its authorship. He summons to the support of his view, neither the circumstance that this work of Huss has been hitherto unknown, nor the fact that Lewis in his "History of the life and opinions of John de Wycliffe" (Oxford 1836) refers to this treatise as one of Wyclif's most important works, but bases his contention on the ground that the omission of words and phrases in this as well as the other three treatises which are with all reason ascribed to Wyclif, implies the unfamiliarity of the writer with the original. This evidence he thus brings forward: „Wenn man bedenkt, dass der Autor, wenn er sein Concept mundirt, kaum nöthig hat, Worte, die er nicht lesen kann, auszulassen — denn wer soll ihm hierüber Auskunft ertheilen? Man aber in dem, dem Huss zugeschriebenen Tractate „De Ydeis" solche ausgelassene Stellen, ja eine sogar mit einer späteren Schrift eingesetzte antrifft; dann

wird der Schluss: dass Huss kaum der Verfasser dieser Abhandlung sei, ein verzeihlicher." To this there are some points of evidence to be added, which though they provide no infallible testimony, nevertheless tend strongly in favour of Wyclif's authorship of this particular treatise, evidence too which clearly cannot have been known to Dudik, Stephens and Pečirka, because it is only the research of recent years which has brought it to light. I mean first of all the relations which existed in a general way between Huss and Wyclif. There is no doubt that these latest investigations have gone to show (I refer especially to Loserth's work "Huss and Wiclif" which marks an era in our knowledge), how intimate this association was, how Huss even in his maturest manhood never broke his close and pupil-like connexion with his English master. And as it has been made clear that in the work of his riper years he almost mechanically adopted, nay to a great degree simply reproduced in writing, the spoken utterances of Wyclif, are we not justified in supposing that in his youth Huss held a position of even less independence with respect to his admired teacher, and especially in regard to speculative work which called for a greater experience of life and maturity than he himself possessed?

Another circumstance which tends in the same direction is that in the List which Loserth gives of Wyclif's writings that were burnt twelve years later (in 1410) by the order of Archbishop Zbinco on account of their reputed heretical tendencies, four out of the five treatises of the Stockholm Manuscript occurs. The only one which is not among them is the "Replicacio de universalibus", the very treatise in fact which Dudik maintains was undoubtedly written by Huss, though for my part I am for certain reasons inclined to doubt even this.

The fact that Archbishop Zbinco caused to be burned one or more copies of treatises by Wyclif bearing the same name is of course no real proof that he is the author of the Stockholm treatise 'de Ydeis'. This can evidently only be decided by an accurate comparison between the original of the copy or copies which were consigned to the flames, and that which we have at Stockholm. But the fact above referred to goes at least to support the plausibility of the supposition that Huss did not write No. 2 'de Ydeis'.[1] In Prokop v. Pilsen's speech in defence of

[1] Loserth's list of the burnt writings also makes it probable that Wyclif was the author of "De veris universalibus".

this burnt treatise, it is expressly mentioned that it consisted of five chapters, which also agrees with that which forms part of the Stockholm Manuscript (see Loserth, "Huss and Wiclif", p. 282).

Recent investigations in England have shown that these writings which have hitherto been looked upon as mutually independent, viz. 'De tempore' (= de indiv. temp.), and 'De Ydeis',[1] only form a part of Wyclif's great treatise '*De Ente*'.

'De tempore' is in fact § 6 of Work I, and 'De Ydeis' § 5 of Work II of 'De Ente'. (This I owe to Dr. Furnivall and the Report of the Executive Committee.)

We now come to the question of the authorship of No. IV, "Replicacio de universalibus", which is also supposed by Dudik to be the work of Huss. I must begin by observing that I consider Dudik's supposition altogether doubtful. Both Shirley, in his "Catalogue of the original works of John Wiclif" and, following him, Lechler in his great work "Johann v. Wiclif und die Vorgeschichte der Reformation" and Vattier in "John Wyclyff, sa vie, ses oeuvres, sa doctrine", mention a treatise with this very title. 'Repl. de univ.' as one of Wyclif's original works (No. 9 of the philosophical writings in Shirley, No. 6 in Lechler and Vattier). It is in the MS. No. 10 in the University Library at Prag, but as[2] I have had no opportunity of comparing it with that at Stockholm, I cannot of course at present offer a decisive opinion on the subject. But so much at least must be plain, that it is by no means certain that Huss was the author. Dudik advances in support of his view the occurrence here and there in this treatise of the expressions "Magister meus reverendus" and "Magister meus".

But these expressions might very well have been Wyclif's own, and might refer to some of those men whom he valued as his Masters, as for instance, the Parisian teacher Henrik Gothals of Ghent † 1293 (Henrikus de Gandavo, *Doctor solemnis*), Johann v. Jaudun († c. 1329), Walter Burleigh († 1337), who may all be considered as Wyclif's forerunners in the exposition of a Platonising Augustinian Realism, and to all of whom, at various places in his writings, he appeals. Perhaps too the expressions in question might refer to William Occam, whom Wyclif

[1] As least as far as the English MS. is concerned. [2] Shirley I know only at second hand, as his excellent catalogue has not been accessible to me.

nevertheless generally mentions by a still more honorable title, "Venerabilis Inceptor". Or it may even be that he refers directly to Augustine (cf. Lechler: Johann v. Wiclif und die Vorgeschichte der Reformation I, p. 461; II, p. 610). Dudik furthermore seeks support for the claim of Huss in the fact that we find no omissions in the Manuscript of this treatise, as we do for instance in No. I, as well as in the comparatively rare corrections which here occur. But when we consider how short this treatise is, covering as it does only nine leaves, this state of things seems by no means remarkable. For corrections do occur, and among the other treatises one could easily find a long series of pages entirely wanting in omissions.

The course of my investigation has therefore led me to the conclusion that the authorship of the four longer treatises contained in the Stockholm MS. may be attributed to Wyclif with an amount of probability which is all but equivalent to certainty, while with regard to the short summary, entitled "Replicacio de universalibus", it is quite credible that it is due to his hand as well.

The words of the text "per manus Hus de Hussynetz" will then refer merely to the actual writer. That Huss with his own hand wrote at least the greater part, if not the whole, of this Manuscript, seems highly probable. The Bohemian works and phrases which occur point to a writer to whom this language was familiar.[1] Furthermore, Dr. Dudik sent through Professor Dr. Kolenati two facsimile passages out of this Manuscript to Herr Hanka of Prague, where Huss' original writings are preserved. One of these passages happened to be a part of the first treatise in which the words "haha czechu" seems to have been written by a different hand from the Manuscript itself (Cap. 10, see Appendix). Mr. Hanka declared the whole Manuscript to be the work of Huss (of course with the exception of certain additions, corrections &c. which are undoubtedly of later date). A fresh comparison between facsimiles from other parts of this codex and the originals of Huss at Prague ought to finally settle this question.

[1] According to Dudik, these occasional Behemian words were probably inserted only to fill up the lines ("eine damalige Modesache"), and are quite without bearing on the text. But an expression like that which we find on leaf 43 (see Appendix), as well as one on leaf 51, has at least some connexion with the text.

Stephens', assertion, adopted by Dudik, that the treatises bearing Wyclif's name, Nos. I, III and V, were unknown and unprinted, now only holds good in part. Dudik himself of course helped to make their existence known to the learned world. Nos. V and III, "De universalibus" and "De materia et forma" are in Shirley's list of Wyclif's original works, though he omits "De individuacione temporis et instantis". (Although Shirley's catalogue dates from 1865 and Dudik's "Forschungen &c." from 1851, the latter's work was not turned to account by the former.) Since Lechler's time they have been included in all works upon Wyclif which have any pretence to completeness. It will be remembered from what has been said above that three treatises bearing the same names as these three were among the works burned on July 16th, 1410. Very soon after this remarkable day, disputations were delivered at the University of Prague in defence of this very treatise "De universalibus" by Idislaw v. Zwinzeticz' and "De materia et forma" by Johann v. Giczin.

But to a certain extent the dictum of Stephens and Dudik above mentioned still holds good. It is a most remarkable fact that not even at this day is there a single one of Wyclif's philosophical works in print.[1] And this circumstance is all the more notable, when one remembers what a reputation for acumen and dialectical ability he enjoyed among his contemporaries as well as with posterity,[2] since we often find "Subtilis vir", "Subtilis magister" applied to the English reformer.

Latterly, however, great interest has been awakened both in the man and his works. The real impulse seems to have been due to Professor Walter Waddington Shirley of Oxford, who died in 1866. Of his excellent "Catalogue" I have already spoken; and besides this he published another work of great importance for the subject, "Fasciculi Zizaniorum". In 1880, Wyclif's works in English were given to the public, but these are inconsiderable both in value and extent, compared with his Latin writings. In March 1882 the Wyclif Society was founded in England for the purpose of editing and publishing Wyclif's still unprinted Latin works,

[1] See Note 1, p. XLVII. [2] Posterity has, however, not estimated Wyclif's scientific ability and importance so highly as his contemporaries, or as he deserved (vide Lechler: J. v. Wiclif und die Vorgeschichte der Reformation I, 34 et seq.). The effect of his great importance as a reformer has in some degree been to oveshadow his repute as a philosopher.

and generally dispelling the obscurity which has gathered for centuries round the memory of the great reformer.

It may now be asked whether these Stockholm treatises are found in MS. elsewhere. I will state what I have been able to discover.

In the Imperial Library at Vienna, MS. No. 4307 : 2 contains 'De universalibus; No. 4523 : 3, De universalibus, 4 (p. 115.) De ideis. No. 5204 : 1, De universalibus. In Trinity College Library, *Cambridge*, are first 3° (Vattier) "Tractatus de tempore 10 pp. large folio, and secondly 5° (Vattier) containing" De universalibus, De tempore, De ydeis. — In the Library of Trinity College, Dublin are 25. Tractatus de tempore, 37 pp. and 28. De ente universali et attributis divinis. At Lincoln Cathedral are 1° De universalibus. A. G. 2°. De tempore, a part of 'De temporis quidditate (? = De individuacione temporis et instantis).[1] Furthermore, as I have already mentioned, there is a copy of Wyclif's treatise 'De universalibus' in the University Library at Prague (VIII. F. I.).[1]

The size and whole appearance of the Stockholm MS. are such as were usual with University pamphlets in the fourteenth century (see above, p. XLVII). The treatises are dated, as I have said, 1398. It was in that very year that J. Huss first officiated as a public teacher at the University of Prague. It is therefore by no means an unreasonable supposition that these philosophical treatises formed J. Huss' earliest lectures. Nor need we be astonished because Huss gave to his hearers Wyclif's philosophical essays, instead of some independent work of his own. For according to the statutes of the Philosophical Faculty at Prague, whereas a 'magister artium liberarum' had a right to deliver original lectures, a 'Baccalaureus' on the other hand was only permitted to discourse from the written work of an eminent Magister of Prague, Paris, or Oxford. It is certainly true that, even two years before his appearance as lecturer, Huss had been promoted to the standing of Mag. artium liberarum. But it is scarcely likely that he, a young man naturally endowed with greater acceptive than creative ability, would at his first appearance as an academic teacher have taken advantage of the privileges allowed him by the statutes of April 20, 1367 (vide Loserth p. 73.) Beginner as he was, he would have found great encouragement and support in the authority of so prominent a dialectician as the Oxford "Magister" J. Wyclif. In the very next year,

[1] Vattier a. a. p. 190, 191; Loserth a. a. 225, 226.

as well as subsequently, we find Huss also occupied in resistance to the attacks to which Wyclif's Realism was exposed from the prevaiing School of Nominalism. One of his contemporaries and declared opponents, Stephen von Dolein, also states in his "Epistola ad Hussitas', that at first among the teachers at Prague Huss was almost the only one who received Wyclif's writings with joy, read them and handed them over to others for study and their future guidance, though there are also some persons who entered their gentle protest against him, persons who now (Dolein wrote in 1417) rest in the Lord and others who are yet alive" (Loserth p. 96). And lastly, when we add to this the fact that the treatises, as I have shown, were undoubtedly written by the hand of Huss, we must allow it to be highly probable that they actually formed his first public lectures.

Since then none of Wyclif's philosophical writings have been printed and published hitherto; and since, furthermore, it is probable that these treatises are Huss' earliest lectures, the contents of the Stockholm MS. must be of no little interest both as a contribution to our knowledge of Huss and in connexion with the question of the general tendency of Wyclif's philosophy, about which extremely little is known.[1] And besides, these writings of 500 years ago help to throw some light on the general subject of scientific University life at that date.

Dr. Dudik too, thirly years ago, expressed a wish in this direction; though hitherto no one has devoted himself to the task. I may perhaps quote the Bohemian scholar's own words: "Und somit bleibt kein anderer Wunsch, als dass diese Schriften in ihrem Inhalte gehörig gewürdigt werden möchten. Für Wyclif so gut wie für dessen Schüler, Huss, haben sie immer einen Werth und als Autograph sind sie eine kostbare Reliquie, wie für Böhmen, so für die ganze gelehrte Welt."

Lastly, it may be asked how it is that no Swedish scholar has taken in hand and endeavoured to interpret this precious manuscript, which has now for so long, — in fact nearly 250 years, — been in the possession of Sweden, after having passed the first 250 years of its existence in the keeping of Bohemia. The reason of this no doubt is partly

[1] Nor will it be disputed that these treatises of Wyclif's which contain, so to say, the propaedeutics of his theology, deserve to be published from this point of view also (vide Lechler a. a. I, p. 24 et passim).

because the great expenditure of time consequent upon the difficulty of deciphering the MS., with its obscurities and numerous abbreviations, has frightened would-be investigators from attempting the task.

The interest which I feel for the work has led me to make a genuine attempt to decipher that one of the five treatises of the MS. which has seemed to me most likely to repay me for my pains. I was influenced in my choice, partly because this particular treatise is a reputed original work by Huss, which gives it a special interest, and partly because of its shortness, and furthermore by the fact that the "replicacio de universalibus" is the only one of the five contained in the Stockholm MS. which seems to be unique. As far as I can learn, no other library in Europe possesses a copy of this treatise.

May I conclude by hoping that my work will be looked upon as a small and humble contribution towards the realisation of the great and noble task which the Wyclif Society has undertaken?

Upsala, October 1889.

A. Hermann Lundström.

Appendix.

Bohemian words and sentences occuring

in

Wiclefi tractatus methaphysici per manus Mag. Joh. Hus de an. 1398 (Stockholm MS.).

I. In the first treatise: "de indiuiduacione temporis et instantis" before Ch. 4 occur the following words: Consequens est dicere de indiuiduacione temporis et instantis &c. and at the end of the line in red ink: "Dobrzye bude daly [1] boh" i. e. "It must be good, if God so grant." [2]

Before Ch. 5 "Supposita igitur ipsa sentencia de indiuiduacione &c." and then in red (leaf 10) "haha nyemczy haha" i. e. "Haha, Germans, haha!" and then in black ink and by a different, though, on the authority of Dr. B. Dudik and Hr. Klemming, Head Librarian at Stockholm, who

[1] Not "dali" as Dudík reads. [2] By the help of Professor Dr. Hjärne in Upsala, I am able to add translations of some of the Bohemian interpolations, but others remain still unintelligible.

went through the MS. together, a *contemporary* hand; "haha czechu" i. e. "Haha, Bohemians!"

Before Ch. 6 (leaf 13): "Post indiuiduacionem mundi &c." and in red ink: "haha nymczy (sic) haha" i. e. "Haha, Germans! Haha!"

Before Ch. 9: "Sed quid dicam de indiuiduacione &c." and in red ink:

"haha nymczy haha ven ven" (not vey vey) i. e.

"Haha, Germans! haha! away, away!"

Before Ch. 12 (leaf 31): "Explicit ergo loyca &c." and in red

"strach brachu" i. e. "Fear of the brother!"

II. In the Second Treatise "de Ydeis" we find in the first paragraph (leaf 40) in red ink:

"Strach protywnosty", i. e. "Fear of opponents!"

In the second paragraph (leaf 43) in red ink:

tulo dadye Aristotylessowy w roh" i. e.

"This is one for Aristotle's horn".

In the third (leaf 48) in red:

"pomniy" i. e. "Remember!"

At the end of the fourth (leaf 51):

"Nechwatay non intelligentibus dawaty" i. e.

"Haste not to give this to those that do not understand."

III. In the Third Treatise "*de materia et forma*" occur the following:

At the end of the first section (leaf 55):

"prdnu [1] (sic!) druzy w roh".

At the end of the second section (leaf 57)

"Buh wssudy" i. e. "God everywhere".

At the end of the third (leaf 59):

"Au' roys osra haczye (sic)".

At the end of the fourth (leaf 63)

"Buh day Wyclefowy [2] nebeske kralewstwye" i. e.

"God give unto Wyclif the kingdom of heaven!"

(leaf 66): "haha"

[1] Dr. Dudik supposes that as this expression is scarcely in harmony with Huss' character; the word "*prdnu*" may be written wrongly for "*padnu*", through there is no doubt that the original has the first form. [2] Thus the MS. Dudik has wrongly Wyklefowy.

At the end of the eighth (leaf 74):

"rosumyej".

And after "Explicit ..... Vycleph":

"O Wycleff Wycleff negednomu ty hlawu zwycless" i. e.

"O Wiclif, Wiclif upon many hast thou exercised wit!"

IV. In the Fourth Treatise: "Replicacio de vniversalibus" are no Bohemian words.

V. In the Fifth Treatise "de veris vniversalibus" occur the following:

At the end of Ch. 3 (leaf 94) in red ink:

"Za zlaty stogy czos slyssal" i. e.

"What thou hast heard may be priced in gold".

Before Ch. 5 (leaf 95) in red:

"hurtyk".

Before Ch. 8 (leaf 102):

"haha niemczy haha" i. e. "Haha, Germans! Haha!"

Before Ch. 11 (leaf 116):

"znamenay czos slyssal" i. e. "Mark what thou hast heard!"

Before Ch. 13 (leaf 124):

"Myly Wycleph dayt boh nebeske kralewstwye" i. e.

"Dear Wyclif, may God give to thee the kingdom of heaven!"

In Ch. 13 (leaf 126) in the fourth sentence "quando sit distinccio" after the word "arguenda" is written in red ink

"hrdyna" [1] i. e. "hero"

but it has apparently no connexion with the text. Lastly at the end of this treatise and of the MS. (leaf 134) after the words "Explicit . . &c," is added in red ink:

"Amen tak boh day" i. e.

"Amen, may God so grant!"

(2). Authenticity and date of the Work.

As we see, Pastor Lundström comes to the conclusion, on one hand, that it is very doubtful whether *Replicacio de Universalibus* was written by Huss, and on the other that "it is quite credible" that Wyclif wrote it. I must for my own part and without the slightest doubt assert

[1] Thus the MS, Dr. Dudik has wrongly "hrdina".

the contrary to the latter conclusion: to me the supposition of Wyclif's authorship is absolutely incredible. The writer discusses at length external evidences of various kinds; but it is strange that neither Dudik nor himself should have taken the trouble to examine the internal evidence afforded by the work itself; that so much should have been made of 'Magister meus Reverendus' — who, notwithstanding Lundström's doubts and suppositions, certainly was Wyclif — and so little of the thesis which the said 'Reverend Master' was evidently upholding. Nor can it be said that the treatise is incomprehensible on account of its Scholastic terminology. When we find the *writer* all along maintaining that there are *no* real Universals, while the 'Reverend Master' asserts them throughout the work — it requires but little acquaintance with Mediaeval philosophy to conclude that Wyclif was not its author; unless indeed this was written at the very outset of his University studies. And even this possibility disappears for any one who has studied his system, which is essentially the same as that set forth in the arguments of the "Reverendus Magister." This, it is true, Lundström could not have done; but might he not have thought it incredible that Huss should have taken the trouble to copy a work of Wyclif, written before Wyclif was himself? I should have much preferred not to have been obliged to say this, for the editor's Introduction plainly shows much serious and pains-taking research; nnhappily there is, I believe, a tendency among certain scholars to overlook internal evidence and to overrate that which is external, especially in works of this kind. Here we have a case in which all disputes and conjectures might have been easily settled by the most superficial examination of the text itself.

On p. 131, we see clearly that according to the 'Magister' with whom the writer is at variance all through, 'idem est veritas rei et entitas universaliter'. This might perhaps fail to be understood as an assertion of Realism. But what of the Master's conclusion (p. 133) *Universale est,* to which the writer opposes (p. 134) *Nullum universale reale in essendo est,* with clear arguments (pp. 134—138) to prove his point . . . . 'Quod non est universale in essendo reale . . . probatur . . . Vel universale in essendo reale et suum singulare differunt, vel non . . . Si esset universale in essendo reale . . . Dicit [Magister] quod universale est, et mea conclusio ponit oppositum . . . And again (p. 144) Volui probare quod nullum universale in essendo est'. And on p. 148: 'Posuit magister istam con-

clusionem . . . *universale est singulare*' (evidently meaning, 'is not a pure abstraction'). Once more we find (p. 149) the writer's assertion, and stated as his own: 'Nullum universale est'. And here I only give such expressions are as on the face of them quite unmistakable: but the whole work would to me at least have no meaning, if we supposed that the writer was Wyclif, defending the reality of Universals, since every one of his arguments is directed point-blank aganist them.

But, this being so, what proofs are there that Wyclif was, as I have said, the 'Magister' referred to? what likelihood have we that Huss was the author of the work? and if not Huss, who may he have been?

To the first question I believe that everybody who knows Wyclif's line of thought, and studies the arguments given, will think that no proofs are required other than the tractate itself. Not to speak of *De Universalibus,* which has not yet appeared, but which I have had the advantage to see, we find the Magister's very arguments repeated and developed in *Logica,* vol II. His point that 'to be a man' (hominem esse) is the essence of man, and that this essence has a universal yet real existence, is to be read in Log. II. pp. 33—35, as well as in the *Replicacio,* pp. 133—134. The difficulties he grapples with about the Universal and its singular forming a number, are to be found both in Log. pp. 47—53 and in Rep. p. 136; the 'Phoenix' difficulty, which he tries to solve in one treatise, occurs in the other, and is answered in like manner. But really there is no need to go further; if anyone who has read Ch. II of *Logica*, vol. II, reads the *Replicatio* without being convinced that the Magister in question was Wyclif himself (or at least some one holding the very same doctrines), I do not see by what means he can be convinced.

If we suppose, however, that towards the end of the XIV. century there existed in Bohemia a 'Magister' whose views and ideas were identical with those of Wyclif, it is possible that Huss may, as a dialectical exercise, have taken up the cudgels against him, and argued the question from a Nominalistic point of view. It has often happened that men, wishing to see things more clearly, have tried to reason themselves out of opinions towards which they had a strong leaning. Still I do not think this at all probable. There are here and there certain traces of fierceness — almost of a dialectical scuffle — that would ill suit such an attitude, which would be but feigned antagonism after all. There is a quiet exultation over a temporary embarrassment of the Magister, denying 'quo

ad presens' a consequence which he admitted to be formally right, that seems to me far different from the tone which Huss would have taken under similar circumstances. And it certainly seems to me that the writer is sincere in his attempts to make Wyclif contradict himself; nay, even in his belief that he has succeeded. Who he may have been, if not Huss, is a question of less importance: possibly some young Dominican or Franciscan friar who, being well skilled in the mental fencing that such a debate required, had challenged Wyclif to a public controversy, and afterwards wrote a short account of it. That the account was fair enough, and contained an impartial statement of both sides of the question, would be a sufficient reason for its being copied by Huss, to whom we may perhaps ascribe the closing words in which he shows that, in his opinion, Wyclif had the best of the argument, and his adversary was only able to proceed by 'extraneis cavillacionibus'. This view of the matter also clearly explains the reason why this treatise was not burnt by Archbishop Zbinca, as Lundström tells us — and also why it passed as a work of Wyclif; which it indeed is in part, as much as the stenographie report of a debate between Gladstone and Beaconsfield may be counted among the works of either.

A few words now as to the date. It is of course — since Wyclif is designated as 'Magister' — sufficiently fixed one way. But whether it be anterior to *Logica* and *De Actibus* it is impossible to say with any certitude. If *De Actibus* was anterior to Wyclif's Mastership, the conclusion is obvious; but we have seen that this is not at all sure. The greater development of Wyclif's arguments and lines of reasoning in *Logica* might lead us to think the *Replicatio* was written before it; but as it is, in all probability, only a report and a summary of a debate that seems to have really taken place, the proof falls to the ground, or at any rate is merely negative. There is nothing whatever to show that the debate took place *after* Logica was finished; but even that hypothesis is not improbable.

(3). Analysis of the Contents.

Properly speaking, the analysis of what is in itself the dryest and most succinct analysis — the skeleton of an skeleton, if such an expression may be allowed — were a task beyond the power of man. To follow the discussion properly, the whole of the tractate, or at least the whole

of the side-notes, should be read, with Wyclif's proofs in support of his thesis, and the adversary's denials and distinctions; with the adversary's proofs of his own counter-thesis, and the distinctions and denials given by Wyclif. But we may at least, in this debate, call the reader's attention to the weak point on each side, and to the argument best pressed home and least easily defended. In this duel of thoughts, if the report of the debate be fair, each of the combatants failed to parry a certain stroke; and (I think) both from the same reason: each was wrong to some extent.

On p. 138 we find the writer cornered by Wyclif's arguments, and actually making this astounding assertion: "A man cannot exist without any animated being existing; and yet it is not necessary for a man to be an animated being; for we can conceive circumstances under which a man is not an animated being. And thus his being animated is not essential, although it is necessary, according to his nature, that he be an animated being!" When such an admission is made, he that makes it must be hard pressed indeed, and Wyclif certainly scores here. Yet it was due to no weakness on the part of the adversary; the fault lay in the system. Nominalists contended that every universal term only signified a class of existing objects; if they did not exist, the Universal term was void of signification as a fact. A man is an animated being; but suppose only one man to exist, and all other animals to be destroyed, what becomes of the class? It would exist no longer, and the man would not be *an* animated being, since there would be no others with which he can form a class. It is necessary that man should be animated, and also a being, but not that he should be *an* animated being! At least it is thus, and only thus, that I can understand this answer, based upon a wrong and narrow conception of classes as composed of existing, not of possible members: a conception which most modern logicians repudiate. And with reason; for when we predicate *animated* of any being, we cannot help placing it in a possible class, whether there be other members or not. But, Wyclif maintaining that the class exists anteriorly to the existence of the animated individual, and his antagonist conceiving a class only as a multitude of similar individuals, the latter was obliged to deny what seems in reality undeniable.

Wyclif is, on the other hand, very hard pressed hunself in another part of the debate. On pp. 143—145, we find him striving to answer this objection: If the Universal is really one with its singular, it cannot

really include its singular, as it must by its universal nature. The underlying question is whether, if you allow that the Universal has a separate existence of its own, independent of any one of its singulars, you are able to count the Universal and its singular separately as two. Not only you are able, but you must; but if so, you have *two singulars,* one of which is not the other. And this must, in the system of Real Universals, be denied: the Universal and its singular are one. How then can one include the other? This is a palpable hit, and Wyclif does not affect to make light of it. He admits that the argument is well put and seemingly conclusive, but 'provisionally' (quo ad presens) denies the conclusion. And further, on p. 144, we see him in the meshes of a similar difficulty, first admitting the conclusion that 'the existence of one thing may be that of another', and then adding — as an after-thought, his opponent maliciously remarks — a distinction against which there is a strong and apparently unanswerable argument. Of course this is the crux of the matter. Give the Universal Humanity, Animation — what you will — only ideal existence, and the difficulty disappears. The problem is how to think them as *real things,* other than their singulars, yet identical with them; and if other, then singulars or units which can be counted; and yet universal. However great Wyclif's philosophical acumen may have been, it is no wonder if he floundered about a little just in this place. We may leave him so: this review of the two most interesting parts in the debate will, I think, suffice in lieu of the detailed contents of so short a treatise.

III. De Materia et Forma.

(1). The Manuscripts.

Of this work there are no fewer than seven manuscripts extant. Shirley gives six of them in his catalogue; the seventh is the Stockholm MS., written by Huss in all probability, and for that reason taken as text. Of the others, I omitted collating Prag. Univ. 8. G. 23 and 5. H. 16, because, having looked over them, I thought their variants of little importance to the text, and in most cases concurring with those already noted, except where they gave blunders of their own. I need not say that this step was only taken with the full concurrence of Dr Furnivall. Lundström's Introduction gives a very complete description of the Stock-

holm MS. The MSS. Prag. Univ. 8. F. 1. and 8. G. 6 have already been described in *De Composicione Hominis.*

The MS. 4. H. 9. of Prague University is bound in wooden boards, with a strong leather back. Its size is abont six inches by ten. The pagination is rather faulty; it extends from f. 1 to f. 262. The MS. is of paper, only the first and last outside leaves being of parchment, with half-effaced copies of Latin verses, some of which apparently relate to the irregular verbs. The words *Pomoz myhy boze* (Help me, O God) written in Bohemian over an erasure, sufficiently indicates the country of its origin.

On the inside cover is an old index of contents; a newer one has been inserted between the cover and the first (parchment) leaf. After the parchment there is one blank leaf that is not paginated. *De Universalibus* (i. e. the treatise which is part of *De Ente*) follows from f. 1 to f. 52 b. as in Shirley's catalogue, not to f. 56 b, as marked in the MS. table of contents. The writing is bold, legible, and probably belonging to the earlier years of the 15 th century; and the corrections are both numerous and carefully made. There are two columns to every page. The chapters are indicated, not only by red initial letters, but by numbers as well. *De Materia et Forma* (beginning on f. 52 b, the number immediately following being f. 57 — an error of course — and ending f. 73 b a). *De Composicione Hominis* (ff. 73 b a to 93 a b) and *De Tempore* (ff. 94 a to 115 b) are also written in the same hand and bear a strong external resemblance to each other. Between the two latter tracts there are, besides the verso of f. 93 b, seven unpaginated leaves. On f. 93 b and the first of the following leaves we find several sentences, beginning with *omnix fenix est,* in another and a sprawling hand; these are probably students' notes. Again, after f. 113 b, come four unnumbered pages, covered with metaphysical figures and diagrams, probably in the same hand which made the students' notes. On f. 114 we have the treatise *De Ydeis,* written in the first hand, apparently; but now there is only one column to each page; and this is also the case with the tract by St. Thomas, *De Encium Quiditate,* which follows from f. 130 b to f. 137 a. F. 137 b and one unnumbered page (*leaf?*) that follows contain a prayer in German, probably in the second (the student's) hand, to the Blessed Sacrament. It begins: "Heiliger Gottes leichnam ich sag' dir Lob . . ." From f. 138 to f. 193 we have an anti-Wycliffian work. *Contra universalia realia;* it begins with: "Probleuma

correspondens . . ." and ends with ". . . miserere michi peccatori". It is carefully annotated and corrected, with an index of contents on the seven unnumbered leaves that follow. On f. 193 b. comes the treatise *De Universalibus* (no. 10 of Shirley's catalogue) which he ascribes to Wyclif, and which extends to f. 258 b. The verso of the same leaf and the four concluding folios contain short tracts, the author of which, though he is plainly not Wyclif himself, confesses that what he writes is taken from Wyclif. The last two leaves are blank.

I had written a lengthy description of the Prag. Univ. MS. III. G. 10, at the time when I collated it; unfortunately that was ten years ago, and my notes are nowhere to be found. I therefore applied to the courtesy of the Head Librarian in Prague University for some description, no matter how short; and he, with a courtesy for which I feel very grateful, at once sent me the following note in Latin, which I give in the original:

III. G. 10. Codex chart. a. 1397 ff. 142 num. 21.5 × 15 cm. a duobus scribis dilucide exaratus sine rubricatione. Asseres corio rubro obducti. Umbilici et fibula desunt.

f. 1—4 b. Quaestiones philosophicae variae.

f. 5—30 b (anepigr.) *Johannis Wiclif Tractatus de materia et forma.* "Cum materia et forma sint universalia" × "aliquam essenciam preter deum".

f. 31 a—69 b. *Eiusdem tractatus de tempore.* "Capitulum primum, supponendo tempus esse declarat" × "subtrahendo ab eo orationis suffragia."

f. 70 a—104 b. *Eiusdem tractatus de universalibus.* "Libellus de universalibus continet 15 cap." × "et sic loquitur 4^0 phisic. tractatu de tempore, quod idem est."

f. 105 a—116 b. *Eiusdem Replicatio de universalibus.* "Presentem agrediendo replicationis materiam" × "nec depictus est rex. Explicit replicatio de universalibus, quam si quis bene conspexerit, videbit multo meliores raciones pro eisdem quam contra eadem, prime enim directe procedunt, alie vero cum extraneis cavellacionibus."

f. 117 a—118 a. Quaestiones philosophicae.

f. 119 a—137 b. *Johannis Wiclif tractatus de ideis.* "Tractando de ydeis primo oportet querere" × "creatura habet ydeam propriam in deo. Explicit tractatus de ydeis . . . a. d. 1397 finitus est liber iste in ferio III ante ascensionis . . . g. b. q."

f. 138 a—142 b. *Johannis Hus Quaestio "utrum materia nunc sub una forma substanciali et nunc sub alia existens sit informis."* (sed finis discrepat a fine quaestionis eiusdem VIII. G. 6. f. 84).

Sequuntur quaestiones aliae.

Asseribus adligata sunt fragmenta membran. cuiusdam cod saec. XIII argum. philos.

Vetus signat. bibl. S. J. Clement. Y II? n. 38.

It will scarce be necessary to state in conclusion, that I have found the work of editing this treatise much facilitated by the number of MSS. and consequent corrective variants. As to their respective value, it would naturally be supposed that the Stockholm MS. generally, and it seems with sufficient reason, supposed to have been written by John Huss, is the best. Yet much of course depended upon the MSS. at his disposal; and if he was born in 1373 and the date of the MS. is really 1398, he must have been too young to venture to correct any but palpable errors in the text he copied. This will account, no doubt, for several mistakes which the other MSS. correct. E (Prag. Univ. IV H. 9) seems to be a very good one, and gives many independent readings. Unfortunately it was collated after all the others, and usually only helps to bear out readings which are evidently better than the Stockholm MS. I was obliged to collate the latter part somewhat rapidly (See Note, p. 177).

(2). Authenticity and Date of the Work.

Shirley gives us, to prove the authenticity of the work, the testimony of Bishop Bale, and the author's name on MSS. 8. G. 23 and 5 H. 16; to which we must add his name at the ending of this tractate in the Stockholm manuscript. And though Bale, by Shirley's own admission is 'careless and uncritical', and the author's name on a manuscript does not prove much, still, taken together with other proofs, they seem here conclusive. Wyclif's style and manner of writing is as marked in this tractate as in any other of his best known works. His desire to 'base philosophy upon Scripture', clearly shown in his *Logica*, is here realized by a very great number of texts, almost as numerous indeed as those we find in the theological works. The authors from whom Wyclif quotes by preference are the same in this treatise; and Grosseteste, whom he constantly refers to — in fact, I believe, few long tractates are without some extract from this

author — is quoted at length in *De Materia et Forma* (p. 171). Besides, the works of Wyclif himself are quoted or mentioned, always, as usual with him, without saying whose works they are; so much so, that in *De Actibus Anime* his allusion (p. 12) to *libro tercio* without any mention of the author would naturally lead us to suppose he is speaking of a work of his own. *De Ydeis, De Trinitate, De Benedicta Incarnacione, De Tempore,* and *De Universalibus,* are all spoken of as either already known or *as about to appear:* and this last is no doubt the strongest proof of authenticity that can be given.

As to the date, we may fix it approximately by the tractates above mentioned. All save *De Benedicta Incarnacione* are referred to as already written; this one alone is to come. Now Mr Harris, in his Introduction to this work, gives an extremely ingenious argument to assign for its appearance one of the years between 1363 and 1367. *De Materia et Forma* came before it, and the whole *Summa de Ente* before that, since Wyclif refers to treatises in the Summa, and even to some of the treatises which stand last upon the Vienna list. *De composicione Hominis,* from its references (pp. 10, 14) to *De Universalibus*, must have been written after that treatise, and also, in all probability, after the *Summa;* and as it is the development and application of the doctrine contained in *De Materia et Forma*, it was most likely written after it. *De Ente Predicamentali* is certainly posterior to the *Summa*, from which it quotes, but I have found in it no quotation either from the present treatise or from *De Composicione Hominis*. If we admit Buddensieg's date of 1362 for that of Wyclif's denial of annihilation (towards which our author near the end of Logica is evidently strongly inclined) these works come in the following order, so far as I can judge. (1) The ten long tractates of the *Summa de Ente.* (2) *De Ente Predicamentali.* (3) *De Materia et Forma.* (4) *De Composicione Hominis;* and (5) De Benedicta *Incarnacione;* not to speak of the *Questiones 13* which seem to have belonged to an earlier period. It seems impossible for a man to have written so much in less than five years; therefore, if 1367 be really the latest date for *De Incarnacione*, I would also incline to think it not far from the earliest, and since *De Composicione Hominis* and *De Materia et Forma* are both short treatises, to suppose them written one year before; let us say, in 1366 or 1365. And even that would give us only four or five years for his immense work *De Ente,* together with the one that immediately followed it. This outpour

is all the more astonishing when we think of the amount of mental work requisite for writing upon such abstruse subjects.

(3). Contents of the Work.

Before giving a detailed analysis of Wyclif's doctrine, it is well to point out what Scholastics meant by *matter* and by *form*, so as to see how much of novelty there was in his views.

In general, and in the widest sense of all, form was that which made difference [1] between a thing existing in one way and existing in another; whilst matter was that which made it identical with itself, though modified. Thus, a piece of wax is now spherical, now cylindrical: sphericity or cylindricity would be the form: the underlying wax, identical notwithstanding the change, would be the matter. So far as the changes which we observe only bear upon shape, colour, and the other qualities perceived by sense, the doctrine seems a mere statement of facts. But it was affirmed that changes are going forward in nature which imply the production of a totally new being, and the destruction of the former one, so that we can no longer properly say, 'This is the same substance', as we can in the case of wax. For when, for instance, wax is subjected to destructive distillation, and can no longer revert to its former appearance, the change is deeper and more substantial. That — whatever it may be — which underlies the present vapour, is not now capable of being a soft yellow mass. And yet, since wax changes into this vapour, there is something which all the time is the subject both of the wax and the vapour. These are two specifically different substances, with the same identical substratum; and as wax as a sphere or a cylinder is indifferent to either of these shapes, so the mysterious substratum is indifferent to being visible or invisible, a combustible solid or a highly inflammable gas. But the wax comes from the pollen of a plant, which in its turn has taken all that it is from the surrounding elements; and here again we have a further substantial change: from the inorganic elements to the living plant, from the living plant to a product which is organic but not organized; from

[1] Not *the difference itself*. Wyclif, as we shall see, takes 'form' to mean this difference, whether substantial or accidental; and this of course, as a relation between two or more objects related, was necessarily a Universal.

the wax to the vapour. And throughout all these changes of external qualities, something remains unchanged; and that something must therefore be itself absolutely indeterminate, but capable of receiving any determination. This was Primal Matter; and its determinations — such at least as made it pass from one class of substance to another — were called Substantial Forms. Every stone, every plant, every animal, every man, was merely primal matter *plus* a substantial form of its own. These were not merely two names for the same thing, or the same thing from two points of view. *To be determined* and *to determine*, *to receive* and *to give*, are not only different, but *incompatible* attributes. What gives "waxness", though not really distinct from wax, must be distinct from that which, from not wax, becomes wax, or in other words receives "waxness".

Thus primal matter and substantial form are the two really different elements into which we must resolve everything that is subject to substantial change. Matter can in no case subsist without form, since it has no quality but receptibility of form, and even that is a purely passive quality. All the lower forms of which the activity is such that it cannot take place without matter, cease to exist so soon as another form takes their place; a form either actually informs matter or disappears altogether. When the daisy fades, when the butterfly or the nightingale dies, their forms — their *souls*, in Scholastic language — cease to be. In man alone, the form, which is the soul, "that by which the body is a living human body", has a distinct activity which does not depend upon matter; and therefore, when separated, though it is no longer actually a form, it need not cease to exist.

Such is the ordinary doctrine of the School, in which we must notice the appeal to the fact of change for the positing of the two elements, and to the principle of contrariety to prove their distinction from each other. The thing is matter, partly; it is partly form; but also it is partly not one, and partly not the other, since each are different. Yet they are both identical in space; where one is, there is the other: form pervades matter, matter upholds form. This doctrine is not so absurd as some may think. In the XVIIth century, Leibnitz had a return towards the end of his career to this old theory which he somewhere says "has a great deal of truth in it"; and even in our days a great many Neo-Scholastic philosophers have elaborated a theory of Matter and Form, identical in its essentials with the ancient one, but strictly agreeing with the data of

modern Physics and Chemistry. Some go so far as to assert that in Sir William Thompson's (Lord Kelvin's) theory of the vortex atom, we have the old doctrine: the vortex movement is form, the 'perfect fluid' is matter; the two together make the atom. But we may now return to Wyclif, who uses the same terms, as we shall see, to designate totally different ideas.

Ch. 1. Form may be verbally defined as that through, or according to which any being is intrinsically *this* or *thus*; if 'according to which', it is extrinsic form, or the pattern or exemplar of the thing made; if 'through which', it is intrinsic; substantial if it makes the thing to be *this thing*, accidental if it makes it to be *thus*. Wyclif, before dealing with extrinsic or ideal forms, gives us a few preliminary remarks on the two other species. Substantial form makes its substance to be what it is, and accidental form is merely the mode of a substance, i. e. the substance itself existing (or acting) in this or that way. Every accident requires a subject, and it is only in a different sense — that of beauty, goodness and perfection — that Augustine calls God the Supreme and self-existent Mode (pp. 163—167). All accidents are forms of a substance; as to their degree of entity, disputes, mostly verbal, have arisen; some denying, some doubting whether they had any or not. This is hardly consistent with Scripture. Of the two extreme doctrines — one of which says that every *thing* must be self-existent, and so an accident is nothing; and the other that God is the only substance, all creatures being accidents (the very essence of Spinoza's doctrine) — Wyclif declares that he admits neither, but states that the world, though it is an accident to God, is divided into accident and substance, accidents bearing the same relation to their substances as created substances to God. As the latter cannot exist without the First Cause, so the former cannot possibly exist without subjects. He concludes the chapter by saying, in reference no doubt to former and wearisome controversies on this point: "I am not going to argue the matter again, unless arguments which I have not yet heard be brought forward" (pp. 167—170). Notice why he admits, in seemingly perilous agreement with the Pantheistic doctrine of Spinoza, that 'the world is an accident to God'. It is because the Universal Man, who comprises all possible men — that is, all men past, present and future — is to him a reality which depends upon God, and, so far as I can understand, is an eternal existence in God; and so of all other created things.

Ch. 2. Here Wyclit treats ot Ideal forms, which are the patterns of all things, existing eternally in God. Neither here nor elsewhere have I been able to find ont whether the Universal Man — who according to him exists really and eternally in God, really and temporally in each of his singulars — is something distinct from the Divine Idea of man, or not. It may be that Wyclif considers the pattern to be something different from the reality created according to that pattern; but then he would have to admit an eternally created being. Or again, he may have thought that the Universal Man, *quà* existing in God's mind, is the pattern of the same, *quà* existing in singulars: but then there would be no real difference between the two. I must therefore confine myself to expounding his doctrine, as he sets it forth.

There is in God an innumerable multitude of ideal forms, one with Him in essence, though we may think of them as distinct from Him; and in this sense He is the Form of all beings. He is Himself the Form of the Three divine Persons, since Deity is common to all Three, and since the Three Persons are not distinct subjects, they are all Three one infinite Form. But sometimes the term is applied to the Person of the Word. Form emanates from matter, in created things, and the compound proceeds from both together; thus the Son emanates from the Father, and the Holy Ghost likewise proceeds from them. And this Supreme Form is the exemplar of all things. Conceive the world as a mere receptivity, a something that by itself would at once flow away into nonentity, and God present everywhere, giving to all things all their qualities of goodness, beauty and perfection (pp. 170—175). This comparison might easily be understood in a Pantheistic sense; those perfections we see in the world, are they not the very perfections of God? But Wyclif here, and indeed throughout his life, refuses to admit this conclusion, and we find him (p. 176) saying distinctly that God "forms outside of Himself and *makes* the beauty (formositatem) of every creature". We may think we see a necessary Pantheistic tendency in the whole of this doctrine; but Wyclif certainly did not see it; and no doubt be understood his own system better than we.

Ch. 3. Our author here begins to join issue with the School. A substantial form is, according to him, a form in the widest and most abstract sense in which the term was used: that by which anything is what it is. What makes a fire to be a fire? Igneity. What makes a stone to be a

stone? Petreity. What makes a man to be a man? Humanity. Therefore igneity, petreity, and humanity are substantial forms. This view, as we see, is not based upon the idea of substantial change, nor of a part of the substance remainng, while the other disappears. In a man there is nothing but humanity, in wax there is nothing but 'waxness'; these words denote the whole being in an abstract way, and that is all. Whereas the Scholastic doctrine as previously set forth, calls the soul the *form* of man, because it *gives* humanity to the body; but it is not itself humanity, for when it is eparated from the body, the existence of the man that was ceases. Wyclif ridicules this idea of a compound of form and matter which is, he says, "like a tunic and its fur". Such a form is absolutely undemonstrable; but Wyclif's notion of form can be very readily demonstrated (pp. 179—180). The rest of the chapter is a side-issue with Averrhoës, who is here accused of misunderstanding Aristotle.

Ch. 4. Objections to the theory are now propounded in order, not only to answer them, but to develop the theory itself. It is said that, according to Wyclif's position, all essential differences would be destroyed. In his view matter is, in the case of fire, *That which* possesses igneity; in the case of man, *That Which* possesses igneity; and so forth; the *That Which* (or subject, or matter, or, as he calls it a page or so further, *essence*) being identical in each case. To the modern mind, this subject is merely logical, and has no identity in these cases save that of the word; even the idea represented may be different. For Wyclif it was a reality. Therefore (the adversary argues) if your *That Which* now underlies igneity and now humanity, the same essence may be at one time fire, at another a man: which is the ruin of all specific differences. Wyclif replies that if *That Which* is to be called an essence, it is so in that sense in which essence abstracts from all differences and limitations, i. e. in a transcendental sense. Quality is *everything* that can be said of a subject; if so, the subject must be free from any qualities, and cannot properly be said to belong to a genus or a species (pp. 182—185). He admits that the same identical subject may be now fire, now water; but not at the same time. He contends that Aristotle's definition of matter applies exactly to his own transcendental Subject: *nec quid, nec quale, nec quantum* etc. It has no attribute but bare existence, is perpetual and cannot cease to be, save by annihilation, which is inconceivable (pp. 185—186). He gives the three examples which we often meet with in his works: the Divine

Essence that is identical with the Father and the Son, who are themselves distinct Persons; the Word that is God and Man at once, although Deity is not humanity; and Universal Humanity, which is identical with Peter and with Paul, though Peter and Paul are different individuals. Therefore, if I say: 'This same essence will be fire and will be water', it does not follow that fire will be water. Wyclif then goes on to examine various changes, a discussion into which we need not enter, since his system explains all of them except Transubstantiation, and he admits that there is here a question which he has not yet solved. Had he admitted that his Subject had a merely *logical* existence, there would have been no difficulty here at all. That which *was* bread *is* Christ's Body. *That which*, the subject of the change, remains of course, even in the orthodox explanation, but it is a mere word that stands, now for bread, now for Christ's Body. But Wyclif, in his Realism, was constrained to give the sentence the following signification: *That identically same real thing* which was bread is the Body of Christ. And the Church had decided that nothing remained of the bread save the outward appearances. Could these be taken as the underlying subject? Was the subject merely the same space, occupied by the appearances? and if so, could he grant that the space had a real existence of its own, without coming into conflict with the Church? No wonder that at this stage Wyclif avoided the discussion, and said: "Est longus sermo, et adhuc mihi inscrutabilis" (p. 186—189).

The rest of the chapter (pp. 189—196) is devoted to a discussion of creation, in the course of which Wyclif says that the essence of things existed before the things themselves (an assertion that he will explain and justify further on); of the objection that, the receptivity of matter being a perfection, the subject cannot be conceived as formless, to which he replies that bare receptivity of *anything* cannot be a form, since a form must determine a subject to be this or that in particular; and of the vestiges of the Trinity in creation. We now see clearly that anything for which a concrete term is made to stand, v. g. *man, horse, tree,* is in Wyclif's theory, the complete substance. What answers to the corresponding abstract terms, humanity, 'equinity', 'arboreity', is the form. And *that which* is either a horse, or a man, or a tree, is the subject or matter, which may be identically the same in each successively, as it is the same in nature for all of them simultaneously. And if we are yet more curious to know what this matter may be, we shall find, on reverting to *Logica,* that it is

nothing else but the atoms which fill the whole of space and correspond to each point of the same, and which at one time may form the body of a man, at another that of an ass, but never exist without any form.

Ch. 5. But Wyclif's antagonists are not yet beaten. Are we, they say, to deny the value of the following syllogism: *This is A; this same thing is B; therefore A is B?* Wyclif asserts that a given man is *that which* possesses humanity; that the same given man is identical with his humanity; yet he denies that matter is form, and that humanity is identical with that which possesses it. As to his examples, those of the Trinity and the Incarnation explain the unknown by what is more unknown yet; and that of the humanity, common to its singulars Peter and Paul, merely begs the question, since most philosophers deny the reality of Universals. Besides, if matter and form are two distinct natures, how can they interpenetrate each other so as to make up one compound (pp. 196—198)?

To this Wyclif replies by asserting that neither matter nor form nor compound is identical one with another, although they have one essence. He points out various senses of the words *nature* and *simplicity*, and then comes to the fundamental distinction which, in his theory, obtains between matter, form and compound. The former is the essence *quà* receptive of form; the latter is the same essence *quà* generable in matter. These, taken singly, are each the simple essence; when together, they are the compound. This therefore is identical with neither, but with both. It possesses the quality of being able to have a form, and also that of actually having it. We may call the abstract essence a 'nature', as we may call the compound or its components by the same name, but with different significations. And here we see where the syllogism given abore is faulty. A given man is identical with *that which*, etc. and he is also identical with his humanity; but he is not identical from the same point of view (pp. 198—203). — After touching on the question whether there may be many sorts of primal matter, Wyclif clears himself of blame as concerns the instances he has given. In Aristotle's time everybody admitted that a universal term was common to all its singulars, and the denial of this in modern times has driven men to absurd assertions. As to the Holy Trinity, Wyclif only intended to prove that anyone who maintained the absurdity of the system would be also obliged to deny the Catholic faith; and the example of Christ's double nature in one Person

was merely adduced as an illustration. That matter must be identical (pp. 203—206) with form because one interpenetrates the other, is an utterly worthless objection.

Ch. 6. (pp. 266—216) Another argument is discussed here. How can this 'created essence' be formless and simple? It is prior to its form, as already stated; yet it cannot exist without it: a flagrant contradiction. It is identical with matter, form and compound, since it is what is common to all three; but if so, it is threefold and not simple. We may give Wyclif's answer very briefly. There are various kinds of priority, amongst which priority in time and origin are most important. A sound is prior in its origin to the tune of which it forms a part, yet it is not prior to it in time. If primal matter is naturally prior to its form, yet cannot exist without one, when is it formless? Never, in time; but it is formless at what Wyclif calls the first instant of nature — a mode of being, not measured by time. What underlies anything must exist (at least in its nature) before that which it upholds. — As to simplicity, the argument equivocates with the various senses of this term. The same essence is matter, form and compound, i. e it consists of these three, just as God consists of the Three Persons, without ceasing to be perfectly simple. The difference is in the point of view you take. The essence of man, of that which is man, and of humanity, is one and the same.

Ch. 7. (pp. 216—225) consists mainly of the same objections as were given before, this time answered by an appeal to the Bible and Augustine, whose expressions coincide with the theory set forth. It is not of much interest, for the opponent's answer would be ready: neither the inspired authors nor the Father of the Church intended to write with Scholastic exactness. However, the argument, confirmed by a great number of quotations, seems to thow that Wyclif's theory agrees more closely with the letter of Holy Writ. Two points may be noted here. One that Wyclif approves of a theologian, who, to avoid sophistical affectation, would answer simply *yes* and *no* to the same question; of course in different senses. This, he says, is an affective mode of reasoning, but with cavillers only. The other is that our author finds himself contradicted by Aristotle. The latter says: "A statue is made of brass; brass is not made a statue." But Wyclif, quoting 'the water that was made wine', and Adam who *was* 'dust', and many other passages of a like nature, merely replies that he does not approve Aristotle's *dictum*.

Ch. 8. (pp. 225—234) Another series of objections is brought up and answered with great dialectical skill. But the most striking part of the chapter, at least in my eyes, is its conclusion. In the last five lines, Wyclif openly denies his doctrine of the Possibles; or at least it seems so. As I have pointed out in the essay at the beginning of this volume, nothing (according to him) was possible, except what actually exists or will exist at some time or other. It is at the bottom of his whole system, one of its foundation-stones, so to speak; and you have but to read in *Logica*, vol II. p. 86, lines 16—36, p. 87, lines 29—37, and p. 89, lines 1—9, to see what his opinion was upon this subject. Yet here he speaks of possible beings which never at any moment of time exist! I confess, when I saw these lines, I was sorely puzzled. Our philosopher's doctrine was not so venerable in my opinion that I should feel obliged, rather than to charge him with inconsistency, to declare the passage spurious, as controversialists are sometimes forced to do when much troubled by a text of the Bible; but nevertheless I was far from inclined to suppose Wyclif had contradicted himself. We must however choose between these two alternatives and a third, which I prefer. He may have used the word *possibiles* in the sense usually employed, either by oversight or in order to be more generally understood; or in other words, he may have meaut by *possibiles* things which he himself considered as impossible. But even this explanation is open to grave doubts, if we admit the lines as they stand to have been written by Wyclif. *Et posse existere,* for instance, sounds very strangely when we compare it with the lines in *Logica* that I have quoted.

Ch. 9. (pp. 235—242) It is lastly objected — and Wyclif very rightly keeps these most serious charges for the end — that the consequences of his theory lead to heresy. Every creature, having intelligible being that is real, would be coeternal with God. Nothing would come to an end, but all things would be perpetual. And this reality would mean the reality of actual, not of merely possible, existence: thus positing a world, created indeed, but eternally created, in contradiction to the faith of the Church, Wyclif's answer is perfectly orthodox; he distinguishes between actual existence and mere intelligibility. That alone which is eternal of any creature is its exemplar, which lives eternally in God. And here Wyclif gives a lengthy exposition of the text of St. John, ch. I. *Quod factum est in ipso vita erat* (according to the ancient punctuation); and this exposition is remarkably beautiful. Still, one cannot help thinking that the

difficulty might be urged farther. For, unless our authvr is inconsistent here, 'mere intelligibility' of which he speaks is but an unintelligibility. And if the Universal Man is independent of each and all of his singulars and is something really existing, is he not real from all eternity? Here, I think, Wyclif could but admit the conclusion, saying however (as I previously supposed) that in so far as this universal exists anteriorly to its singulars, it is the Ideal Man, not essentially other than God; and that the same, as existing in its singulars, is distinct from God. This would explain his remarkable statement on p. 239, that "he cannot go so for as to assert the identity of all things with God, since he would risk being misunderstood"; and when he denies (on the same page) that any creature exists eternally, he evidently means 'in so far as it is a creature, singular, and restricted to being at some moment of time'. In so far as it is identical with its Universal, which abstracts from all time, and has been from all eternity willed by God, it exists otherwise: and in so far it is not a creature. Our author, as we see, is able by this distinction to affirm in one sense that no creature is God, and in another to say — though he tells us he does not think himself justified in affirming this — that every being is God, "concedendo asinum et quodlibet nominabile esse Deum".

Such is the treatise *De materia et Forma,* in which we plainly see the principles laid down in *Logica* now worked out to very startling conclusions. It was already easy to perceive in the former work how nearly Wyclif's system approached to the Pantheism of the old Realists: here the resemblance becomes much more striking. He never, it is true, declared himself a Pantheist openly; and his boldness was such that, had he believed his system led to it, the declaration would no doubt have been made. But his subtility was as great as his boldness, and he probably found in his distinction grounds for holding back, which, inadequate though they might have seemed to other minds, were amply sufficient to his own. Others may have thought him a Pantheist; he certainly held, from first to last, that he was not.

DE ACTIBUS ANIME.

PRIMA PARS.

CAPITULUM PRIMUM.

F. 47^{a} | Gracia dicendarum restat tractare de actibus, potenciis, intencionibus, et habitibus anime. Et primo de actibus, cum sint nobis nociores, et media inducendi in noticias aliorum. Quod autem sunt actus anime, pauci vel nulli dissensiunt: nemo enim dubitat quin quandoque senciat, intelligat, velit, vel nolit, et sic de ceteris actibus in particulari. Et inpossibile est hominem sic se habere, nisi fuerit unum ens denominans ipsum esse huiusmodi; igitur tale ens est ponendum. Et cum denominacio sit accidentalis, et per consequens formalis, sequitur quod sit quoddam ens a quo formaliter et inmediate homo est denominatus esse sic actuatus; et illi enti, quodcunque fuerit, impono nomen actus. Visio ergo, audicio, olfaccio, gustacio, et taccio, vocantur actus sensuum particularium; sed sensacio, ymaginacio, estimacio, fantasiacio, et memoracio, vocantur actus continue sensuum necessariorum. Intelleccio, volucio, et nolucio, vocantur actus potenciarum non organicarum. Intellectus et voluntatis appetitus, vel desiderium appetibilis antequam habeatur, vocatur actus potencie appetitive vel concupiscibilis; et sic de fuga, que est actus illis contrarius. Sed delectacio, dolor, vel tristacio, est in fine consequens

Wyclif, taking as generally admitted the existence of certain mental acts, external sensation, internal feeling, volition and thought, together with the various

7. MS. descensiunt. 14. MS. uccu^{t9}·

Title: J. Wicleff . . . Anime *in red ink*; prima pars capitulum primum *deest;* larger initial G.

There is no division of chapters in the Cambridge MS. C. C. C. 103, only large initial letters here and there, and towards the middle, *Secunda Pars*.

emotions and passions,

habitum convenientis vel disconvenientis. Et tales actus consecuntur quascunque potencias anime, ut videtur; sed distinccius potenciam volutivam, que eciam non solum habet appetitum vel deappetitum, quod est volucio vel nolucio, sed habet actus sperandi vel desperandi, gaudendi, tristandi; et sic de multis actibus compositis vel aggregatis. Et sic virtutem irascibilem consecuntur actus irascendi, dedignandi, et sic de multis aliis, de quibus per ordinem tractabitur.

proceeds to enquire what they are.

De istis ergo, quoad questionem "si est", non est dubitandum, set supposito quod sunt que noto, tractandum est de suis quiditatibus.

Three theories: (1) That they are absolutely distinct from the mind; (2) that they are the mind; (3) that they are accidents under the category of Action.

In qua materia sunt tres opiniones; prima dicit quod omnis actus anime est qualitas, et res absoluta que potest per se existere, sicud corpus. Secunda dicit quod omnis actus anime est ipsa anima; et tercia dicit quod omnis actus anime est accidens de genere accionis.

11 Arguments against the first theory. I. If it were true, thought would not be an action of the thinking mind.

Contra primam sic: omnis actus denominans formaliter subiectum esse agens est accio. Sed omnis actus anime qualis primarie denominat formaliter subiectum esse agens: ergo omnis talis est accio. Maior patet ex diffinicione *quid nominis* accionis, quam ponit auctor sex principiorum, dicens quod descriptive accio est forma, secundum quam, in id quod subicitur, agere dicimur; ut declaratum est tercio libro. Et minor patet: nam quilibet actus anime denominat formaliter ipsam esse agentem, eo quod anima, cum sit activa, habet pro eius propria operacione vel accione intelleccionem vel intellectivam que supponitur esse actus anime. Nec potest esse melior distinccio accidencium, quam capiendo ex autoritate vel supposicione suas descripciones *quid nominis*, vel raciones generales, et videre utrum tales illis accidentibus conveniant.

II. A quality, distinct from the mind, could not at the same time be its activity, since these are distinct categories.

Secundo sic: Omnis qualitas denominat formaliter subiectum suum esse quale, ut patet ex descripcione Aristotelis, capitulo de qualitate; sed nullus actus anime sic denominat; ergo nullus talis est qualitas. Minor | sic: esse "quale" et esse "agens" sunt due denomina- F. 47[b]
ciones generalissime diffinientes: igitur, cum nulla forma potest formaliter et inmediate denominare talibus duabus

17. MS. 1[a] racio *in marg. in red ink; ib.* MS. omne. 19. p'nar[t] *pro* primarie. 22. MS. desc'p[e]. 23. MS. ɢbıɢ *pro* subicitur. 24. MS. maior. 30. MS. auto[te]. 33. MS. *in marg.* 2[a] racio *in red ink.*

22. *Auctor sex principiorum.* Gilbert de la Porrée.

denominacionibus, sequitur quod actus anime denominans immediate et formaliter animam esse agentem, non denominat immediate et formaliter ipsam esse qualem. Confirmatur per hoc quod actus sensitivi et intellectivi terminantur ad obiecta (secundum omnes loquentes de actibus), nec possunt cognosci nisi cognoscendo obiecta a quibus specificantur. Sed certum est quod nulla res absoluta in me terminatur ad unum distans a me, nec specificatur a me; sicud nec dependet vel in *esse* vel in *cognosci* ab uno coruptibili distante ab illo. Igitur etc. Sive enim actus sensitivi sint res absolute extense, sive multiplicate, cum non protenduntur usque ad obiectum extrinsecum, patet quod nec terminantur nec finiuntur ad illud.

Acts of sensation, v. g. are classified according to their different objects, which make them known to us; an absolute quality could not thus depend on something else.

Item, omnis potencia inanimati potest in eius operacionem, habita sufficienti applicacione proporcionati obiecti sine alia re absoluta media (ut patuit de accione, et quelibet posicio modernis temporibus concedit); sed in quantum potencia est simplicior et perfeccior, potest in eius finem cum paucioribus mediis, ut patet secundo De Celo: igitur multo magis virtus cognitiva potest in presencia proporcionati obiecti in eius operacionem, sine hoc quod producat rem absolutam mediam inter potenciam et habitum productum. Maior patet ex hoc, quod alterans sensibiliter aliud non alterat alteracione que sit res absoluta, nec movens aliud localiter movet alia re absoluta media inter motorem et motum, ut patet et patebit. Et minor patet, non solum de intelligenciis, de quibus ponit philosophus exemplum, sed de potenciis anime. Nam sensus communis sufficit comprehendere quodlibet sensibile cum paucioribus actibus quam sufficiunt sensus particulares; et sic de ymaginativa quoad sensum communem, et estimativa quoad ymaginativam; et intellectus hominis superaddit omnes illas vires. Intellectus angeli excedit intellectum hominis, et intellectus dei omnes alias potencias. Non igitur est racio quare agens sensibiliter extrinsecum potest in suam operacionem sine produccione rei absolute, quin per idem potest et agens spirituale intrinsecum.

III. No force in nature requires anything but the presence of its proper object to become active; the force of Mind. therefore, requires no quality to intervene between itself and its object.

For the higher any power is, the fewer acts it requires to attain its object.

Item, ponatur quod anima moveat voluntarie corpus Socratis localiter; tunc, secundum opinionem, ad omnem

IV. If a man's volition to move his body were

8. MS. al^{ta} *pro* absoluta. 12. MS. mla^{te} *pro* multiplicate. 14. MS. *in marg.* 3^{a} racio. 39. MS. *in marg.* 4^{a} racio.

20. *De Celo.* By Aristotle.

one absolute quality, existing throughout the body, it would act everywhere in the same way; each part being equally mobile, would move with equal swiftness; which is impossible, at least in the case of progressive movement.

There would therefore be as many such qualitative acts as there are different movements; and if we suppose one fundamental quality directing all these, it is unnecessary, since the soul can do this; and unintelligible besides without the soul. Suppose this volitional quality — the soul with its faculties existing no longer — to be miraculously preserved: it would continue to produce movement as before; which could not be, unless the quality knew of the various motions; it would no longer be a quality, but a subject, and identical with the soul.

punctum Socratis esset quedam qualitas absoluta producta, que est volucio; et illa inmediate movet corpus, et ex consequenti se ipsam. Sed contra: illa volucio nec potest poni extensa, nec uniformis, nec difformis, nec multiplicata, et sic de aliis proprietatibus dandum rei absolute; igitur, etc. Si enim sit multiplicata, cum eiusdem speciei sit virtus secundum locum motiva movens brutum (ut patet per Avicennam et racionem) sequeretur *a pari* illam esse multiplicatam; et per consequens appetitus sensitivus illam producens esset multiplicatus. Et cum eque mobilis sit quelibet pars corporea Socratis ut alia, sequitur quod talis res, naturaliter movens secundum eius ultimum, eque velociter moveret quamlibet partem ut aliam; quod est inpossibile de motu progressivo, cum alique partes quiescunt, et alie moventur uno motu, et alie alio; ut patet ex processu libri de progressu animalium. Oportet igitur ponere quotlibet actus et partes quiescentes, et diversimode motas, sicud ponunt philosophi de motoribus orbium. Nam si unus actus sit res absoluta que possit per se et in mediate movere ita dispariter tot partes, multo magis F. 48 anima; nam *b* volucio nunquam posset ita dispariter et ordinate movere unam partem corespondenter ad aliam quiescentem, nisi esset res volutiva et deliberativa. Nam, corupta omni anima et potencia anime Socratis *b*, actu manente conservato a deo, sufficeret cum dei conservacione naturaliter in operacionem suam, ut modo. Sed quomodo hoc, nisi cognosceret et informaret? Si autem est dare voluciones extensas infinitas, tunc volucio partis quiescentis contrariaretur volucioni partis mote. Et sic ad omnem punctum forent res eque fortes contrarie, contra se nitentes, et per consequens melius et facilius moveretur corpus Socratis, producta volucione in corde, vel mota parte, et non amplius, quam producta illa qualitate per totum. Confirmatur: *b* res naturaliter movet et manebit continue eque intensa, vel quantumlibet intendetur, ut pono; igitur, pari evidencia qua in principio ita velociter movet, movebit et in fine, cum non sit maior re *a*, nec virtus plus inclinans ad oppositum. Et iuxta hoc continue produceret anima novas res extensas, nunc ad pausandum partem, nunc ad movendum

5. MS. mlta *pro* multiplicata. 8. MS. ama. 13. MS. vote *pro* velociter. 18. et *before* partes *erased in* MS.

secundum unum motum, et nunc secundum alium. Et cum hoc non posset facere nisi actu elicito, cognoscendo quomodo oportet partes huiusmodi se habere, sequitur quodlibet progrediens cognoscere motus et ordines parcium progrediendi: quod non solum contradicit experiencie, sed racioni.

Nec valet dicere quod volucio movet secundum proporciones et disposiciones organorum et virtutum que debilitantur per continuacionem, quia eque bene proporcionatur pes quiescens sicud pes motus, et eque bene brachium motum ad anterius ut brachium motum ad posterius. Sicud igitur gravitas et levitas, caliditas, et cetera uniformia principia movendi movent subiecta uniformis capacitatis universaliter, sic esset de volucione, si esset res absoluta, nec debilitas virtutis vel spiritus que imperantur ab actu volendi inpediunt: tum quia frequenter vigorantur per motum et manent eque forcia moto homine ad sursum, sicut homine quiescente; tum eciam quia omnia inferiora voluntate sunt resistiva sibi, et eo velocius moverentur quo remitterentur in potenciis.

It is of no use to reply that the difference in the organs causes the difference in the movements; for they all have the same relation to volition, whether in movement or at rest. If it were a quality, it would act like gravity and heat, which move uniformly.

Nec valet dicere quod anima regulat sicud virtus in semine regulatur ad diversas informaciones fetus faciendas; tum quia ipsa non regulat, nisi per volucionem quam producit. Que cum fuerit producta, ita naturaliter agit, sicud caliditas producta a calefaciente; tum eciam quia, si anima sufficiat regulare illam rem extensam immediate sine distincto actu, per idem sufficeret regulare virtutem secundum locum motivam, et alias vires immediate sine re absoluta media producta. Nec est volucio tante efficacie ut secundum eius intencionem vel remissionem sufficiat velocius aut tardius movere corpus. Tunc enim sufficeret quilibet volare ut avis, et desistere a motu quando vellet, quia illa res absoluta habet inclinacionem naturalem ad sursum sicud virtus inducta a solido supposito, si ponitur sic, quod per se posita sufficeret elevare corpus et omnes vires quas iam movet
F. 48b ad sursum. Et sic actus | volendi intellective multiplicatus per totum celum esset res absoluta per se movens celum; et per illum moveret intelligencia celum; igitur per accidens, sicud per accidens celum est quantum.

If it be said that volitional movements are, like those of the seed in conception, regulated by the soul itself, this is worthless; for the soul regulates them only through volition. Besides, the answer implies that the soul, by means of mere volition, could determine any effect whatever; if it chose to fly in the air, it could do so.

And many other absurdities would follow.

9. MS. 9ciaeʒ. 14. MS. um^mia; *ib.* MS. v^te *pro* universaliter. 15. MS. fpm.

Et per idem quelibet forma absoluta per accidens denominat, et deus (sicud et quelibet res naturaliter causans), per accidens causat, quia per appetitum vel inclinacionem que mediat tanquam res absoluta. Et illa, si per se poneretur, esset vaga et nihil appetens, sicud dictum de virtute inducta in lapidem vel aliud violentatum. Cum enim omnis forma absoluta esset tante potens ipsa per se existente et conservata a deo, sicud ipsa conservata a suo subiecto, ut patet de sacramento altaris, sequitur quod volucio demonis movens grossum cadaver sufficeret per se movere illud idem, et a pari volucio hominis.

V. Acts of the mind are true, false, universal, particular &c. They cannot, therefore, be absolute qualities, which, as such, are no more universal or false than light is, or colour. But thought is true or false as the subject thinks truly or falsely; just as movement is quick or slow as the body moves quickly or slowly. If to elicit any mental act, we had to posit another distinct from the mind, we should be forced to posit an infinite multitude of acts, one produced by another, and none directly by the mind; if any can be elicited directly, why not all? And if the first act thus directly elicited, is an absolute quality, the soul creates and annihilates them; for not

Item, actus sunt veri, falsi, universales, particulares, confusi, distincti, et possunt per se produci sine actu distincto; igitur non sunt res absolute potentes per se existere. Consequencia probatur per hoc quod nulla res absoluta est falsa vel universalis, nisi quia signatur false vel universaliter. Cum igitur actus non signentur, eo quod distinguntur a speciebus, ut suppono pro nunc, igitur non pocius sunt res absolute universales vel false quam lux vel color. Intelleccio igitur est eo vera quo vere intelligitur, et eo falsa vel universalis quo false vel universaliter intelligitur, sicud motus est velox, eo quod mobile velociter movetur; et sic de aliis respectibus. Et quoad secundam partem antecedentis, non dicetur racio quare ad produccionem speciei vel alterius rei absolute requiritur actus distinctus a producto, quin per idem ad cuiuscunque rei absolute requirentis produccionem, requiritur actus distinctus. Et sequitur quod in quacunque intelleccione anime sunt infiniti actus antecedenter se producentes. Nec videtur racio quare anima non moveret se per se et inmediate, cum sic per se primo agens, et per se primo recipiens illam qualitatem, quod est contra demonstracionem Aristoteles 7° phisicorum; et sic crearet ac adnihilaret res absolutas, si sufficeret producere res absolutas taliter in seipsa. Nam significata *a* voluntate, que libere producit *b*, actum volendi in seipsa, certum est quod non producit illum de potencia materie potius quam producendo angelum in seipso. Nec oportet quod *b* res absoluta informet *a* voluntatem, quia possibile est quod

9. MS. sacrato altare. 13. MS. *in marg.* 5ª racio. 17. MS. ɔigl^e. 28. MS. vqc *pro* requirentis.

deus suspendat actum informandi manente conservacione *b* ad *a*, eo quod prius quoad consequenciam est conservacio quam informacio. Igitur solum dependet tunc a suo efficiente, quod non coincidit cum materia secundum Philosophum, quia tunc foret idem in actu et potencia respectu eiusdem. Igitur iuxta diffinicionem creacionis *b* crearetur; nec informacio impedit creacionem, sicud patet, posito quod Christus creavit in se albedinem informantem, sicud creat animam. Nec remanencia materie post corupcionem *b* qualitatis impedit adnihilacionem; sicud patet, si deus primo faceret formam substancialem vel accidentalem per se existere, et postmodum adnihilaret illam, servata materia in qua fuit. Si enim ad adnihilacionem forme requiritur adnihilacio cuiuscunque subiecti a quo poterit naturaliter dependere, tunc nulla | forma posset adnihilari, nisi quodlibet materiale adnihilaretur, quod est impossibile. Quandocunque igitur aliqua res absoluta secundum se et quamlibet partem corumpitur, tunc adnullatur vel adnihilatur. Ex quo racionaliter credi potest quod inpossibile est aliquam formam substancialem vel accidentalem esse rem absolutam distinctam a composito, et potentem per se existere, nisi forte fuerit anima intellectiva.

F. 49a

being material, they are not educed from matter, nor are they necessarily dependent upon a subject, since they are 'absolute accidents'. They proceed from no subject, but solely from an efficient cause: which implies creation. The remanence of matter is no argument against this, since God could create and annihilate a soul, the body remaining as it was. If not, annihilation were impossible, unless God annihilated the whole material world. We may thence infer, that with the exception of the human soul, no form, accidental or substantial, has absolute entity.

Confirmatur tripliciter: primo per hoc quod si forma elementi sit res absoluta composita ex partibus intensivis, et potens ex dei potencia per se esse sine materia, tunc possibile est deum successive secundum partes servare illam in eodem situ cum illo, quod iam est sui materia, sine hoc quod partes deminute quoad intensionem informent. Faciat igitur deus hoc successive in hora, et corespondenter post deminucionem adnihilet illud quod ante fuit forma, et patet quod nulla est racio quare sic adnihilaret formam, quin per idem, quandocunque corumperet illam in materia, secundum se totam adnihilaret illam.

If it had, we could conceive it as gradually ceasing to inform its matter, while still coëxisting with it; this would be tantamount to a gradual annihilation *quà* form.

Similiter non maiorem dependenciam naturalem habet forma a sua materia quam ab efficiente causante extrinseco; sed deus, corumpendo effectum secundum se totum, conservando illud efficiens extrinsecum quod

For as the creation of matter with a form that depends upon it implies the creation of that

25. MS. .1. *in marg.* 30, 31. MS. informacionem *pro* intensionem. 33. MS. illud *pro* illud quod. 37. MS. 2 *in marg.* 38. MS. cato = causato.

form, so the conservation of the form distinct and independent of its matter would imply the annihilation of the form.

conservavit ipsum naturaliter, non minus adnihilaret effectum. Igitur, per idem, non minus adnihilaret formam servando illud, quod fuit eius materia, totaliter distinctum. Sic enim, si deus simul crearet materiam cum forma dependente ab illa materia, non minus crearet formam; igitur, per idem, non obstante dependencia, adnihilaretur forma totaliter corupta, servata materia.

A thing might remain as it was, even were its form annihilated; for as matter and form are supposed to be two distinct things united without dependency, neither *causes* the other; dependency implying causation.

Similiter nullius rei absolute totaliter distincte a reliqua causata est dependencia ad eandem, et per consequens adnihilacio unius talis non impeditur esse adnihilacio propter servacionem alterius. Maior patet; quia, iuxta opinionem, quelibet forma substancialis vel accidentalis potest esse sine substancia; igitur non magis dependeret aliqua talis a subiecto quam econtra. Dependencia enim includit per se causacionem.

The answer is that there is a natural dependency, which can be removed by supernatural power. But this would take away all necessity from every cause except the First. Heat, to produce fire, would require a separate action of God. It would be more philosophical simply to deny that any quality depends upon matter; and to say that their production is creation, and their cessation, annihilation; which assertion would make substances of them. There is likewise in this

Nec valet dicere quod est naturalis dependencia si non fuerit impedimentum supernaturale, quia summa contingencia est quod unum causatur a relico causante secundo; ut si deus concurreret cum caliditate et faceret illam conservare ignem in *esse*. Subiectum enim potest manere idem in numero cum hoc, quod accidens sit independens ab illo. Igitur, quod accidens dependet ab illo, hoc habet per accidens ab extrinseco et non per se, sicud totum dependet a parte et respectus a subiecto. Nec habebit sic opinans evidenciam ad ponendum aliquam qualitatem dependere a materia, sed magis philosophicum esset sibi dicere quod non, ut patet de qualitate. Sicud igitur sequitur: *materia secundum se totam producitur, sine materia contribuente; igitur creatur:* ita, sequitur, *hec forma sic producitur, igitur creatur;* et si totaliter corumpitur, sic quod nihil sue essencie maneat, tunc adnihilatur. Unde libro contra Felicianum hereticum autorem: *Sola substancia est proprie creatura.* Et confirmacio est de composicione actus, ex hoc quod actus quo cognoscitur corpus esse album est cognicio albi, et cognicio qua cognoscitur corpus simpliciter, est cognicio simpliciter: sit igitur *a* prima et *b* secunda. Tunc patet quod non sit possibile *a* esse rem absolutam compositam et *b* simplicem, nisi *a* plures partes habuerit; vel *b* nullas

8. MS. 3 *in marg.* 18. MS. *in marg. Responsio.* 19. MS. ac *pro* ut. MS. fiet℞. 29. MS. q̂bᵗᵉ *pro* contribuente? 32. MS. f, *(erased)* lio; *ib.* felinu. 33. MS. caum *pro* autorem. 36. MS. 9oa *pro* cognicio albi. 37. MS. σ v-o sit.

F. 49b et *a* aliquas. | Quantum enim ad obiecta accidencium eque compositum est obiectum utriusque; et preter hoc de compositissimo obiecto potest haberi actus simplicissimus, et de obiecto simplicissimo actus compositissimus. Imo, actus non capit *esse* ab obiecto; igitur nec simplicitatem nec composicionem parcium: non igitur plus componitur *a* quam *b* ex suis partibus quantitativis vel qualitativis. Nec valet dicere quod *a* aggregatur ex multis actibus, quorum unus est *b*; quia stat actus simplices esse sine hoc quod supperaddatur illis actus componendi vel dividendi, et de actibus similibus simplicibus resultare actus contrarios et quantumlibet varios complexos. Non igitur est actus complexus unum ethrogeneum habens partes diversarum naturarum. Si igitur actus complexus esset una res absoluta indivisibilis, posset esse et cognosci sine partibus extremorum; quod est falsum.

system no way to affirm that one mental act is more complex than another; for the complexity of their objects has nothing to do with it. And yet some acts are certainly more, others less complex. And a complex act is not a mere aggregate of different acts, as it would be if each act had a distinct and absolute entity.

Item, contradiccionem claudit quod aliqua res potens per se existere sit essencialiter successiva, sicud patuit de motu et tempore, et illa posicio bene fatetur; sed multi sunt actus anime de se successive: igitur non sunt res huiusmodi absolute. Assumptum patet, discurrendo per actus cuiuscunque potencie cognitive. Nam tactus, percipiens subiectum continue, gustabit novum et novum gustabile descendens in gutture; olfactus eciam multiplicato continue novo odore percipiet novum et novum odorem. De auditu, quoad sonum, cum consistit in successione, patet idem; et de visione, quoad lumen continue novum. Et idem patet de oculis motis continue percipiendo virtute visivam super partes uniformis continui ad individuum illius uniformantem; vel aliter, intuendo per foramen vel eandem incidenciam idem visibile secundum diversas partes que obiciuntur visui. De omnibus sensacionibus interioribus patet idem, ut de sensacione continua motus temporis, vel alterius successivi. Nam inpossibile est virtutem sensibilem vel insensibilem cognoscere continue datum motum vel tempus, nisi cognicio sit successiva, vel posset esse; quia estimando et ymaginando motum successivum ex mocione sensativa motus et immutacione sensus, patet quod omnes sensus interiores continue noviter immutabuntur,

VI. It is admitted that nothing capable of self-existence is successive in its essence. Now many mental acts are such; as, v. g. the external senses, of which the sensations are as successive as their changing objects;

and the internal feelings; for our imaginations of time and movement require succession. The same is true of our other mental acts.

13, 14. MS. ethro^u *pro* ethrogeneum. 18. MS. *in marg.* 6 racio.
31. MS. at℮. 34. MS. ſſ'ȝbȝ.

sicud et intellectus, saltem de possibili. Et idem patet de discursu ymaginacionis reminiscentis estimative, fantastice, vel racionis discurrentis vel silogizantis, qui omnes actus possunt consistere in successione; et idem patet de actibus dolendi, tristandi, volendi, nolendi etc.

This difficulty is explained away by asserting that one act suffices for the perception of successive things; or that every instant a fresh complex act arises; or that there are two distinct acts, one successive, the other not.

Hic sunt tres responsiones. Prima dicit quod continue manebit idem actus quo successive sencientur diversa sensibilia; secunda dicit quod pro quolibet instanti erit novus actus instantaneus compositus actuum successivorum, vel nullus erit successivus; et tercia dicit quod pro quolibet instanti erit tam actus instantaneus quam successivus novus, et sic continue erunt duo actus quorum neuter erit pars alterius, nec ambo erunt partes alicuius tercii.

Refutation of the first answer. Unless there were a continual change in the acts, corresponding to that of the objects, we should perceive the successive in a way contrary to its nature.

Contra primam responsionem sic.

Universaliter actus variantur ad variacionem obiectorum, sed continue erunt novi et novi motus per se sentiti; igitur continue novi et novi actus senciendi. Aliter enim in qualibet sensacione motus esset inevitabiliter error circa illud quod non posset esse. |

Sensation of movement implies continuity of change in presentation and representation; consequently continually changing mental acts.

Similiter continue senciendo motum sensibilem erunt F. 50a continue nove species acte et nove intenciones noviter signantes naturaliter novos motus; igitur novi actus. Consequencia patet ex [hoc] quod nec species nec intenciones possunt causari sine novis actibus quibus eliciantur, nec eadem species singularis naturaliter signare sic diversa.

Given that the whole of that which is perceived is in a state of continual change, it is impossible that the corresponding mental acts remain the same; for then there would no longer be correspondence; and, however, uniform the change may be, each part is perceived by a fresh act.

Similiter, posito quod Socrates movetur successive, nunc ascendendo, nunc descendendo, nunc circulariter, nunc recte, sicud patet esse possibile, cum hoc quod continue varietur in coloribus et continue percipiatur moveri, tunc non manebit precise idem actus nec precise eadem intencio, quia motus disparium specierum sencietur; diversis igitur sensacionibus et diversis similitudinibus in specie sencientur, et per idem contingit quantumlibet uniformem motum sentire continue novo et novo actu.

4. MS. actum. 6. MS. nota tres responsiones *in marg.* 9. MS. 9po9 acc^u scceffi^m. 15. MS. 1 *in marg.* 21. MS. 2 *in marg.* 24. hoc *deest* MS. 28. MS. 3 *in marg.* 32. MS. p'e. 37. MS. dictu.

24. *Species, intenciones.* Though these words do not, in Mediaeval Psychology, quite exactly correspond to the *presentation* and *representation* of modern thought, I have used the latter terms, because the difference is here irrelevant.

Sensation is only of that which is present.

Similiter, quandocunque evanescit sensibile et sensacio illius sensibilis, cum sensacio non sit nisi presencium; sicud dicunt autores ponentes in hoc diversitatem inter sensum communem et ymaginacionem. Et concordat ethimologia nominis qua dicitur *presens* quasi *presensus*.

Now if, as happens, this present is continually differing, one single act would represent it as present when it is past or future, i. e. otherwise than it is. And if we can perceive the smallest part of what is not present, why not the whole of the past and future?

Sed in multis sensacionibus prenarratis erunt continue nova et nova sensibilia; igitur continue nove et nove sensaciones; vel aliter non esset possibile me videre aliquid nisi videtur illud, quod non posset esse; et per idem viderem rem antequam esset. Sed quis est tam acute videns aut propheta, ut videat omnes coniuncciones, opposiciones, vel affectus celestium corporum futuros et preteritos? Nam non dicetur racio quare videt aliquam partem motus celi preteritam totaliter vel futuram, quin per idem quamlibet sic videret.

Similiter, supposito quod vidissem *a* motum per horam, et *b* motus sit futurus continuus cum *a,* unus homo minus dispositus quam ego sentiret *b* motum substancia commune nova; nec sensacio preterita impedit me elicere novos actus et novas species; igitur, cum ego sim eque bene applicatus ut ille, videtur quod ego eliciam novos actus et novas similitudines super priores. Minor patet ex hoc, quod simul possum habere actus et species similes de motibus similibus: igitur multo magis de uno motu simili post relicum.

We cannot receive more impressions than we feel; to each of the continually changing impressions there must correspond an act, which would give us an infinite multitude of acts in any space of time, however short.

Similiter, quam capax est medium specierum, tam capax est virtus cognitiva hominis; sed nullum medium est determinatum quoad multitudinem specierum: igitur nec virtus hominis sensitiva. Et cum nullo modo magis est sensus receptivus quam elicitivus, sequitur quod pro quolibet instanti natus est elicere actum. Nec prior actus impedit, stante virtute, quia etsi continue fuisset homo intentus in aliquod sensibile et quantumlibet parva foret interrupcio (virtute salva et circumstanciis debitis) non minus subito videret visibile; imo si, pro quolibet instanti, stantibus paribus, esset novum appositum, pro quolibet instanti videret illud, eo quod non est dare

1. MS. 4 *in marg.* 2. MS. n϶ *pro* nisi. 16. MS. 5 *in marg.* 18, 19. MS. mem sba *pro* motum substancia. 21. MS. σ͡ι *pro* sim. 26. MS. 6 *in marg.* 29. MS. no° *pro* nullo modo. 33. in *deest* MS.

18. *Substancia commune nova.* I can make nothing of this, which possibly might give the key to the whole passage.

maximam multitudinem actuum quos poterit virtus elicere, sed in quantolibet tempore potest infinitum multos elicere.

Refutation of the other two answers. A fresh complex act of sensation arising at each instant, would suppose an infinite number of perfections welling from and upheld by the soul.

Contra duas alias opiniones arguitur primo, quoad illud in quo conveniunt. Primo enim sequitur quod quelibet anima sit infinitum perfecta, quia infinitarum rerum non communicancium eque perfectarum est in quantolibet tempore productiva, et omnium illarum simul conservativa, igitur est | infinitum perfectibilis per tales; et F. 50^{b}
cum iam habeat infinitas potencias activas et passivas ad tales, sic quod iam non sit infinitum perfeccior quam tunc esset, sequitur quod quelibet sit infinitum perfecta.

Such acts, besides, must have a certain duration, and thus the explanation of lasting sensations by instantaneous acts falls to the ground.

Similiter, dum virtus elicuerit actum, non est in eius potestate ipsum dimittere quandocunque vult, sed habet naturalem periodum. Igitur superfluit pro quolibet instanti elicere novum, vel si hoc fiat, infiniti non communicantes simul manebunt. Assumptum patet de actu cogitandi, volendi, nolendi, et universaliter de quolibet actu apprehendendi convenit: non corumpitur, nisi forte a contrario. Cum igitur anima infinitos actus potest simul habere, et sit eque conservativa sui per se effectus, sicud productiva, nec voluntarie corumpet tales actus sentiendi, quia non posset cogitare sic de illis, sequitur quod non continue subito corumpetur.

It is a fact that sensation lasts, after the object is no longer presented; as in the case of a brand whirled round.

Similiter experiencia concordat quod sensaciones excellencium sensibilium manent in virtute in illorum absencia; igitur omnium sensibilium sensaciones manent per aliquantum tempus. Antecedens patet de ticione ignito circumducto in tenebra, qui videtur delinquere post se calentem circulum propter servaciones actuum; et sic patet de intuentibus solem vel nivem et divertentibus in loca tenebrosa, ut ponit Alacen et alii, recitando multa talia experimenta. Omnis igitur actus sensitivus est essencialiter durativus.

Each of such hypothetical acts, if instantaneously

Similiter nullius successivi est dare primum instans vel ultimum, ut patet tercio libro; sed talium sensacionum

4. MS. 1 *in marg.* 7. MS. qpfcā4 *pro* eque perfectarum. 14. MS. 2 *in marg.* 26. MS. 3 *in marg.* 33. MS. alacē. 36. MS. 4 *in marg.*

33. Alhacen, an Arabian optician of the 11th century. 37. *Ut patet tercio libro.* In Shirley's catalogue, there is, "On f. 84vo we read: 'iuxta dicta tercio libro scibile mensurat scienciam de eodem.' What is this third book?" Here we find an

est dare primum instans et ultimum: igitur non sunt successive. Confirmatur per hoc, quod in eadem specie specialissima non est dare duo, quorum unum sit successivum et aliud permanens, cum successivum et permanens sunt differencie generum, vel saltem plus quam differencie individuales. Non enim potest aliqua accio vel denominacio esse successiva, nisi fuerit successive unum ens in adquiri vel deperdi; set hic nec intendetur nec remittetur actus, ut pono, nec erit aliqua materia continua a qua caperet sensacio suam continuitatem; igitur etc. Et quod indivisibile sit pars quantitativa divisibilis creditur esse inpossibile.

permanent, is indivisible, is of another nature than what is successive and divisible, and cannot account for it.

Ideo dicit 2^{a} particula secunde opinionis quod non erit una sensacio composita ex illis instantaneis, nec erit alia successiva. Sed contra illud est quod declaratum est alibi: motum successivum non posse sentiri per tempus, nisi sensacione successiva. Sicud igitur homo continue senciet, sic sensacione continua senciet, et non continua sensacione si non successiva; igitur, etc. Si enim omnis alius motus foret subductus preter sensacionem illam, ad hoc foret tempus continuum, et per consequens motus successivus continuus in senciendo.

To make one whole of sensation out of the instantaneous and the successive impressions is absurd; instantaneous acts cannot feel a successive continuum *as* successive.

Contra terciam responsionem procedunt raciones facte contra actus successivos. Et patet quod est irracionalis, cum superfluit respectu eiusdem virtutis et eiusdem sensibilis ponere duos actus eque intelligibiles, eque distinctos

And to separate sensation into two distinct series of acts is beside the mark, for it does not explain the

13. MS. 5 *in marg.* 23. MS. 6 *in marg.* 26. MS. in^{les} *pro* intelligibiles.

allusion to the third book already, and this allusion is several times repeated in the course of the work. A little further (p. 14) there is an allusion to the *second* book, concerning the optic axis and distinct vision. Now in Logica, Vol. II, p. 181, we find *this very statement*, and at the end of the chapter: *Notetur liber tercius Vitulonis* (Vitellionis). I have not been able to see the work of the Polish optician, but am inclined to think that it was so well known in Oxford in those days that further reference to it was thought unnecessary. That several of the *dicta* quoted are rather metaphysical than optical does not militate against this possibility, for all natural philosophers were then metaphysicians. Wyclif cannot be alluding to his own Logica, for the statement mentioned occurs in his *Tractatus Tercius*. It is true that there he speaks of the third, not the second book of Vitellion, but this may be a mistake of the copyist, or the same details may be found in both books. Further (chap. III) we shall find the name of the celebrated optician joined to a reference to his book.

unity of continuous sensation.

per omnia, et eque sufficientes ad denominandum virtutem apprehendentem, quorum actuum neuter sit reducibilis ad alterum, nec ambo ad tercium. Nam eque perfecte perciperet homo pro hoc instanti illo actu instantaneo, sicud ambobus simul: immo non invenietur principium individuans vel distinguens unum actum ab alio, potissime si actus successivus sit res absoluta habens pro hoc instanti unum indivisibile sui productum secundum se totum. |

VII. The hypothesis that these acts are capable of existing by themselves is against their consisting, as they do, of (1) quantitative and (2) qualitative parts.

Item, actus tales componentur ex suis partibus quantitativis et qualitativis, quod non potest sustineri cum hoc quod sint res absolute potentes per se existere; igitur non sic est. Assumptum patet de actibus videndi, et per idem de aliis quibuscunque: nam, videndo compositum obiectum, alius actus corespondet uni parti vise et alius alteri, et ex illis componitur quantitative unus magnus actus: igitur etc. F. 51

(1) *Quantitative.* One part of what we see is not the other. We see more or less distinctly; the same act cannot now perceive one object, now another, so it cannot exist independently of its object.

Maior patet tripliciter: primo per hoc, quod videndo diversas partes eiusdem materialis alius actus est confusior, et alius distinccior, ut est propinquior puncto coniunccionis duorum axium piramidum radialium, ut dictum est secundo libro. Igitur, cum nec idem potest esse conservatus se ipso, nec idem actus terminari eque primo ad omnino disparata obiecta, sequitur quod alius actus corespondet uni parti et alius alteri, et hinc dicitur quod actus diversificantur penes obiecta. Si enim idem actus posset manere nunc unius subiecti et nunc alterius, non dependeret a subiecto nec a specie causante.

The sight of one colour is not the same act as the sight of another, though simultaneous therewith.

Similiter, frequenter intuendo idem obiectum, alia est species visionis qua videtur una pars, et alia species qua videtur alia; igitur partes videntur distinccius visionibus in specie, et per idem cuiuscunque quod videtur quantum partes videntur distinctis visionibus, saltem in numero. Maior patet de re colorata visa secundum diversas partes diversis coloribus in specie coloratas, vel diversimode figuratas, ut est facies, vel aliter difformes vel diversificatas, in quibus omnibus sunt diverse visiones corespondentes diversis partibus, ut patet ex dictis alibi; igitur etc.

10. MS. 7 racio *in marg.* 14, 15. MS. co^lu *pro* compositum. 17. MS. 1 *in marg.* 23. MS. 9f39 *pro* conservatus. 24. MS. ɕba = subiecta. 29. MS. 2 *in marg.*

22. *Secundo libro.* See note, p. 13.

Similiter, posito quod *a* et *b* essent discontinuata, visu percipiente discontinuacionem eorum, essent diverse visiones presumpte ad percepcionem discontinuacionis, ut patet de sensacione sensibilium communium: sed stat cum hoc quod illa continentur, stantibus visionibus et virtute percipiente continuacionem. Igitur stat de eodem continuo habere multas visiones distinctas secundum partes. Minor patet ex hoc, quod secundum opinionem, viso quantocunque albo, et ablatis successive quotquot partibus visis, manebit continue eadem visio, et nulla corumpetur, quia nulla corumpetur nisi parti coresponderet specialis visio. Igitur multo magis propter motum vel continuacionem unius cum relico non oportet visionem corumpi. Et sequitur probandum. Quo habito, patet quod ex visionibus parcium componitur una visio quantitative. Nam ille parciales visiones sunt cause totalis visionis, et non nisi intrinsece; quia aliter esset processus in infinitum in causis essencialiter ordinatis, quia essencialibus, quarum nulla sit pars alterius: igitur relinquitur quod sunt partes totalis visionis.

Quod autem visio componitur ex suis partibus intensivis tripliciter suadetur. Primo per hoc quod videtur esse una res absoluta que potest intendi propter quamlibet octo circumstanciarum videndi; et impossibile est rem absolutam esse plus intensam sine eius condensacione vel reali adquisicione rei absolute, ut patuit de qualitate. Igitur oportet ad intensionem visionis generari novas res absolutas.

Similiter, videndo album per cristallum, vel quodlibet compositum per diaphanum, simul visum videntur con-
F. 51b fuse duo disparata secundum eius pyramidem | radialem; igitur actus corespondens est compositus ex suis partibus intensivis. Consequencia patet per hoc quod ille visiones sunt partes tocius visionis et non quantitative: igitur intensive.

Similiter, posito quod *a* album intendatur sic quod ad *b* albedinem continue visam adveniat per coextensionem

Our sight of two separate things is one sight,

for were either of them separately to disappear, sight would still remain;

much more is our sight of a continuum one sight,

made up of partial acts of vision, which cause a quantitative whole.

(2) *Qualitative*, or intensive parts.

Sight depends upon eight varying influences: if it were an entity capable of self existence, each of these would produce new entities by the intension of sight which they effect.

When we look at anything through a glass we see it and the glass as different, though coinciding in space. These two objects imply intensive, not extended parts of vision.

If a certain thing gradually becomes equally white with another, seen at the same time, the

1. MS. 3 *in marg.* 22. MS. 1 *in marg.* 26. MS. esse *deest.* 30. MS. 2 *in marg.* 37. MS. 3 *in marg.*

25. *Circumstanciarum.* See Logica, Vol. II, p. 176. 35. *Non quantitative.* Wyclif here supposes as an evident fact that the eye does not perceive directly the third dimension of space.

corresponding sights, being distinct as to their objects, yet making one, imply qualitative difference in the acts.

c albedo simul visa: patet quod visio corespondens *b* et visio corespondens *c* distinguntur secundum distinccionem visorum, cum utraque posset manere sine altera, et per idem componunt intensive unam visionem. Nam si nulli parti corespondet propria visio, tunc, viso albo continue intenso, pro quolibet instanti esset nova visio secundum se totam; et stat proxima racio.

Thus every mental act, even thinking and willing, must consist of spatial and intensive parts, if it be a self-existing entity.

Ex istis credi potest quod non potest salvari actus esse res absolutas, nisi componantur tam ex suis quantitativis quam qualitativis; et idem inveniet homo de actibus quarumcunque virtutum interiorum, ut de actu intellectus vel voluntatis, dum feruntur super aliquod divisibile secundum racionem divisibilis.

But this is impossible, for presentation itself is not extended; still less can the acts based upon it be so.

Quo patente, probatur quod repugnat ipsos actus esse res sic absolutas; primo per hoc quod nulla species et per consequens nullus actus elicitus a specie est extensus, et per consequens non est res absoluta habens partes quantitativas: antecedens post modum probabitur.

Besides, if the act of sensation, had intensive parts, then its subject (the soul) would correspondingly have intensive parts: which is inadmissible.

Similiter, si haberet partes intensivas, subiectum eius corespondenter haberet partes intensivas denominatas ab illis partibus intensivis qualitatum; sed hoc non est verum de subiecto huiusmodi specierum: igitur, etc. Prima consequencia videtur per hoc, quod si sunt res absolute denominantes, quelibet illarum habet propriam denominacionem; et, cum infinitum remissa sit aliqua, sequitur vel quod totum subiectum sit infinitum remissum vel infinitum remissa aliqua est pars; et cum non est dare percipientem partem nisi intensivam, sequitur quod, quacunque forma existente re absoluta que possit per se existere et composita ex suis partibus intensivis, oportet subiectum corespondenter componi.

Less intensity in one of these supposed intensive parts would imply either less or more distinctness of perception. Not more: for the very distinctness of the perceptions of each part would interfere; the better we see the glass, the less distinctly we see through it; and vice versa.

Similiter, tunc pars remissior talis actus foret vel confusior vel distinccior. Si distinccior, inpossibile esset quicquam tali actu confuse concipere, nisi infinitum distincte conciperetur alia eius pars, cum tunc partes qualitative communiter confusius apprehenduntur, sicud patet de viso per vitreum cristallum vel aliud diaphanum. Si confusior, tunc excellenti lumine radiante super po-

14. MS. 1 *in marg.* 19. MS. 2 *in marg.* 25. re fa *pro* remissa and in the following lines. 28. MS. pti^{te} *pro* percipientem. 32. MS. 3 *in marg.*

27. *Aliqua est pars.* The argument is intelligible, but the text seems to be corrupt here.

litum splendidum vel excellenter coloratum, foret actus videndi remissior, quia certum est secundum perspectivos et experiencias quod lumen forte in talibus multa visibilia occultat et visionem confundit. Et cum visio est intensior, sicud patet ex eius forti impressione, et de actibus apprehendendi universalia, est maior color; nam apprehendendo figuram in communi sub gradu ut octo, patet quod percipiendo partes intensivas actus vel ad species vel ad individua illius generis secundum equales et appropriatas proporciones, vel foret totus actus infinitum intensus, vel quelibet talis pars infinitum remissa. Nec valet dicere quod quelibet pars actus extenditur, sicud ad omnem speciem vel individuum figure; tum quia tunc non distinguerentur penes obiecta, tum quia tunc non confusius signarentur sub partibus parcialibus actibus quam totalibus, cum infinitum confusius F. 52a signantur illa quam genus signatum | gradu ut octo.

Not less; for then, by a contrary conclusion, a dazzling light or colour would be *more* distinctly seen than a moderate one; which contradicts experience.

Similiter, si actus componitur sic intensive, quandocunque videretur unum album cum alio, ex visionibus eorum fieret una intensior: quod est inpossibile, quia tunc apprehenderet esse unum duplum intensive ad utrumlibet illorum, secundum intencionem actus, et sic infinitum intensa foret visio, videndo quodcunque uniforme; cuius oppositum experimur, cum visiones similium se confundunt. Et prima consequencia videtur per hoc, quod ad omnem punctum cerebri ubi est visio unius visorum, est visio cuiuscunque: igitur, cum omne natum sit componi intensive ex talibus, sequitur quod unum componitur ex talibus.

If the act of sight had intensive parts, the total act would be infinitely intense in the case of seeing anything homogeneously producing an impression.

Similiter, si visio sit res absolute extensa, tunc quelibet pars quantitativa primi sui subiecti informaretur parte sui, et vere denominaretur videns, et per con-

If vision is an extended thing, it is coëxtended with that which it sees; the

18. MS. 4 *in marg.* 27. MS. omī *pro* omne. 30. MS. 5 *in marg.*

18. *Similiter.* The line of Wyclif's argument runs thus: The act of sight, as it is elicited in our brain, gives us awareness of the colour seen, independently of its size. Suppose this colour to be a white surface; each point that is white goes to make up the intensity of this awareness. Now if it were really composed of intensive parts, each point (of which there is an infinite multitude) contributing a certain intensity to the act, this act would be infinitely intense. To each point there would correspond a certain intensive part. — The adversaries would no doubt answer that the intensity contributed by each point of the surface is infinitely small.

thing seen is identical with that which sees, we have to admit that the act of vision exists in the colours themselves, and that a mirror is capable of sight.

sequens vivens et cognoscens; quod nemo diceret. Quis enim diceret quod speculum cristalinum est animatum, videt et cognoscit actu elicito differencias visibilium? Et consequencia patet ex hoc quod inpossibile est formam omogeneam absolutam extendi per subiectum, nisi quelibet eius pars habeat disparem informacionem, et per consequens dispar subiectum primum ipsa informatum.

It does not follow, because an act is elicited in matter, that it is elicited by that matter; for spirits act in and through corporal substances which do not share in their acts.

Similiter, non sequitur: *in isto corpore et per illud corpus est actus elicitus, igitur illud corpus elicit illud actum.* Igitur non est medium ad probandum quod spiritus corporeus, vel quelibet alia pars corporea, elicit actum cognoscendi. Maior patet ex hoc quod intelligencia separata potest sentire vel percipere qualitatem medii in medio et per medium, absque hoc quod communicet medio accionem suam. Nec est talis potencia extensa per corpus, ut probabitur postmodum: igitur etc.

VIII. If the act of sensation (being of all things the most knowable and the most capable of making itself known) were an entity by itself, it would be necessarily the most known.

Item, si actus esset res absoluta, potens per se existere, tunc esset summe proportionatus ad gignendum noticiam sui ipsius, et imprimendum eius speciem in virtute; quod probabitur multipliciter esse falsum. Et consequencia probatur per hoc quod nihil est magis cognitum quam actus, ut patet de doloribus, sensacionibus et universaliter omnibus intelleccionibus, in tantum quod nemo dubitat utrum dolet, delectatur, vigilat, dormit, sentit, intelligit, vult, amat, vel odit, etc Et quod natus est gignere suam speciem videtur per hoc, quod est activus in sensum, et naturaliter inclinatur ad manifestandum seipsum, et potest de illo haberi species in eius absencia, et per consequens in eius presencia, per quam ipse apprehendatur confuse; igitur composite.

This is false: for it would follow thence that the devil knows our thoughts better than he knows material things. For if awareness, according to the hypothesis,

Arguitur sic: primo, videtur sequi quod demon potest longe melius cognoscere cogitacionem et intencionem hominis quam potest cognoscere aliquod materiale, quod est falsum. Et consequencia patet per hoc quod cogitacio est una res absoluta potens per se existere vel in lapide aut quocunque alio corpore, ut dicit responsio,

2. MS. fpc cristalinus est animatus. 8. MS. 6 *in marg.* 17. MS. 8 *racio in marg.* 30. MS. 9[te] *pro* composite. 31. MS. 1 *in marg.*

7. The reasoning comes out more clearly in the case of touch. If touch is an extended act, the extended hardness or softness which we touch exists in the object touched as in the hand which touches it, and the *feeling* itself exists in the hard or the soft thing.

et est magis proporcionata apprehencioni intelligencie quam aliquod tale materiale; nec aliunde inpedimentum; igitur, etc.

Nec valet dicere quod actus apprehenditur, sed nescitur utrum informat, propter tria. Primo, quia eque probabili coniectura cognoscit diabolus formam informare, cognoscendo illam esse, sicud cognoscit aliquod subiectum esse quale, vel informatum; secundo, per hoc quod informacio est res absoluta potens cognosci eque bene a diabolo sicud ab homine. Tercio per hoc quod F. 52^{b} diabolus potest videre quum | homo demeretur, et per consequens quum actus informat. Nec dicetur racio quare talis res non ageret, servata eius essencia, sicut faciunt accidencia eucaristie (ex quibus tota illa opinio habet ortum) et per idem ageret in subiectum alienum; sed dicitur quod est dare qualitates que agunt in extrinsecum et non in subiectum proprium (ut qualitates de tercia specie) et alias que nec agunt in subiectum proprium nec alienum (ut qualitates de quarta specie); et est dare alias que tam agunt in subiectum proprium quam alienum (ut qualitates de secunda). Igitur est dare qualitates que agunt in subiectum proprium, et non alienum (ut qualitates de prima), sicud infirmitas, dormicio, consuetudo, etc. Sed dico quod inpossibile est rem aliquam formalem per se esse, et non posse per se agere; quia tunc vane haberet appetitum ad fines extrinsecos. Nec actus anime solum agit in subiectum proprium, sed in extrinsecum, ut corpus a quo distat et animam in qua ponitur non esse actus sensitivus.

Similiter, quam proporcionata est anima unius hominis ad apprehendendum talem rem per se existentem, est anima cuiuscunque et potencia intelligencie separate. Igitur, cum una natura intellectiva potest cognoscere talem rem, sequitur quod quelibet. Si dicitur quod nihil preter deum potest cognoscere talem rem per se existentem: contra, albedo et alie qualitates materiales

exists in the stone that is felt, it can exist yet better in an angelic mind.

We cannot say that the devil perceives that act, but is ignorant that it belongs to us. For (1) his knowledge in that respect is as great as for all other similar objects. (2) This 'belonging', according to the theory, is an absolute entity, cognoscible by itself. And (3) he knows when an act is a sin, and therefore, must know when it is imputable.

Those driven by the theory of the Eucharistic accidents to admit sensation as an absolute entity, must admit that this, like those, can act by itself upon another subject.

Four species of qualities, according to Aristotle's Categories.

What is by itself must act by itself; and thus a mental act is a quality that influences not only the mind to which it belongs, but exterior bodies and minds also.

It cannot be said that God alone can apprehend it, since the

20. et *deest* MS. 24. MS. dor *pro* dormicio. 30. MS. 2 *in marg*. 32 MS. intllīe sep^{te}. 36. MS. alias.

24. St. Thomas divides Aristotle's four classes of qualities, as follows: Quality being a modification of a substance, it either modifies (1) the nature of that substance, or (2) its power of action, or (3) its possibility of being acted upon, or (4) its quantity. (See Sum. Theol. 1^{a} 2^{e} qu. 49, art. 2. *in corpore art.*)

accidents in the Eucharist are apprehended by men, and the case is similar. If a doctor touches a sick man, he at once should be sensible of the pain felt by the latter, since it is a thing by itself, better cognizable from without than from within. But this is false; and pain is not by any means a positive entity.

quas theologi ponunt posse per se existere, essent ita manifestive suarum naturarum sicud ipsis informantibus. Igitur per idem illa res absoluta sic foret per se activa.

Similiter, dolor infirmi esset immutativus sensus tactus palpantis medici qui est eiusdem speciei cum dolore in membro medici, ut suppono; et satis proporcionatus igitur inmutaret solum tangentem. Quod est falsissimum: quia tunc medici non tangerent ita libenter pulsus febricitancium. Et minor patet ex hoc quod omnis qualitas tangibilis melius tangitur dum distat a nervo tactus per medium carneum, quam si foret intrinsecus; quia sensibile positum omnino intrinsecum non sentitur, ut patet de caliditate ethici, et quelibet in nervis quorumlibet. Non igitur est dolor nervorum plus res positiva quam fames vel inanicio quam stomacus sentit.

Again, all *things* are good; some mental acts, such as pain, &c. are not good; therefore they are not things. Every thing tends to self-preservation; and this is good in nature; but pain has no such tendency, yet it is a mental act.

Similiter, omnis res absoluta est naturalis et bona, sicud quelibet eius naturalis proprietas; sed non sic est de dolore, fastidio et ceteris que propter peccata fuerunt inducta: igitur non sunt res huiusmodi absolute. Maior patet cuilibet philosopho. Quelibet enim talis res habet appetitum naturalem conservandi seipsam et per consequens a natura habet talem appetitum propter aliquod bonum. Et minor patet, De infirmitatibus libro 2°. Nam omnes tales denominantes corumpentes naturam eveniunt in minori parte preter intentum nature; et informaciones illarum sunt nocive, ut informaciones viciorum, ut postmodum probabitur: igitur etc.

Again, this would destroy the essential difference between a substantial form that acts by itself to inform its subject, and the accidental determination of quality.

Similiter, si actus talis natus sit producere species in anima naturaliter, continue posito actu et posita capacitate anime sic produceret, et per consequens dolor continue ageret novam speciem doloris, et quilibet sensus immediate ageret in se; quod est falsum, quia nulla qualitas continue agit in subiectum in hoc quod informat ipsum, ut | patet per Aristotelem de possibili qualitate; F. 53a
sed pocius quelibet forma naturalis absoluta potens per se existere naturaliter informat et perficit suum subiectum, et non indifferenter inducitur a cultello scindente et quocunque indisponente suum subiectum.

2. MS. itornbȝ. 4. MS. 3 *in marg.* 5. MS. quod *pro* qui. 7. MS. tangent*e* 12. MS. sensum *pro* intrinsecum. 13. MS. qulibȝ. 15. MS. inanict *pro* inanicio. 15. MS. 4 *in marg.* 28. MS. 5 *in marg.* 29. MS. 9e *pro* continue.

Similiter, tale incisivum non agit in animam generando dolorem, potissime cum tam prurigo quam delectacio causatur per incisionem et anima post modum naturaliter dolebit. Igitur respondetur quod dolor, qui est percepcio disconvenientis, causatur naturaliter ex privacione alicuius positivi debiti mediate et non per se ex qualitatibus vel rebus positivis; quia tunc semper agerent manifestam dolorem, et eo forcius quo essent intenciores; cum tamen opposito modo sit: quia remissis qualitatibus corporis usque ad non gradum, ultra modum intenderetur dolor et in eius deperdicione dilectaretur natura. Non igitur habet potenciam et inclinacionem naturalem ad illam suscipiendum.

The same cause may produce pain or pleasure; it is, therefore, the perception of *disagreement*, not of anything positive, which occurs when we feel pain. If it were otherwise, pain would be always in direct proportion with the intensity of the quality perceived.

Item, inpossibile est aliquam rem esse inseparabiliter malam; set multi actus anime non sunt res huiusmodi absolute, et per idem nulli. Minor probatur de invidia, mendacio, odio dei, et multis similibus, que Aristoteles dicit 2° ethicorum esse per se mala.

IX. Certain mental acts, as lying, for instance, are bad in their very nature; but every absolute entity is naturally good.

Hic est duplex responsio. Prima dicit quod omnis actus quoad essencialem substanciam est bonus, set est in actu quedam obliquitas vel deformitas; et illa est per se mala. Et sic deus wlt omne actuale peccatum, et facit omne tale. sed non deformitatem; et ponuntur ad hoc multa exempla. Primo de eodem actu, qui in prima medietate hore erit meritorius ex precepto, et in secunda demeritorius ex precepto opposito. Secundo ponitur exemplum de actu adulterii, suspensionis, et ceteris similibus corporalibus actibus, qui cum aliquibus circumstanciis sunt in aliquibus personis mali et illiciti et in aliis personis sunt liciti, et inceptu meritorii. Tercio de actu voluntatis terminato ad diabolum, ponendo quod sit deus per diaboli illusionem; talis enim cultus potest ex ignorancia invincibili excusari.

The adversaries reply to this (1) that what is bad in those acts is not their nature, but their moral obliquity. The same act may be thus morally good and bad during two successive half hours. Many bodily actions are right in certain circumstances, and wrong in others. To worship the devil, believing him to be God, is excusable on account of the mistake.

Secunda responsio dicit quod quilibet talis actus per accidens informat; et sic, ipso non informante, foret bonus; et modo per informanciam accidentalem est malus: et

But the best known answer is that (2) the badness of an act is in its actually belonging to a subject;

1. MS. 6 *in marg.* 6. MS. med *pro* mediate. 8. MS. maiaꝫ *pro* manifestam. 9. MS. tum *pro* tamen; *ib.* MS. ref' *pro* remissis. 14. MS. 9ª *racio in marg.* 23. MS. pot'. 27. MS. suspentiis. 28. MS. aliqu? 35. MS. ipsa.

15. *Anime.* I think a few words are wanting here, such as: *sunt inseparabiliter mali, ergo.*

abstracting from that, it is good.

illa est famosa responsio dicens actum per accidens esse activum.

Rejoinders. (1) Certain acts are so evil that they can by no means be good; and that good may come of them does not diminish their essential malice.

Contra primum arguitur: actus invidendi, actus mentiendi, et odiendi deum sunt inseparabiliter mali; igitur non quilibet est per accidens malus. Pro antecedente suppono quod non obsit actum esse malum, et bonum fieri ex illo, immo illum esse occasionem multorum bonorum. Sic enim ex maxima malicia vel privacione que fundatur in substancia actus, frequenter occasionantur multa bona.

The subject is determined by them according to their nature, and cannot be otherwise determined by them; and as the subject is necessarily determined by them in an evil sense, their nature must be evil. As, v. g., an act of hatred of God, or of speaking against the known truth; however they may be elicited, these are evil, therefore, essentially so.

Quo supposito, arguitur sic. Si aliquis talium actuum informat suum subiectum secundum naturalem informacionem, tunc est malus; sed quilibet illorum sic per se informat, igitur quilibet illorum est inseparabiliter malus. Minor postmodum probabitur. Et maior patet per hoc quod non posset esse quod homo diceret contra conscienciam, odiret deum, vel desideraret nihil esse, vel odiret rem sine racione possibili, nisi hoc esset malum. Cum igitur ille sint proprie denominaciones illorum actuum, sequitur quod illis denominantibus secundum proprias denominaciones essent mali.

If of two contrary acts one is good by its very nature, the other is bad in the same way, or two contradictory propositions would at the same time be true. Now some acts are such that they cannot be morally evil. Theological divisions of acts.

Similiter, si unus contrariorum actuum voluntatis | est F. 53b per se bonus, relicus est per se vel inseparabiliter malus. Sed est dare aliquos actus per se bonos, igitur est dare actus illis contrarios inseparabiliter malos. Maior patet ex hoc quod, dato opposito, oportet dare de possibili quod uterque talium actuum contrariorum sit malus, vel uterque bonus; et loquor de bonitate laudis meritorie subiecto. Quo dato, duo contradictoria essent simul vera, ut: "bonum est Socratem habere *a* actum, et bonum est ipsum non habere illum, sed actum oppositum". Et minor patet de actu diligendi deum, de actu volendi vitare malum culpe, et ceteris multis que deus non posset facere malos; sic quod homo habendo illos demeretur in quantum haberet illos. Ideo dicunt theologi quod est dare actus indifferentes, actus bonos de genere, et actus simpliciter bonos vel simpliciter malos, actus neutros (ut elevacio fragminis, vel alia que non specificantur plus ad bonum quam ad malum moris quoad

3. MS. 1 *in marg.* 16. MS. desi^{ri}. 21. MS. 2 *in marg.* 37. MS. ĩmīō.

37. I can see no distinction between the 'actus indifferentes' and 'neutros'.

suam speciem). Actus bonos de genere vocant qui racione sui generis sonant in bonum, cum circumstancie privative vel intenciones male possunt facere quod non sint meritorii simpliciter, ut dare elemosynam, quod non prodest privato gracia, vel intendenti vanam gloriam, quoad vitam eternam.

Similiter, alii sunt actus principiati de lege nature, cum quibus deus non potest dispensare; ergo sic arguitur: Si quilibet actus sit per accidens bonus, ordinet deus quod homo demereatur in amando illum, in volendo evitare malum moris in communi et in volendo facere ut diceret, et ordinet quod actus oppositi sint meritorii; scilicet, odiendo deum scienter et contra conscienciam, faciendo malum moris et faciendo oppositum illius quod diceret. Et patet quod in quantum aliquis cum ista lege odit deum, amat deum; quia facit deo beneplacitum conformando se voluntati divine. Et in quantum, cum istis paribus, vult scienter facere malum, vult bene facere; et sic ex illa maledicta lege esset deus inhonorandus et contrarius actus mutatus in eius oppositum, et omnis veritas reduplicativa, vel lex eterna destructa; quia homo plus amaret deum quam aliud citra deum, plus se quam proximum, et cuilibet esset suum tribuendum; et sic de multis aliis que sunt per se racionalia.

Certain acts are commanded by the law of nature, with which God Himself cannot dispense. But if every such act were only accidentally good, God might attach merit to their contraries, so that v. g. to hate God would please Him, and a man would be obliged to do so out of love for God.

Deus igitur non potest concedere talem legem. Cum igitur deus ordinat quamcunque formam absolutam que est naturaliter bona; et ordinat eius primum actum qui est informacio, cum illa sit naturalis et finis forme, sequitur quod si actus tales odiendi per se mali essent forme absolute naturaliter bone, deus ordinaret quod denominarent subiecta odire deum, et taliter velle: quod est impossibile. Ideo dicit secunda responsio quod tales actus per accidens informant, et addit quod actus odiendi potest esse actus amandi.

Such a thing is absolutely impossible, therefore these acts are evil in their own nature, as determinations of a subject, and cannot be conceived as conformable to God's will.

Contra, sit *a* actus quo Socrates odit deum: et ponitur quod per totam illam horam non informet, et in fine

Answer to (2) which supposes that an act may

4. MS. sit meritorie. 7. MS. 3 *in marg.* 8. MS. quod *pro* ergo. 20. MS. 99 *pro* contrarius. 35. MS. 1 *in marg.*

5. *Privato gracia.* To a man out of God's grace. 21. *Reduplicativa.* This may mean, the 'doubling' of the expressions, when we say: A man hates God out of love for Him, and if he loved God would not love Him. But I think it more probable that it is a mistake for *redarguta,* or something else.

exist without determining its subject. At the moment when it begins to determine, there is a transition from non-activity to activity; this transition is the act itself, and the hypothesis of its pre-existence without determining is superfluous. Besides, it would have been possible for God to create various pains at the beginning of the world; and thus sinners in Hell would not suffer greater, i. e. *more lasting* punishments than men on earth: for they might continue to exist eternally, though no longer determining their subjects.

informet; tunc sic in fine incipiet esse quod hoc odit deum; igitur tunc novus actus vel nova informacio incipiet esse; et quicquid illud fuerit, illud ponendum est esse actus. Igitur, non solum antiquus actus noviter informabit, sed novus generabitur. Minor patet, ex hoc quod illa informacio denominabit subiectum formaliter | et inmediate agens; igitur, iuxta descripcionem accionis, F. 54[a] illa informacio erit accio; et cum due superfluunt, sequitur quod antiqua non denominabit. Si enim actus posset per se manere, tunc ex dubio deus creavit omnes dolores et penas in principio, mundi, et inprimet illos secundum quod tanta demerebuntur; et sic non maiorem penam vel dolorem habebit dampnatus in inferno quam habebit quilibet peccator in hoc mundo vel purgatorio de possibili quo eadem pena successive puniet eos. Et hic considera quod locucio de magnitudinibus penarum videtur supponere illas esse successivas. Non enim dicitur quod una pars orbis est maior equali parte mei, quia diuturnior, sicud cum dicitur de pena. Nec videtur quod homo eliceret actum dolendi propter unam rem absolutam inproporcionatam sensitivi, quia per idem veniente tali pena. Si enim scirem quod talis pena esset ad ostium et ingrederetur me formido, perpetuo ego tantum dolerem et timerem novo actu quantum dolerent pro intoxicacione serpentis.

Again, if it is false that a man hates until a certain moment, after which this is true (although the act pre-existed), we have an act at once new and not produced.

Similiter, potissimum medium probandi actus distingui est verificacio successiva contradictorium. Igitur, cum in fine hore erit verum quod Socrates odit, postquam per ante fuit falsum, sequitur quod est dare actum odiendi non tunc generatum, propter quem sic incipiet esse. Quidlibet enim aliud ab actu est inpertinens, eo quod ponendo novam informacionem diceretur commune tempus quod est unus actus in primis elicitus, qui successive et vicissim informabit sine generacione alicuius novi actus posterioris.

The theory would also destroy the distinction between an act and a habit, both being able

Similiter, in hoc differt actus ab habitu quod actus manet solum dum agens agit, sed habitus manebit post, inclinando ad actum. Igitur, si actus potest sic latere dum non actualiter consideratur, et postmodum inclinare

14. MS. pηcco *pro* peccator. 19. MS. $\widehat{\text{tn}}$ = tamen? 21. MS. ff,[di] *or* ff,[vi]. 22. MS. sciret. 23. MS. hostium; *ib.* MS. me formido me. 24. MS. dolorem et timorem. 26. MS. 2 *in marg*; *ib.* MS. po[t-e mu]. 36. MS. 3 *in marg.* 37. MS. imti[d'] *pro* inclinando.

ad considerandum, videtur quod habeat racionem habitus. Non enim est dare in anima (2° ethicorum) nisi actus, habitus, potencias, et species actus. Igitur, si non erit actus, erit habitus, species, vel potencia.

to exist potentially without an actual determination of their subject.

Similiter, in prima apprehensione et obieccione rei generatur naturaliter talis actus; sed in qualibet posteriori obieccione eque proporcionata non erit inpedimentum ex parte anime ad producendum novum actum; igitur confuse produceretur novus actus. Minor patet ex hoc quod infiniti actus similimi possent simul esse, et agencia sunt pure naturalia subiecta accidencium talium. Et sic infiniti actus forent simul thesaurizati in anima superflue; nam compaciuntur se, et antiquus non corumperetur propter adventum novi.

Our mind, each time it was impressed by the same object of thought, might elicit unnecessary acts *ad infinitum*, and all similar; for the first, self-existent, might still coëxist with the others.

Similiter, quam naturale est alicui accidenti informare, tam naturale est sibi inexistere, et e contra; set deus potest tollere informacionem accidentis, igitur et inherenciam. Et cum, tollendo inherenciam, dat unum novum modum essendi, sequitur quod a pari potest dare novum modum informandi; et sic posset facere quemlibet actum anime informare lapidem, vel quamlibet substanciam. Sic enim potest facere intellectum informare quamlibet materiam, alia accidencia absoluta informare quamlibet substanciam, et unire sibi quamlibet naturam. Et sic non solum quodlibet corpus esset quodlibet intellectivum, sed accidencia.

Accidents determine the substance to which they belong; both determination and belonging are equally essential. If the former were not so, then neither the latter; and an act of thought might conceivably belong to a stone.

Similiter, est dare aliqua accidentia que per se informant in quolibet genere accidentis: igitur, cum predicti F. 54^b actus sint virtute accidencia, | cum illis sequitur quod illi per se informant, et per consequens non possunt latere non informantes. Antecedens fuit declaratum [De] qualitate et quantitate, 2° libro. Et de aliis respectibus est nocius. Nam, ponendo actum anime rem absolutam que possit per se existere non informando, oportet dare informacionem, que sit accidens distinctum, a quo formaliter et immediate subiectum denominatur agens. Et illa (iuxta diffinicionem *quid nominis*) erit accio; et cum

If it were possible that an act could exist without determining any subject, it would no longer answer to the definition of action; it would require another accident, determining it to determine, and would no longer render the subject active by its immediate influx.

3. MS. erit non. 4. MS. pe^n *pro* potencia. 5. MS. 4 *in marg.* 11. MS. cn^{to} acci^{um}. 15. MS. 5 *in marg.* 25. MS. esset non solum. 27. MS. 6 *in marg.* 31. MS. De *deest.* 32. MS. 2° h° *smear ed with red.*

35. *Accidens a quo formaliter et immediate subiectum denominatur agens*, is the accepted nominal definition of action.

accio illa absoluta sit virtute accio, cum ista sequitur quod sicud illa non potest esse non informans, sic nec illa, et per consequens talis absoluta qualitas non est ponenda tanquam actus formaliter denominans subiectum agere: sed, si denominat, hoc est efficienter per accidens et remote, et sic non virtute cum agencia immediate denominante.

Our adversaries say that the same act may successively have objects of various species. If so, it would be a substance.

Quoad aliud membrum, quod idem actus potest nunc terminari ad unum obiectum, et nunc ad aliud, nunc esse volucio, nunc intelleccio, nolucio, etc., videtur quod sit contradiccio; quia ponendo actus distingui, patet quod isti actus sunt diversarum specierum. Igitur unus actus non potest sic alterari ab una denominacione in aliam; sic enim actui competeret racio substancie, quia potest per se existere et transmutari.

Will following *won't* would imply, as in substances, production and destruction; for we have here, as there, two contradictories that are successively true and false, false and true.

Similiter, per hoc medium potissume est deducibile actus generari vel circa idem obiectum, vel circa novum, quod nunc est verificacio unius contradictoriorum de apprehensione illius subiecti, postquam per ante oppositum fuit verum. Igitur, cum non stat absolute velle aliquod obiectum, postquam illud fuit simpliciter nolitum ab eodem sine tali verificacione contradictoriorum, sequitur quod tam erit generacio, quam corupcio actus. Aliter enim actus volendi et actus nolendi, respectu eiusdem obiecti et eiusdem virtutis, non essent contrarii.

This theory would totally change the nature of a mental act. It might exist antecedently to the man who elicits it, and the same act would be now potential, now actual; there would be no reason for supposing that

Similiter, nulla natura agit superflue, sed meliori modo quo cum paribus potest. Cum igitur (per opinionem) natura potest generare in principio unum actum qui denominaret animam volentem, nolentem, aut apprehendentem quodcunque obiectum, sequitur quod, producendo novos actus, superflue ageret. Non igitur producet novos actus, sed idem manebit, nunc in habitu, nunc in actu, nunc terminatus ad unum obiectum, nunc ad aliud, nunc secundum unam racionem, nunc secundum aliam; et sic actus esset habitus qualiscunque, et per

1. MS. $\widehat{v^{ce}}$ = univoce? 8. MS. 1 *in marg.* 14. MS. in *pro* enim. 16. MS. 2 *in marg.* 26. MS. 3 *in marg.*

14. *Substancia.* According to Scholastics, substance is that which underlies successive changes, and remains the same throughout. If the same act could be now thought, now will, it would be the underlying subject of both thought and will, just as a piece of iron, sometimes cold, and sometimes hot, is the subject of heat and cold.

consequens omnia locuta de actibus, quod specificantur et individuantur ab obiectis et potenciis, quod eliciuntur actus meritorii, et quod novus actus generat habitum, iuvat, vel impeditur ad resistendum passionibus (et sic de ceteris), essent falsa.

many are elicited, since this one would suffice for all.

Item, actus anime habent denominaciones, quas claudit contradiccionem aliquam rem absolutam habere; igitur non sunt res absolute. Antecedens probatur quintupliciter. Primo sic, posito quod christus elicuit actum asserendi, quod *antechristus erit*, absolute sine aliqua connotacione: patet quod si ille actus fuit res absoluta, et realiter informavit, quod necessarium est ipsam fuisse et informavisse, et tunc patet quod necessarium est sic fore, esse, vel fuisse, vel aliter christum fuisse deceptum, ut superius deductum est. Cum igitur inpossibile est ipsum fuisse deceptum, vel omne tale assertum necessario evenire, relinquitur oppositum antecedentis, scilicet quod actus christi non fuit una talis res absoluta informans eius animam, sicud nec volucio divine essencie est res huiusmodi absoluta.

X. Mental acts have attributes which contradict a self-subsistence. (1) Every assertion of Christ was certainly true, but some were true not necessarily, but contingently. Now if such assertions were entities in themselves, they would be either necessarily false or necessarily true.

F. 55ª Similiter, posito quod omnis homo intelligat se esse non intelligentem, quod est satis possibile, cum inpossibile potest intelligi, pono quod quilibet talis actus intelligendi sit *a*. Et patet quod *a*, cum sit intelleccio, non denominat subiectum suum esse non-intelligens, sed intelligens. Si enim denominaret hominem esse non-intelligentem, cum omnis forma vere denominat, sequitur quod verum esset omnem hominem esse non-intelligentem, quod repugnat casui. Relinquitur igitur quod denominat hominem intelligere se esse non intelligentem: quo dato, sequitur quod quilibet talis actus vel sit verus, vel inpossibilis. Consequens falsum, quia proposicio que subordinatur tali actui est contingens: et consequencia patet, quia, si actus corespondeat tali complexo, "ego sum non intelligens", tunc claudit contradiccionem illum actum esse verum, et per consequens per se est in-

(2) If all men thought of themselves as non-thinking beings, this act would mean either a necessary truth or a necessary falsehood; whereas it might be true, but only contingently.

6. MS. 10ª *racio in marg.* 7. MS. contradicciones. 11. MS. 1 *in marg.* 21. MS. 2 *in marg.* 22. MS. intllccē. 32. ppoī.

33. To understand the drift of this argument, we must revert to Wyclif's theory, by which he affirms that the same subject, *that which* is at one time a man, may at another not be a man. Therefore, that which we are *might*, under other circumstances, not be thinking. See Logica, Vol. II, p. 16.

possibilis, vel non potest esse verus. Si alteri proposicioni corespondeat, tunc est talis proposicio [affirmativa], cum tamen solum sit proposicio negativa, et solum actus negativus, ut suppono; et nullus actus negativus corespondet proposicione affirmative.

(3) Suppose I say: I know this to be false — *this* meaning the very thing that I am saying. The supposition is admissible, for things which cannot *be*, may be *known*; the very denial of the supposition implies that its meaning is known; and as a fact we can have each word of the proposition in our mind, discuss them, and conclude whether they make up a false proposition or no. Now this act of the mind, if it be an absolute entity, is at once true and false; true because it truly determines the mind as an existent, and false because of its truth, since the act is known to be false.

Similiter, sit *a* actus intelligendi corespondens huic oracioni mentali "ego intelligo hoc falsum", demonstrando oracionem mentalem cuius *a* est actus. Casus patet tripliciter; primo, quia possum intelligere que non possunt esse: igitur. Etenim hoc non potest esse verum vel falsum; hoc potest intelligi. Secundo, ex hoc quod, negando casum, habet negans unum sensum in anima, racione cuius ipse negat; et cum non bene negaret racione illius sensus, nisi intelligeret illum, sequitur quod sic potest intelligi. Similiter certissima racio cum experiencia docet quod philosophus potest habere tales species in anima, "ego intelligo hoc falsum", et cum hoc potest homo considerare penes se, utrum illa quatuor [verba] sint proposicio falsa, et per consequens intelligere quod sunt proposicio falsa. Consequencia patet per hoc, quod multi putant tales casus esse possibiles, igitur possunt intelligere, sicud putant. Quo admisso, patet quod *a* actus est verus, et falsus. Verus est, quia est res absoluta que vere informat suum subiectum, et falsus ex hoc quod est sic verus; cum tunc est ita quod ipse intelligit illud falsum. De hoc dicetur in 1° libro de insolubilibus.

2. MS. affirmativa *deest.* 6. MS. hec *pro* huic; *ib.* 3 *in marg.* 8. MS. c9 *pro* cuius, *and* casus. 10. MS. possit? 19. MS. verba *deest.*

26. *De insolubilibus.* Shirley gives this title under the heading of lost works of which the first words are not preserved. It is, therefore, a hopeless task to identify this treatise with another that bears a different title. But as in Ch. VIII of the third tractate De Logica (Logica, Vol. II, pp. 194—227) we find this question dealt with at length and very completely, it is allowable to suppose that it is the missing work; especially as several of those whose first words are given by Shirley are found in Logica, v. g. *De propositionibus temporalibus:* "Sequitur jam ultimo de . . ." (Logica, Vol. III, p. 133); *De speciebus hypotheticis:* "Sequitur de speciebus hypotheticarum" (Logica, Vol. II, p. 1); *De motu locali:* "Sequitur de localibus pertractandum" (Logica, Vol. III, p. 1); *De comparativis:* "Consequens est ad dicta superaddere" (Logica, Vol. II, p. 129); *De velocitate motus localis:* "Jam ultimo restat videre" (Logica, Vol. III, p. 85, words slightly changed); *De copulativis:* "Sequitur de copulativis pertractandum"

Similiter, iuxta illud sequitur quod inpossibile est hominem distincte cognoscere singulos eius actus, quod probatur esse falsum. Et consequencia probatur, quia si sit possibile, habeat Socrates *a* actum rectum, et *b* actum reflexum, per quem intelligit *a*; tunc vel cognoscit Socrates *b* distincte vel non. Si non, habetur intentum; si sic, vel eodem *b* actu et per idem quolibet actu cognosceretur idem actus, quod est inpossibile; vel aliter actu distincto, et sic erit processus in infinitum, vel ultimus actus manebit incognitus.

> Besides, it would be impossible to reflect upon any mental act; for if the first act were known by a second, the second would require to be known by a third, and so on: or we must posit an act that knows itself; which is impossible.

Hic est duplex responsio. Prima dicit quod quilibet actus ostendit se sine actu alio distinctissime, et secunda dicit quod ultimus actus manet incognitus in quocunque habente multos actus. Contra primum sic. Aliquis actus est cognoscibilis actu reflexo; igitur non stat hominem distincte cognoscere aliquem actum, nisi actu super illum reflexo. Antecedens patet, et consequenciam probo; quia in hoc differt noticia distincta a noticia confusa, quod distincta est illa que directe terminatur ad obiectum distincte cognitum, sed confusa est illa que secundarie respicit obiectum sic cognitum, ut quando videro Socratem, illa noticia terminatur di-
F. 55b recte et primo | ad Socratem; et si terminetur ad illum actum, hoc est valde confuse.

> Refutation of two answers.
>
> We cannot admit that each act manifests itself with absolute destinctness. Were it so, every act would be distinct reflection; whenever I saw a man, I should distinctly — not confusedly — think of the fact of my seeing him; which is false.

Similiter, multi habent quotlibet actus anime, et dubitant utrum sint tales actus, vel non considerant quod sunt tales, sicud patet tam de laicis, quam de clericis, et postmodum considerando de illis actibus nesciunt illos, eliciendo novos actus quos reflexos dicimus. Igitur ad distinctam actuum noticiam requiritur habere actum vel actus reflexos terminatos principaliter ad illos.

> Many, both learned and ignorant, either doubt or do not think of the mental acts which they elicit; another act, of which those acts are the object, is requisite.

Similiter, non dubium quin stat componere quod "hoc est album", non componendo vel actualiter cogitando quod sic componitur. Cum igitur non possit actualiter et distincte cognosci quod actus est, nisi componendo quod actus est, sequitur quod stat habere quamlibet accionem anime sine actu reflexo super illam;

> We surely can say 'This is white', without explicitly affirming that we see the whiteness.

11. MS. 2ˣ responses *in marg.* 14. MS. a *in marg.* 25. MS. b *in marg.* 26. MS. actus accio. 33. MS. c *in marg.* 38. MS. *after* anime, *a small gap.*

(Logica, Vol. III, p. 23). Moreover, if *dicetur* is not a mistake, it would seem that the present tractate is anterior to the Logica.

As a fact, reflection upon any present act disturbs us in its performance. The act of reflection differs from the direct act, in that its object is not necessarily the same, as to universality, positiveness, and moral goodness.

et per consequens sine distincta noticia talis actus. Illud confirmatur per experienciam qua cognoscimus quod homines, dum advertunt ad actus suos, sive extrinsecos, sive intrinsecos perturbant seipsos in quidlibet directe faciendo. Et quod actus reflexus distinguitur ab actu recto patet, quia illi actus terminantur ad diversa obiecta. Unus est universalis, alius singulare, unus affirmativus, alius negativus, unus malus, alius bonus, unus prior, alius posterior, et sic de quotlibet differenciis; sicud patet cogitando primo et volendo quod nemo sit, et postmodum cogitando quod talis actus est malus. Aliter enim non distingueretur actus reflexus ab actu recto, nec diversificarentur ad diversitatem obiectorum.

When I say: "This will be", I certainly mean actual knowledge of *this;* but *this* cannot be taken as directly signifying my mental act, since many doubt whether such acts exist at all.

Similiter, cum omnis noticia actualis sit sciencia actualis, patet ex dictis quod stat habere actum rectum sine eius noticia actualis, quia *scire*, eius sciencia actuali; ut solum componendo quod "hoc erit", non habeo actualem consideracionem de alico actu anime, cum nullum terminum intelligo qui signat mihi actum anime, quia "hoc" in illo casu dato oportet ponere quemlibet terminum equivoce signare actum anime, et quicquid fuerit intellectum intelligere actum anime; quod est falsum, eo quod actus intelligendi sunt per se noti, et nemo noscit vel experitur quod sic intelligit, cum multi opinantur quod non sunt tales actus.

Nor can we admit a series of reflective acts of which the last cannot be distinctly known as such. Why should it not be known, since a man's own acts are what he knows best?

Ideo dicit secunda responsio, quod ultimus actus manet incognitus in quocunque. Contra, inter omnia que sunt in anima vel ab homine noscibilia, actus sunt maxime noscibiles, ut patet tam experiencia quam auctoritate; set stat hominem distincte cognoscere omnes eius habitus, potencias, et cetera, tam sensibilia quam insensibilia; igitur magis vel a pari stat hominem distincte cognoscere omnes eius actus.

None of our acts could be distinctly known, without an absurd infinite series of reflective acts; for the last act is distinctly knowable, and yet cannot be known without supposing another.

Similiter si actus non posset distincte cognosci, nisi per actum reflexum super eum, sequitur quod sit processus in infinitum in actibus; cuius tamen oppositum dicit philosophus 2° de anima, ponens quod eadem est virtus qua sencio, et qua sencio me sentire, ne sit processus in infinitum. Et consequencia patet ex hoc, quod dato ultimo actu, cum ille sit distincte cognoscibilis, et non nisi per actum reflexum, ut dicitur, sequitur quod alterius sit procedere.

14. MS. d *in marg.* 26. MS. a *in marg.* 35. MS. b *in marg.*

Similiter, habeat Socrates *a* actum rectum, et *b* talem F. 56ª reflexum, | quilibet actus anime mee est sine alico alio actu, quia cognosco illam copulativam, "deus est, et quilibet illorum actuum est"; et patet quod *b* actu cognoscit aliquid distincte, et non nisi actum, cum sit actus reflexus super actum: igitur *b* actu cognoscit actum; et cum *b* sit indifferens ad noticiam *a* vel *b*, sequitur quod utrumque illorum distincte cognoscit per *b* actum. Si autem dicatur quod utrumque illorum confuse et non distincte cognoscitur per *b*, querendum quid distincte cognoscitur per *b*, et mutandus est casus sic, quod Socrates non habeat aliquem actum complexum nisi talem. Iste actus est satis possibilis, nisi ex hoc quod sequatur inconsequens, sicud in materia insolubilium; et aliter non esset causa negandi casum, eo quod experiencia demonstrat illum esse possibilem. Patet eciam quod actus amandi, noscendi, odiendi, et cetera potest ferri in duo obiecta distincte; igitur non obest distincte cognoscere duos actus eodem actu.

A man may have at the same time two distinct acts, one by which he knows, v. g. God's existence, and another implying the knowledge of his own mental acts: these are independent and distinct; the second knows the first, and contains the knowledge of itself;

and its possibility cannot be denied, save in the case of so-called insoluble propositions; for there is nothing to prevent two objects being known by one act.

Similiter, quibuscunque rebus homo potest racionaliter velle carere; maior patet ex hoc, quod aliter esset potencia naturalis hominis diminuta, cum non posset in quodcunque sibi utile ad quod haberet inclinacionem naturalem; et per consequens potencia vel nisus ad hoc esset frustra. Et minor sic probatur. Si actus anime sint res absolute distincte, patet quod continerent accidens aliquos actus valde cruciantes. Sicud enim quilibet experitur, terrena cogitacio deprimit sensum multa cogitantem, et frequenter quomodocunque curis curiosi invite fiunt insompnes ex conviacionibus quas libenter vellent relinquere. Si igitur essent res absolute distincte ab anima, possent racionaliter niti ad earum destruccionem. Ponitur igitur quod Socrates habeat *a* actum sibi nocivum, et nitatur voluntarie ipsum destruere: consequencia de quanto plus nititur voluntarie

These acts may be such that we should reasonably wish not to have them; for they may be very painful; yet this wish would not be reasonable, for it could not possibly be fulfilled.

Our thoughts are often very painful to us,

and if they are things distinct from the mind, we might desire their destruction.

1. MS. c *in marg.* 3. MS. 9g^do. 13. MS. possibile cū ex hoc *pro* nisi. 20. MS. 5 *in marg.*; *ib.* MS. quo cunque. 26. MS. 9tīr3. 29. MS. qcūq3. 30. MS. 9uia^bq.

21. It is evident that the minor and the conclusion are wanting here. We may suppose them to run thus: *Sed, si actus sint res, non possumus racionabiliter velle eis carere. Igitur non sunt res.*

At the same time they cannot be destroyed; our will is powerless against them: our soul tends naturally towards their preservation, contrary acts are *things* and therefore, may coëxist with them; nor are they destructible in themselves.

ipsum *a* destruere, de tanto plus sic cogitat, habet *a* intensius. Igitur impossibile est voluntarie deserere *a*; et ex isto videtur quod anima sit necessitata per actus suos qui sunt incoruptibiles, cum per ipsam non possunt corrumpi, sed pocius naturaliter conservantur, tanquam per subiectum suum naturale; nec ab actibus contrariis, quia de quanto contrariantur sunt simul se compacientes; nec *a* conservante ablato, sicud est de lumine, quia solum dependet ab anima et suis causis. Nec sunt de se coruptibiles, ut motus et tempus, quia sunt res absolute potentes per se existere et intendentes continue ad suum *esse*; non igitur possunt corumpi.

If it be said that a past act, existing no longer, may be desired, but cannot *be*, this reply makes its entity depend upon time; each instant we should have an entirely new act; thus contradicting the hypothesis of its independent existence. But that hypothesis would imply that our consciousness of them has nothing to do with their existence;

Nec valet dicere quod propter diversitatem temporis sit novus actus, et sic stat me velle actum meum esse qui fuit nunc ad duos annos, sine hoc quod ille possit esse; quia tunc continue foret novus actus secundum se totum, propter novitatem temporis a quo dependeret. Nec esset possibile eundem actum esse primo elicitum in *a* instanti, qui fuit primo elicitus in *b* instanti; et sic caperent actus individuacionem suam a tempore sicud motus, et non essent res absolute.

Confirmatur ex hoc, quod si essent res absolute, non corrumperentur per solam omissionem apprehensionis, ut est de actibus quos homo vult destruere; nec esset inpossibile deum tollere illa, invito homine | qui habuit F. 56b illos actus. Ymo deus posset [imponere] homini vel facere ipsum credere quod non haberet talem actum; immo sic esset in casu aliquod verum, quod nemo posset credere, ut neminem habere aliquem actum et aliquod verum, quod nemo posset actualiter scire: ut me solum habere *a* actum incomplexum, vel nihil actualiter concipere: et per consequens articuli fidei non essent difficillimi ad credendum, nec anima esset in potencia ad omnia cognoscibilia cognoscendum. Immo talis actus anime: "*b* actus desinit esse", signaret naturaliter *b*

whatever was thought would exist as it was thought, and God could not interfere with it,

5. MS. corq *pro* corrumpi. 15. MS. ille *pro* esse. 26. MS. imponere *deest; a word erased.* 32. MS. pc *pro* per consequens.

7. *Compacientes.* Wyclif always returns to this point; absolute entities do not require a subject, but *are* subjects. Black and white cannot coëxist in the same subject; but a black dog and a white dog may coëxist. In like manner, according to the theory, contrary acts, being things, do not destroy each other.

actum desinere esse, et per consequens deus non posset ipsam servare per tempus, nisi falsificaret seipsum, nec talem actum corumpere. Iste actus est eternus, eo quod nulla res signat naturaliter primarie falsum. Immo, quoad actus malos homo videtur omnipotens in malis, cum eque bene sequitur "deus vult se sic habere, igitur sic se habet", tam bene sequitur, "ego volo peccare, igitur pecco"; immo, si volo cogitare, velle, intelligere, etc. quicquam, signandi tunc sic facio. Immo videtur, quod si volo habere quantumlibet preteritum actum meum, habeo illum, eo quod actus non individuantur a tempore, cum tunc consisterent in successione, quia lapso tempore individuante non essent.

man would be almighty for evil, the evil deed existing by man's will as necessarily as God by His own; and the will to revive a past act would suffice to revive it, since it does not depend on time.

Item de actibus volendi, nolendi, et ceteris actibus virtutis non organice, probatur quod non sunt res absolute potentes per se existere. Et primo de pena displicencie qualibet puniuntur dampnati. Ponitur igitur quod *a* sit unus talis actus qui in principio mundi fuit creatus, et peto quod in prima parte proporcionali unius hore puniet Socratem ad condignum propter peccatum veniale, in secunda Platonem, in tercia tercium, et sic in infinitum, ita quod aliquem puniet in vindictam, et aliam tanquam penitencia salutaris. Et ponendo quod per secundam horam puniat ad condignum peccatum in purgatorio, et in principio tercie hore puniat animam in inferno, manente eternaliter pena intensa ut octo. Et patet quod Socrates punitur pena eterna, quia a pena, que est pena eterna. Semper enim erit pena eadem in numero, sicud idem homo, successive habens filios per generacionem et corupcionem eorum, manebit continue idem pater. Ex quo videtur quod deus non iuste distribuit illis penas, cum eadem pena precise puniet quemlibet illorum, et ipsi dispariter demerentur. Non igitur equabitur illa pena cuilibet demerito alicuius illorum, cum ipsa erunt quantumlibet materialia, et pena eadem nec maiorata nec minorata; erit enim semper eque magna

XI. Pain, if an absolute entity, might be inflicted successively on many, the same individual act applied to each, so that a soul in purgatory would suffer the same eternal pain as one in hell.

But what is eternal cannot be temporal; and if not temporal, it is against God's justice to inflict eternal punishment undeservedly.

9. MS. σig[di] c[c]. 10. MS. habere actum. 14. MS. 11[a] racio *in marg.* 19. MS. 1[9] hoīc *pro* unius hore. 22. MS. ām *pro* alium. 26. MS. manes. 28. MS. eius *pro* eadem.

16. *Primo.* Wyclif does not give a 'secundo'; which renders it likely that one paragraph, if not more, is wanting in this MS.

quoad duracionem, quia continue eadem eterna, et continue eque magna quoad intencionem, quia continue intensa ut octo.

Refutation of the answer, viz. that the same punishment is not equally great in the subjects to which it is applied. Punishment, being an entity, must act in so far as it has entity, and it has entity only in so far as it punishes. It being the same entity in every case, its intensity and duration are the same.

Sed hic dicitur quod *a* non est tanta pena Socrati quanta est dampnato. Contra, *a* est tanta pena Socrati quanta pena est alicui, cum solum sibi sit pena vel saltem alicui sui. Sed quantacunque pena *a* est, vel potest esse, tanta pena est alicui, cum pena dicitur comparative *pena*, de quanto *punit*: igitur *a* est tanta pena Socrati quanta pena potest esse. Minor patet ex hoc quod *a* non potest esse longior vel intensior pena quam est, et ex consequenti sequitur, cum quante est pena alicui, tante punit ipsum, quod tante punitur Socrates, quante punietur | aliquis relicorum: quod derogat dei iusticie. F. 57[a]

CAPITULUM SECUNDUM.

Arguments to prove that mental acts are qualities. I. Men are called good or bad on account of their mental acts, which make them *such* formally: and quality is suchness.

In oppositum; omne accidens denominans subiectum formaliter esse quale, est qualitas: sed actus anime sic denominant: igitur sunt qualitates. Maior patet de veritate sermonis, et minor probatur sic. Per actus meritorios et demeritorios homines denominantur boni vel mali, et (ut videtur) non oportet ponere ex illis actibus generari aliquas alias qualitates que formaliter denominant; igitur etc. Non enim quilibet actus bonus de genere inducit habitum moralem, nec antecedit ad habitum supernaturalem.

II From joy to sorrow there is a mental change, and this change must come under the class of alteration. Now alteration is a change of

Item, anima movetur in gaudendo vel tristando, cum ex hoc est ipsa substancia variabilis differenter a deo; cum igitur non sit motus perceptibilis quo moveretur nisi alteracio, sequitur quod alteratur, et cum omnis alteracio

3. MS. ut g[to] (gradato?) *pro* ut octo. 4. MS. Responsio *in marg.* 16. MS. Capitulum secundum *deest; large initial I in red ink.* 17. MS. 1[a] racio *in marg.* 19, 20. MS. v' ꝺꝯ *pro* veritate sermonis. 27. MS. 2[a] racio *in marg.* 29. MS. moꝯ pcıꝺ.

29. *Motus.* Movement is equivalent to *real change* in Scholastic terminology. Such changes are divided into local motion, alteration, increase, diminution, production, and destruction. And it is clear that the change from joy to sorrow is alteration.

sit circa qualitatem, sequitur quod gaudium vel tristicia sit qualitas, et cum sit actus anime, sequitur actus anime esse qualitates, et cum omnes sint eiusdem generis, sequitur quod omnis actus anime sit qualitas.

quality; and since one sort of mental acts may be, they all must be classed thus.

Item, beatitudo vel felicitas est actus anime, quia felicitacio; et illa est qualitas, et non respectus. Igitur, per idem, omnis actus anime est qualitas. Minor patet tripliciter: primo, quia convenienter respondetur ad questionem querentem qualis est Petrus, quod est beatus: igitur beatitudo est qualitas.

III. Happiness is a mental state and a quality; for 'happy' answers the question, *qualis?*

Similiter, tunc non esset possibile deum creare beatitudinem, vel beatificare hominem, cum quilibet homo beatificat se producendo secundum eius beneplacitum actus beatificos. Similiter contingit actum esse successivum, subducto omni alio motu: igitur contingit esse successivam adquisicionem parcium actus, quod non esset nisi essent qualitates que essent materia talis motus; igitur etc. Nam impossibile esset aliquid successive alterari, moveri localiter, vel augmentari, sine materia distincta a transmutacione successive adquisita: cum igitur accio non potest esse per se terminus accionis, requiritur actum esse qualitatem.

These acts change successively; and change implies something lost, something acquired, and something that remains: that which remains must be a quality.

Item, secundum autorem sex principiorum, omnis accio est in motu, et econtra; sed non sic de actibus anime, cum sint permanentes, et immanentes; igitur non sunt acciones. Minor satis patet, cum posita *a* visione, subducto omni motu locali alteracionis vel augmentacionis alio a visione, patet quod in *a* visione permanente non est dare prius vel posterius quoad successionem pocius quam in ligno vel lapide. Et hic videtur quod respectu cuiuscunque actus anime immanentis oportet dare accionem transeuntem qua producatur: nam *a* generabatur et fiebat de *non esse* ad *esse*, et non continue succesive, cum sit indivisibile permanens. Igitur est dare eius generacionem vel faccionem subitam precedentem actum illum; et cum quilibet posset esse permanens, sequitur quod respectu cuiuscunque est dare accionem precedentem. Et patet clare quod talis permanens non fundatur formaliter in motu.

IV. Our mental acts are either merely actions or qualities; they are not mere actions, for all action consists in movement, and mental acts, permanent and immanent, do not imply movement. Each of such acts, however, is produced by some transient action which precedes it.

5. MS. 3ª racio *in marg.* 23. MS. 4ª racio *in marg.*

23. *Autorem.* See pag. 2, note.

V. If a mental act were but the subject qua knowing, it would follow that the same act might, after ceasing, be again reproduced; which is impossible. For if at two different times I have two distinct, but exactly similar mental acts concerning the same object, their contents being identical, they are the same; i. e. the first, having ceased, exists no more.

Item, si actus tales sunt de genere accionis, et non dicunt formaliter nisi subiectum intelligere, sequitur quod idem actus possunt quotienslibet redire; consequens impossibile, quia tunc posset quotiens voluerit recreare coruptum. Et consequencia sic probatur. [Ponatur] quod ego intelligam Socratem *a* actu intelligendi, et ponatur quod post desinam intelligere Socratem et reintelligam eum *b* actu simillimo preter hoc quod F. 57b elicitur in alio tempore: et patet quod *b* non ponit nisi me intelligere Socratem, et consequencia ad illud; nec *a* ponit nisi me intelligere Socratem, et consequencia ad illud; igitur qualitercunque *b* ponit, *a* posuit, et econtra. Ex quo sine dubio sequitur quod *a* sit *b*, et *a* actus est coruptus: igitur intentum. Nec valet dicere quod actus individuantur a temporibus, quia sunt permanentes, potentes indifferenter esse in quolibet tempore, et indifferenter in quolibet generari.

VI. Action requires a subject that is acted upon. definition. Now some mental acts do not require this. We can think of what cannot possibly exist: such objects of thought are not acted upon.

Item, omnis accio requirit subiectum in quod agatur, sed non sic omnis actus anime. Igitur non omnis talis est accio. Maior patet per Aristotelem ponentem descriptive accionem esse formam secundum quam in id quod subiectatur agere dicimur: et post, in solvendo dubium de re producta per accionem, dicit quod accio non requirit quid agatur, sed in quod agatur. Minor patet de actu intelligendi, volendi, et ymaginandi, quibus intelligitur, et est volitum et ymaginatum, quod non potest esse; ubi patens est quod actus non terminantur ad obiecta intellecta, volita, vel ymaginata, tanquam terminancia illos actus, cum illa non possunt esse, et per consequens non terminare. Nec deus suplet vicem illorum, cum non possunt esse (ymmo per idem supleret vicem chimere in omni accione, quod fatuum est dicere). Nec terminantur ad species quibus apprehenduntur, tum quia species sunt media apprehendendi, et non termini, tum quia sic species paterentur mediantibus illis actibus, et essent principaliter intellecte, volite, vel ymaginate; quod est falsum, quia multi habent tales actus qui non putant quod sunt species in anima.

It were absurd to say that God takes their place as the thing thought of. Nor do our mental representations form the object of these actions, they are that by which, not that which we cognize.

VII. If we go through the arguments in the preceding chapter, we find that they tell equally against this theory.

Confirmatur per hoc, quod discurrendo per raciones prius factas, invenietur pro maiori parte quod eque procedunt difficultates solvende ab illa via, sicud ab

1. MS. 5a racio *in marg.* 5. MS. Ponatur *deest.* 7. MS. ponitur. 20. MS. autorem?

opinione contra quam arguitur; ut patet primo de explanacione illius novi entis, vel alterius modi habendi quo voluntas se habet eliciendo primum actum, ubi non est qualitas, vel quantitas subito adquisita vel deperdita.

Secunda difficultas est quomodo anima non potest agere, nisi producat accionem permanentem, et alia coruptive et transeunter agencia satis possunt. Isto enim videtur quod non oportet per locum *a simili*, quod si ignis potest in finem suum sine re absoluta producta, quod virtus cognosciva potest.

Tercium dubium est de actu voluntatis vel appetitus quo localiter movetur animal. Videtur enim difficultas tacta eque movere contra illam viam, sicud contra aliam.

Quartum dubium est de adnihilacione actuum, de composicione illorum ex suis partibus succedentibus, et partibus quantitativis permanentibus.

Quintum dubium est de significacionibus talium actuum et noticiis, quomodo ita patenter noscuntur ab hominibus, et de modo generandi illorum.

Sextum dubium est de per se malicia et bonitate actuum, et de modo denominandi illorum. Ponunt enim precipui philosophi quod omnis actus anime est per se bonus, sicud et omne positivum; et solum privacio ut malicia est mala, sicud nititur doctor profundus capitulo 26to probare libro primo per multas raciones et autoritates et 2° libro capitulis 18° et 9no sequentibus. |

F. 58^a^ Septimum dubium est de principiis individuandi actus, utrum tempus et subiectum individuant omnes actus, vel solum illos qui sunt successivi et requirunt obiecta ad que terminentur, sic quod actus circa obiecta que non sunt de se individuantur.

Octavum dubium de speciebus quomodo sunt capiende.

a) How, v. g. does the will elicit its first act, if there is no antecedent quality that can be changed? *b)* How is it that the soul cannot act without destroying a former action, whilst material agencies can? *c)* Voluntary movement has the same difficulties in both systems. *d)* How can an act be annihilated or combined with another? *e)* The theory comes in conflict with evident truths concerning these acts and their origin. *f)* It posits acts that are essentially bad; whereas it is generally admitted that all positive things are good in themselves. *g)* What has time to do with differentiating these acts? *h)* And how are the various kinds of action to be classified?

1. MS. 1 *in marg.* 6. MS. 2 *in marg.* 8. MS. possunt quod. 12. MS. 3 *in marg.* 16. MS. 4 *in marg.* 19. MS. 5 *in marg.* 22. MS. 6 *in marg.* 29. MS. 7 *in marg* 32. MS. ɔba *pro* obiecta. 34. MS. 8 *in marg.*

26. *Doctor Profundus.* Bradwardine. 29. *Septimum dubium.* In the following chapter, Wyclif refutes all the objections here set down, except (g) and (h). He reserves (g) for the second part of the work, where he deals with the relations between time and mental acts; but (h) is either treated at the very beginning of Chapt. III or nowhere.

CAPITULUM TERCIUM.

Wyclif answers the last difficulty first. *a)* There are three sorts of action; the first by which any being tends to be,

Pro responsione ad istud dubium suppono divisionem accionis 3° libro declaratam. Alia enim est accio essencialis terminata ad intrinsecum, quia ad essenciam sic agentis. Quali actu quecunque essencia potens per se existere appetit se esse, et tali (actu) intelligit et appetit anima essencialiter se esse, et talis actus est agencia qua quecunque essencia est trina, ut declaratum est. Non enim est possibile aliquam substanciam esse, nisi appetat se esse; et ille appetitus non potest poni accidens, cum a nullo possit talis separari, nec passio, quia nihil dicit extrinsecum.

another by which it tends towards its last end: these two are not accidental but essential.

Et secundo, in qualibet essencia creata ex tali accione procedit accio secunda inseparabiliter inexistens circa aliquem finem extrinsecum, ut anima per se appetit beatitudinem, et omnis essencia creata naturaliter et per se suum finem, non actu elicito accidentali, sed per se, sicud per se quelibet creatura appetit bonum, et quelibet res creata appetit *esse* divinum, ut dicitur primo *ethicorum*, et secundo *de anima*. Tercio modo accipitur accio pro agencia, que est forma accidentalis qua agens formaliter et actualiter denominatur agens, et ex tali agencia procedit motus; cum, secundum autorem sex principiorum, omnis accio transiens est in motu, et ex istis principiantur asserciones et negaciones, cum agens appetit habere quod non habet, et alico carere quod habet.

The third is an accident, and is the formal source of change.

There is thus a fivefold division of being, in terms of action. (1) Essential or substantial action. (2) Its essential tendency, or property. (3) The accident or action which that energy produces. (4) The movement or

Et patet quintuplex divisio entis quarto metaphisice textu, et commento secundo; nam basis tocius entitatis est substancia vel agencia essencialis, que est primum genus accionis; et primum genus entis est substancia, ut patet ibidem. Et ex tali substanciali agencia procedit secunda agencia, que est passio vel proprietas substancie; et illam dicit textus esse secundum genus entis. Et tercio, ex istis procedit agencia accidentalis; et accidens vocat textus tercium genus entis, et ex tali accidente procedit motus, quem textus vocat quartum genus. Quamvis enim

1. MS. Capitulum tercium *deest; large initial P in red ink.* 6. MS. ctu *deest.* 8. MS. 3'ua *pro* trina. 37. MS. quem textus vocat tercium genus entis et ex tali accidente procedit *after* motus *and before* quem.

change effected by action.

commentator dicat quod motus sit per se passio predicamentum, et auctor sex principiorum quod sit qualitas, (tamen ampliative videtur quod poneret per se predicamentum); sed Aristoteles vocat motum viam ad alia accidencia, non ponendo undecimum predicamentum, sed motum quasi proprietatem passionis. Et cum, secundum commentatorem (tercio phisicorum), motus componatur ex multis affirmacionibus et negacionibus de preterito et futuro, quas commentator vocat encia logica, alii encia complexa, alii encia racionis, et alii generaliter veritates, patet ordo quinque generum entis ex triplici divisione accionis.

(5) The logical entities, or truths, implied in movement.

Sed ulterius est notandum, quod tercium membrum subdividitur, cum alia sit agencia accidentalis immanens, et alia transiens. Inmanens vocatur [illa] que est agencia accidentalis, non requirens passum extrinsecum in quod agatur, ut sunt actus anime. Et ideo auctor dividit accionem in accionem corporis et accionem anime; sed agencia transiens vocatur illa que requirit passum distinctum ab agente, et concomitanter | F. 58b ad agenciam paciens ab eodem. Et utrumlibet membrum subdividitur, cum alia sit agencia successiva immanens, alia autem creditur permanens; alia instantanea et alia temporalis, ut sensacio motus, visio albi quiescentis et apprehensio luminis desinentis; et sic alia est agencia transiens successiva, ut alteracio vel mocio localis; agencia alia dicitur permanens, ut nisus gravis vel fortis contra

b) Energy may be *transient,* as that of material forces, which passing from one subject to another, requires an object distinct from the agent; or *immanent,* when it remains in the subject that is thus active; both are either *successive* or *permanent, instantaneous* or *temporal.*

1, 2. MS. p'ditu.. 3. MS. amue. 15. MS. illa *deest.*

1. *Commentator.* Averrhoës, the Arabian commentator of Aristotle. 7. *Ex multis affirmacionibus.* This is a good sample of the Scholastic point of view, so exasperating to modern minds, because it insists on expressing everything in terms of language. That movement is made up of affirmations and negations, seems ridiculous to us. Yet Averrhoës merely means that to the fact of something being in motion there correspond many affirmations and negations concerning it, which are successively true. If my finger, v. g. be drawn along a foot rule we have successively: *It is true that my finger is on the first inch; it is not true that it is on the second, on the third, etc.* — and: *It is not true that it is on the first, the third, the fourth* etc.; *it is true that it is on the second.* Motion, and in general change, implies that the same propositions are true after having been false, and false after having been true.

renitens quiescens, et alia subita, sicud illuminacio medii. Omnes enim iste acciones terminantur ad passa distincta ab agentibus, non racione subiecti quod agat spiritualiter in res agentes (sicud est in prima accione in qua agens patitur passione que est salus et perfeccio, ut loquuntur philosophi), set in racione realiter passi transmutacione pacientis a suo quodammodo contrario, specialiter dum passum resistit agenti.

Coming to mental acts, we find them divided into such as require an organ to be elicited, and such as do not; for essentials and non-essentials are also to be found in accidents.

De actibus anime est divisio secundum divisionem potenciarum et obiectorum; ut alius est organicus (ut sensacio interior vel exterior), alius non organicus (ut actus intellectus et voluntatis); alius requirit obiectum ad quod terminatur ad *esse*, tale quod universaliter omnis sensacio, et noticia alia non requirit, ut ymaginacio, intelleccio, appetitus et volucio. Nam in omni genere accidencium est dare accidentale et essenciale, ut genus, speciem, differenciam, proprium et accidens.

Science, or certain knowledge may be either the actual unhesitating assent to the truth; or it is not the act, but a disposition towards it.

Unde dupliciter potest accipi sciencia actualis, vel noticia; vel pro actu adherendi. cum existencia illius quod primo apprehenditur, sine formidine contraria illi adhesioni; et sic noticia potest esse non noticia, quia, pereunte cognito, perit noticia. Et isto modo accipit philosophus scienciam, capitulo de qualitate, ponens illam esse in predicamento relacionis, cum sit corespondencia cogniti ad actum cognoscendi. Secunda tamen est sciencia: hec est habitus de genere qualitatis.

The name of action may in a wide sense be given to the substance itself, or its essential tendency; in a strict sense it is

Secundo, principaliter notandum est quod hoc genus accio, sicud cetera genera generalissima, potest extendi ad omnem agenciam supradictam, et sic quelibet essencia, vel propria passio qua essencia per se tendit in suum

9. MS. 3 *in marg.* 25. MS. crediti — credendi?

1. *Illuminacio medii.* Light was supposed to be an instantaneous movement. 4. *Spiritualiter.* See St. Thomas, Sum. Theol. 1ª pars, qu. 78, art. 3, for an elucidation of this term. He distinguishes between the changes produced by an exterior object. Some are in the sensory organ in the same manner as in the object, v. g. heat or cold (secundum *esse* naturale). But the heat *as felt*, is not in the object, but in the subject alone. and this change is "secundum *esse* spirituale"; others, as colours, for instance, impress our organs only "secundum *esse* spirituale"; for the colour of a red-hot poker does not pass into the eye as its heat passes into the hand. 16. *Accidentale.* Note the sharp distinction between accidents, meaning *phenomena,* and accidents, meaning *non-essentials.*

finem, potest devocari accio; secundo modo potest nomen accionis limitari ad agenciam accidentalem; et sic est predicamentum. Nec est inconveniens nomen talis predicamenti esse ambiguum vel analogum, quia hoc pene invenies de nomine cuiuscunque predicamenti: nam substancia quandoque communiter accipitur pro quocunque ente absoluto sufficiente per se existere (et sic est commune ad deum et creaturas), quandoque limitatur ad ens absolutum potens per se subsistere accidentibus absolutis, et sic est genus commune ad substancias corporeas et incorporeas; et sic essencia divina non est in predicamento substancie nisi per reduccionem, quia principium substancie. Non enim est possibile deum secundum naturam divinam per se substare accidenti absoluto, ut qualitati vel quantitati, quamvis infinitis actibus relativis per se subsint. Nam bonitas, iusticia, sciencia, et quicquid in eo non relative dicitur, sonans in qualitatem, est ipsa substancia vel essencia. Et eodem modo magnitudo sue potencie, immensitatis, vel quic-
F. 59a quid in quantitatem sonans, sive | continuam sive discretam, dummodo non relative dicitur ad extra, est ipsa essencia, sicud est eius eternitas; et ternarius personarum corespondenter. Igitur, sicud dicitur de nomine substancie, dicendum est de nomine accionis. Quandoque enim ampliatur ad signandum quamcunque formam qua quicquam est formaliter agens; et vere sic est commune ad deum et omnes substancias vel essencias absolutas, cum deus per propriam sapienciam vel agenciam (que est verbum sue locucionis) est intelligens et dicens res: et sic est quelibet essencia modo essencialiter noscens seipsam. Et quandoque restringitur ad formam accidentalem qua quicquam dicitur formaliter agens; et sic est predicamentum, et anime acciones sunt per reduccionem in illo predicamento, quia eius principia. In omni enim genere est unum primum quod est medium et mensura omnium aliorum, ut dicitur 10° metaphisice.

limited to accidental agency. This ambiguity does not matter, for it is found in the other categories too. God in one sense is a substance in another He is not; He is, if substance means that which exists by itself.

He is not, if it means that which underlies accidents; for His attributes *are* His very being.

Action also may have a wider or a stricter signification, meaning either the active substance, or that which springs from it.

Tercio respondetur per ordinem ad argumenta, supponendo quod omnis actus anime a qualitatibus (que sunt intenciones, potencie et habitus) est distinctus, cum sit accidens de genere accionis. Ad primum dicitur quod minor est falsa. Ad hoc enim quod ens denominet sub-

Answers to the other objections in Chap. II.

(1) It is not the actions themselves, but their goodness

1, 2. MS. accio nomen accionis. 29. MS. dns *pro* dicens. 33. MS. a[e] = alie? 37. MS. 3[a] conclusio *in marg.*

or badness, which makes men good or bad; these are qualities indeed, but they are distinct from the actions,

iectum inmediate et formaliter accidentaliter esse quale, oportet quod sit forma accidentalis, qua posita, subiectum est tale; sic quod non sit alia forma proprior, secundum quam subiectum sit tale. Unde actus meritorii et demeritorii denominant homines efficienter esse bonos vel malos, et bonitates vel malicie ex illis resultantes denominant homines inmediate et formaliter esse malos vel bonos.

as is clear from the fact that the same actions are now good, now bad; that the goodness or badness remains when the actions are over; and that there is no correspondence between the acts and the states induced by them.

Et quod bonitates et malicie resultantes ab illis actibus distinguantur ab illis actibus, satis patet ex hoc quod illi actus possunt manere, bonitate vel malicia deperdita, et bonitas aut malicia potest manere, illis actibus deperditis. Ac tercio stat illa adquiri subiecto, quantumlibet inproporcionaliter (puta verius bonitatem [aut] maliciam quam actum, vel econtra); et patet distinccio inter illa.

These states or qualities, however, are merely the thing itself, *quà* good or bad.

Sed non ymaginor quod bonitas vel malicia, quam pono qualitatem, sit res absoluta que potest per se existere; quia hoc non concipio de aliqua forma accidentali quo subiectum formaliter est bonum, sic quod claudit contradiccionem aliquid esse actualiter bonum sine tali bonitate sibi accidentali, quia tantum ponitur per illam bonitatem quod per hoc concretum: *istam rem esse sic actualiter bonam.*

(2) Action effects a change in the mind that acts. But *change* may be understood either *a)* as the happening of any new determination in any subject; or *b)* as the acquisition of a new quality, properly so called: and in this sense the mind is said to change; or *c)* as the acquisition of some extended quality, by the loss of its contrary. This last is the change that Aristotle calls *alteration.*

Ad secundum dicitur concedendo quod anima alteratur. Sed pro materia notandum quod tripliciter contingit ens alterari. Primo modo largissime per qualiscunque forme accidentalis absolute adquisicionem; et isto modo dicit Porfirius quod Socrates est alter in theatro quam fuit in foro propter adquisicionem situs vel loci. Secundo modo, propter qualitatis adquisicionem, sive fuerit sensibilis sive insensibilis, sicud virtuosus alteratur et factus bonus moraliter. Et isto modo contingit animam alterari, et hominem (secundum animam), per adquisiciones disposicionum, habituum, specierum, vel potenciarum. Sed tercio modo propriissime dicitur aliquid alterari, quod est per se ens adquirens vel deperdens successive qualitatem sensibilem per contrarii adquisicionem vel deperdicionem; et isto modo ad qualitates que sunt de tercia specie qualitatis | ponit philosophus alteracionem F. 59b
proprie dictam in 7° phisicorum. Cum enim totum genus motus proprie dicti sit per se sensibile (ut patet secundo De Anima), patet quod alteracio, que est eius

8. MS. ab *pro* quod. 13. MS. ve9· 14. MS. aut *deest.* 25. MS. pro *pro* per. 30. MS. v'cuſ9·

univoca species, erit eciam sensibile, quod non esset nisi quantitas adquisita vel deperdita fuerit sensibilis; quia subducta omni qualitate sensibili ab homine moto localiter, augmentato, vel alterato, non plus perciperet illum motum quam percipio motum venti. Dicitur igitur quod homo, gaudendo vel tristando, inevitabiliter relinquit post gaudium vel tristiciam quamdam disposicionem et quamdam alteracionem specierum in memoria, racione quarum secundo modo loquendo satis alteratur. Cum enim sit melior vel peior, vel aliquod ens memorans noviter vel saltem intensius quam prius, satis ostenditur quod sit variabilis et non semper conformiter se habens ab intrinseco, sicud deus.

Joy or sorrow after it has passed, leaves behind it a certain state or disposition of the mind; but this change merely proves that the soul does not possess the immutability of God.

Ad tercium dicitur quod assumptum est falsum, vel aliter est equivocacio. Pro quo memorandum quod, sicud habita proporcione qualitatum priorum in mixto (ut vitro vel quocunque alio) secunda qualitate, informacio resultat consecutive, sicud passio consequitur suum subiectum ([ut] diafaneitas, fragilitas, vel quecunque alia qualitas secunda): sic, habita plena noticia obiecti beatifici secundum ultimum capacitatis virtutis, et plena adhesicione ac dilectacione in illo obiecto cum securitate perpetuo sic manendi et summa subordinacione aliarum virium et parcium corporis secundum ultimum sue capacitatis, secundum disposiciones quas theologi vocant dotes; habitis, inquam, istis, inevitabiliter resultat beatitudo, que est qualitas quedam denominans subiectum formaliter beatum; non aliquid quod deus potest auferre et ponere in alio subiecto vel multiplicare sine multiplicacione sui subiecti, sed unum quod tantum ponit quantum ponitur per hoc quod iste est beatus; et iste disposiciones prime naturaliter vocantur quandoque partes beatitudinis, quandoque materialiter beatitudines. Per illa patet ad primam instanciam quod, querendo qualis est Petrus in patria, convenienter respondetur quod est beatus, cum beatitudo sit eius insuperabilis qualitas. Et

(3) Certain changes imply merely the pre-existence of a subject properly disposed, not a pre-existing quality. Glass, by the very fact of its ingredients being rightly blended, has transparency; and thus, the full knowledge of the object of bliss necessarily results in the beatific vision, without the separate creation of any beatific quality. The proper dispositions of the subject are called the *parts* of bliss, or blisses.

14. MS. ad 3m *in marg.* 15. MS. ate *pro* aliter. 19. MS. ut *deest.*

13. Against those who set up each quality as a subtle abstract entity, distinct from that which has the quality, Wyclif points out that every creature must be changeable, and defines quality merely as "the being itself, *quà* thus changed".

querendo qualiter agit beatus, dicetur quod comprehendit vel intuetur deum.

It does not follow, because these dispositions proceed from free-will, that man beatifies himself, since grace is an indispensable aid.

Quoad secundum dicitur quod conclusio illata non sequitur, nam obiectum beatificum dat cuicunque creature beate de sua gracia beatitudinem, et creatura disponit et disposuit se ad hoc, eliciendo tales actus. Nullum tamen actum elicit, nisi ad quem deus principalius graciose concitat, cum contradiccionem claudit quod homo quicquam benefaciat sine gracia dei speciali.

Whether man's action is an auxiliary efficient cause of bliss, or no, bliss cannot exist by itself.

Si autem instetur quod homo concurrit efficienter ad suam beatificacionem in eliciendo actum, sicud sacramentum facit dispositive graciam, ego non contradico isti sensui. Utrinque tamen esset inpossibile ut beatitudo esset potens per se existere. Nam hoc non coëfficit animam, quamvis disponat ad hoc. Et quoad verbum *creandi* implicatum, dicitur quod dupliciter accipitur ad propositum; uno modo pro produccione entis in subiecto quod quondam creavit; et illo modo creat deus tenebram, faciendo illam individuacionem | cuius materiam quondam creavit. Sed secundo modo dicitur creare aliquid, cum facit illud quod nulla pars eius vel subiectum eius prefuit, sicud fecit in principio mundi de materia prima, et frequenter postmodum de animabus quas creavit. Sed pro primo modo creandi, notandum quod, si fuerit disposicio cuius produccionem deus non potest communicare creature, ut est infusio gracie vel glorie, vel dacio beatitudinis, tunc specialiter dicitur deus creare talem disposicionem: non sic quod deus potest talem disposicionem primo per se creare, et postmodum infundere (ac si quis liquorem infunderet in receptaculum per cannalem), sed dare talem graciam, gloriam, vel beatitudinem creare, est primo obiective, et primo effective facere creaturam deo gratam, gloriosam, vel beatam.

Beatitude is said to be created in the soul, relatively to its being caused by God's direct action, not in the sense of a substance which in no wise exists before creation.

F. 60a

In this first sense, God simply makes His creature blessed, and by the fact its beatitude springs into existence.

This gross manner of considering grace and glory as something separable from its possessor, and therefore, to be bought and re-sold, was

Illius enim grosse ymaginacionis fuit ille maledictus simoniacus de quo in actibus apostolorum capitulo octavo legitur, quod voluit emisse potestatem apostolorum, ac si vellet emisse loculum plenum gracia, et illam secundum parvas proporciones vendidisse ad usuram, sicud ypotecarii vendunt sirupos vel electuaria. Sed audivit

2. MS. *after* deum, orare *very indistinct*. 10. MS. 9it *pro* concurrit. 13. MS. vel *pro* ut. 35. MS. actibus capitulo octavo apostolorum.

35. Actus Apostolorum, VIII, 18—21.

responsum a subtili piscatore quod non fuit sibi pars neque sors in sermone illo; quia erravit, estimans donum dei peccunia possideri. Et post illum surrexit ille maledictus hereticus pellagius, acutus in pravitate. Sed respondet in ymaginacione putans grosse quod gracia esset una res quam deus posset servare per se et infundere, sicud homo insorbet olera, et ideo consequenter dixit quod gracia beatitudinis datur de lege ad faciliendum hominem ad bene et meritorie operandum, sed non requiritur. Et illius opinionis sunt multi moderni theologi. Et sic erravit de quiditate originalis peccati, putans quod fuisset quedem macula positiva in semine vel carne per aquam corpoream abluibilis; et sic credo multos errasse per defectum noticie quiditatum talium.

the root of the heresy of Simon Magus. Pelagius, teaching that we can please God without grace, also conceived it as something not identical with *a man's being pleasing to God*, and separable therefrom. Many modern theologians labour under a similar error. His doctrine as to original sin is erroneous in like manner.

Unde credo quod contradiccionem formalem claudit, quod deus salvet aliquem hominem, vel cooperetur cum eo meritorie operante sine speciali gracia et caritate creata distincta a deo et qualibet alia substancia. Et si queritur de quiditate talis gracie, dicitur quod est optima qualitas, non potens per se existere, sed per se denominans formaliter hominem gratum deo. Nec darem unam guttam illius gracie, si esset res que posset per se existere, pro infinitate auri vel omnibus bonis possibilibus citra deum; saltem si essem securus de eius perpetua inexistencia: quia plus valeret mihi quam infinitorum angelorum asistencia sine tali. Non igitur dissencio quod vocetur res positiva vel pes tauri si opporteat, cum hoc tamen quod intelligatur (sicud ego intelligo), quod non possit per se existere, cum nihil ponit nisi hominem esse gratum deo, et F. 60b | illa que consecuntur ad hoc. Expediens tamen fuit quod quidam dixerunt quod non sit res sed qualitas quidem, quod non est *quid* sed *cui*, et quidem quod est ens sed non reale, cum sit relacio. In talibus enim, ubi homines sunt profundati in nimis grossis concepcionibus, expedit revocare eos recordando modum loquendi ultra hoc quod opporteret, si haberent veros conceptus apostoli et antiquorum doctorum, sicud in simili docet Aristoteles, 3° ethicorum. Nec credo quod unquam apostolus vel antiquus sentenciavit quod gracia sit res que posset per se existere.

Digression concerning the nature of grace: Wyclif asserts that to think it a separable entity is flatly absurd. A quality, yes; self-existent, no. It would be, if such, worth more than infinite treasures, provided it could not be lost. Let there be no quarrel whether it is or not something positive; no matter what it may be called, it cannot exist by itself. Nevertheless, the position of some who assert that it is a mere belonging, a relation, and unreal, has this good side, that it errs in the right direction; such an exaggeration is useful at times.

17. MS. operato. 30. MS. possibilis? *pro* ponit

7. *Insorbet*. Cf. 'insorbet ut olera' (De Apostasia p. 100, l. 25).

Return to the main question. Every act is accompanied by a certain disposition of the subject as concerns the act.

Redeundo igitur ad terciam confirmacionem, dicitur quod quandocunque in hac vita homo elicit actum anime concomitatur disposicio vel indisposicio quoad bonitatem moralem, quoad memoriter retinendum vel obliviscendum, vel tercio quoad debilitacionem organi quo actus elicitur; quia sicut allegatum est 3^{c} li^{o} (scilicet li^{o} 3° questione 16^{a} vitulonis) visio non fit sine dolore et passione oculi a substancia abiciente, et per idem nullus alius actus organicus fit sine congrua debilitacione organi; ideoque omnem talem actum quantumcunque dictum permanentem, dum illa vita vivitur, concomitatur quidem motus racione qualitatis adquisite vel deperdite.

But this fact of an accompanying relation does not affect our position. Our adversaries themselves say that the presence of beatitude would not beatify unless it were united to its subject; and union is a relation.

Nec multum nocet noscentibus veritatem, quod beatitudo requirat relacionem vel habitudinem respectivam ad deum. Nam, posita beatitudine subiectiva quam ipsi ponunt deum posse ponere in lapide; ad hoc — nisi foret informacio vel unio — nihil valeret. Immo, secundum conceptus illorum, positis beatitudine subiectiva cum sua informacione et beatitudine obiectiva, nisi affuerit accepcio beatitudinis obiective, totum non valet attomum; et certum est quod accepcio et unio ponunt respectus.

He who has the quality of beatitude must be inseparably united to it, since it would not otherwise be what it is.

Ego autem dico quod, posita illa qualitate, est sic qualificatus ita securus de sua beatitudine, quam securus sum quod nihil simul est et non est; nec stat deum cum illa qualitate superinducere penam vel privare ab illa, quamvis posset si vellet. Et sic cognicio condicionate veritatis incommutabilis est sufficiens carta securitatis beatitudinis. Scio enim, et multo magis quilibet beatus in patria, quod si habet summam perfeccionem corporis et anime, quod illa nunquam deficeret in futurum.

He must know that he is perfectly happy, and if perfectly, then eternally.

Et certe antecedens patet. Cognosceret per experienciam (vel, secundum illos, intuitum) illam beatitudinem, et satis videret quod ipsa perpetuo informabit, cum veritates de preterito, de futuro, et alie quecunque sint intuibiles in verbo.

Augustine, affirming the perfection of this mental vision, confirms our view.

Unde nota diligenter Augustinum, libro de immortalitate anime, ubi diffuse declarat quod sensacio est actus senciendi, et omnis talis passio est pati sensus. Unde, in fine libri, sic scribit: Cum anima in quarto gradu conceperit quanta sit, quodam incredi-

7. MS. vitloȝ. 11. MS. vuts *pro* vivitur. 30. MS. desineret?

7. *Vitulonis.* The words in parentheses seem to be a marginal note, transferred to the text.

bili fiducia pergit in contemplacionem veritatis; sed hec accio (id est, appeticio intelligendi ea que vere summe que sunt) summus aspectus est anime: quo perfecciorem, meliorem, recciorem non habet.

Et per idem patet responsio ad quartum argumentum. F. 61[a] Nam omnis actus anime est in motu, ut in suo | signato vel effectu, sicud omnis motus est in accione ut in eius causa; nec est possibile subducere omnem motum alium a visione vie, quia omnem talem concomitatur alter; etsi orbes oculorum, visibile, et medium quantumlibet quiescant. Unde conceditur quod (sive actus anime ponitur permanens, sive successivus) quod est dare generacionem actus vel actus incepcionem que distinguitur ab actu, cum sit solum instantanea et actus temporaneus. Sic enim est in motu successivo, quod continue erit subita motus generacio distincta a motu eius [cuius] est generacio.

(4) The argument, denying that mental acts consist in movement, fails here; for causing movement, they are to it as the cause is to the effect; and movement is in them as the effect is in the cause. What produces the movement is an action, and yet is not the movement produced.

Dubium tamen est utrum actus sensitivi hic in via vel in patria, et pene vel dolores in inferno, consistant in successione vel aliter sint permanentes, ut oportet; vel tercio aliqui permanentes et alii successivi. Et videtur tripliciter quod aliqui sint permanentes; primo, quia stat virtutem manere fixam et intuitum continue fixum sine mutacione speciei aut intencione vel remissione actus, ubi non est diversitas signanda parcium actus; quia nec a subiecto nec ab obiecto. Secundo, quia actus: non est enim virtutem sic intueri illud obiectum et hoc manebit continue, sive varietur subiectum, sive non, saltem de possibili; igitur et actus manebit continue idem. Tercio, quia actus in patria non generabunt qualitates vel corumpent; quia si generabunt continue sine corupcione, in infinitum intenderentur, et si corumperent, perirent visiones beatitudinum, cum continue defluerent, sicud motus; nec debilitas corporis vel potencie erit ibi, sicud nec fastidium vel alienacio ex-

Are all acts of sensation successive, all permanent, or some one and some the other? The point argued at length.

16. MS. cuius *deest.* 18. MS. dubium *in marg.* 20. MS. vtoȝ *pro* ut oportet. 23. MS. intintū. 27. MS. ītuī.

21. I have been utterly unable to make out this paragraph, and the following. Some parts cannot even be construed. But what points most clearly to a serious corruption of the text, or to a considerable gap, is the fact that the argument proposes to prove that some mental acts are permanent, and concludes that all are successive!

crescens. Ideo relinquitur quod ibi erunt actus sensuum, sine motu concomitante, et per consequens, cum actus sensitivi, ut prius declaratum est: igitur, iuxta argumentum proximum omnes sunt successivi, cum non stat successivum et permanens esse eiusdem speciei specialissime.

Similiter, omnes tales actus temporanei in patria sunt longi et sic magis recte diuturnitatis: igitur sunt successivi. Consequencia videtur per hoc, quod non est racio significanda quare pena vel leticia permanens foret longa pocius quam quecunque pars orbis vel luminis: cum tamen pene inferni dicuntur infinite, et infinitum maiores pene vel leticie sempiterne quam pene temporales intenciores et maiores mole. Relinquitur igitur quod sint magne diuturnitate, sicud tempus et motus, et per consequens successive.

Similiter, subducto omni motu preter ymaginacionem et sensacionem dampnati sine variacione actus vel qualitatis inducte foret tempus consequens ymaginacionem, sicud videtur commentator dicere in quarto phisicorum; sed tunc non esset prius vel posterius, nisi quoad partes pene fuerit successio: igitur in qualibet tali pena est successio parcium, et per consequens in omni leticia accidentali. Assumptum videtur per hoc, quod aliter non essent pene dampnatorum infinite proporcionate de meritis punitorum, cum non excedant penam horalem: quod est contra iustum distributorem penarum et premiorum; nec aliter generaretur fastidium ex diuturnitate | pene, cum apparet homini longa pena; et cum non sic F. 61b
esset casus apparicionis quoad ymaginativam non est causa fingenda.

It is probable that some acts are permanent and some successive; but their duration does not affect their intensity.

Pro isto probabiliter dici potest quod alii actus sunt permanentes et alii successivi, tam in patria, quam in via. Et illi qui sunt permanentes, quamvis sint eiusdem speciei cum aliis successivis, non sunt magni propter diuturnitatem. Credo tamen quod post diem iudicii, tam pena, quam leticia, erit magna et successiva; quia tunc erit tempus, quamvis non per motus illorum orbium, sed quadam laude successiva dei: de qua laude, utrum erit voce tali qualem musici ponunt causari in orbibus ex conneccione vel proporcione suarum parcium, vel

In Heaven the praise of God will be successive; whether

1. MS. $s^{c}s\widehat{n}$ = succesivi; 3. MS. $s^{c}s\widehat{n}$.

quomodolibet aliter, est grandis sermo, et mihi ambiguus. Quomodocunque igitur loquamur de actibus anime, semper habent motus sibi corespondentes, quamvis Barlay [et] precipuis logicis videatur quod auctor sit intelligendus de accionibus corporis quod omnes tales sunt in motu. Tripliciter enim accipitur motus in communi, sicud dictum est de alteracione. Quandoque enim accipitur proprie pro mutacione successiva vel subita, qua motum adquirit sibi, vel deperdit substanciam, qualitatem, vel quantitatem, sicud in postpredicamentis motus species ponit philosophus esse sex. Secundo modo accipitur largius, includendo variacionem factam per creacionem vel adnihilacionem. Tercio, largissime sumitur, includendo essencialem limitacionem passivam a causa superiori naturaliter cognita; sicud philosophi accipiunt, quando dicunt inclusas motrices orbium moveri a deo tanquam ab amato et desiderato, de quanto limitantur ab illo apprehendendo sub racione amati finis bene ordinantis, quod sic se habeant modo orbes aut quomodolibet aliter, laudando deum. Et certum est quod, sic loquendo, omnes beati perpetuo movebuntur. Et patet quod, ut oportet, omnis accio est in motu. Hoc tamen credo, quod erit successio in celo post iudicium, a qua causabitur tempus; quia non credo quod tempus mensurans gaudia beatorum erit passio penarum vel mocionum successivorum dampnatorum; set de [hoc] alias erit sermo. Et sic, ut prius dicitur, concedo quod sive loquamur de ente permanente, sive de ente successivo, dummodo sit permanens vel temporaneum, quod eius generacio posita distinguitur ab ipso.

Ad quintum dicitur quod non est inconsequens eosdem actus in communi vel in specie redire quotienscunque. Sed duplex est hic dubitacio: prima de principiis in-

proceeding from the music of the spheres, is a doubtful point.

Movement may be understood either as a change (successive or instantaneous),

or as the otherness consequent upon creation or annihilation,

or as the tendency of any being towards its cause, by which it is limited;

in this last sense, the Blessed are everlastingly in motion; and thus action consists in movement.

(5) Mental acts, specifically the same, may recur; the question is, *a)* what differentiates one from another, and

4. MS. ct *deest*. 5. MS. cor^{res} *pro* corporis. 27. MS. hoc *deest*.
2. MS. ad 5^{m} *in marg*.

4. *Barlay*. Perhaps the same as Walter Burley. 22. Wyclif's distinction, by which he manages to admit that every act consists in movement, appears here to be over-subtle. The two latter species of movement are not real, for in neither case is there a real change. In Creation, for instance, Scholastics say that the change from nothingness to Being (the *terminus a quo* not existing in fact) is not a real change. It would follow that in such cases the *acts would not be real:* which it was certainly not Wyclif's intention to prove.

b) whether the same individual act can recur.

dividuandi actus; secunda, si possunt idem actus, quantumlibet singulares, redire idem in numero.

a) Acts are differentiated by the difference in their subjects, and in the times at which they are elicied.

The same movement, made here and in Rome, would be differentiated by the difference in space: time can be in many places at once, but place cannot.

As to instantaneous acts, they are differentiated, not by time, but by the instant in which they occur, or begin to occur.

Quoad illum, dicitur quod omnes actus successivi individuantur a suis propriis subiectis et temporibus mensurantibus, ut patet quinto phisicorum, capitulo de unitate motus, ubi dicitur quod ad unitatem numeralem motus requiritur unitas numeralis subiecti et spatii, et temporis. Unde, quamvis in eodem tempore idem esset multiplicatum hic et Rome, adhuc illo moto localiter foret alius motus hic et alius ibi, situs autem non potest multiplicari. De actu autem summe instantaneo, patet quod individuatur ab instanti, ita quod | non esset ille F. 62 actus si in alio instanti esset elicitus de actu permanente. Dicitur quod non individuatur a tempore, quia, quocunque instanti temporis dato, ille actus potest manere sine illo; sed quilibet talis [in]dividuatur ex suo subiecto vel obiecto vel saltem equevalenter, et ex hoc quod est vel fuit in tali instanti generatus. Unde, posito quod idem subiectum eliceret duos actus de eodem obiecto secundum eandem racionem, unum prius et alium posterius, et utrumque permanentem, adhuc differret unus a relico per hoc quod sunt actus qui in diversis instantibus inceperunt. Et ideo notabiliter loquuntur illi qui cum Porfirio dicunt quod principia vel condiciones individuantes, quas Avicenna vocat appendicias materie, sunt *hic* et *nunc:* id est, ubicacio et quandalitas. Tempus autem et situs per se mensurantur sine accidentibus illis inherentibus, a quibus individuarentur, quia aliter esset processus in infinitum in principiis individuandi. Substancie autem quecunque composite ex materia et forma individuantur ex suis principiis, scilicet ex materia et forma, et specialiter si quelibet singularis materia sit illis accidentalis, tunc individuantur a suis formis. Et materia cum forma individuantur ex se, sic quod non sit ulterius principium individuandi preter suas partes vel deum. Ipse enim individuat omnem rem causatam, sicut et omnem bonum

In general, the principles of individuation are the *here* and the *now*, for acts.

Substances consisting of matter and form are individuated by both, or by their forms alone.

And God is also that which individuates every being.

9. MS. romo *pro* Rome. 16. MS. in *deest.* 25. MS. am[ma].

21. *Permanentem.* Wyclif is speaking of instantaneous acts. But Scholastics do not understand by *instant* only the instant of time, but also the duration of an unchanging act, which may be equivalent to a very long time God's eternity is called an instant, because He has no successive acts of thought.

actum anime terminat, quamvis non in racione subiecti primarii talis actus; cum sic terminare actum intelligendi sit *esse* illud quod principaliter apprehenditur illo actu, sicud sunt universalia respectu actuum communium, et singularia respectu actuum singularium. In hoc igitur substancie vel essencie, que conveniunt per se existere quoad suas individuaciones, differunt ab accidentibus, quod ipse non individuantur a tempore quoad *fieri*, nec quoad *esse;* sic quod, si eedem anime redirent in permagno anno Platonis quantitate 36 milia annorum, actuantes sive eandem materiam sive diversam, redirent idem homines numero, et corespondenter de quibuscunque formis substancialibus redeuntibus.

Thus accidents differ from substances;

for if souls could return to the same bodies, they would be the same in number, notwithstanding the lapse of time.

Utrum autem forma substancialis possit redire eadem numero, est alterius negocii. Ex omnibus istis narratis patet quod omnis individuacio causatur a primo principio, quod non proprie est individuum, quia non est per se vel per accidens in aliqua specie.

The first principle of individuation, God, not coming under a species, is not properly an individual.

Et ex istis patet responsio ad secundam difficultatem et formam compositi argumenti: quia *a* actus ponit me sic intelligere Socratem et illa que consecuntur ad hoc, inter que unum individuans illum actum est, quod ipse tunc incepit esse. Nec video quod esset possibile duos actus elici pro eodem instanti simillime primo de eodem obiecto, et in eodem subiecto. Actus enim possunt habere partes et esse quantumlibet similes, dum unus terminatur ad unam partem primi obiecti, et alius ad aliam; sicud patet de actibus videndi et ymaginandi. Et ex istis videtur probabile quod nec actus peccatorum, nec illa peccata que sunt privaciones redeunt in eodem numero, saltem nisi fuerint communia; de quibus concedit Lincolniensis quod non solum unum genus peccati, sed qualecunque peccatum, potest redire idem quoad sub-
F. 62b iectum et materiam, vel | subiectum, sed non quoad tempus individuans.

b) It is impossible for the same act to recur, because we are conscious of each act as it happens at a given time; recurring, the time would be different, and the act too.

Unde probabile videtur quod omne accidens permanens vel successivum individuatur a quandalitate: ut quantitas qualitas, relacio etc., sic quod alia esset quantitas vel qualitas, si produceretur in uno instanti quam si produceretur in alio. Vel, secundum alios, antequam producatur est indifferens utrum in uno instanti vel

It is probably time that gives individuality to any accident,

though some think that an accident is in itself indifferent to time.

27. MS. primo.

alio producatur, sed dum fuerit producta, tunc ideo est illa quantitas, quia est quantitas que tunc producebatur. Prior tamen responsio est mihi probabilior, quia aliter non esset alia illuminacio medii propter diversitatem temporis, nec alia quantitas vel qualitas, manente eodem subiecto et conformitate gradus. Et sic dicitur de peccatis redeuntibus quod qualelibet peccatum potest redire idem quoad subiectum, quoad pretericionem actus, et quoad obligacionem ad penam propter omissionem penitencie; sed ex illa dimissione insurgit novum peccatum omissionis; et sic incipit esse nova obligacio ad penam novam et propter peccatum preteritum et propter novam redicionem.

The recurrence of the same sin at different times means the recurrence of a new sin only different from the former one by the violation of a duty which is present.

(6) Every act is produced in the soul, as in its subject. If we do not admit that mental acts are determined by objects which do not exist, in the sense of *apprehending or tending towards them* we must say they are determined by God, or simply admit that what cannot exist may determine.

Ad sextum dicitur quod minor est falsa, cum omnis actus anime producitur in ipsa anima, ut subiecto; sive sit actus immanens. Et sic (secundum nolentes ampliare illum terminum *terminare* [ad] actus quibus apprehenduntur vel appetuntur illa que non sunt) non terminantur ad illa, sed deus terminat illos actus in hoc quod facit illos esse finitos, sicud terminat quamlibet creaturam quamvis equivoce a terminacione per obiectum. Alii autem dicunt (cum quibus non ego), quod actus terminatur ad illud quod non est nec potest esse. Actus igitur quibus apprehenduntur intenciones, potencie, vel habitus, terminantur ad illos et non alii.

(7) *a)* Each new mental act implies a change in the soul; but this does not imply that a new absolute entity is evolved.

Ad primam confirmacionem dicitur, ut patet 4° libro, quod inpossibile est animam elicere novum actum, nisi moveatur. Unde ad primum actum volendi inclinat naturaliter bonum volitum, quia primo omnium vult homo ens esse actu elicito; et sic aliter se habet nunc quam ante. Sed non oportet quod nova res absoluta sit generata, sicud patet 3° libro tractatu de motu: et solvitur prima difficultas.

b) There must be, before any act takes place, a tendency

Ad secundam dicitur quod nullum agens potest actu transeunte successivo quicquam producere, nisi habeat

14. MS. ad 6m *in marg.* 17. MS. ad *deest.* 26. MS. 1 *in marg.* 34. MS. 2 *in marg.*

4. *Illuminacio medii.* If light were an instantaneous movement, the otherness of the illumination throughout the space between the sun and the earth could not be accounted for by time, supposing illumination to be in itself indifferent to the instant at which it took place. 15. *Sive.* The second *sive* failing, the text must be corrupt. But the sense reads well enough if we supply *sive transiens.*

nisum, inclinacionem activam, vel quomodocunque aliter nominandum, precedentem naturaliter et causaliter transeuntem (sicud declaratum est libro 3°, de inclinacione ferri ad deorsum, que potest suspendi per alteracionem adamantis, et potest manere sine hoc quod producat actum transeuntem apposito prohibente forciori). Quod autem anima non ita instanter producat actus successivos et transeuntes, sicud agencia minus nobilia, hoc est propter superioritatem sue nature in agendo. Si autem non posset sine re potente per se existere noviter producta principiare motum (que res coefficeret motum) esset inperfeccionis in anima.

towards that act; but that this tendency should require the existence of another being to produce its act, would put the soul on a level with matter.

Ad terciam dicitur quod magna diversitas est ponere quod actus sit accidens respectivum, factivum et non activum, nec habens appetitum vel inclinacionem, nec potens esse vel facere sine subiecto, cum sit *subiectum sic* | F. 63a *agere;* et ponere quod sit una res absoluta potens per se existere, per se appetere, et per se agere, sicud membrum hominis. Et ideo multa argumenta procedunt contra unum modum dicendi que non procedunt contra alium. Unde, quamvis vires vel potencie anime et actus volendi vel appetendi sint causativi motuum et aliarum operacionum sensibilium, habent tamen limitatos modos ex circumstanciis concurrentibus cum quibus possunt causare, et cum quibus non; et sic quoad genus velocitatum diurnitatum et talium accidentalium quibus causant. Et ideo dicunt naturales quod tales vires anime dependent ab organis corporalibus, et hinc debilitantur, fortificantur, generantur et corumpuntur, secundum disposiciones in illis organis; non tamen sunt res absolute potentes per se existere, quia sunt qualitates. Et sic dicitur quod saltans, cum devenerit ad extremum gradum altitudinis quem sufficit attingere uno saltu a solido fulcimento, etsi vires, actus et organa sint equeposita, deficit tamen virtus quam contraxit ex supposito: quia (sicud alias probatum est) [est] dare in proiecto et reflexo virtutem quandam successivam qua deffinite movetur mobile secundum inclinacionem gravitatis. Sed falsum est concipere illam virtutem esse unum absolutum potens per se existere, quia vere illa virtus est mobile sufficere

c) When we speak of an act as an accident we mean merely that it is the subject itself, *quà* active; and thus it has no power in itself separately from the subject. If we define it thus, arguments that otherwise might have force, have none.

The powers of the soul may be said to cause movement, but not independently of circumstances. Some even sepend upon the bodily organs, and are destroyed with them.

A leaper, when at the highest point of his leap, can go no farther, not because strength, but because the supporting ground, fails him; in like manner, our powers cannot act without their subject.

13. MS. 3 *in marg.* 15. MS. acci^m. 36. MS. est *deest.* 38. MS. fovltū?

ex pretericione proieccionis vel reflexionis in talem vel talem actum. Et patet quomodo proporcio quam motus consequitur continue variatur proporcionaliter ad variacionem motus.

d) We cannot properly speak of an act being created or annihilated; when it is destroyed, its subject must remain. It has successive parts, like motion; and the arguments against them are similar to those against motion. Some acts have quantitative parts, as touch; some have the quantity in their object, not in the subject, as sight.

Ad quartum dubium dicitur quod nullus actus potest creari vel adnihilari, utendo proprie terminis. Non enim potest deus quemquam actum destruere, nisi servando subiectum propinquum vel remotum. Et habent actus partes successivas, sicud dictum est de motu; et corespondenter dicendum est ad argumenta hic afferenda in materia de successione actuum, sicud dictum est in materia de motu. Sed quoad partes quantitativas actuum quoad molem est difficultas magna. Aliqui enim habent magnitudinem quoad molem, ut tactus, si virtus tactiva sit extensa; et aliqui habent magnitudinem obiectivam et non subiectivam, ut visio et ceteri actus facti per virtutes multiplicatas, cum quibus illi actus multiplicantur, et individuati ab obiectis a quibus individuantur et dependent. Partes enim talium actuum componunt unum actum magnum, non subiective, sed obiective.

The ancients imagined that the act of sight, issuing from the organ, ended in its object, knowledge being a spiritual contact, and love, a spiritual presence. Intensive parts belong to acts, as intensity belongs to quality. But many things may contribute

Et hinc credo antiquos posuisse virtutem egredi ab organo cum actu suo et terminari ad obiectum; et sic cognoscere per contactum quemdam spiritualem; et animam, immo hominem, esse quodammodo cum amante: et iste sensus est satis bonus. De partibus intensivis actuum dicendum est proporcionaliter sicud dictum est de partibus intensivis qualitatum. Hoc tamen notandum, quod infiniti actus concurrunt ad unum actum causandum, qui non sunt partes eius, sed essencie extrinsece, ut actus propriorum sensibilium concurrunt | ad causandum F. 63b

5. MS. 4 *in marg.* 8. MS. actum. 10. MS. hinc inde si *(end of line)* enda.

24. *Cum amante.* Not *cum amato*, because it was believed that, whereas knowledge made the subject in a way other from itself (intellectus . . . natus *fieri omnia*) love drew the loved object somehow *into* the subject. 30. *Propriorum . . . communium et per accidens sensibilia. Propria* sensibilia are those qualities which only one sense can directly perceive, as *colour* for sight, *sound* for *hearing* etc. *Communia* are those which several senses directly perceive; v. g. pleasure or pain. *Per accidens* are those which are perceived by several senses not directly, but by means of the *proprium.* Thus shape is discerned by the eye, because it discerns colours that happen to have this or that shape; and by the touch, which perceives warmth and hardness together with a certain shape.

actus sensibilium communium et per accidens sensibilium. Sed actus terminatus ad universale non habet singulares actus sensibilium communium et per accidens sensibilium terminatos ad singularia illius universalis. Immo, idem actus vel est actus confusus cuiuslibet illorum singularium et distinctus respectu universalis primo apprehensi. Et sic idem actus respectu alicorum est distinctus, et respectu aliorum est confusus; et sic actus diversitate specificantur et sorciuntur alias condiciones ex obiectis ad que principaliter terminantur. Idem enim est intelligere in universali illum et illum. Aliud tamen est distincte intelligere vel signare illum, et aliud sic intelligere illum. Quandoque autem distinxi illas confusas significaciones a distincta; et sic de actibus. Et modo apparet mihi quod non oportet Ad quintum, etc.

to form an act which are not parts of that act themselves; and the same act may be confused or distinct, as concerns its universal object, or its singulars.

e) Is already answered by the preceding remarks.

Ad sextum dicitur quod multi actus sunt inseparabiliter mali et tamen boni, cum claudit contradiccionem ens esse nisi fuerit bonum. Unde dupliciter dicitur aliquid esse bonum vel malum: scilicet, formaliter, ab intrinseco (vel per se) sicud est omnis creatura bona, et omne positivum non peccatum; vel aliter per accidens, occasionaliter, et ab extrinseco, sicud peccata que deus non permitteret esse, nisi proficerent uno modo vel alio, cum ens et bonum convertuntur. Unde videtur mihi quod doctor profundus minimam realitatem ponit in actibus. Bene tamen probat quod omnes actus alico modo sunt boni; non tamen probat quod omnes mali actus per accidens sunt mali; sicud patet de actibus voluntatis et aliquibus actibus extrinsecis. Infinitos enim actus, tam extrinsecos quam intrinsecos, deus non posset de potencia absoluta facere malos, et infinitos contingit signare quod deus non posset facere formaliter bonos. Aliquos autem posset deus facere bonos et post malos et econtra; non tamen est possibile aliquem esse actum quin genus eius sit bonum. Et sic vult Anselmus nullum actum esse per se malum in quantum est illius generis. Unde malos actus et peccata dicunt sancti frequenter non esse, eciam nec habere causas efficientes, sed defficientes; nec esse verum quod deficiunt sed falsum, quamvis deficiant. Et per ista tolluntur

f) We say that certain acts are essentially bad, as acts; yet as entities, they are good. We have intrinsic and formal goodness, and extrinsic and accidental goodness or badness.

Bradwardine proves well enough that every act is somehow good, but not that all bad acts are accidentally bad. For there are numberless acts that God's infinite power could not render good, and others that He could not render formally bad. Every act, generically speaking is good; specifically it may not be so. Thus it is said that sins do not *exist*, and have no efficient, but rather deficient causes.

16. MS. 6 *in marg.* 31. MS. non malos.

25. See note, end of Chapt. II.

Bradwardine, has neither reasons nor authority to prove that all acts are *essentially* good.

multe autoritates. Nec probat doctor per locum ab autoritate vel racione quod omnis actus sit per se bonus, ut videtur ipsum intendere, sicut patet discurrendo per argumenta sua; nec probat quod deus facit omnem talem actum, ut dictum est 3° libro capitulo sexto, et dicetur super libro sentenciarum alibi, si deus dederit.

Hatred of God is essentially bad, though the outward act may be indifferent.

Actus igitur invidendi, odiendi deum, mentiendi, vel fraudandi, sunt inseparabiliter mali, si actus extrinseci possunt vel esse boni, vel saltem habere consimiles cum aliis circumstanciis bonos.

For the right understanding of what Anselm says, remember that he posits real Universals, which are good in themselves: thus hatred is good, because it universally includes hatred of sin; yet hatred of God is not denied to be evil.

Sed pro intellectu Anselmi de conceptu virginali 3° et de casu diaboli 19° et 20° et aliorum loquencium de actibus, ponendo quod sunt nature et per se boni, notandum est diligenter quod illi ponunt universalia ex parte rei, et omne ens positivum habens aliquod universale bonum ponunt per se bonum. Et sic odium in genere dicerent bonum, quia odium peccati est bonum. Non tamen excluditur quin claudat | contradiccionem quod odium dei sit malum. F. 64[a]

Thus God may be said either to do evil, or not to do it, as we consider permission or active production of evil.

Et sic dicunt deum facere talia mala in quantum permittit, dum possit prohibere. Et quandoque negant illud, intelligendo positive faccionem.

Nothing taken indeterminately is simply wrong; to wish to be like God is not evil, but to wish it as Lucifer did, is evil.

Omne enim positivum dicerent habere universalem essenciam bonam, et sic esse per se bonum; et tamen infinita singularia illius universalis dicerent inseparabiliter mala; ut velle similari deo non est simpliciter malum, sed velle ut primus angelus voluit fuit inseparabiliter malum. Unde nullum positivum ponunt simpliciter iniustum, quia non in quantum tale est iniustum, sed privaciones (ut peccata et malicie) sunt per se mala quia in quantum huiusmodi. Et sic privaciones dicunt *deum non facere;* et illa positiva de actibus dicunt *deum facere.*

What makes against perfection in any act is not of God's doing; what makes for it is.

Quia igitur sufficit ad per se et formaliter in existenciam alicuius denominacionis, dato singulari quod eius genus sit per se huiusmodi vel eius passio; ideo dicunt quod omnis accio est per se bona, et per accidens est mala, quia per deformitatem sibi a posteriori inexistentem, que (cum sit prefixum *non*, sicud est totum genus malicie) nec est genus, actus, nec passio, vel proprietas, sed accidens privativum alicui accidenti separabiliter et alteri inseparabiliter inexistens.

This leads these doctors to say that everything evil is accidentally so; for the prefix that expresses deprivation is posterior and accidental to the genus.

Evil may thus by determination inhere

Et ideo consequitur quod nullum positivum est per se malum vel privativum de-

37. MS. p' *pro* prefixum.

nominative, quamvis inseparabiliter sit tale. Multe enim sunt predicaciones necessarie denominaciones inseparabiliter inexistentes, que non proprie sunt per se nec per accidens; vel, si dicantur per accidens, hoc intelligitur de accidenti inseparabili, sicud binarius est paucus, pedale, parvum, qualitas est remissa; et sic de ceteris, quorum aliqua sunt inseparabilia quoad individuum et separabilia quoad speciem, alia autem sunt inseparabilia quoad speciem et separabilia quoad genus; et sic odium in communi consequitur malicia separabiliter quoad genus et inseparabiliter quoad species multas et quoad individua.

inseparably in a positive thing which in itself and without the determination, is good. Some determinations may belong inseparably to the individual, not to the species, nor to the genus.

SECUNDA PARS.

CAPITULUM PRIMUM.

Sequitur secunda pars, cuius primam partem quoad veritatem de preterito tractabo isto capitulo. Ponit enim quod summe contingens est me fuisse, et sic de omni veritate de preterito que aliquando potuit non fuisse. Cuius evidencie sunt tales: Inpossibile est quod quicquam contingens vel possibile distinctum contra necessarium mutetur in necessarium, vel econtra. Sed hoc sequeretur, si veritas de preterito posset esse necessaria postquam fuit contingens: igitur, sic non potest esse. Maior patet tripliciter. Primo ex testimonio Aristotelis (primo de celo, in fine) dicentis contra Platonem quod inpossibile est naturam coruptibilem mutari in necessariam. Secundo, patet hoc ex racione que forte movebat Aristotelem. Nam in latitudine contingencium quoad diuturnitatem est processus in infinitum. Igitur, quo-
F. 64b cunque contingenti signato, | ipsum infinitum distat a condicione necessitatis. Sic enim probant theologi quod solum deus potest creare, quia inter *esse* et non *esse* simpliciter est distancia infinita que solum ab illo potest preteriri; igitur, per idem non iuxta communem cursum nature potest de contingenti facere necessarium.

Tercio; sic: veritas contingens nec a se nec ab alio potest mutari in necessitates: igitur non potest sic mutari. Prima pars patet per hoc quod si veritas per se solam se scit perficere, tunc eque primo habens illam

I shall here deal with the truth of any act in the past or of anything past in general.

It is affirmed that *my having existed*, or any truth which at any time is contingent, is contingent still.

I. What is contingent cannot become necessary, and *my having existed* was once contingent. The major has Aristotle in its favour,

and also the infinite distance between necessity and contingency, which cannot be passed over.

Besides a contingent truth can become necessary neither by itself, nor by the action of any other cause,

2. MS. Capitulum primum *deest; large initial S in red ink.*

4. The MS. has ***ponit***. As we go on, we see that the view here expounded is against Wyclif. *Adversarius*, or some such word, should be supplied.

not by itself; if it had that power, it would always be necessary. Nor by another: for if that other could give it necessity, it could also destroy it. If you say that before the fact there is no truth, but the mere possibility of a truth, what of the affirmation: *This thing, now moving shall be moved for an hour?* Its truth is contingent, depending on some ones will; yet at the end of the hour, it becomes a necessary *has been*. And so of all other such propositions.

sufficienciam sicud *esse*, nunquam foret contingens vel dependens, sed semper prima veritas. Nec ab alio potest, quia illud aliud, sicut potest perficere, sic potest alias destruere; et in isto sunt theologi intricati de confirmacione intellectivarum et hominum, qui possunt deperdere quodcunque ens recipiunt a deo libere contradictorie conservante, sicud libere dedit illis. Dicitur forte quod non est dare veritatem contingentem mutatam in necessitatem: quia, quamvis contingens sit filium fuisse tamen non est veritas sed possibile ante actum quod filius meus fuit. Sed contra: illud est hoc quod motum fuit per horam, et erit per aliam ex libertate voluntatis; est verum *fuisse* et *non* necessarium; sed postquam fuerit completus, necessarium erit ipsum fuisse. Igitur eadem veritas contingens potest alterari in necessitatem; et idem invenies de omni veritate de preterito futura. Nam si *filium meum fore* sit futurum, tunc eternaliter fuit quod filius meus erit; et *sic fuisse* est veritas contingens eterna et filio meo producto incipit esse necessitas.

II. If what is past in necessary, its denial is unthinkable. Yet such propositions as: *Caesar has not existed*, are admitted every day. This is in favour of those who think time is an absolute entity which God can at will annihilate or create anew.

Item, nihil est admittendum nisi possibile; sed admittendum est sine alico inconveniente quod *ego non fui* (et sic de similibus); igitur quodlibet tale est possibile; et per consequens, cum quilibet responsalis obligatur ad negandum aliquid, sequitur quod non habet admittere impossibile. Et minor patet, cum cotidie bene admittitur quod Aristoteles sit futurus, et quod Cesar non fuit etc. Et hoc haberet magnum colorem penes eos qui dicunt tempus esse unum absolutum, quod deus posset adnihilare et recreare quocies voluerit. Nam penes sic dicentes, sicud potest recreare tempus, sic omnem veritatem continue fuit in tempore, et per consequens primam futuricionem ante actum, et quamcunque aliam negacionem quam fecit; cum omne generabile sit coruptibile, eo quod inpossibite est (secundum Aristotelem, ubi supra) quicquam habere temporis inicium, et esse eternaliter duraturum.

We canot say: What was once true, now happening to

Nec valet responsio que dicit quod talia inpossibilia per accidens que aliquando fuerunt vera bene possunt

11. MS. motum qui.

24. *Obligatur*. In the Scholastic dialectical exercise of Obligations. See Wyclif's *Logica*, vol. I, Introduction, XXVIII—XXX, and pp. 69—74.

admitti; immo prodest pro veritate discucienda talia admittere. Quia si iam sit inpossibile, cum non possit esse latitudo in inpossibili, sicud nec in negacione quoad *non posse esse*, sequitur quod ex tali sequitur quidlibet negandum a | respondente sicud ex per se inpossibili. Et per consequens tanta est causa negandi tale, cum fuerit impossibile, sicud aliquod inpossibile assignandum; et per idem tollitur responsio que dicit quod talia sunt admittenda, sicud et omnia inpossibilia, dummodo non arguantur ad illa: et hoc gracia argumenti, quia aliter multa argumenta perirent. Unde communissime admittitur quod nos sumus ante obligacionem, vel tale tempus quod de facto est preteritum. Immo sic concedit Aristoteles vacuum esse, et medium infinitum subtiliari et sic de multis. Nam secundum veritatem nihil est admittendum, quo admisso quod est quomodocunque inconveniens proponendum [sequitur]; sed sic est de quolibet inpossibili, igitur etc. Maior patet per hoc quod, iuxta principia obligacionis, omne repugnans posito non est concedendum, sed omne repugnans tali posito, cum sit sequens, est concedendum; igitur nullum tale est admissibile. Et quod ex omni tali inpossibili sequitur quidlibet inferendum patet sic. Si inpossibile est *te non fuisse*, ita quod non possit sic esse, tunc non posset sic esse *nisi tu sederes*, et per consequens sequitur: sic est; *tu sedes* (et sic de quolibet inferendo). Prima consequencia patet ex hoc, quod aliter oportet dare oppositum, videlicet, quod sic posset esse cum hoc quod non sederes: ex quo sequitur quod sic possit esse. Idem enim est, "Non potest sic esse nisi tu sedeas", et "Si tu non sedes non sic est". Et certum est quod hoc sequitur ex dato, cum nullum inpossibile potest stare cum alio. Nec aliud vult logicus habere per consequenciam logicam, nisi quod antecedens signatum non posset

F. 65a

be impossible, may safely be admitted. For we have no power to admit in any way that which cannot be, and we ought both to deny these and all other propositions similar to them.

Nor can we say that, though impossible, they are admitted for arguments sake, v. g. that we are now at some moment of past time, just as Aristotle supposes the existence of a vacuum, &c. For we should not admit anything out of which self-contradiction might follow: and all that is impossible is in this category, because we can draw any inference we like therefrom. For example: if *your never having existed* is impossible, admitted, it would follow that v. g. *you are sitting now;* otherwise your never having existed would be possible.

17. MS. sequitur *deest.* 25. MS. Si *pro* sequitur.

25. *Sederes.* This argument proceeds upon the generally received axiom that an impossible proposition is one from which, when admitted, *any* conclusion may be drawn. 33. *Consequenciam logicam.* Note that there are two sorts of conditional propositions, one inferring a real nexus between antecedent and consequent, as: *If I am alive, my heart beats*, and the other inferring only the truth of the consequent, as: *If I am alive, I saw him.* Wyclif is here speaking of the latter sort of conditionals.

esse sine consequente, ut dicetur de condicionibus, et eodem modo sequitur necessarium consequi ad quidlibet assignandum, ut: "Si deus est, tunc tu fuisti"; cum non sit possibile deum esse, nisi tu fuisti; quia si est, oportet te fuisse. Et hoc est quod antiquitus solet dici, quod sicud necessarium sequitur ad quodlibet, ita ex inpossibili sequitur quodlibet. Veritates enim necessarie sunt adeo cathenate quod, una destructa, nihil manet. Et tantum odiunt inpossibilia, quod non possunt esse, alico permanente. Ex necessario enim procedit verum contingens: ideo, quocunque inpossibili signato, si illud est, tunc nihil est. Nec videtur quod tales proposiciones non sunt admittende, quia aliquando fuerunt concedende; et nullum inconveniens potest deduci ex concessione illarum scienti consequenter respondere, sicud potest deduci ex concessione huius, "deus non est".

Item, quam commune est *esse* ad encia presencia, preterita vel futura signanda, ita commune est *posse* ad qualecunque tempus presens, preteritum, vel futurum. Sed *esse* est commune ad omnia talia; igitur et *posse* ad quecunque talia tempora signanda, ut pro illis amplicet. Antecedens patet; nam omne verbum, quantumcunque presens non amplicativum fuerit, connotat omne tempus in hoc quod connotat tempus presens in communi. Igitur multo magis hoc verbum amplicativum *potest*. Si autem precise idem tempus connotent in preterito et presenti, videtur quod, sicud talis petericio *potuit* non esse, sic et *potest*.

Confirmatur tripliciter: primo per hoc quod deus | est potencie infinite, non maiorabilis nec minorabilis F. 65b quoad potenciam. Sed oppositum sequeretur, si potencia sua non se extenderet ad preterita; igitur se extendit ad illa. Minor sic: omnia que deus in fine illius hore poterit, nunc potest, et infinita ultra: igitur potencior est nunc quam erit in fine. Consequencia patet per modum arguendi communitatem unius termini excedere alium. Et antecedens patet per hoc quod infinita instancia, infinitos motus, et alia encia potest deus nunc prohibere ne fuissent, quorum quodlibet in fine erit necessarium fuisse. Nec valet dicere quod non est signum potencie prohibere talia, quia ad prohibendum talia requiritur magna potencia, et alii propter impotenciam

Logical consequence means merely that if one thing is true, another is true; thus anything may be stated as antecedent to a necessary truth. And conversely anything may be the consequent of what is impossible; or, if we posit a thing impossible, we may infer that nothing exists. There is no need even to deny an impossible proposition, provided we adhere to consistency in our answers.

III. As esse *is said of things in the present, so* posse *is said of things in the past or the future;* esse *can be extended to the past and the future, therefore,* posse *also. And what* might *not have been* may *not have been.*

Three more arguments in favour of this view: (1) God's infinite power is neither to be increased nor diminished; but if God were not able to do at one time what He can do at another, this would not be true. God can now prevent the happening of numberless things; therefore, He can destroy their happening when it has occurred. It cannot be denied that this

5. MS. non oportet.

non possunt prohibere talia. Quis enim, nisi deus, sufficeret prohibere pretericionem instancium futurorum, prohibendo motum celi? aut quomodo non esset magna vis virtutis moralis prohibentis adulterium, homicidium, vel huiusmodi actum, qui antecedit causaliter ad veritatem de peccato necessariam? Nec valet dicere quod talia postquam fuerint non sunt factibilia et sic non est potencia vel impotencia facere talia, quia impossibile est quicquam esse semel factibile, vel generabile, nisi continue sic fuerit. Quia aliter non converterentur termini secundum figuram quam ponit philosophus, primo de celo in fine; nec esset aliter possibile, generabile, vel factibile esse, quia non antequam fuerit nec postquam fuerit erit factibile vel generabile, ut dicit responsio. Nec valet dicere quod de potencia infinita potest infinitum tolli, cum hoc quod maneat continue infinita, non minorata, quia hoc non tollit deperdicionem potencie dei sine adventu nove equevalentis; potencior igitur esset si posset in preterita: et cum hoc non claudit contradiccionem, sequitur quod non esset ita bonus potens etc. sicud aliquid potest intelligi esse.

Similiter, nulla quantitas et per consequens nullum tempus est de genere activorum, et per consequens non fit per tempus quod *hoc instans fuisse* incipit esse necessarium, potissime cum tempus non sit nisi per accidens causa generacionis, et per se causa corupcionis: nec *hoc instans esse* quod est ita contingens sufficit causare dictam veritatem summam. Relinquitur igitur quod prima veritas causat illam, et cum libere contradictorie hoc faciat, sequitur quod posset expectare causando illam veritatem remissius quam necessitat, non subito necessitando se ad sic faciendum, nisi forte universo deficeret perfeccio ex defectu talis necessitatis. Quod videtur, cum immediate post hoc mundus non poterit carere illa veritate, nisi secundum se totum dissolveretur. Cum tamen pretericiones multorum actuum pocius inperficiunt mundum, illas igitur potest deus ammovere perficiendo mundum, cum omnis defectus sit aput ipsum originalis. Potencia enim hominis se extendit ad preterita, ut ego possum fuisse, et aliter fecisse
F. 66a in | multis quam ego feci; quia aliter non esset nunc mihi possibile quod fui, sed fuit possibile quod fui:

prevention is an act of power, nay, of infinite power.

It is no use saying that a thing is no longer do-able when it is done; and that consequently it is necessary. For what is once do-able is always so; if not, when will it be so? If not *after* it is done, not *before* for the same reason. Nor can we say that infinite power may decrease, and yet remain infinite; for this would at any rate imply a change in the unchangeable God, less powerful now than before.

(2) Time, having no activity of its own, is unable to change what is contingent into what is necessary; God alone can do that; and as He is free, He may leave it contingent or not as He chooses. God is able to destroy the Past utterly.

For even man can change his own Past. *It is possible that I might have done otherwise* means present possibility; if not, we should have to say: It *was* possible, not, It *is*.

20. MS. sequitur *pro* esset.

quicquid enim est possibile, potest esse, et contra. Ideo non est possibile quod ego non fui, sed fuit possibile, sicud iam non potest esse, sed potuit esse. Si igitur potest esse quod fui, tunc alia potencia potest sic esse sicud dicit esse, et diu fuisse. Si igitur potencia hominis se extendit ad preterita transmutanda, multo magis potencia dei. Et negans hoc de potencia hominis habet dicere quod, quicquid homo fecit, non potest melius fecisse. Et si potuit illud melius fecisse, tunc sequitur quod homo multa potuit facere antequam fuit natus, quorum nullum potuit facere postquam fuit natus; quia multas acciones individuatas a tempore ante instans nativitatis sue.

Can a man do better than he has done in the Past? You must deny that, if you say he cannot change his Past.

(3) We ought to sorrow for certain past acts; now, if the past were necessarily fixed, it would not be in our power, and sorrow would be foolish. No one is blamable for what he cannot help. Our sorrow is either superfluous or useful; if the latter, it is because we can thereby change our past. Otherwise, to lament a friend's death is to lament that an absurdity is not true; and whatever I have done, I could not have done better.

Similiter, homo naturaliter et racionaliter debet dolere de actu preterito, sicud patet de naturaliter erubescentibus de turpibus preteritis, et rationaliter confitentibus. Sed nemo debet dolere de alico quod non est in eius potestate; igitur talia preterita sunt in hominis potestate. Minor patet ex hoc quod nemo est laudandus vel culpandus propter illa que non sunt in eius potestate, ut dicitur 2° ethicorum, et patet de racione. Nam omnis talis dolor (si non superfluit et non debet fieri) proficit de quanto est bonum utile, et per consequens ens pro quo dolet est in dolentis potestate. Isto enim modo naturaliter dolent et deflent homines amicos mortuos, quia potest esse quod sint quorum *non esse* dolent; et sic non faciunt bruta. Non igitur plus valeret vel esset racionale dolere de alico quod non posset esse, quam dolere pro *non esse* chimere vel alterius impossibilis. Quemcunque enim actum feci ego, non possum melius fecisse illum, nec est possibile quod cum melioribus circumstanciis fecissem illum.

There was, it is true, the bare possibility of my doing better; but this was the same thing as the possibility of my existence 1000 years ago, of my being born under a better star, &c.

Et si dicatur quod potui fecisse oppositum vel melius, et ideo sum culpandus, tunc essem culpandus propter potenciam per mille annos completum antequam fui; et hoc ita faciliter sicud nunc possum quicquam facere. Et sic parentes mei potuerunt ex sciencia sua produxisse me meliorem in naturalibus, in optima constellacione que unquam fuit, et sic breviter quicquid vel qualitercunque aliquis homo potuit fecisse quidlibet potuit fecisse. Et si dicatur quod sit culpandas vel laudandus propter illa que potuit fecisse quando

5. MS. scuē *pro* sicud.

34. MS. potenciam antequam fin.

non fuit, ad hoc sequitur idem: quia quilibet, antequam fuit, potuit habuisse quantumlibet magnam potenciam quando fuit, et potuit in illo tempore quantumlibet magna mirabilia. Si igitur homo esset laudandus propter *posse* preteritum, tunc quilibet esset eque laudandus, et F. 66[b] si propter facta preterita, cum illa non sunt | in potestate eius nec possunt proficere, non esset equaliter laudandus sicud unus presentiter bene operans vel operaticus; nec inequaliter, cum meritum non sit proporcionabile merito.

for which I am not responsible. Past possibilities are infinite, but no one deserves praise or blame for them.

In oppositum istius arguitur sic. Qualitercunque determinate est et non potest desinere esse, necessario est, sed tales veritates de preterito sunt determinate et non possunt desinere esse; igitur sunt necessarie. Maior patet ex hoc quod [proposicio] non caperet instantaneam veritatem que non potest desinere esse instantanee necessaria nisi de veritatibus dependentibus a futuro ut sint tales *(Hoc fuit futurum)*: sed tales non sunt determinate vere. Et confirmacio illius est dictum Agathonis (6to ethicorum) approbatum a philosopho, quod deus privatur illo, de genito facere non genitum. Et precipui theologi in hoc consenciunt quod mulierem que est corupta deus non potest facere virginem, quia non potest facere virginem; quia non potest facere quin fuit corupta.

Arguments to the contrary. (1) What is true in the past is so determinately, nor can it cease to be: this implies necessity. Nothing can be true at any instant, if at that instant it is not necessary; unless it be a truth which depends indeterminately on the future. Lost virginity cannot be restored, even by God's power, as theologians say.

Item, omnis faccio, quantumcunque large accepta, requirit unum terminum positivum, set "te non fuisse," et universaliter quelibet talis veritas de preterito, non potest habere talem terminum; igitur non est factibile. Maior patet ex 5to phisicorum. Omnis enim motus est de subiecto in subiectum, ut motus proprie dictus; vel de subiecto in non subiectum, ut corupcio, vel de non subiecto in subiectum, ut generacio: quarta enim comparacio de non subiecto in non subiectum est impossibile. Et minor patet ex hoc, quod talis prètericio negativa non potest habere affirmativam pretericionem sive terminum positivum; quia, si talis affirmacio est vel fuit, tunc nemo nec est, nec fuit, nec erit. Et que-

(2) What cannot change is necessary; every change implies something affirmative from *this* to that or not that, &c. But *your not having been* implies neither a change from *you* to *not you* with *having been* affirmative; nor from *having been* to *not having been,* with *you* affirmative.

1. MS. non *deest.* 11. MS. 1[a] racio *in marg.* 15. MS. proposicio *deest.* 18. MS. sunt *pro* sint.

24. *Virginem.* See St. Thomas. Sum. Theol., Prima pars, qu. XXV, art. 4.

libet alia affirmacio est impertinens, cum oportet omnem motum esse a contrario in contrarium. Illud posset explanari in facilioribus terminis, sed sic locutus sum pro cognoscendis terminis et conceptu Aristotelis.

(3) If what is past may be changed, then anything can begin over again any number of times, and exist eternally; which is absurd.

Item, per deducciones ad inconsequens, arguitur ad idem. Nam iuxta illud sequitur quod omne coruptibile infinities potest incipere et desinere esse, et per infinitum magnum tempus durare. Quod sic probatur: quocunque homine existente signato, ipse potest naturaliter in quolibet instanti futuro nasci, et per consequens infinities potest nasci. Si enim in quotlibet instantibus potest nasci, sine hoc quod immediate post vel ante nascatur, sequitur quod quotienslibet potest nasci et per idem corumpi, et per idem per quantumlibet magnum tempus esse; tum quia per cuiuslibet temporis aliam partem potest esse, tum quia aliter oportet ponere instans vel tempus succedere post quod non possit esse; quod repugnat racioni, cum secundum illam eque possibile est iam per naturam quodcunque coruptibile incipere esse, sicud fuit quando incipit, cum sequitur penes sic opinantem: Sic potuit Socrates naturaliter se habuisse; igitur sic poterit in eternum.

(4) Any doctor could bring a man to life again, the blind could see, wine might be made out of vinegar, and every miracle might be a usual occurrence, if what can once happen can always do so.

Item, iuxta illud sequitur, quod, quocunque mortuo assignato, quicunque medicus potest ipsum sanare, facere vivere, et sic de oculo ceco facere oculum clarissime videntem, | membra spermatica deperdita restaurare, de F. 67ª
aceto immediate facere vinum, et breviter de omni preterito facere quod ipsum non fuit; et sic de infinitis que philosophus reputaret impossibilia, et nos christiani reputaremus miracula. Et consequencie patent ex hoc quod quantumcunque infirmo vel mortuo assignato, quantumlibet simplex medicus potuit aliquando sanare; et si potuit, tunc (per opinionem) potest, quia ponit hoc verbum *posse* de presenti eque indifferenter predicari de preterito, sicud de presenti vel futuro; et per consequens oculus coruptus, sicud totus infirmus, potest quantumlibet faciliter a quocunque totaliter de novo fieri. Et sic non solum de potencia non includente contradiccionem, sed de possibili quoad nos; potest facere *hoc* esse vinum (demonstrando acetum). Et sequitur quod nihil potest deperdere potenciam naturalem se-

13. MS. $\mathrm{q}^{\mathrm{odl}}$ʒ. 23. MS. 4ª *in marg.*

nescere vel debilitari, nullus enim lapsus temporis, sicud nulla accio vel mora, potest quicquam reddere insanabile, irrecuperabile, et sic de ceteris similibus.

Item, ponatur quod intelligencie habeant proposiciones eternas de qualibuscunque veritatibus, et patet quod est dare genus veritatum vel talis proposicio, "Hoc instans est" non sufficit per tempus manere vera. Illa proposicio *a* effectu vera est [sed] non sufficit naturaliter nisi per diem manere vera. Et sic de infinitis gradibus proposicionum contingencium (natarum in maiori et in minori, contingencium ad utrumlibet), et necessariarum. Cum igitur quelibet talis de preterito, cuius veritas non dependet a futuro, sufficit eternaliter manere vera, nec est in potestate alicuius facere illam esse falsam, videtur quod illa sit necessaria, et per consequens oppositum inpossibile. Confirmatur per hoc quod *a* proposicio vera de preterito, in infinitum excedit quamcunque proposicionem contingentem in firmitate veritatis. Sicud enim illa anima se habet ad *esse* que est incoruptibilis et eterna, sic veritas de preterito. Cum igitur necesse sit illam esse, sequitur per idem quod necesse sit veritatem talem esse. Dicens enim quod est in potestate cuiuscunque facere veritatem talem non esse, habet dicere de quacunque anima vel homine, confirmato quod ipse potest facere illud non esse.

(5) A singular proposition, referring to one instant, is known by angels, or pure intelligences, as eternally true.

If so, and if nothing can make it false, it is necessarily true.

Thus its truth is infinitely greater than that of anything contingent, which either may or may not be.

Item, iuxta istam viam, consiliandum est eque de preteritis sicud de futuris, quod est contra doctrinam Aristotelis (3° c° 7° ethicorum) et contra omnem prudenciam. Quid, rogo, valeret consulere de hoc: "navale bellum fuit," aut de aliis huiusmodi veritatibus preteritis? Et consequencia patet, eo quod quilibet homo qui tunc fuit, vel in futurum erit, potest eque precavere pericula in illo bello contingencia, sicud unquam potuit. Igitur causata est racio nunc consulendi de illo, sicud fuit tunc; et sine dubio multi apponerent diligenciam ad salvandum Hectorem, et sanandum multos qui de facto sunt corupti, si crederent se posse faciliter in illud.

(6) If the doctrine of the contingency of the past were true, we should have to take thought about it as about the future; for we should be able to avoid past accidents by making them not to have taken place!

Unde hic respondet posicio, dicens quod verbum *posse* F. 67^b^ est eque indifferenter | amplicativum pro preterito sicud pro futuro, et ideo non refert dicere quod *hoc potest*,

The answer is here that *to be possible* abstracts from time, whether past, present or future.

4. MS. 5^a^ *in marg.; ib.* MS. ponitur. 8. MS. sed *deest.* 15. MS. quin quod. 26. MS. 6to *in marg.* 36. MS. ectorem.

5*

The general conclusions are admitted to be true; but though a dead man can live, he cannot live *after* he is dead; a word may be spoken or not spoken, but not recalled when once spoken.

Given that I can cure a certain man's eye, it follows that he is neither dead nor blind.

et dicere quod *hoc potuit*, vel *poterit* sic se habere. Et sunt omnes conclusiones predicte concedende. Verumtamen non est possibile mortuum vivere, aut hominem redire post sui corupcionem, vel revocare verbum locutum, et sic de aliis in sensu composito locutis, set in sensu diviso sunt proporciones tales simplices concedende esse possibiles. Et tunc negande sunt alie tanquam incompossibiles prioribus. Et ideo signanter dicit philosophus, quod a privacione ad habitum inpossibilis est regressio, et impossible est aliquid redire post sui corupcionem. Et sic de ceteris. Posito igitur quod ego sanem oculum Aristotelis, aut preservem virginitatem cuiusdam, negandum est quod Aristoteles sit coruptus, vel oculus eius fuit cecus, aut data mulier fuit corupta. Omnia enim illa repugnant posito, et sic non reputat supradicta reducta inconveniencia.

But this answer seems to wrest words from their natural sense. If *to be possible* abstracted from time, what is the meaning of the past and the future tense, so often employed?

Sed contra illam posicionem videtur primo quod abutitur terminis. Si enim tunc esset *posse* de presenti, de preterito, et futuro, ad quid ponitur hoc verbum *posse* habere differencias temporum, cum non differt hoc *posse* et hoc *potuisse* sic se habere?

It is against nature to take counsel how to do past things; no one is so foolish as to try. Let him that holds this view cure his dead grandfather, and I will believe his theory.

Similiter videtur quod natura docet nos opposito modo loqui. Nam naturalis prudencia docet quemlibet non consiliari de preteritis, sicud non timet periculum preteritum, sed futurum. Nec aliquis est ita fatuus quod innititur ad hoc, quod sanet Aristotelem vel unum tale preteritum. Si tamen posset ex propria potencia precavere talia, et bene sciret quod talia faciliter possent nocere, vel perficere, similiter ex sua inpericia vel industria timeret naturaliter talia, et speraret bona, sicut facit de futuris; quod est contra Aristotelem (6to phisicorum, capitulo 6to). Sanet igitur sic opinians avum suum, vel faciat unum tale mirabile, et credam ei.

It admitted, it would jumble up the present with the past to such an extent,

Similiter, subducta omni tali obligacione, concedit quod potest in presenti instanti salvare Aristotelem. Illi igitur non repugnat hoc putatum esse necessarium: *Aristoteles fuit mortuus per duo milia annorum ante hoc instans.* Sunt igitur ambo simul concedenda; primum, quia est quasi necessarium, ut opinio concedit; et secundum, quia est verum et creditum vulgariter esse firmius verum quam primum. Ex quo sequitur quod Aristoteles semper potest esse, et infinicies potest mori, ac infinicies generari. Nam in quolibet instanti potest esse, sicud per omnem horam, diem, septumanam,

annum, etc., et per idem in quibuscunque instantibus generari et mori; et specialiter iuxta opinionem que concedit quod quocies fuit Oxonie, tocies fuit homo.

Similiter iuxta illud sequitur quod unum tempus potest identificari cuicunque alteri, et maiorari ac minorari in infinitum, quod est contradiccio. Et consequencia sic probatur: *b*, dies lapsa, potest esse futura, quia potuit esse futura, et per consequens in quocunque tempore
F. 68[a] indifferenter potest esse futura. In *c* igitur die futuro potest esse futura; et cum impossibile sit *b* esse cum *c*, nisi unum sit pars alterius, vel sit idem tempus, sequitur quod *b* potest esse *c*, et cum tempus sit maxima causa individuacionis, videtur multo magis quod omnia reliqua possunt idemtificari, et per idem sequitur quod hora potest imaginari ad quantumlibet parvum tempus et quantumlibet diu durare.

that one day might be infinitely lengthened, and form part of another, so that all times would be confused; and with time, all things.

Similiter, signato motu eterno preterito, quelibet eius pars diurna potest cras esse; igitur et totus ille motus, et per consequens totum tempus eternum, et sic in quolibet instanti futuro est possibile mundum incipere esse, sic quod non fuit. Antecedens patet, quia quecunque eius pars potuit esse futura, igitur potest; et per consequens tempus quod fuit passio talis motus potest cras esse, et sic omnis dies qui fuit potest cras esse. Et per antecedens ante omne tempus possumus esse, et sic mundus in quolibet instanti incipere esse.

This would make it possible for the world to begin at each instant of time, since one and the same time may be as well in the future as in the past!

Dicitur forte quod datus motus et data generacio possunt esse futura, et sic cras, cum ille terminus *cras* sit communis; sed non possunt esse in alio tempore, nisi in isto (demonstrando tempus in quo fuerunt) quia tempus est principium individuacionis huiusmodi motuum qui non possunt idemtificari. Et sic illud tempus potest cras esse, sed non in distincto tempore similiter adequato. Illud non tollit quin ante omne tempus possimus esse quia ante omne instans et omnem horam: et per consequens ante instans generacionis mee qui fuit *a*, possum esse. Et per ulterius sequitur: ante *a* possum esse, et

This cannot be evaded by saying that a movement, taken abstractly, may be in any future time, but individually only is one time; for at any rate I might be in existence previously to any given instant, and therefore,

33. MS. adẽto. 34. nd *pro* illud.

7. *Potest . . . quia potuit.* I think that Wyclif, urging this difficulty, loses sight of his adversary's distinction between the abstract present *potest* and the *potest* restricted to a certain portion of time.

previously to the instant of my conception; together with other absurdities.

sic multas generaciones habere, et per consequens multociens generari et corumpi. Ego enim essem idem in quocunque instanti fuissem generatus; et cum in quolibet instanti possum esse generatus, infinitas generaciones possum naturaliter habere.

If you reply that the future implies the past, I say: If the world had a beginning, according to you this beginning is possible now: and each of us may be the first man.

Nec valet dicere quod, admisso quod totum illud tempus sit futurum, sequitur aliud tempus precessisse; quia cum mundus incepit esse, sicud potuit esse quod nullum tempus fuit sed quodlibet est futurum, sic ad huc potest esse. Et sic quilibet nostrum potest esse primus homo sine patre, et per consequens possibile est neminem forisfecisse; debet igitur quilibet nostrum inhibere alteri ne sic primarie peccet, cum sit in potestate sua sic peccare, et salvare totum genus hominis a tali peccato; quod tamen theologi dicunt soli deo posse competere. Sicud igitur una pars unius anni non potest esse pars alterius anni, qui erit mille annis post illum, sic nullum tempus potuit precessisse illud tempus; nec aliquod potest esse tempus, nisi quod fuit vel erit, quia tempus est per se individuatum; et si veniret aliud quam tempus signatum, illud interrumperet omne tempus et fieret totum novum tempus: quod non est bene ymaginabile.

Nor can you take refuge in the eternity of the world, for by your showing, all things being contingent, it is possible that nothing exists, and that the world is not eternal.

Nec valet dicere quod necesse est mundum fuisse eternum, aut quodlibet instans vel pars finita temporis eterni potest fore, sed non totum illud tempus; quia iuxta opinionem possibile est nihil esse, et per consequens quilibet | [F. 68b] homo potest facere quod mundus non sit eternus, cum potest esse primus homo incipiens esse cum mundo. Cum igitur non claudit contradiccionem sic esse, possibile est iuxta principia opinionis sic esse, et ad hoc sunt raciones de infinito alibi fiende. Non igitur propter individuacionem potest quecunque pars temporis fore post hoc instans.

To be able signifies to be something, actively or passively.

Similiter hoc verbum *posse*, implicat vel signat unum ens, cum sit verbum amplicativum, et illud non est nisi *posse* vel potencia: igitur ipsum signet potenciam: et

7. *Precessisse.* The future implying the past, another possible future would imply another possible past. I may be in existence before a certain possible instant of my conception, but not before another possible instant. The reply is clear enough; Wyclif, in this paragraph, endeavours to show that, in his adversary's theory, it is inadmissible.

cum omnis potencia ymaginabilis sit activa vel passiva, sequitur quod ipsum talem solum signet. Si igitur alia potencia potest esse, vel est illa potencia delibilis vel indelibilis. Si delibilis, tunc potest non esse, et per consequens potest esse quod ipsa non posset esse, et sic alia agencia possunt difficultari quantum ad acciones quas possunt facere, sic quod una vice de difficiliori possunt facere quam alia; quod repugnat posicioni. Si autem potencia sit indelibilis, tunc non est nisi in deo vel materia prima; sed hoc non denominat hominem, quia sic quilibet posset in infinitum magnum effectum naturaliter, cum potencia ex qua sic potest non sit limitata. Nec denominatur res potencior propter potenciam passivam, quia tanto est substancia activa impedicior quoad est passivior. Sicud igitur sum certus quod ego fui, in tantum quod non possum discredere illi, sic est necessitas limitans me ad illum modum sciendi ultra modum sciendi contingens futurum, quod propter naturam sui non possum nisi opinari. Et cum sic loquntur autores de *posse* idem suppositus post declaracionem.

All power must be active or passive.

I have no power either way to think of my not having been: this, therefore, is a necessity that goes beyond contingency, which is mere matter of opinion.

Quo supposito, restat respondere per ordinem argumentis. Et primo premittenda est distinccio de necessitate; sicud enim verum ad veritatem, et ens ad entitatem, sic necessarium ad necessitatem Omne igitur necessarium est necessitas, et econtra. Prima autem demonstracio necessarii est, quod quedam est necessitas simpliciter et quedam secundum quid, vel ex condicione. Vocatur autem simpliciter necessitas, veritas quam oportet esse; et illa dividitur in absolutam et per accidens. Necessitas absoluta est quam oportet [et] semper opportuit esse, ut esse deum; et necessitas per accidens dicitur quam iam oportet, sed non semper oportuit esse; ut me fuisse. Et absoluta necessitas quidem est prima, ut "deum esse" et quedam creata ut "mundum esse". Et causa-

I shall now answer the arguments first set forth, after giving various senses of the word *necessity*: *1. Complete* which is *absolute* or *relative*;

if absolute, *uncreated* or *created*; *created* necessity being *affirmative*,

2. MS. Aristoteles alia. 3, 4. debilis . . . indebilis *everywhere*.
31. MS. et *deest*.

21. *Declaracionem*. This sentence is not to be construed. I suspect also that there is a gap somewhere in the paragraph, or that the text is corrupt; for the conclusion and the beginning do not seem to hold together. 35. *Mundum esse*. Wyclif here speaks of the ideal world which he calls a 'created truth'. See Logica, vol. III, pp. 224 to end, and Introduction, p. XXXV.

negative, or *conditional*; *universal* or *singular*. 2. *Incomplete*, which is either *antecedent* (said of a cause in regard to its effect) or *sequent* (said of an effect in regard to its cause).

tarum quedam est affirmativa, ut "corpus esse", quedam negativa, ut "hominem non esse asinum", quedam conditionalis contingenter, ut "si tu es homo, tu es homo", quedam universalis, et quedam singularis. Si autem sit necessitas ex condicione vel secundum quid, tunc est necessitas quam non oportet esse, sed oportet illam esse condicione supposita, ut in 2° | phisicorum in fine, F. 69[a] vocat Aristoteles veritatem ex fine supposito necessariam ut habere navem est necessarium ad navigandum, quia habere navem est, et non possit navigari sine habitu navis. Et talis necessitas est duplex; quedam enim est antecedens, et quedam consequens; et vocatur necessitas antecedens causa aggregata vel consequens, qua posita, sequitur causatum, et illud causatum est necessitas consequens.

Antecedent necessity is either *voluntary*, which, though it necessitates its effect, does not destroy free will; *natural*, which produces its effect without intending it; or *coactive*, producing an effect contrary to the nature of the subject coërced. There can be no merit, but there may be demerit, in acts produced by the last two causes; a vice coërces man to elicit vicious acts; but he is to blame for the growth of the vice.

Et est triplex necessitas antecedens: quedam voluntaria, quedam naturalis, et quedam cogens. Voluntaria (ut voluntas dei), quantumcunque contingens, est necessitas antecedens respectu cuiuscunque effectus. Et illa non tollit libertatem arbitrii, meritum, demeritum, contingenciam vel fortunam, sicud declarant theologi [et] doctor profundus, 3° capitulo 1°, 2°, et infra. Necessitas naturaliter antecedens est causa ex qua sequitur causatum sine deliberacione ad causatum causandum (ut lux applicata ad diaphanum sine impedimento agit necessitate naturali suum lumen); et sic de omnibus agentibus naturalibus. Necessitas cogens est causa violentans causatum ad effectum ex illa sequentem; ut malus habitus necessitat ad actus viciosos. Et isto modo loquitur philosophus 5to metaphisice 16to. Et iste due necessitates, quamvis compaciantur casum et fortunam ac contingenciam, non tamen compaciuntur suum proximum effectum esse meritorium; sed demeritorium bene potest, dum propria culpa demerentis fuerit causa necessitatis antecedentis.

Consequent corresponds to antecedent necessity.

Et necessitas consequens vocatur quodcunque causatum [quod] sequitur ex tali necessitate.

Hence I infer: (1) that every truth must be

Et ex isto elicio mihi tria; primo, quod impossibile est aliquam veritatem esse, nisi fuerit necessitas simpliciter vel secundum quid, aut antecedens aut consequens

2, 3. MS. 9[l] *pro* conditionalis. 8. MS. necessitate. 13. MS. σx *pro* sequens. 21. MS. ẽ heog[l]; *ib*. MS. et *deest*. 24. MS. σ̃n a[t] *pro* sine. 37. MS. quod *deest*.

respectu diversorum. Patet ex hoc quod prima veritas est necessitas simpliciter antecedens ad multas veritates simpliciter sequentes ex illa; ut, si deus est, nihil simul est et non est; et quecunque alia veritas causata est, tam antecedens quam consequens simpliciter, vel secundum quid respectu diversorum. Omnis enim talis veritas est causa, qua posita, sequitur creatum. Et creatum sequens est causa posteriori, aliqua contingens simpliciter, et alia necessaria. Non enim est dare ultimum causatum, cum ipsum causaret infinitas relaciones ipso posteriores ex ipso sequentes.

Secundo, patet quod sophiste et maior pars hominum loquens de necessario intendit famosius necessarium simpliciter; quia aliter non distinguerent necessarium contra contingens. Anologum igitur per se sumptum famosiori est sumendum; immo, secundum logicam Aristotelis non sequitur "hoc secundum quid est tale, igitur est tale"; et illud sequar ego in futurum, loquens de necessario.

Tercio patet quod magna causa controversie in ista materia est equivocacio in terminis. Unde sophistis non placet modus loquendi doctoris profundi de descripcione
F. 69b necessitatis antecedentis, consequentis, et aliis, | concernentibus istam materiam. Unde secundum ipsum, 3° libro, capitulo 2°, *necessitas naturaliter antecedens est causa activa, qua posita, cum omnibus suis disposicionibus naturaliter previis quibus causat suum causatum, necessario et indefectibiliter sequitur illud causatum causari.* Non enim necessario sequitur me sic facere, quamvis deus velit me sic facere, sed necessario, si Deus vult me sic facere, tunc sic facio: ut non est necesse me sedere si (vel dum) sedeo, sed necesse est quod sedeo, si sedeo; ita quod necessitas sit consequencie, et non consequentis. Unde aliquibus videretur quod necessitas antecedens et consequens est quedam consequencia, que est habitudo *sic esse* ad *sic esse,* et non illa contingens veritas antecedens vel consequens. Unde falsum est quod agens naturale, applicatum ad passivum, necessario agit, vel incipit agere, sed necessario si applicatur ad passivum super quod dominatur, agit vel incipit agere; et ignoranciam illius sophismatis vidi frequenter necessitare responsales. Nota

necessary, either with complete or with incomplete necessity. The truth of God's existence is the first cause of all others, and all others are caused in one sense, causes in another; so that there is no last effect, as each cause gives rise to infinite other relations. (2) Most people understand by *necessity* that which is complete, for they oppose it to contingency. I understand indeed something analogous to it; but what is necessary in a certain sense need not be so in every sense. (3) The controversy on this subject proceeds mainly from a confusion of terms. Sophists do not approve of Bradwardine's definition of antecedent and consequent necessity. He says that natural necessity is the necessary following of an effect from its cause. Though God may will an act of mine, it does not follow that I do it by necessity; but it necessarily follows that I do it. Likewise we cannot say that a natural agent

8. MS. priori. 32. MS. vl du??

acts necessarily upon its object, but that it is necessary, when applied to its object, that it should act. These terms, however, are often used differently. *White* wood is necessarily white, but *wood* is not. Aristotle says that *what is must be when it is;* which is sometimes understood as conditional necessity, sometimes as contingency determined by antecedent necessity; which is not so of things in the future. From this terminology no doubt springs the distinction between the *now* and the *ever* necessary. *Possible* also may mean what lies in the power of any cause to effectuate. But some things are possible to certain causes, and not to others; some, only to the First Cause. All these meanings of terms must be borne in mind, in view of what follows. I say that all truths concerning the past are necessary in the highest degree and their contradictories, absolutely impossible.

tamen quod tales termini, *necessario, de necessitate* etc., possunt quandoque sumi cathegorice et denotare necessitatem antecedentis ad consequens, vel econtra. Et, posita causa sufficienti respectu cuiusquam causati, de necessitate, tali condicionali cuius antecedens ponitur, sequitur consequens. Et isto modo loquitur Anselmus in libro de concordia et predestinacione, post principium et multis aliis locis, concedens quod lignum album necesse est esse album, sed illud lignum non est necesse esse album. Et eundem modum loquendi habet Aristoteles primo pery ermeneias in fine, dicens quod omne quod est, quando est, necesse est esse, et omne quod non est, quando non est, necesse est non esse: ubi volunt quandoque necessitatem condicionalem intelligere, et quandoque volunt contingens esse tali necessitate ex antecedente: determinante vero, ut, si aliqua res est, tunc ex necessitate comitante sequitur ex determinata veritate quod illa est; et sic non est de *fore* rei. Quamvis igitur non placeat sic loqui, proficit tamen scire modum loquendi pro intellectu autorum; et ex isto, credo, inolevit distinccio de necessario quoad ad *nunc*, et necessario pro omni tempore.

Ulterius, nota de possibili quod aliquod est possibile simpliciter; quod potest esse sive per se sive a quacunque causa prima vel secunda; et isto modo loquar ego de possibili. Sed aliud est possibile secundum quid, puta possibile cause create; sicud omnia que possunt fieri a causa secunda sunt possibilia illis. Et illa que non possunt fieri a causa secunda sed a prima, sicud creacio et alia opera miraculosa, sunt impossibilia quoad causam secundam, sed non sunt inpossibilia. Immo, omne nominandum est alicui cause secundum quid impossibile; ut, quod mihi inpossibile (hoc est in quod ego non possum) est alteri possibile; et illas significaciones oportet cum diligencia notare pro conceptu dicendorum de generibus veritatum.

Istis premissis, patet quod tales veritates de preterito sunt simpliciter necessarie, et sua opposita sunt simpliciter impossibilia, hoc est, non | possunt esse, sicud ille F. 70a veritates non possunt non esse.

5. MS. eius.

11. *Pery ermeneias.* De interpretatione; the third in order of Aristotle's works. 28. *Illis*, i. e. causis secundis.

Et ad primum argumentum, dicitur quod assumptum est falsum. Nam contingens potest mutari in necessarium, sed non est possibile econtra, quia natura semper proficit et non desinit quantum ad perpetua. Nec sequitur: "tanta est distancia a necessario ad contingens, sicud econtra, et stat de contingenti fieri necessarium, igitur stat de necessario fieri contingens"; quia per idem sequeretur de aceto immediate fieri vinum, sicud econtra, et de sene iuvenem, sicud econtra, et sic de multis similibus que scimus esse impossibilia.

Refutation of (I). What is contingent may become necessary, but not *vice versâ*. From the difference between the contingent and the necessary being the same, you either infer nothing, or endless absurdities.

Si aliter ponitur vis in hoc verbo *moveri* quod nullius speciei motus est quo veritas contingens mutetur in necessitatem cum non est dare locacionem subiecti vel adquisitum aut deperditum, dicitur quod ex contingenti fit necessarium, non quidem ut ex nocte fit dies, sed idem quod iam est contingens erit alias necessarium; non per absolutum sibi adquiritum, sed per hoc quod oportet ipsum esse, postquam fuit possibile ipsum non esse. Et hoc sine dubio principaliter est a deo, qui talem eternam legem instituit quod nullum quod est absolute preteritum potest non fuisse, sed quod verum contingens potest large alterari (hoc est fieri alterum) per adquisicionem denominacionis non qualitatis a denominacione qualitatis ad denominacionem necessarii. Et patet quod respons'o in fine data non proficit.

What is the change that takes place?

The Contingent becomes necessary by acquiring necessity over and above the contingent truth which it possessed before; the same truth which *before* might have been otherwise, *now* cannot be otherwise. God's eternal law is that what is past cannot *not* have been; whereas the contingent is subject to change.

Sed ad primam confirmacionem dicitur quod satis possibile est corpus coruptibile fieri corpus incoruptibile; nec procedit processus Aristotelis (primo, de celo) contra Platonem. Sed volens palliare processum potest dicere quod procedit ex supposicione: supponens quod mundus sit compositus ex elementis contrariis composicione qualitativa, racione cuius composicionis naturaliter corumperetur in fine sue periodis, sicud homo, vel aliud coruptibile; sed ex voluntate opificis qui ipsum fecit in principio temporis est servatum a corupcione: et sic de se coruptibile, sed eternum *ab alio.* Hoc, inquam, non est philosophicum, cum potens mundum facere naturaliter incoruptibilem in prima eius factura, sic faceret racionaliter ne tediaretur in eius preservacione et si dicas quod sic fecisset corpus humanum primo incoruptibile et omne quod mutabit in necessarium propter

Aristotle's argument against Plato is worthless, unless we take it as a hypothetical one, and suppose that the sky is incorruptible, not by its nature, but through God's will. But it is not philosophical; if the sky's nature could be incorruptible, why should not God have made it so at first?

13. MS. cum . . . . subiecti *twice.*

Adam was created immortal, and the past, as we say, becomes necessary. But this is according to reason. It is impossible that the movements of the sky should be necessary; and it was fitting, according to the state of nature, that man should die. If the first man had not sinned, very possibly we might have been immortal.

tedium evitandum, dicitur quod ipse non potest tediari; sed racioni convenit quod sic fecisset de mundo. Et racioni repugnat quod sic fecisset de omnibus aliis contingentibus, que faciet necessaria. Ymmo, hoc non potuit absolute: contradiccionem enim claudit motum contradictorie libere servatum, et secundum sui partem futurum, necessario fuisse. Et sic requirit ordo naturalis quod homo primo proficiat in uno statu merendi et subiaceat necessitati moriendi, et aliis miseriis, et hinc deveniat perpetuus secundum exigenciam meritorum.

Theologi tamen dicunt quod si primus homo non peccasset, tunc non subiecisset naturam humanam morti vel talibus miseriis; sed post certam | periodum pro- F. 70b ficiendi fuisset translata sine morte ad celum. Nec est id incredibile, cum spiritus leves sufficiunt habilitare corpus quod nunc habemus, ut ex affeccionibus anime ipsa elevet nostrum feculentum et grave corpus ad notabilem altitudinem, via saltus. Quanto magis anima habens quasi incomparabiliter intenciores et puriores affecciones plus proporcionatas locacioni corporis in celestibus, et spiritus plures puriores et obedienciores, cum corpore longe minus resistente, possit elevare corpus quantumlibet alte. Nec obest composicio ex contrariis perpetuitati, quia, secundum Lyncolniensem in libello, omnes planete et stelle componuntur ex contrariis elementis, et tamen sunt incoruptibiles. De toto isto alibi.

The distance between the Contingent and the necessary is not infinite, being equivalent to a certain possibility and to a difference of time; which in course of time and with God's concourse, may be got over.

Ad secundam confirmacionem, dicitur quod contingens, quantumlibet distans distancia latitudinis contingencie a necessitate, solum finite distat distancia possibilitatis vel difficultatis aut distancia temporis; et talem distanciam potest agens finitum transire cum coefficiencia potencie infinite, ut motus potest facere datum motum contingentem necessario fuisse, cum contingente tempore, et illa veritate sine quo nec potest quicquam facere. Sophista vero non contentatur de admissione talis distancie, quia distancia ponit utrumque distans et per consequens necessitas in quam transmutabitur est cum contingencia, quia distancia ad aliam necessitatem est impertinens. Et sic negat sophista quod multum distat

We cannot properly speak of a great distance

33, 34. MS. t9 et illam veritatem. 39. MS. sentencia(?)

34. *Sine quo.* Quo is perhaps not a mistake. It may be meant to stand for *Deus*.

a fine anni, sed magnum tempus erit complete secundum se totum elapsum, antequam erit finis illius anni, et sic illa contingencia non distat a necessitate sua; sed magnum tempus erit; et certa difficultas fiet ad hoc quod fiet necessaria. Et cum opporteat deum coefficere ad hoc, sicud ad omnem naturalem accionem, patet quod requiritur ad hoc potencia infinita. Sed illam alteracionem relinquo sophistis, contentus de sentencia; sed videtur mihi quod bonus logicus notaret distanciam infinitam inter hoc contingens et ipsum necessarium: immo, ymaginato tempore infinito, quod necessario est, et ymaginato in alio extremo instanti, quod necessario vel inevitabiliter instans est, et ymaginata latitudine diuturnitatis contingencium vel coruptibilium temporum ab illa gradu usque ad necessitatem temporis eterni, non est illa distancia inter hoc contingens et illud necessarium. Nec oportet aliquem gradum gradatum illius latitudinis adquiri ad hoc quod de contingenti fiat necessarium. Ideo inter contingens in communi, et necessarium in communi, est tanta latitudo, et non inter quodcunque contingens et quodcunque necessarium. Sed utrum oportet fore maiorem determinacionem vel certitudinem antequam de tali contingenti fiat necessarium, dicetur tractatu proximo. Non igitur videtur mihi quod inter proprietatem contingentis ad utrumlibet et proprietatem necessarii sit talis magna distancia, nisi quoad duracionem temporis vel aliud fingendum quod aliqui F. 71[a] vocant vehemenciam essendi. Nam inter *posse non esse*, et *non posse non esse*, non est distancia, cum non sit medium inter contradictoria; et talem vehemenciam essendi potest causatum cum communi influencia subito causare, sine saltu; tales enim termini similitudinarii et analogici gravant responsales. Ideo aliqui negant modos loquendi, et alii admittunt. Falsum enim est quod inter *esse* et *non esse* est distancia infinita.

Ad tercium dicitur quod talis veritas, quamvis sit per se necessitabilis, sicud per se homo est risibilis, non tamen per se quoad causam, sed ab aliis. Et multe veritates requirunt homines et talia coruptibilia, sic quod deus non posset de potencia sua absoluta per se necessitare tales veritates sine iuvamine mobilium vel preterito vel

Between now and the end of the year; yet much time must elapse before the end arrives.

An infinite power is of course required, since God acts in every change that occurs.

The distance between the Contingent and the Necessary should be noted, as not that between one moment and time, however, long, even eternal.

There is a great difference between taking them in general, and comparing one thing contingent with another that is necessary.

Between them (in the first sense) there is no such great distance, only that of time, and so-called intensity of being.

Where there is nothing intervening, there is really no distance; but *to be able not to be*, and *not to be able not to be*, are contradictions, and nothing intervenes.

That a truth *may* become necessary depends upon its nature; the *becoming* so depends on something else.

33. MS. rn̄fale3.

> There are many truths such that God cannot give them necessity without the aid of movement or change. 'Who gives necessity freely can freely take it away', is false. The highest liberty is necessity; the lowest is the liberty of contradiction. If God can confirm a soul in grace, it does not follow that He can withdraw His gift. Suppose a master, able to keep and unable to break his promise, makes one, under certain conditions, to a servant; if the servant fulfils the conditions the master *must* also fulfil his promise, given and kept freely. God is such a master. We must not imagine grace to be a thing that can be placed no matter where.

existente; hoc est, sine hoc quod tale iuvit, iuvat, vel iuvabit ad talem veritatem. Nec sequitur: libere dat prima causa necessitatem isti veritati; igitur, potest tollere necessitatem ab illa; quia summa libertas est necessitas et libertas contradiccionis est infima. Nec sequitur, si deus confirmat hominem vel intelligenciam, quod potest alias auferre ab illis confirmacionem, vel antecedens ad confirmacionem: quod ymaginor sic. Esto quod unus dominus satis potens et non potens mentiri vel deficere, promisit unicuique de famulis suis quod quicunque perseveraverit debite in famulatu suo usque ad finem diei, quod hereditabit eum perpetua hereditate sufficienti pro se et suis, et quantum ad laborem diurnum ministrabit sibi sufficienter de omnibus pro tunc necessariis. Tunc planum est quod dominus in fine diei, vel post, non poterit auferre ab alico perfecte famulancium usque ad finem hereditatem predictam, quamvis gratis dedit et gratis servabit. Consimiliter credo esse philosophicum ponere quod deus sit unus dominus non impossibilis, nec potens mentiri vel habere dominum vel superiorem, qui statuit et dixit diccione vel lege eterna quod quodcunque individuum hominis usque ad finem vite sue manserit debite iusticie famulans et sibi debite affectus perpetuabitur in gaudio, tam corpore quam anima; et cum illud venerit, non erit in dei potestate illud auferre. Non autem est ymaginandum quod deus dat unum frustum gracie quod potest auferre et ponere in lapide vel bruto. Sed certum est quod dat sibi magnam graciam in sic premiando (que vocatur gracia confirmacionis) quam non potest auferre, sicud non potest habere tale non gratum sibi vel acceptum. Gracia enim, iuxta prius dicta, vel est creaturam esse gratam deo, vel deum habere creaturam sibi gratam; vel tercio communius potest quidlibet gratis datum dici gracia specialis. Igitur gracia est confirmacio; et conformiter ymaginandum est de eadem lege eterna quod homo sit premiatus, non potest difformare volucionem suam ab illo quod deus voluerit ipsum velle. Principium enim eternum est quod voluntas creata non potest quicquam velle, nisi mota et determinata ad illud | volendum. Sed tunc erit voluntas confirmata, F. 71^b exempta ab omni possibilitate impellentis ad contrarie volendum voluntati prime cause; ideo erit exempta ab omni possibilitate contrarie volendi voluntati divine.

> To be confirmed in grace is to have one's will eternally united to that of God, so that the possibility of willing the contrary is taken away.

Omnes igitur tales confirmaciones vel necessitates incipientes esse dependent quodammodo a veritate de preterito, et illa a veritate simpliciter intellecta. Quantum ad alia concernencia in particulari istam materiam, relinquo ipsa theologis; vel forte mihi alibi pertractanda.

Refutation of (II). We can admit what is impossible in three cases: (1) when we are not sure; as when we say, *This is a man*, though it is in reality an ass. (2) We can admit, for argument's sake, that something which has happened in the past is not true, or *vice versâ*. (3) We can admit any absurdity for the sake of knowing what will follow from the admission. If we have admitted an impossible thing by mistake — then we must hold to all the consequences, until made to see our error; we must then deny it and all its consequences, on the understanding that we never meant to admit an absurdity, our ignorance being our excuse. Nor should we here admit that the answer was wrong.

Ad secundum argumentum dicitur quod impossibilia possunt admitti in tribus casibus. Primo, posito quod non sciatur illa esse impossibilia; ut viso animali a remotis, quod credam esse hominem, cum hoc quod sit asinus, potest admitti illud esse hominem, vel quodcunque de quo dubitatur utrum sit tale. Secundo, posito quod aliquod sit impossibile per accidens quod quondam fuit possibile (ut impossibilitates de preterito) potest admitti quod sint veritates, gracia argumenti. Et tercio gracia cognoscendi formalem consecucionem vel aliam veritatem quamcunque, potest poni inpossibile et admitti: ut admittitur quod nihil sit, aut quod homo sit asinus; et sic de quantumlibet impossibili. Sed hoc credo: quod quocunque impossibili dato, sequitur quidlibet concludendum, sicud ex quocunque antecedente sequitur quodcunque necessarium, ut deductum est. Et sic negatur assumptum argumenti.

Et si queritur quomodo sit convenienter respondendum, admisso tali impossibili, dicitur quod diversimode secundum tres gradus admissionis inpossibilis. Unde, admisso impossibili quod credebatur ex ignorancia sensus esse possibile, concedendum est illud et quodcunque sequens scitum sequi; quod si per experimentalem sensacionem cognitum fuerit positum esse inpossibile, tunc negandum est illud et quodcunque impossibile sequens. In omni enim tali casu, ubi error sensus potest facere assensum ad impossibile, subticenda est protestacio negandi positum, si sit inpossibile et quodcunque impossibile sequens; et sic revocanda est sustentacio admissionis propter ignoranciam excusantem. Nec propter hoc est concedendum quod male respondebatur, quamvis

32. MS. protestacione.

28. *Experimentalem.* It is possible that, at these 'Obligations', tricks were played as in the old Greek schools of philosophy. A veiled figure is shown. "Do you know this person?" — "No". — The veil is withdrawn. — "She is your mother: you do not know your mother."

The rules of the exercise provide for such a mistake.

concedebatur impossibile. Non enim concedebatur, nisi sub tacita condicione quod sit possibile: quia dubitatur in principio utrum fuit possibile. Et in regulis obligacionum inseritur illa particula "scitum a respondente esse tale", ut nullum inpossibile scitum esse tale a responsali est simpliciter admittendum; et sic de aliis regulis.

If both the questioner and the respondent know that some thing once possible is no longer so, then it can be admitted clearly stating "for the argument's sake", and other like impossibilities may be admitted in the same way. When an impossibility is introduced, in order to find whether it is connected with another, we must deny that it has any connection with the opposite truth. But we should neither admit all that follows from, nor deny all that contradicts, a possible statement.

In secundo casu, ubi tam opponens quam respondens noscunt ponendum esse inpossibile, sed quod quondam fuit possibile, sequela tali que pro omni tempore fuit bona, tunc addendum est illud: "Gracia talis finis", et negandum est illud continue infra talem obligacionem esse inpossibile, et quodcunque antecedens ad illud; et sic multa que de facto sunt vera, et necessaria per accidens; sed repugnancia sunt neganda. Tercio casu, ubi | [F. 72ª] admittitur impossibile, gracia cognoscendi quod ex illo non formaliter seu causaliter sequitur datum inconsequens, quod est illud et quodcunque sequitur; negandum est signatam veritatem causaliter vel formaliter sequi. Ut, si homo velit probare quod ex hoc quod aliquid est, deus est, et ponat mihi quod nihil sit; intendo probare quod ex hoc quod nihil est deus non est, tunc habeo concedere quod nihil est, et quod deus non est. Sed forte negabo quod ex hoc quod nihil est, deus non est, sed ex hoc quod deus non est nihil est. Est autem dare multas species obligacionum et multas species posicionum, ut patebit 6to libro. Nec est omne sequens ex possibilitate concedendum, nec omne repugnans negandum.

We deny that truth can be created anew, or that past time can return; we admit that some things that have begin, remain eternally. As to Aristotle's argument: It is true that if a man begets a son, the latter, made up of contrary elements, is liable to dissolution;

Ulterius negatur recreacionem talem veritatum aut reditum temporis esse possibilem, immo conceditur quod aliquid potest incipere et manere eternaliter, sicud de anima, et de tempore. Et ad Aristotelem potest dici quod ipse nihil per se posset generari generacione physica, cum hoc quod maneat postmodum incoruptibile secundum proporcionem principiorum pro tempore sue creacionis, ut omne generatum (quale solum est per se generabile) poneret Aristoteles fieri ex sibi contrariis, et sic semper habere contrarium a quo esset coruptibile. Non tamen probat quin elementum generatum et mixtum

18. MS. sequitur et. 33. MS. posse.

32. Wyclif here reverts to what Aristotle says: A changeable nature cannot become necessary.

similiter posset eternaliter manere; nec vidi argumentum in textu Aristotelis, vel alibi, quin corpus quod iam est coruptibile potest alias disponi et proporcionari, tam quoad partes quoad situm et proporcionem extrinsecorum (ut cessacionem motus primi) quod fiat corpus neutrum et incoruptibile, et sic exemptum a contrarietate et transmutacione ad formam, sicud iam est de celo. Unde creditur quod Aristoteles voluit quod mundus non sit una res naturaliter coruptibilis, ut homo, et preservari a deo, ne una pars celi agat in reliquam, ad quam accionem est utriusque appetitus naturalis. Hoc enim non est verum, cum celum sit exemptum a contrarietate, nec pars eius materialis, cum sit satiata forma, habet appetitum ad aliam, nec est physice alterabilis. Patet igitur responsio ad secundum argumentum.

but this only proves that dissolution is possible. Under certain circumstances we can conceive a body remaining for ever unchanged. Remarks on Aristotle's theory of the incorruptibility of the heavens.

Ad tercium dicitur quod conclusio est concedenda de significacione temporis, cum omne verbum secundarie connotat quodcunque tempus, et sicud *esse* non est commune ad illa preterita vel futura que non sunt, sic *posse* non est commune ad potencias que fuerunt et erunt, si non sint. Ymmo, dicitur quod hoc verbum *posse* presentis temporis solum primarie connotat presens tempus, et *potuit* connotat solum primarie tempus preteritum; sed *poterit* connotat primarie solum tempus futurum. Unde formaliter sequitur de veritate sermonis: *Socrates potest esse*, igitur est potencia *a*, qua potest esse in tempore quod est presens, quamvis deductive sequitur tanquam necessarium, si *a* potuit vel poterit. |

Refutation of (III). We admit the analogy between *esse* and *posse*; but as *esse* does not belong to past or future things which are not, so *posse* cannot be predicated of past or future things either; all depends upon the tense which is employed.

F. 72[b] Sed hic queris quare hoc verbum ampliat pocius pro futuris quam pro preteritis que eque non sunt, ut conceditur, ampliando *posse*, quod homo qui nunquam fuit vel erit potest annuatim expendere mille libras, et de Cesare negatur ipsum quicquam posse expendere. Dicitur, sicud prius, quod ampliando *posse* multa possunt sic se habere potencia aliena, et iuxta tales potencias non dicuntur ipsa potenciora, cum non sunt vel non habent nisi potenciam passivam ad sic *esse*. Unde, quia aliena potencia habet sufficienciam reducendi talia futura ad actum; sed nulla potencia sufficit reducere determinate preteritum: ideo quodam instinctu naturali inclinantur homines ad concedendum de futuro, quod ipsum potest

Why then can *posse* be used in the future, not in the past? If it is possible for a man who does not yet exist to spend money (in the future) why is it not possible for a dead man to spend money (in the past)? Because a passive potentiality may become actual by means of an active power; but no power can restore what is past.

22. MS. nota de posse *in marg.*

esse, et de preterito hoc negare; et sic concedimus quod Antechristus non solum poterit esse, sed quod potest esse.

It is preferable, however, instead of saying *This is possible to be* (in the future), to say: It will be possible that this may take place.

Verumtamen melius esset dicere quod *poterit esse ita*, quod connotetur potencia activa propria; et hoc verbum *poterit* contrahat hoc infinitum *esse* ad signandum pro tempore futuro. Ita quod iste sit sensus: Erit in ipso potencia a qua est possibile quod sit. Non enim videtur quod hoc verbum *potest* contrahat sic hoc infinitum *esse*, cum utrumque sit presentis temporis.

When we say *is*, there is always a tendency to contract its meaning to now.

Yet the other terminology is more used.

Videtur igitur quod sequitur: hoc potest esse; igitur hoc potest esse in instanti quod est presens. Immo, cum ista, *Hoc instans est,* videtur sequi quod potest esse in hoc instanti; quod scimus esse falsum, si scimus quod nec est nec fuit. Et credo quod plus consequens vim vocis foret sic dicere, quam concedere ad talem sensum quod hoc potest esse, id est potencia a qua poterit in futurum fore. Illa tamen significacio est usitacior.

As to God's power it extends to all that *is*, but not to that which *is not*. Not to be able to do what once was possible, does not argue loss of power. Note: (1) That *impotent* is not the same as *not potent*, the former signifies want of power which ought to be possessed.

Ad primam instanciam conceditur quod potencia dei se extendit ad preterita que sunt; sed de veritate sermonis nec se extendit ad preterita nec ad futura que non sunt. Nec sequitur, etsi infinita non possit quorum quodlibet quondam potuit, quod propter hoc sit inpotens. Pro quo nota tria. Primo quod iste terminus *impotens* non convertitur cum isto termino infinito, *non potens;* sed est privativus, sicud iste terminus *iniustus*. Unde, sicud lapis non est iniustus, sic non est impotens ad generandum. Talia igitur dicunt privacionem forme in subiecto in quo nata est forma talis esse.

(2) That power does not depend upon the object it is applied to. (3) That God's power extends to as many objects as His Thought and Will.

Secundo, nota quod potencia est forma intrinseca potenti, vel essencialis (ut in deo), vel actualis (ut in homine); ita quod non dependet ab obiecto in quod potest, sed solum est potencia talis deperdibilis per alteracionem vel debilitacionem potentis.

When a thing's futurition is no longer possible, God begins to make it impossible: so there is no loss,

Tercio nota quod potencia [dei] semper fertur in eque multa, sicud et eius intelleccio, volucio etc.; ut quando deus desinit posse causare futuricionem dati producibilis, ut desinit posse prohibere hoc fuisse, fore, vel esse, tunc incipit posse facere quod futuricio dati producibilis non possit esse post | instans quod est presens; F. 73a
vel saltem, si omnia que in fine poterit sic nunc potest

35. MS. dei *deest.*

et infinita ultra, eadem potencia manebit continue, que posset continue in omnia illa, si illa essent factibilia. Et ideo, sicud non sequitur: *deus non potest facere chimeram, igitur est inpotens ad faciendum chimeram,* quia oportet capere in antecedente quod chimera sit factibilis a deo. Ipse igitur continue conservat equas veritates, cum secundum ultimum sue potencie conservat veritates.

Sed queris cum *istum motum fuisse* fuit quondam generabile, factibile, et causabile, quare non adhuc est huiusmodi? cum sit quod queritur quare non est ipse impotens ad faciendum hoc, cum hoc sit factibile ab illo, et ipse non possit facere hoc ipsum? Igitur, *posse facere hoc* fuit potencia eius que desiit esse.

Sed pro isto intellige quod tales termini, dicentes a verbis ampliativis denotantes aptitudinem, possunt tripliciter sumi: aliquando distrahunt tempus presens, ut idem sit *hoc esse causabile* et *hoc posse causari;* aliquando striccius sumuntur quoad tempus, ut intelligatur *causabile* esse *illud quod habet potenciam ut causetur.* Et sic de causativo respectu activi. Et isto modo loquitur philosophus 3° phisicorum 11°: "Cum domus fuit, non amplius edificabilis est." Sed tercio, dicitur de omni tali quod (vel sibi simile in specie) habet aptitudinem esse huiusmodi. Et isto modo loquitur in primo de celo, volens ista converti: *generabile, coruptibile, contingens, possibile,* et opponi istis *ingenerabile, incoruptibile, eternum, necessarium.* Et credo quod ista significacio fuit sumpta de conceptu rerum communium. Si enim species hominis sit per se generabilis et coruptibilis in suis individuis, quare non individuum quod sortitur predicacionem speciei haberet conformem passionem? non quia ipsum potest generari, sed quia est cuiusdam nature communis que in aliquo eius individuo potest generari et in alio corumpi.

Potest igitur dici quod, ad inferendum impotenciam, oportet capere unum factibile quod in se est factibile a potente, sed quod deficit potencia illud faciendi: quod est impossibile de deo. Nec est inconsequens admittendo tales potencias respectivas, quod infinite desinant esse, sine hoc quod ipse fiat minus potens, aut impotens.

as to the number of objects. God's power extends to anything in so far as it is able to be made; but He is not, therefore, impotent because He cannot make an absurdity to be.

Why then, if the preterition of a given movement was once in His power to cause, should it not be now? The power to do this was His, and is not.

Here note that such terms as *causable, generable,* &c. mean either the mere possibility of v. g., causation, or the existence of a power by which it may be caused, or its own fitness to be caused.

This points to the theory of real Universals; natures which, in their individuals, tend towards causation, &c.

To say that God is impotent, we must find something that can be made, then prove that He cannot make it.

That God's respective power, as to the making of this or that thing, should cease

31. MS. indicm̄.

with the thing made, implies no diminution of His real power; but at the same time, other respective powers spring up; so that even in this sense, His Omnipotence remains untouched.

Nec sequitur: *deus est non potens ad hoc, igitur est impotens ad hoc*, vel *impotens;* et patet quid de tribus responsionibus sit tenendum. Adverte tamen cum diligencia, si deus continue incipiat posse que prius non potuit in loco illorum que desinit posse et prius potuit, et ampliando hoc verbum *posse* ut prius dictum est, non inveni equevalenciam, quia est potencia activa in deo, ex qua poterit in futurum fore qualitercunque erit vel poterit esse ex parte dei.

I can do much evil that God cannot; but there is nothing He will be able to do in the future, and cannot do now. If we abstract from the time to which *posse* extends, then we must use other language;

Unde, quamvis possim multa mala facere que deus non potest, non tamen inveni que deus in futurum poterit facere, et iam non potest. Unde deus potest facere quod futuricio dati instantis non possit esse post *b* instans, quamvis illud | *b* instans non sit prius. Verumtamen restringendo hoc verbum *posse*, conceditur quod deus potest facere hoc instans esse sine hoc quod aliud instans precedat, et sic in principio non potuit. Et facit multa esse necessaria que in principio non potuit facere tunc esse, et sic in quodcunque potest nunc, in illud vel eque difficile potuit tunc; et sic in qualecunque vel quantumcunque potest nunc, in tale vel tantum potuit tunc. F. 73b

but God's power is as great at one time as at another.

Redeu[n]do igitur ad significacionem secunde instancie, conceditur quod tempus et multa possunt facere necessitates, dummodo non possunt agere; et sic creditur concausare generacionem rei in hoc quod ex eius adventu sit res que fuit preordinata in illo fieri. Non tamen inevitabiliter, sed postquam coruptibile fuerit, est decretum quod in fine sue periodi vel citra peribit; et sic currit debilitacio vel corupcio rei determinate cum tempore. Deus igitur causat talem veritatem cum uno alio contingenter conferente, et libere hoc facit, quamvis non possit sic exspectare et mitigare accionem, ut

Time, though not actively, renders many things necessary, according to God's decree that certain things shall perish; and though God decrees thus

29. MS. piodo, *and thus several times.*

19. *Et sic.* I think that before these words there is a gap. Wyclif, after saying that "God now makes many things to be necessary, which He could not make to be so in the beginning", may have added; "and in the beginning He made many things to be necessary which He cannot make now;" — concluding, as in the text, by a denial of any decrease of God's power. 24. *Facere* might be understood metaphysically; but Wyclif's Realism makes of time an existing entity. 31. *Uno alio,* i. e. tempore.

dicitur: quia hoc repugnat legibus eternis quas ipse instituit, quibus non potest contravenire propter eius bonitatem et potenciam. Et sic non debet dici defectus mundi quando caret tali veritate, quia loco illius habet unam aliam, ut natus est habere adhuc talem veritatem.

freely, yet He cannot but abide by His own eternal law.

Conceditur tamen quod tales veritates proficiunt mundo, sicud et earum cogniciones: quod patet ymaginando casum quem Gallienus ponit quandoque ex corupcione memorie contigisse: viz. quod quilibet cives unius civitatis tantum perdiderunt de memoria, quod non recoluerunt qui fuerunt patres vel parentes, et sic de omnibus actibus vel policiis preteritis. Quantum igitur malum foret hoc si tota Anglia sic desiperet! Quamvis multi ex defectibus preteritis appeterent quod sic esset. Et sic dico de omni veritate preterita, quod ipsa quodammodo proficit; quia aliter deus non sineret illam esse, nec ordinaret potenciam memorandi ad illam cognoscendam. Aliqua igitur talis veritas sine qua mundus non potest esse nocet isti; quam deus potest emendare, non tollendo illam veritatem, sed vel monendo transgressorem ad satisfaciendum, vel puniendo pro delicto: et sic potencia dei se extendit ad preterita, cum necessario conservat, et per consequens potest conservare omnia illa.

I admit the knowledge of past events may be useful.

It were a great evil if a whole town, still greater if all England, were totally to forget the past.

Some, however, would like to forget what has gone wrong.

Were there any past truth that profited nothing, God would not allow it to subsist in our memories.

If one of these necessary truths be hurtful, God has power to make amends by warning or punishing the sinner; and by keeping these truths in existence, He exerts His power.

Sed de homine, videtur mihi inproprius modus loquendi quod ipse potest fuisse; admisso tamen modo loquendi ad illum sensum quod possibile est ipsum fuisse, et potencia infinita potest facere quod ipse fuit (quia aliter negandum esset quemquam potuisse fecisse quidquam) et ultra concedo quod non possum melius fecisse, vel me habuisse, quam me habui qualitercunque determinate; sed potui, antequam sic me habui. Et sic
F. 74a conceditur quod antequam fui | natus potui multa facere continue que postquam fui natus non potui; immo hoc est verum de deo.

That I am able to have been *is not well expressed, but, taking it to mean that* I may have been, and would have been if God had willed it so, *then I say that I cannot* now *have done better than I did; but* at the time *I could do better.*

Ad terciam instanciam dicitur quod minor est falsa ad communem intellectum. Debet enim homo dolere de actu preterito, sed principaliter de veritate presenti.

33. MS. determinante me habui.

9. *Gallienus* may be the Roman physician Galen; the extract given looks like a bit of mental pathology.

It is not true that in contrition our principal sorrow is for our past sin; it is for the state that sin has produced in us; this sorrow has the effect of making us better in the present. It is not now *in a man's power not to have sinned. But he is to blame, because it was* then *in his power. Sorrow appeases Him we have offended, warns us against repeating our offence and has even a certain sweetness.*

Petericio enim actus mali, mortis, vel alicuius talis cuius *esse* perficeret hominem, imperficeret eum; et ideo principaliter dolet de eius imperfeccione vel malicia. Et quia veritas talis est (cum paribus) causa sue imperfeccionis, ideo dolet naturaliter de tali veritate que est quodammodo in eius potestate quoad excitandum ipsum ad dolorem, quo quodammodo perficitur; et, ut dicitur, in hoc quod eandem potenciam habet homo nunc quam habuit quando suffecit opposito modo se habuisse. Sed ego credo quod non sit in hominis potestate non fecisse talem actum quamvis quondam fuit, et ideo est culpandus. Culpacio enim debet subsequi delictum quod presupponit, et sic debet presupponere fuisse potenciam evitandi. Sic igitur proficit dolor, de quanto pacat personam contra quam delictum fuit commissum, de quanto exemplificat ad retrahendum a talibus ex eius nocumento. Immo videtur experitis quod habet de se quandam dilectacionem annexam, sicud patet de affectis ad fletum.

Digression: not only men, but brutes also, grieve for what is past, and the argument to prove the resurrection by our sorrow for the dead is faulty. No one is to blame for a possibility of acting, unless he has actually misused that possibility, or not used it when he ought. Nor am I to blame for not always having done my very best, unless everybody is slightly to blame in that respect. In conclusion, I admit that I might have been born at any instant in the

Immo, credo tam bruta quam homines dolere naturaliter de hiis que non possunt redire, ut patet de canibus et avibus, que dolent de amissione sui similis: ideo non est argumentum probare resurreccionem hominum pro naturali dolore mortis eorum: sic enim dolet homo pro morte canis vel equi. Illacio nocumenti, cum paribus, est racio dolendi de preterito; qualis racio non reperitur in *non esse* chimere: hoc enim nemini nocet.

Ulterius, tenta responsione, dicitur quod nemo est culpandus propter potenciam qua potuit sic vel sic fecisse, nisi actualiter habuisset illam et abusus fuisset illa, vel omittendo sine hoc quod satisfecit. Potencia enim qua potui sic vel sic me habuisse antequam fui natus, non fuit potencia. Nec sum culpandus, quamvis non continue proficiam secundum ultimum potencie mee et evitem omne malum quantum potencia mea sufficeret ad ultimum; nisi forte nemo possit esse inculpabilis vel sine delicto levi digno venia. Sed illud relinquo moralibus, concedens quod in quolibet instanti preterito potui fuisse natus, et sic per infinita tempora fuisse, in quorum nullo potui fuisse postquam fui natus; quamvis, antequam fui, potui fuisse generatus in quo-

41 and 42. MS. postquam — fuisse *twice*.

libet tali; et sic continue desinam posse multa facere F. 74[b] que prius potero: | immo antequam fui, pro quolibet instanti quod fuit, desii multa posse que ante illud instans potui: et sic potencia qua, antequam fui, potui sic fecisse, fuit eternaliter in *deperdi*. Sed de hoc tractatu proximo.

past, but as time drew on this 'might have been' was continually narrowed, until the moment of my birth, which them became the only one possible.

CAPITULUM SECUNDUM.

Restat tangere secundam opinionem, quoad hoc. Ponit nihil simpliciter inpossibile, nisi affirmativum includens contradiccionem.

Arguments to prove that nothing is simply impossible, save an affirmation which includes a contradiction.

Nam omnis necessitas, ut est maioris et vehemencioris entitatis, est magis necessaria; sed affirmacio est maioris et vehemencioris entitatis quam negacio; igitur affirmacio est magis necessaria quam negacio. Maior patet ex hoc: quante necessarium est ens, tante est verum, et per consequens necessarium. Maior igitur entitas est maior necessitas. Et minor patet ex hoc quod negacio non habet *esse* nisi per affirmacionem.

Any affirmacion has a greater degree of entity than a negation, and is therefore, more necessary.

Item, omne causatum necessarium est minus necessarium quam eius per se causa; sed omnis veritas negativa est causata: igitur, nulla est magis necessaria quam eius causa. Maior patet ex hoc quod quandocunque, in essenciali ordine causandi, causa et causatum participant univoce aliquam denominacionem, et causatum propter eius causam, causa plus participat eandem, ut patet primo posteriorum. Et minor patet ex hoc quod non est alia veritas incausata, nisi una, que causat omnem veritatem causatam; que non potest poni negacio.

Every negation owes its being to an affirmation which is denied; it is, therefore, less necessary (or less impossible).

Item, si *nullum hominem esse asinum* sit simpliciter necessarium, et causatum habet aliquam essencialem causam (ut docebitur postmodum). Nulla enim entitas causatur per accidens, sic quod possit facere se non causatum. Causa igitur essencialis dicte veritatis, cum

Take any negation; if it is necessary, it is founded on an affirmation, and derives its necessity therefrom.

5. MS. p[c] *pro* fuit. 7. MS. Capitulum etc. *deest; large initial R in red ink.* 24. MS. v'ce *pro* univoce.

24. To set this forth more clearly by an example: Genius can be predicated both of Homer and of the Iliad (participant . . . denominacionem); — but Homer is the cause of the Iliad; therefore, there is more genius in Homer. I have left the word *univoce* as it stands, though it ought (at least in the language of more modern Scholastics) to be *analogice*.

But to be simply necessary is to be thus *by itself*, not by anything else.

oportet ipsam esse affirmacionem, est necessaria simpliciter, eo quod, ipsa pereunte, perit simpliciter necessarium. Si igitur claudit contradiccionem illam negacionem non esse, claudit contradiccionem eius causam non esse. Unde igitur habet ista negacio quod est simpliciter necessaria, nisi a simpliciter necessario?

If some negations are necessary and no affirmations are so, it follows that the former are more perfect in their nature than the affirmations on which they depend, and consequently that they do not depend upon them.

Item, si omnis affirmacio potest non esse, et infinite negaciones non possunt non esse, infinite negaciones sunt natura priores affirmacionibus; et cum repugnat naturam posterius essencialiter causare prius in natura, sequitur quod nulle tales negaciones habent affirmaciones per se causas. Prima consequencia patet ex hoc quod, descriptive, "illud est prius natura a quo non convertitur subsistendi consequencia". Firmius igitur *esse* habent quam affirmaciones, cuius oppositum ponit philosophus secundo pery armenias in fine, dicens quod prius et magis verum est bonum esse bonum quam bonum non esse malum. Et racio est, secundum eum, quia ideo bonum est non malum, quia est bonum.

Aristotle points out that to say; What is good is good, is truer than to say: What is good is not evil.

Being and *knowing* correspond; an affirmation is more knowable than a negation; therefore, it is more a being.

Item, unumquodque se habet ad *esse* sicud ad *cognosci* (ex secundo methaphisice); sed affirmacio est cognoscibilior quam negacio: igitur et magis et prius ens. Nulla enim est racio quare cognoscibilius est *hominem esse* in communi quam *individuum esse*, nisi | quia prius natura- F. 75ª liter est *hominem esse* quam *individuum esse;* et sic de aliis. Et minor patet ex hoc quod nulla negacio cognoscitur nisi per affirmacionem, sicud nec privacio; et ideo docet Aristoteles (libro priorum et primo posteriorum capitulo 7°), quod demonstracio affirmativa est prestancior quam negativa. Nulla enim est negacio, qua posita, sequitur illam cognosci a quocunque, cum ex nulla negativa possibili sequitur nisi simpliciter necessarium. Sed ex affirmativa bene sequitur rem cognosci; igitur prestancior est affirmacio quam negacio. Nec valet obieccio qua obicitur *nihil simul esse et non esse* fore primum notum; quia, ut declarabitur libro ultimo, hoc est notum per affirmacionem prius notam.

The proof is that negation is known, but by affirmation,

and that an affirmative is clearer than a negative demonstration.

That *nothing can at once be and not be* is not a primary truth; it depends on an affirmation.

Entity and goodness come to the same. Now a negation is not good by itself.

Item, quanto aliquid est magis ens, est magis bonum, et econtra. Sed nulla bonitas reperitur in negacione, nisi per accidens; igitur nec entitas. Minor patet ex hoc quod quanto ens est bonum, est ipsum appetibile; sed

19. MS. non *deest*. 24. MS. illum (?) *pro* individuum.

nihil potest appetere negacionem, nisi per accidens, sicud non potest proficere, nisi per accidens; principalius igitur appetit eius perfectum et *esse* quam aliquod *non esse*. Cui, rogo, esset bonum nihil esse? aut quomodo potest aliqua negacio movere ad ipsam appetendum? cum non cognoscitur *non esse* rei, nisi intuendo aliquod positivum, cui noscitur repugnare *esse* datum, aut per aliquam aliam privacionem que cognoscitur, vel per habitum, vel per actualem apprehensionem positivi oppositi tali privacioni? Homo enim percipit tenebram percepcione medii alio sensu a visu, ut tactu; et percipit disposicionem oculi ad intuendum ex parte sui, partim ex sensu, et partim ex habitu, quiescente in anima. Si igitur negacio apponitur, hoc est virtute et gracia alterius.

What we desire is not that which a thing is not, but that which it is, positively speaking; what is not can only be known by a positive act of perception of something else. We know darkness by groping; i. e. positively, by touch, not sight.

Item, nulla veritas communis est prima veritas. Maior patet ex predictis, cum omnis veritas communis dependet et causatur ab individuis, et per consequens non est prima causa non causata. Quamvis enim nulla anima *sensitiva* informat hoc cadaver, quia *nulla* anima informat illud, tamen cum hoc nulla sensitiva informat illud, quia nulla illarum informat illud. Et *omnis anima sensitiva est aliqua illarum*. Et sic in affirmativis; *quia substancia animata sensibilis est, ideo animal est*; et *quia homo est, ideo animal est*. Et minor patet ex hoc quod omnis negacio negat verbum, et omne verbum est commune; unde idem est *hoc non esse animal*, et *nullum animal esse hoc*, et illud est commune ad infinita; et hoc invenies in primo principio complexo.

A general truth cannot be primitive, since it is composed of multitudes of singular truths.

Now every negative proposition, by denying the verb, denies it universally. The singular negative: *This is not an animal*, amounts to: *No animal is this.*

Item, quam primo est aliqua res in ordine naturali, tam primo in eodem ordine est ipsam esse. Sed deus est prima res in ordine naturali: igitur primo in ordine essendi est ipsum esse, et per consequens prius est ipsum esse quam talem veritatem negativam esse. Maior patet ex hoc quod idem est ens et entis *esse*, iuxta prius declarata. Et quod ipse non sit talis veritas negativa, patet ex hoc quod ipse est

God's being is the first truth of all, for God and His being come to the same. And He certainly is not anything negative,

29. MS. 9+o.

16. *Veritas*. We must here supply the minor: Every negative proposition contains a general term. 31. *Ipsam esse*, its being or *the proposition stating tha' it is*, which, in the Realistic theory, is the same thing.

He who is the source of all that is affirmed, and the ultimate goal of mind and will.

unum optimum positivum ordinativum, intellectivum, volutivum, et sic de multis quorum quodlibet repugnat *esse* illius veritatis. Ipse enim est maxime per se ens, gracia cuius omnia alia ordinantur; quod alienum est a dicta negacione. Cum igitur per se completissime causat affirmaciones, non est pura negacio, et quietat tam intellectivam quam | appetitivam per suum *movere* F. 75[b] positivum, concausando in omni causacione: et illud est impossibile de alico communi vel negacione.

By His own existence, He is first and supreme, and the cause of all order.

Et cum ordinatur suppremum in ordine naturali (quod non potest poni ab alio), sequitur quod ordinat se ipsum in illo gradu, et quecunque alia in suis gradubus ordinata. Et ex illo sequitur quod sapienter et voluntarie ordinat; que omnia nemo potest assentire competere negacioni, distinguendo contra affirmacionem.

A negation can be said *not to be*, but not *to be*.

Unde in tantum fuit illud notum philosophis, quod non vocant negacionem *esse*, sed *non esse*, sicud patet in libro pery ermeneias, et libro phisicorum Aristotelis.

The vagueness of meaning of negative terms bars them from being classed with affirmations.

Nec possunt negaciones ponere in ordine vel predicamento cum affirmacionibus propter suas equivocaciones.

The primordial truth is God's being, not to be denied without absurdity.

Et ex istis colligi potest a mihi probabili quod prima veritas est prima necessitas, que est, *deum esse*, quam claudit contradiccionem non esse, cum ab illa sit quelibet veritas alia assignanda. Et per consequens, nec negacio nec prētericio nec futuricio nec *posse esse*, nec commune aliquod est prima veritas.

Thence we have it that God is a pure act, not a potentiality of being; for potentiality does not exist in itself.

Et hoc est quod philosophi dicunt; primam causam esse actum purum, precedentem potenciam in tantum quod ipsum *posse* presumit actum purum, qui est ipsum *esse*. Nam, si est ipsum *posse esse*, tunc est prima a qua potest esse, et per consequens alicui actualiter existenti inexistit. Sed cui nisi prime cause?

Thence Augustine and Anselm infer God's existence from the very notion of truth.

Et ad illum sensum deducunt Augustinus (2° de libero arbitrio, capitulo 14°) Anselmus et alii theologi deum esse, ex necessaria dacione veritatis, et

And Avicenna and Algazel infer His necessity from His supremacy.

Avicenna cum Algazale vocant ipsum solum necesse esse non difficile, cum non habeat prius nec in alico genere, vel specie: et sic de multis pulcris veritatibus.

I have already answered in full those who deny the possibility of negations, etc.

Sed hic sunt multe responsiones; alia que negat tales negaciones, futuriciones, prētericiones, etc. posse esse; alia que dicit omnem talem negacionem esse quidlibet,

3. *Veritatis*, i. e. negative. 39. *Posse esse.* No doubt these adversaries of Wyclif denied them as real things.

ut *te non esse asinum* est deus et omne quod est; sed de istis satis est dictum. Tercia responsio dicit tales negaciones esse, sed nec causari nec causare. Quarta dicit quod non communicat cum affirmacionibus in causando, sed eque primo causant in suo genere sicud affirmaciones in suo; et sic de multis variacionibus lateralibus.

Contra terciam responsionem sic: multe negaciones inceperunt esse, et multe desinent esse; igitur fient modis suis et per consequens causabuntur; et per idem una negacio facit; sicud *non habere pulmonem* facit *non respiracionem.*

Similiter, omnis negacio est bona et ordinata ad aliquem finem, gracia cuius conservatur a prima causa: igitur omnis talis est causata. Illud satis declaratum est prius de negacionibus.

Similiter, omnis demonstracio fit virtute prime negacionis, que est verum immediatum et causa conclusionis (ex processu primi posteriorum); in tantum quod ideo quelibet quantitas est maior quam aliqua sui pars, quia aliter pars quantitativa esset non quantitativa pars; et ita *idem simul esset et non esset* ideo, propter hoc quod *nihil simul est et non est; et quantitas est*, est omne tale maius quam aliqua eius pars quantitativa, ut declarabitur ultimo libro. Quomodo enim est possi-
F. 76ª bile negacionem esse, vel aliquam causalem de | negacionem esse veram, nisi negacio possit causari? ad quid enim quereretur causa quare homo non loquitur, aut quare deus non dat homini graciam (et sic de aliis negacionibus) si non possint causari? Nam vere diceretur cuilibet sic querenti quod non est causa quare omisi vel feci illud opus; et per consequens quelibet causalis per quam responderetur ad talem questionem esset impossibilis.

Contra quartam responsionem: satis patet quod negaciones causantur ex affirmacionibus, ut unus facit alium non agere, aut non taliter se habere, eo quod facit antecedens ad illud. Similiter, quelibet negacio concausat affirmacionem *de inesse* cum alia affirmacione: igitur responsio falsa. Ex hoc enim quod deus sic se habet et nihil aliud a deo, solus deus sic se habet; et

Others either say that *a)* negatives exist, but are not causes or effects.
Or that *b)* they have an influence in causation which is independent of their corresponding affirmatives.
Refutation of *a)* Negations begin and cease to be true; becoming, they are caused. Because one is true, another is true; so one causes the other.
What is maintained in being by God, as negations are, must be caused.
Every demonstration depends on the primordial negation: *nothing can at once be and not be;* and it is caused thereby.
How could any causal proposition respecting a negation be true otherwise?
Why does this man not speak? *Because* follows, and gives the *cause* of the man's not speaking.
Refutation of *b)*. It is certain that every negation depends upon an affirmation, which is, therefore, its cause; and every affirmation implies a

25. MS. rc͡o *pro* quomodo. 39. MS. de mc͡ci: inessenciali?

corresponding negation: there is, therefore, no independence. *To be equal*, and *not to be unequal* to two right angles, comes to the same.

sic de omni veritate affirmativa universali. Immo, virtute primi principii negativi, tenet quecunque conclusio affirmative demonstrata in aliqua sciencia doctrinali: ut ideo triangulus habet tres angulos equales duobus rectis, quia habet tres que non sunt inequales duobus rectis; immo, quia aliter pars esset equalis toti, per deduccionem ad impossibile.

If, as already shown, all negations are caused, they cannot be independent, but there must be some order among them. They agree with affirmations in having entity, though less perfect, and essentially dependent on the former. The *impossible* depends in like manner on the *possible*, and so of privation and substance; which opinion has authority in its favour.

Similiter, omnes negaciones sunt causate, iuxta deducta, igitur est dare ordinem et dependenciam tocius generis negacionum ad genus affirmacionum; est igitur ordo que sunt diversarum coordinacionum, et conveniunt primo in ente, ut patet de privacione et affirmacione ipsa priori [et] meliori; et sic de ceteris comparacionibus extra genus, qualis videtur esse inter *possibile esse* et *impossibile esse*, ita quod prius sit possibile aliquid esse, quam impossibile esse quod chimera sit. Hoc enim ideo est, quia repugnat enti vel possibili. Relacio igitur *impossibilis esse* ad *possibile* fundatur principaliter in possibili, et non in negacione. Et per consequens in substancia; eo quod omnis opposicio reducitur ad opposicionem habitus et privacionis in predicamento substancie; ut patet 10mo metaphisice 15°, et allegat doctor profundus, primo libro, capitulo 13°. Habitus enim potencie dei ad sic causandum est causa quare sic est impossibile; sicud ipse ibi allegat doctorem solennem et doctorem subtilem tenere, cum, affirmacione existente causa affirmacionis, negacio est causa negacionis.

Arguments against the definition of the *simply impossible*. 1. *The same thing is and is not at the same time*; this is neither an affirmative nor a negative proposition, so it is not an affirmation containing a contradiction, as stated at first.

Ulterius, quoad secundam partem, videtur quod sit falsa, per hoc quod *idem simul esse et non esse* est manifestissimum impossibile, et sic de qualibet copulativa facta ex contradictoriis: et tamen nullum istorum est proposicio affirmativa vel negativa, cum sit chategorica: igitur responsio falsa. Et si dicatur quod quelibet talis sit affirmativa, quia affirmat veritatem esse, tunc superflue additur quod solum affirmativa includens contradiccionem est impossibilis, quia omnis negativa

4. MS. equales *deest*. 13. MS. et *deest*. 15. MS. *after* aliquid esse esse. 32, 33. MS. chate^{ca}.

25. *Doctorem solennem et doctorem subtilem. Doctor subtilis* is of course Duns Scotus. St. Thomas is sometimes called Doctor solemnis, but Wyclif no doubt here alludes to Henricus de Gandavo, cited in *De Ecclesia*, p. 367. 32. *Chategorica.* Probably a mistake for *copulativa.* A categorical proposition must be either affirmative or negative; but not a copulative one.

est affirmativa affirmans negacionem principaliter signatam, et *deum esse* (cum omnibus aliis sequentibus); immo, quelibet universalis negativa, ut talis, *nullus homo est asinus* includeret contradiccionem. Contradiccio enim non est principaliter signatum per contradictoria, quia F. 76[b] illud non potest esse; nec est relacio inter *esse* et | *non esse* sibi contradicens, quia impossibile est relacionem esse inter aliqua que repugnant esse [simul]; est igitur contradiccio, vel significacio duorum quorum unum repugnat alteri, vel proposiciones contradictorie; et quomodocunque dicatur, invenietur tales negaciones includere contradiccionem.

If you say it is affirmative, because it affirms its own truth, then every proposition is affirmative. Besides, every negative proposition contains a contradiction: *No man is an ass; man* contradicts *ass*.

Item hec est impossibilis, *si tu es homo, tu es asinus;* et hec non includit contradiccionem; igitur posicio falsa. Maior sic probatur: omne possibile est admittibile, posicione presignante illud omne concedendum; sed non sic est de ista condicionali: igitur non est possibilis. Minor sic: posito tibi quod *si tu es homo tu es asinus*, non repugnat ille quod *tu potes esse homo:* est igitur concedendum tanquam necessarium inpertinens; ex quo sequitur quod *tu potes esse asinus*, et per idem quidlibet potest esse quidlibet. Sequitur enim: *si tu es homo, tu es asinus; sed tu potes esse homo, igitur potes esse asinus,* per hoc medium: si antecedens est possibile, tunc consequens est possibile. Et quod concessibilis non repugnat formaliter alicui proposicioni demonstrabile videtur: quia omnis concessibilis non ponit aliquid demonstrabile iuxta opinionem; in tantum quod talis bona concessibilis *si tu es, tu es*, non ponit deum esse nec ipsum non esse; igitur a pari concessibilis non valens non ponit aliqualiter demonstrabile; cum tunc concessibilis opposita illud negaret. Si enim hec concessibilis affirmativa repugnaret formaliter huic, "ego sum", tunc poneret formaliter *me non esse*, quod nemo dicit.

We can find an impossible proposition *without* any contradiction; v. g. *If you are a man, you are an ass*. It is admittedly impossible, by the rules of Obligation. Yet there is no contradiction: the possibility of being a man does not exclude the possibility of being an ass.

Now this proposition, being conditional, does not contain anything about actuality, only possibility; and therefore, there is no contradiction.

Item, impossibile est *hominem non posse esse;* et tamen talis proposicio non est affirmativa includens contradiccionem; igitur posicio falsa. Assertum probatur tripliciter: primo per hoc quod quondam fuit possibile hominem posse esse, et iuxta opinionem nullum possibile potest mutari in impossibile, vel econtra, sicud

Again, according to the adversary, what is once possible cannot cease to be so: thus, that *a given man cannot exist*, is not possible. Yet it is a negative proposition.

8. MS. repugnat; *ib.* simul *deest*. 19. MS. est *pro* esse. 26. MS. demo͡e *several times, pro* demonstrabile.

To say: A man cannot exist, and God knows it, would be a negative proposition, denying God's existence, and therefore, impossible.

nullum necessarium potest mutari in contingens aut impossibile, vel econtra. Igitur iam non est impossibile hominem posse esse. Similiter, si *homo non potest esse et deus sic intelligit*, sequitur quod deus sic intelligendo intelligit impossibile; et per consequens, si proposicio sic primarie signaverit, illa foret impossibilis. Et cum quelibet proposicio sic primarie signans foret negativa, sequitur quod negativa potest esse impossibilis. Nemo enim sani capitis dicit quod si data dies vel accio preterita, vacuum, corpus, infinitum, etc. non potest esse, tunc deus non potest esse. Et admisso quod aliquid potest esse, cum hoc quod unum quodcunque preteritum non posset esse, sequitur directe oppositum posicionis, viz. quod in casu possibili negativa pure est simpliciter impossibilis; nec docebit posicio. Unde formaliter sequitur: *hoc tempus preteritum non potest esse, igitur deus non potest esse;* potissime cum multi opinantur antecedens necessarium et consequens impossibile. Similiter idem est: *hoc non posse esse* (demonstrata chimera), et *impossibile esse* vel *contradiccionem claudere quod hoc sit*. Sed non potest claudere contradiccionem quod hoc sit; igitur non potest esse, *hoc non potest esse;* et per consequens non potest bene admitti quod hoc non potest esse, demonstrata chimera vel quocunque alio.

And if we admit that anything in the past is now impossible, we have to give up the theory; or to say that the assertion of the Past as a non-entity implies the denial of God's existence,

and that the negative which denies the existence of an absurdity, is inadmissible.

From this theory it follows, moreover, that existence, if posited, is denied;

Item, ponitur quod *si tu es, tu non potes esse;* et arguitur sic: | si tu es, tu non potes esse; sed contra- F. 77a
diccionem claudit quod tu es, igitur contradiccionem claudit quod tu non potes esse: et per consequens necesse est te esse. Et ista est affirmativa demonstracio: igitur aliqua talis est necessaria, cuius oppositum ponitur in opinione. Quod autem concessibilis sit admittenda ab ista via, patet ex hoc, quod possibile est nihil posse esse (ut dicit), et si nihil potest esse, tunc, si tu es, tu non potes esse; igitur possibile est quod si tu es, tu non potes esse. Consequencia patet ex hoc principio necessario: si antecedens est possibile, consequens est possibile. Et ultra sequitur quod prima concessibilis est possibilis. Et minor silogismi ypothetici patet ex hoc quod contradiccionem claudit nihil posse esse, et tamen *non, si tu es, tu non potes esse*, quia ponantur simul de possibili. Et patet quod concedendum est nihil posse

10. MS. vam. 29. MS. democ.

esse, et cum hoc quod potest esse quod *tu sis*, cum hoc quod *tu potes esse:* quod est contradiccio manifesta. Et sic habet posicio ista admittere quantumcunque difformes concessibiles de possibili: nam, ut uniformiter dicam, habet admittere quod contradiccionem claudit deum vel aliquid esse, sic quod, si deus vel aliquid est, tunc illud est et non est: quia, si nihil potest esse, tunc, si aliquid est, nihil est; quia, ut prius dictum est, non posset esse quod nihil potest esse cum opposito concessibilis, viz. quod posset adesse cum hoc quod non nihil sit. Sed antecedens est possibile; igitur consequens; et ita necessario est possibile quod si deus est, ipse est et non est; et sic quelibet affirmativa potest claudere contradiccionem. Nam necessario potest esse quod nihil possit esse, et si potest esse quod nihil possit esse, tunc potest esse quod, si deus est, ipse et non est; igitur, necessario sic potest esse quod, si deus est, tunc simul est et non est. Assumptum primum patet ex hoc quod, si non necessario possibile est quod nihil possit esse, ponitur igitur quod non sit possibile nihil posse esse; ex quo sequitur quod necesse est aliquid posse esse et quod negativa mera sit impossibilis. Et minor, que est concessibilis sequens, patet ex dictis. Nam si nihil potest esse, tunc si deus est, ipse est et non potest esse; et per consequens est et non est.

not only in particular, but in general,

denying at once and affirming everything,

even God's existence.

Item, si possibile est nihil posse esse, tunc deus non potest esse; consequens ad minorem est falsum; igitur antecedens. Prima consequencia probatur sic; si deus est, ipse non potest non esse, et si sic, non est possibile nihil posse esse. Igitur a primo ex opposito; si est possibile nihil posse esse, tunc deus non est. Prima consequencia sic probatur. Si deus est, tunc est unum tale quod non potest incipere vel desinere esse; et si sic, tunc est unum necesse esse non potens non esse. Deus enim de virtute sermonis vel saltem virtute memorie quibus cognoscitur esse, est unum tale quo non potest esse prius, melius, pocius, etc.: et per consequens, est unum independens quod non potest corumpi, vel fieri a se vel ab alio, ut methaphisici satis sciunt deducere. Si igitur est unum tale quod non potest vel

To say that everything might possibly not exist, is to say that God is impossible, which is false.

For either God is impossible, or He is necessary, being, by the very meaning of His name, that which can neither begin nor cease to be.

26. *Si possibile est.* The supposition that *possibly nothing exists*, so fiercely combated in the following pages, was really made in discussion, as we shall see a little further.

potuit incipere vel desinere esse vel habere causam, tunc est necesse | esse non potens non esse. F. 77b

If we affirm the possibility of nothing existing, we affirm this possibility as existing, which is a contradiction in terms. The power which could make that there was nothing would annihilate itself.

Confirmatur tripliciter, primo sic: si potest esse quod homo vel nihil potest esse, tunc aliqua potencia potest sic esse, et per consequens potencia potest esse; et ultra sequitur quod potens potest esse tali potencia. Et per consequens illa proposicio, *potest esse quod nihil potest esse*, implicat contradiccionem. Implicat enim esse possibile quod aliquid immediate per se corumpat vel generet se, quia potencia faciens *nihil posse esse* extingueret immediate seipsam.

Were there nothing, there still would be something, i. e. that which makes that there is nothing. And note that when the adversary says that It is possible that nothing exists, he posits this possibility as a necessary truth, for if not, the possibility of its contrary would be affirmed, and thus destroy it.

Similiter, si nihil potest esse, tunc possibile est quod nihil potest esse. Et per consequens ab aliqua potencia potest esse quod nihil potest esse; et sic aliqua potencia potest esse. Declaratum enim est superius quod *si nihil est, ita est quod nihil est;* et per consequens, possibile est nihil esse. Et hic considera quomodo summe necessarium est quod possibile est nihil esse, quamvis sit affirmativum ponens potenciam, et per consequens summe necessarium est potenciam esse, et ex hoc actum priorem esse. Si enim non est possibile nihil esse, vel posse esse, tunc necesse est aliquid esse vel posse esse, et per consequens claudit contradiccionem nihil esse vel posse esse. Evidencius igitur sequitur: a*liquid potest esse; igitur necessario aliquid potest esse*, quam sequitur: *nihil potest esse; igitur necessario nihil potest esse;* ut patet 5to metaphisice de necessario, quod principalius dicitur de affirmacione.

There are infinite truths, which are beings, in the sense given; they are necessary; therefore it is impossible that there is no being. One depends upon another, they have One First Cause, which is God, according to the demonstrations given by Augustine, Anselm, and Grosseteste.

Similiter, absolute necessarium est *hominem non esse asinum*, *te esse si tu es,* et ita de infinitis veritatibus que omnia sunt encia, iuxta declarata. Igitur, absolute necessarium est ens esse; igitur non est possibile nullum ens esse. Et patet ulterius, cum omnes tales negaciones sunt cause vel causate, sequitur quod absolute necessarium est ordinem causarum et prjmam causam esse, et per consequens deum esse. Ex hoc enim Socrates non simul est et non est quod nihil simul est et non est; et sic de infinitis veritatibus eternis causatis ab ista negacione, que est primum principium et immediatum: negativa tamen, ut dicitur primo posteriorum. Est igitur in ordine privativorum. Et ex ista consideracione de veritate probant Augustinus Anselmus et Lyncolniensis in suis scriptis de veritate necessaris deum esse.

Item, omni termino potest intellectus assentire, cum anima sit in potencia informari quacunque veritate, et per consequens habet aptitudinem naturalem ad cuicunque tali assenciendum, sed nullus intellectus potest assentire huic: *nihil est vel potest esse.* Igitur non potest esse veritas. Maior patet ex hoc quod omnis veritas (et per consequens omne ens) est per se cognoscibile sicud per se homo est risibilis; et ad illum finem ordinatur ut cognoscatur omne utile ab ordinante illud fore ad talem finem. Et minor patet ex dictis negacionibus que nec possunt ordinari nec cognosci, cuiquam proficere, vel conservari. Non, inquam, possunt ordinari ad aliquem finem ymaginandum, nec possunt cognosci cum, eo ipso quod sunt, perit omnis natura cognitiva; nec possunt esse bona utilia, cum tollunt omnia quibus fierent utilia; nec | [F. 78a] possunt conservari, eo quod, ipsis positis, perit omnis ordo cognoscendi cum omnes veritates equeparantur, ipsis positis. Et quod nullus intellectus potest assentire quod sic sit, patet multipliciter. Primo ex hoc quod primum cognitum est ens esse. Secundo ex hoc quod quelibet cognitiva potencia appetit et cognoscit se esse; et tanto distinccius et perfeccius quo est perfeccius cognitiva. Non igitur virtus cognoscens nihil simul esse et non esse assentiret cum hoc quod nihil sit. Tercio ex hoc quod primum apprehensum est positivum per quod apprehenditur negacio; sic quod, si nulla res posset esse, non posset esse movens ad apprehendendum negacionem talem. Sicud enim ymaginacio non potest assentire quod anima vel deus sit, propter improporcionem virtutis ad apprehensibile, sic nec intellectus potest assentire quod nihil sit, cum non potest assentire nisi per mocionem, vel saltem requisicionem obiecti. Negacio enim, negans omnem rem, non potest esse obiectum intellectus; et multo magis non potest esse finis assensus aut volucionis.

Our mind, though made to assent to every truth, finds it impossible to admit that *possibly there is nothing.* This therefore is not true. Truth is made to be knowable and useful to man; such propositions are neither; with their admission there exists no one to know them, nor any one to whom they might be useful. Our first knowledge is that *there is something.* We know that we exist, and cannot at the same time accept as a possibility that there is nothing. As our imagination cannot realize God or the soul's existence, because that is out of proportion with its scope, so reason cannot conceive the possibility of nothing existing.

Confirmatur illud tripliciter, evigilando ingenium sic sopitum. Primo enim, iuxta priorem sentenciam, ponit posicio quod qualitercunque potest esse impossibile,

From the admissions of the possibility of absolute

10. MS. melius.

34. *Requisicionem* may possibly mean the state of a mind seeking to get a clear notion of some object.

nothingness, necessarily possible, we must infer that nothing exists.

taliter non potest esse; et per opinionem potest [esse] quod inpossibile sit aliquid esse; igitur non potest aliquid esse, immo necesse est nihil esse. Sed quis assentit huic sine omni obligacione quod nihil potest esse? Et tamen patet quod hoc habet querere, cum concedendum est quod *necessario* potest esse quod nihil potest esse, et per consequens necessario possibile est nihil posse esse. Et per consequens necessario possibile est necessario nihil esse; et per consequens tale possibile non potest incipere vel desinere esse; necessario est: et per idem omnis negativa esset necessaria et omnis affirmativa inpossibilis. Sed quis tantum decipitur?

The first object of thought is Being; and therefore everything possible is knowable. If absolute nothingness were possible, it would therefore be knowable as Being.

Similiter, iuxta prius dicta, cum ens in communi sit obiectum intellectus et cognicionis; sicud omne visibile potest videri, sic omne possibile potest ab intellectu cognosci, vel aliter unum contraccius ente esset primum obiectum intellectus. Et cum tale non posset per se deducere in assensum sui, *Nihil est*, oportet quod per aliquid. Vel igitur per signum naturaliter signans, vel voluntarie, ut voces extra, si per significacionem principalem. [Et] cum omnis talis presupponit significacionem et apprehensionem naturalem, sequitur quod tale obiectum apprehensum moveret naturaliter ad assensum sui *esse*. Nec aliquid aliud est assignandum quod moveret ad assenciendum quod nihil est, quia semper eius significacio naturalis moveret ad assenciendum aliquid esse; igitur etc. Si enim sensibile faceret principaliter signati (et per consequens cum necessario sensibilis non possit agi in anima sine cooperacione virtutis agentis), sequitur quod presupponitur apprehensio virtutis agentis respectu principaliter signantis, antequam principaliter signet. Nec est fingenda res naturaliter movens ad sic credendum.

If there is nothing, there never can be anything, and nothing is possible, which is absurd.

Similiter, facto per impossibile assensu quod nihil est; adhuc est pronitas ex evidenciis ad assenciendum quod | aliquid vel aliqualiter potest esse. Et, intellectu F. 78b bene experrecto, est satis notum quod si nihil est, nihil

1. MS. esse *deest*. 12. MS. decipit. 21. MS. et *deest*.

22. *Credendum*. I have given the general sense of the paragraph as well as I could in the marginal notes; but the text is in places so corrupt that it cannot be construed.

potest esse. Igitur cuicunque intellectui sic experiecto est satis notum quod non sit possibile nihil esse. Minor sic: si nihil est et adhuc aliquid potest esse, aliquid potest per se solum facere seipsum. Ponatur enim quod nihil sit, et quod in *b* instanti primo sit aliquid. Si igitur multa tunc erunt, vel erunt ordinata quod unum fiat ab alio (et sic eadem est primum) vel omnia erunt inpertinencia aliis, vel solum unum erit. Et quomodocunque sit, deducendum est ad hoc quod aliquid erit primo per se. Quod pono fore *a;* et patet quod prius est *a posse* esse quam *a esse*, cum sit coruptibile contingens. Et per consequens potencia *a*, qua *a* potest esse, precedit *a* esse; et cum illa potencia sit posterius *a* essencia cui inest, sequitur quod *a* precedit naturaliter seipsum. Et hic foret instancia Aristotelis (8° phisicorum, de incepcione mundi) insolubilis, quare in uno instanti inciperet *a* esse, et non in quocunque, cum non potest poni voluntas libera vel aliqua alia causa naturaliter antecedens. Et per idem corumpens se immediate per se, continue corumperet se; et hic esset querendum de deo, posita incepcione omnium rerum in *a* instanti. Et sic de multis aliis.

Nothing can be supposed making itself out of its own pure possibility,

yet we should have to suppose at least one being making itself thus, having the power to be before it is the being to which the power belongs!

In tantum enim credidit unus subtilis logicus isti opinioni, quia dixit mihi quidlibet posse esse deum per corupcionem cuiuscunque superioris; et sic credo poneret deum negativum et unum inanimatum, dependens ab infinitis ipso prioribus, deum. Et revera magnus sopor est in animo sic dicentis! Ymaginatur enim quod

Thus God might make Himself; and a logician actually told me that anything might become God, if all that were more perfect than itself were reduced to nothing;

1. MS. expiecco. 5. MS. et *pro* sit *before* aliquid. 27. MS. ipsum.

2. *Satis notum.* Because, if nothing were *possible*, this affirmation would destroy its own possibility. 16. *Insolubilis.* Aristotle's argument (so-called because it is hard so answer) in favour of the eternity of the world, when stripped of its terminology, runs thus, and resembles Wyclif's argument a good deal: If the world begun, it began at a certain instant of time. If this was the *first* instant, there was no *now* before it, and the world was eternal. If not the first instant, then time, which is but measured movement, existed before there was anything that could move. St. Thomas shows that Aristotle here begs the question (Sum. cont. Gent. l. 11, c. 36.) 23. This *subtilis logicus*, whoever he may have been, had arrived in his own way at the conclusions of the German Transcendental philosophers — an impersonal God, always becoming. He must have been a sort of Hegel, born far before his time.

he was surely dreaming, imagining that beginning or ceasing to be takes place without a cause. Waking reason shows that this cannot be; the efficient cause must exist before the effect; and so must the power to produce. Such a view destroys every notion of philosophy (the science of causes), for it destroys all dependence between cause and effect.

omnia que iam sunt incipiant esse, et alias desinant esse, sine causa faciente incepcionem vel desicionem: ac si homo ymaginaretur se successive converti in quidlibet assignandum. Sed racio vigilans dicit istam ymaginacionem esse impossibilem, cum impossibile sit effectum esse sine efficiente; et propter *prius* naturaliter, prius est potencia in efficiente, antequam efficiat. Quomodo, rogo, aliter cognosceret dictus philosophus aliquas esse causas, cum credat non opportere causam esse, etsi effectus sit? aut quomodo cognoscet quod causatum compositum dependet ex sua forma, si credat posse esse quod quidlibet sit independens ab altero? Cum igitur sic opinans cognoscat quod, si *a* potest esse necessarium, impossibile, vel possibile, tunc est huiusmodi, cognoscere potest cercius quod si aliquod causatum est, causa finalis non causata est, ut docebitur alibi. Non enim est per se notum quod si sic potest esse sic est, demonstrando per *ly* "sic", *quod inpossibile est aliquid esse*, quod necesse est nihil posse esse, vel quod possibile est *a* diem fore; et breviter, demonstrando quamcunque veritatem de inpossibili, necessario, vel contingenti. Et, cum ista posicio concedit sensus, habet querere consequenter omnes dictas consequencias. Demonstretur igitur racio in aliis, discutiendo et assenciendo sequelis facilioribus. Scimus enim quod si potest esse quod necessario deus est, vel quod deus est, tunc sic est; et sic de omni absolute necessario; ut, si potest esse quod impossibile est deum non esse, vel idem simul esse | et non esse, tunc sic est; et sic, si potest esse absolute necessarium quod nihil sit, sic est. F 79[a]

The possibility of anything being necessary and its necessary affirmation, come to the same.

If there is nothing necessary, either it is contradictory to suppose anything necessary, or it is not.

Ex istis sum motus ad eliciendum contra illam viam quindecimam racionem. Nam, si possibile est quod nihil potest esse necessarium vel contingens (et loquor de necessario ut ista posicio loquitur: cuius oppositum claudit contradiccionem) demonstracio patet; quia contradiccionem claudit aliqua aliter esse, nisi taliter non posset non esse. Vel taliter posset esse; cum sit de-

22. MS. s[a] *pro* sensus.

32. *Quindecimam.* If we count *all* the varions refutations from *Contra terciam* (p. 91), considering the three arguments of *Confirmatur tripliciter* (p. 96) as one, we shall find them to be fourteen. 35. I think there is a gap between *contradiccionem* and *demonstracio.* The side-notes show how I try to fill it.

monstracio immediata per contradictoria, si primum membrum detur, tunc est necessarium iuxta exponentes; si secundum, tunc est verum contingens. Si igitur *nihil posse esse* potest esse necessarium, tunc iam est necessarium [secundum] frequenter dicta. Et si sit contingens, tunc potest oppositum evenire, scilicet, quod aliquid potest esse; quod repugnat veritati primo date. Ideo planum est quod claudit contradiccionem quod sit verum contingens (distinguendo contingens contra necessarium) quod nihil potest esse. Non igitur posset esse verum, nisi esset absolute necessarium quod nihil potest esse. Et hoc admisso, negandum est aliquid fuisse vel potuisse fuisse. Sed ista responsio non evadit, quin sine obligacione quelibet affirmativa sit neganda tanquam inpossibilis; quia, subducta omni obligacione, concedit quod necessario potest esse quod nihil potest esse: tunc iam est necessarium quod nihil potest esse, eo quod, si sic adhuc non sit, et sic potest esse, tunc ab aliqua potencia sic potest fieri. Omne enim quod non est alico istorum quatuor modorum non est; vel sic quod fuit et desinit vel desiit esse, vel erit, et sic incipit vel incipiet esse, vel tercio, dum nec erit [nec fuit], sed est potencia a qua potest sic esse (ut est de effectu possibili que nunquam fuit vel erit) vel quarto, quia non potest esse. Sic igitur *b effectum fore* potest continue fieri a potencia, quamvis non possit incipere esse. Et patet quod nullo istorum modorum est verum quod possibile est quod nihil potest esse, nisi forte quarto modo; quia, iuxta opinionem, non est in potestate prime cause facere ipsum non posse esse, cum etsi non esset, adhuc posset esse. *Quidlibet igitur non posse esse* est iuxta opinionem incausabile. Relinquitur igitur quod sic sit falsum quod nihil potest esse, [et] quod falsum non possit esse.

If contradictory, according to the definition, the non-existence of anything necessary *is itself* necessary; if not, then its non-existence is contingent. If contingent, then something may be necessary, and (as above proved) *is* necessary. Therefore contingency is out of the question, and you must absolutely deny not only all possible past things, but all affirmative propositions.

Everything either (1) was and is not, or (2) will be and is not; or (3) is possible; or (4) is impossible.

The proposition that possibly nothing exists belongs to none of these categories but the last.

Similiter, cum *deum esse* sit contingens et per consequens est *esse* firmius a quo dependet, scilicet *nihil simul esse, et non esse*, quod est prius naturaliter quam deum esse, sequitur quod non sint gradus in contin-

This theory makes God's existence contingent, depending on the negative axiom of contradiction.

5. MS. secundum *deest*. 22. MS. nec fuit *deest*. 27. MS. *pro* non possibile. 33. MS. et *deest*.

22. *Dum nec erit*. "Whilst it is not in the future or in the past." Wyclif here includes all existents amongst things possible.

It follows then, contrary to Aristotle, that all contingent things are equally contingent. Time is eternal, and more permanent than God.

gencia, scilicet contingencia contingenti in maiori parte, contingenti ad utrumlibet, et contingenti in minori. Consequens contra Aristotelem et veritatem. Et consequencia patet ex hoc quod summe contingens est deum esse, eo quod infinitum faciliter potest non esse. Et sic est dare tempus eternum iuxta posicionem, quod non potest desinere vel incipere esse: quod est maioris permanencie quam deus; cum ipsum vel motus celi non sit maioris permanencie quam celum vel mundus sibi subiectus, sequitur quod illud sit maioris permanencie quam deus.

An answer: God and all everlasting things may possibly not be; but if they were not they never could have been. But this is contrary to the meaning of posse, *which signifies power relatively to a certain* suchness. *If this suchness is not impossible, there* exists a power *whereby it is actualizable. If God did not exist, all those truths which are now contingent, as depending upon His will, would become necessary. But something necessarily must be contingent, i. e. not necessary. Then there would only remain negations; but even these would be subordinate one to another:* This does not exist, because nothing exists. *And the necessity of all truths would*

Ideo dicit quodam modo quod deus et talia corpora perpetua bene possunt non esse; sed tunc repugnat quod fuerunt vel erunt; sicud dicitur de tempore eterno quod potest non esse, sic nec incipere nec desinere esse. Ista autem responsio non intelligit significacionem illius verbi *posse*. Ipsum | enim est verbum positivum F. 79b signans principaliter potenciam a qua potest sic esse: ut, si non sit impossibile quod sic sit, tunc est potencia a qua potest sic esse; ita quod iste negaciones, *non esse impossibile,* ponunt affirmativam potenciam.

Similiter, si, deo non existente, nihil potest esse, tunc, deo non existente, forent omnes negaciones et omnes veritates necessarie, quod deus non potest facere in vita sua, cum, eo ipso quod ipse est, ipse potest ad utrumlibet in multas veritates contingentes; quia necessarium posicioni. Tamen non potest de dei omnipotencia esse sine contingenti, iuxta illud commune sophisma, *necessario aliquod ens est quod non necessario est.* Deus enim non posset facere quin ipse posset multa, absoluta vel respectiva, causare, que non sunt. Posito igitur toto genere negacionum, sine hoc quod aliquid sit, patet quod est ordo et causacio in negacionibus infinitis, quia, quocunque singulari positivo demonstrato, ex hoc *illud* non est, quia nihil est. Et omnes veritates essent tunc necessarie. Sed, rogo, a quo caperent tantas primitates, nisi a prima causa negacionum, que in infinitum precedit deum in causando? Nec valet negare istum modum loquendi, quia non implicatur, nisi quod nihil potest esse, aut, sicud alia negacio, nata est principaliter signare qualiter communiter loquentes conce-

1. MS. scilicet contingencia scilicet. 34. MS. Determinato.

dunt esse. Si igitur *possibile sit nihil posse esse*, quia *nihil potest esse*, tunc ex negativa sequitur affirmativa. Et quecunque concessibilis post illud positum est concedenda, ut, *si tu es homo tu es quidlibet*, eo quod repugnat summe necessitati quicquam posse esse, ut superius deductum est. Causa igitur quare ex hoc: *nihil potest esse*, non sequitur inconsequens, est quia *hoc non potest esse:* immo, negans ex ista proposicione proposita sequi inconsequens, non docebit quomodo ex hoc quod *aliquid est*, sequitur impossibile. Immo, universaliter: si volo probare hominem esse asinum, vel quicquid aliud, assumo sic: si homo est, homo est asinus, sed homo est, igitur homo est asinus. Minorem daret quilibet mihi sine obligacione; vel si non, capio quamcunque aliam affirmativam veram, et formetur racio. Et probo maiorem: quia si non aliqualiter potest esse, tunc si homo est homo, est asinus; sed antecedens est possibile, igitur consequens. Et certum est quod consequens non potest esse verum contingens sic significando; et hoc est unum brogardicum ad probandum omne inpossibile. Potest igitur colligi ex dictis quod non sit possibile nihil posse esse.

proceed from the first principle of contradiction.

And not only would there be order amongst these negations, but they would be founded on or would elicit affirmations, so that anything impossible may be affirmatively proved to exist; for if nothing is possible, then everything impossible must be admitted to exist.

Item, quantum ad triplicem distinccionem de inpossibili, videtur quod repugnat posicioni; primo, quia nullum est inpossibile vel necessarium, nisi simpliciter; et per consequens divisum non dicitur de quolibet dividencium. Secundo, quia omne impossibile vel necessarium quoad nos est necessarium vel inpossibile simpliciter. Ponit enim posicio exemplum de inpossibili quoad nos, de inpossibilitate capcionis avis evolantis, et de non dixisse verbum quod dictum est. Sed ista videntur mihi incircumspecte dicta, eo quod infinitum agilis possum esse, infinitum magnus, infinitum diu durare, et per
F. 80ª consequens quantum avem possum multis modis | quan-

This position denies all distinction between impossibilities; what is impossible is simply so. If you say "This or that is impossible *quo ad nos*", admitting that there is no limit to our possible perfections, you destroy that impossibility.

26. MS. difu . . . di decin.

20. *Brogardicum.* Brocardia, Brocardicorum opus; a collection of ecclesiastical canons by *Burkhard,* Bishop of Worms, called, by the Italians and French, Brocard. It means also an elementary principle or a short proverbial rule, in law, ethics, or metaphysics. See Webster's Dictionary. (ed. 1900). 23. *Triplicem distinctionem.* A proposition, according to the old Scholastie distinction, might be either *morally*, or *physically*, or *metaphysically* necessary, or impossible.

The whole question lies in this; whether any determinations, applied to a given subject, do or do not contradict themselves. If not, a man can be God, and any being can do anything. Given determinate limits to a man's size, power, &c., the passing of those limits implies absurdity. Here come the questions of an infinite world, a vacuum, the Continuous consisting of points &c. Nothing is impossible except what is naturally so; whatever is possible, is either the First Truth or those truths that proceed therefrom; and its contrary jars with all nature; if with the nature of one being, then with all. Nature forms a confederacy; what makes against one necessary truth makes against the existence of the whole world. Dissolution exists, as a natural result of action and of passion; and nothing absolutely opposed to nature can exist.

tumcunque faciliter capere; et sic, cum necessario potui non dixisse illud.

Et redargucciones omnes dependent super isto quod non claudit contradiccionem me sic posse vel me habere, et quod plus est (cum probabile creditur quidlibet causatum cuilibet posse idemtificari, et sic hominem posse esse deum) probabile videtur quod quidlibet potest facere quicquid aliud potest facere. Si enim est dare limites potencie et denominacionum hominis ultra quos non potest, ut de quantitate, duracione, sciencia, etc., tunc claudit contradiccionem excedere tales limites; et multo magis claudit contradiccionem nihil esse. Et hic incidunt omnes difficultates de infinito mundo, de vacuo, de composicione continui ex indivisibilibus, de identificacione rei cum alia, de multiplicacione rei, et sic de aliis, in quibus sunt opiniones utrum claudunt contradiccionem vel non; quam materiam potes sparsim colligere in hac summa.

Quantum ad inpossibile apud naturam, patet quod contradiccionem claudit quicquam esse inpossibile; nisi fuerit inpossibile apud naturam, aut econtra; cum deus sit natura, et omne universale similiter. Qualitercunque igitur potest esse, potest esse prima veritas vel a prima veritate, et per consequens qualitercunque potest esse, potest esse a natura. Si igitur quicquam sit inpossibile apud naturam, tunc omni nature repugnat ipsum esse, et per consequens simpliciter non potest esse. Immo, ut plus dicam, repugnat quod alicui nature repugnet qualitercunque esse, nisi cuilibet nature repugnet sic esse. Si enim sit confederacio in policia humana, racione cuius repugnare uni foret repugnare tribus eorundem, multo magis in policia naturali universitatis encium est federacio magis firma. Nam destruere unum necessarium est destruere totam universitatem encium iuxta declarata. Nec corupcionem repugnat esse, cum sit naturalis, tam agenti quam passo. Immo, nihil potest esse simpliciter violentum; igitur est cathenacio aurea, secundum poetice loquentes, inter encia universi, cui repugnat esse aliquod impossibile vel non bonum.

19. MS. Conclusio *in marg.*

CAPITULUM TERCIUM.

In isto dubio videtur mihi, sicud prius, quod prima veritas (que est *deum esse*) necessario sit necessitas a qua est omnis alia veritas, et *posse esse*, vel *non posse esse;* ita quod quicquid ipse potest vel causatum ab eo, illud est possibile et solum tale; et quicquid ipse non potest nec aliquod causatum ab eo, illud non potest esse vel illud *esse* est inpossibile. Et sic omnis necessitas, contingencia, vel inpossibilitas est ab illo. Et sic concedo quod omne absolute necessarium claudit contradiccionem non esse, et omne quod est inpossibile claudit contradiccionem esse; et voco contradiccionem in proposito [quod] impossibilitatem claudit, ita quod claudere contradiccionem est implicare quantum ad actum significandi qualiter non potest esse; ut contradiccio est quod ego non fui, quia non potest esse quod ego non fui. Unde non sequitur: hoc *est* impossibile, contradiccio, F. 80b vel repugnancia, | igitur hoc *est;* sed pocius sequitur oppositum. Quia antecedens principaliter ponit quod hoc non potest esse. Et sic isti termini: falsitas, inpossibilitas, falsum, et inpossibile, et alii similes, possunt supponere personaliter negative, ut *hominem esse asinum* est falsum et inpossibile; hoc est: non est nec potest esse. Et tunc sunt proposiciones negative. Quandoque autem supponunt simpliciter ac si essent termini secunde intencionis in proposicionibus affirmativis, ut: "*deum non esse* est inpossibile", est una impossibilitas; et "*Cesarem non fuisse* est inpossibile" est alia inpossibilitas. Et ut breviter dicam, omnis veritas de inpossibili est inpossibilitas, et omnis veritas de falso est falsitas. Ut, si verum est *te esse*, tunc falsum est *te non esse*, et hoc est falsitas, id est, taliter est falsum.

Et isto modo sunt doctores et logici intelligendi, quando dicunt quod, si veritas vel necessitas est, tunc falsitas et inpossibilitas sunt, quia, posito uno oppositorum, relicum est ponendum. Inpossibilitas igitur est privacio necessitatis quam oportet esse, posita necessitate; et sic intelligunt quando dicunt quod omnis falsitas,

Wyclif's position: *That God is* is the necessary truth on which all possibility and impossibility depend.

What God can do, and what He causes to be is possible, and that alone.

The non-existence of what is absolutely necessary, and the existence of the absolutely impossible are self-contradictory terms.

This *is* impossible, therefore, this *is*, cannot be said; rather: this *is not*.

Falsity and impossibility are predicated truly in a negative sense; *This is false* means *This cannot be*.

But we may use them affirmatively, regarding them as acts of the mind: God's non-existence is *an* impossibility.

What we say truly of the impossible is affirmed as an impossibility.

Logicians must be understood thus, when they say that truth implies falsity &c., and therefore that falsity proceeds from God.

1. MS. Capitulum etc. *deest; large initial I in red ink.* 13. MS. quod *deest.* 28. MS. c°ef' *pro* Cesarem. 29—30. MS. Et . . . impossibilitas *twice.*

This form of speech by which they grant (though in diverse senses) that truth is falsity,

and that there are many impossibilities which are necessary and depend on God, must be borne in mind in studying these writers.

possibilitas, vel inpossibilitas, est a deo. Quod si non placet sic loqui (cum tunc ad sensus equivocos concedendum esset quod veritas est falsitas, imposibilitas necessitas, et sic de aliis que videntur inpossibilia, cum tamen sensus sit necessarius) satis est quod cognoscatur terminos sic signare apud aliquos scribentes, et sic non contempnantur raciones et dicta eorum propter defectum noticie equivocacionis terminorum. Ipsi igitur concedunt quod multa sunt inpossibilia; ut, quod homo est asinus est inpossibile, et quod homo est asinus non est; sed quod homo est asinus est inpossibile de necessitate; igitur ideo illud inpossibile (quod dependet causative a deo) illud necessario est.

And it is an amazing fallacy to conclude thence that nothing is impossible in itself; *A falsity is a truth* means simply: It is a truth that *this is false;* and so also of impossibility. Nor does a falsity become truth; but that which is now false, becoming true, ceases to be false.

Unde mirabiliter par[a]logizantur quidam, probantes quod tale impossibile non ex se formaliter est inpossibile, quia non est. Concedens igitur quod veritas est falsitas, non concedit oppositum de opposito, sic quod entitas sit non entitas; sed concedit quod veritas est [hoc] falsum esse; et sic necessitas conceditur esse inpossibilitas, hoc est, aliqualiter intelligitur non posse esse. Et patet ex hoc quod falsitas non mutabitur in veritatem; ut iam falsum est quod ego vixi 40 annis; et illud falsum non erit verum, quia illud falsum iam non est. Conceditur igitur quod multa possunt esse necessaria que iam non sunt necessaria, et sic de possibili et impossibili.

Three Objections. I. *To be* means *to be known.* God's existence is not the first principle of knowing; therefore, not of being. The axiom of contradiction is the first principle of knowing, or it would require to be demonstrated, as God's existence requires it.

Sed contra istam posicionem instatur tripliciter. Primo sic: Unumquodque se habet ad *esse* sicud ad *cognosci*, et econtra, ut patet ex 2° metaphisice, et sepius allegatur; sed magis notum est quod nihil simul est et non est quam quod deus est: igitur est magis et prius ens. Confirmatur per hoc quod illa negacio est primum principium, virtute cuius tenent omnes demonstraciones affirmative et negative. Si igitur illud haberet causam, posset demonstrari. Minor patet ex certissima experiencia, qua scimus neminem dissentire isti principio, nec aliquem indigere illud adiscere; sed multum necessarium est adiscere questionem, si est de deo. Igitur | non potest esse medium concludendi nihil simul esse et non esse. F. 81[a]

18. MS. hoc *deest.*

22. If this example be taken as the statement of a fact, *De Actibus Anima* was written before *Logica*. See *Logica* III, 144, l. 20, 21.

Item, si deus alia potest et alia non potest, tunc potencia sua est limitata, et non omnimode infinita, ut dicunt theologi. Consequencia patet ex hoc quod essencia sua est actus qui est primus terminus sue potencie, iuxta dicta; et impossibilia terminant potenciam suam ex alio latere, cum usque ad illa exclusive potest, et non ultra. Et quod consequens sit inpossibile, patet ex hoc quod in omnia que possunt esse, potest; igitur in omnia potest. Sic enim supponit terminus respectu illius verbi "potest". Et confirmacio illius est quod non est cognoscibile *a posteriori* que potest vel non potest; nec *a priori*, cum nihil sit prius impossibili necessario nisi deus; et per ipsum, cum non posset esse medium concludendi, nihil demonstracione cognoscitur.

II. If there is anything that God cannot do, His power is limited by those things which are impossible to Him.

But if God can make all that can possibly be, then nothing is impossible to Him.

And if there were anything, we could neither know it *a priori* nor *a posteriori*. i. e. not at all.

Item, quam manifestum vel primum est aliquod necessarium, tam inpossibile est eius oppositum; sed per opinionem summe necessarium et manifestum est deum vel aliquid esse; igitur summe manifeste inpossibile est nihil esse. Assertum patet ex hoc quod habitus est mensura privacionis, et opposita sunt alterutrum media cognoscendi; unde formatur apud morales hoc principium, quod, quam bonum est aliquod, tam mala esset eius privacio. Et potest utrumque deduci; nam quante necessarium est aliquid esse, tante impossibile est illud non esse, eo quod idem est *necessario hoc esse* et *impossibile esse quod hoc non sit*. Et quod consequens sit falsum patet ex hoc quod nemo scit formaliter deducere inconsequens vel contradiccionem ex hoc posito et admisso, *Nihil est;* immo, intellectus assentit illi, dissenciendo contradiccioni. Et sic de veritatibus de preterito, quas inpossibile esset probare nisi per testes, ut legiste probant.

III. In so far as anything is necessary, in so far its opposite is unthinkable. If the existence of anything were the most evident of truths, it would be impossible to think of absolute non-existence;

Which is not true; it can be admitted as a truth and consistently defended.

Nor can there be any proof of past truths, save the indirect one of testimony.

Ad ista tria essent multa dicenda; sed transcurrendo pro presenti.

I will refute these objections briefly.

Dicitur ad primum quod primum est falsum, cum supreme nature sit maxime notum ipsam esse; et illa noticia est maxima et prima noticia. Et quantum ad noticiam nostram, dicetur octavo libro, ut superius promittebatur, quod *deum esse* est primum notum a quocunque cognoscente, non tamen est explicite cognoscibile, nisi a re racionali. Unde illa auctoritas secundi metaphisice: "Sicud oculus vespertilionis ad radios solis, sic intellectus noster ad illa que sunt manifestissima in natura," non tollit quin certissimam cognicionem habe-

(I) The existence of a Supreme Nature is the most known of all truths, and the first known to all beings, but explicitly only to rational beings.

The eyes of a bat cannot look at the sun, yet our knowledge of God, though

amus de deo, sed confusam et abstractivam; et infinitas proprietates eius ignoramus; immo sensualitas nihil distincte cognoscit de illo. Verumtamen, sicud omne videns videt in virtute solis, et, secundum lyncolniensem, videt confuse solem, sic omne cognoscens cognoscit in virtute et in lumine prime cause, et confuse primam causam. Nec hoc obiective, quia confusius cognoscitur lumen irradians super colorem quam color, quamvis color virtute luminis cognoscatur. Sic igitur innata est nobis via, dum fantasmata dominantur, distinctius cognoscere inferiora quam superiora, sicud bruta faciunt; et tamen prius naturaliter, tam quoad consequenciam quam causative cognoscimus priora; immo, primo omnium primam causam. Nos enim sumus in potencia deponendi sensuale dominium fantasmatis super mentem, et sic | cognoscendi et quietandi in ipso principaliter. Et ad [hoc] faciendum, est cognicio negacionum nobis ordinata, pro isto statu esse nobis certissima; sicud cognicio umbre et dimissi luminis est maxime proporcionata debili visui convalescenti, qualis est intellectus noster pro statu opinandi. F. 81^{b}

Et sic, quantum ad primitatem principii, potest dici quod illud principium recitatum ab Aristotele, 4to methaphisice, 9no est idem in re cum hoc: *aliquid est.* Idem enim videtur "idem simul inesse et non inesse eidem secundum idem est impossibile" et "necessarium est aliquid esse vel non esse"; et idem est *necessario aliquid esse vel non esse*, et *necessario aliquid esse;* quia veritas disiunctive, cuius altera pars est inpossibilis, et reliqua necessaria, non superaddit veritatem partis necessarie, et idem est "necessario aliquid esse" et "aliquid esse". Et ideo a primo veritas primi principii est affirmacio; et per consequens primum principium affirmativum signans primarie convertibiliter cum isto, *aliquid.* Verumtamen illa veritas potest diversimode ostendi et signari secundum quarum unam ostensionem cognoscetur esse necessarium et secundum aliam ignorabitur, vel credetur posse non esse; ut idem est: *necessario deum esse*, et: *esse impossibile deum non esse;* sicud patet per equipollenciam, et per deduccionem superius tactam, qua probatur esse summe inpossibile, et per consequens

certain, is confused and abtract. Senses indeed can have no distinct perception of Him. We see by means of the sun, and thus in a way see the sun; so it is of our knowledge of the First Cause. We see colour by light, but the latter less explicitly. Thus our nature, when imagination predominates, knows inferior things more clearly than things superior, yet the latter are *first* known. But we have power to shake off the yoke of imagination, by the knowledge of negations, which gives us the greatest certitude.

Aristotle's principle of contradiction is in reality the same as this: *Something exists.* For the disjunctive: *Necessarily something either does or does or does not exist* (which is admittedly equivalent to the other axioms) implies that in either case something is necessary. It is only the form that varies in these different axioms, more or less applicable to different cases.

14. MS. omnem. 15. MS. diuu. 17. MS. hoc *deest.*

summe false, deum non esse. Et cum, quanto aliquod est magis falsum, est magis verum ipsum esse falsum, patet quod summe verum est, esse falsum quod deus non sit: quod totum sonat, iuxta raciones pueriles, esse necessarium deum esse. Et sine dubio idem est aliquid esse et deum esse.

And hence God's existence is the most certain of all things, amounting to the affirmation that something exists.

Ideo a primo significatum primi principii est *deum esse;* sed tamen, cum primum principium non adequate, quamvis principaliter, signet deum esse, queratur de veritate adequate signata, et supponitur quod sit communis ad omne *esse* creatum, cum deus non univoce est cum rebus causatis. Et tunc est difficultas, si illud potest demonstrari, sic arguendo: *quandocunque causa completa et sufficiens ponitur respectu sui causabilis causandi, tunc illud causabile ponitur; sed deus est causa completissima respectu veritatis causabilis in communi; igitur ipse est.* Hec enim racio videtur fieri ex prioribus nocioribus, et causis conclusionis; non oportet conclusionem prius ignorari propter difficultatem demonstracionis, quam ponit Aristoteles, primo posteriorum, quia intellective demonstrat conclusionem quam eternaliter sciverunt. Nec esset possibile esse demonstracionem per tempus. Sufficit igitur quod faciat scire, conservando scienciam; quod si conceditur, patet quod conclusio est magis sciencia quam antecedens vel medium, et prius antecedente, cum antecedens sit causatum contentum sub conclusione communiori. Ideo forte, cum ens sit primum causatum, non silogistice demonstrabile, sed sequens consequencia naturali tanquam posterius a priori; quia non est possibile demonstrare, nisi ex philosophantibus, ut sonant sex passiones demonstracionis posite ab Aristotele, primo posteriorum. Sed de hoc octavo libro.

However, though the first principle of contradiction signifies this truth in itself, it does not suffice by itself to show it. A difficulty; can the existence of created truth be proved by God's existence, thus positing another truth anterior thereto?

At any rate, such a demonstration would not belong to time but to eternity,

and would perhaps not be strictly syllogistic, since nothing is anterior to that which exists.

Ad secundum, dicitur quod potencia dei videtur mihi esse summe et maxime et per se finita et limitata, |
F. 82a quia alie potencie finiuntur per illam, et illa per se finit se, sicud patet per theologos concedentes ternarii

II. God's power is indeed limited, but limited by Himself alone, whereas all others are limited by His power.

21. MS. intllue͡. 30, 31. MS. phib3.

13. The difficulty lies in this: that the proposition by which God is proved to cause all truth must be itself a truth caused by and dependent on God. I believe that some words are wanting in the next sentence to complete the sense.

suppositum esse finem binarii prioris suppositorum; immo finit se quantum ad *posse*, respectu intelligencia extrinsecorum in que potest et in que non potest. Ideo, sicud est per se, sic finit se per se. Sed inercia vel confinium distinguendi inter illa que potest et illa que non potest videtur pro statu opinandi esse scolasticus locus exercitandi in veritate vel demum infinite, quamvis sibi sit manifestissimum quante potest. Aliqui enim ponunt quod potest in contradiccionem, ne cogantur ponere ipsum esse potencie limitate, et ex hoc quod plus potest quam quis potest intelligere vel sustinere. Cum igitur homo potest intelligere et sustinere ipsum posse in quidlibet citra contradiccionem, sequitur quod ipse potest in contradiccionem. Et illud forte movebat antiquos (4[to] metaphisice) concedentes de possibili idem simul esse et non esse. Et tercio moventur ex hoc: *deus potest facere idem multiplicari simul in diversis sitibus sub contrariis denominacionibus;* et sic de aliis que nos poneremus inpossibilia. Igitur (per idem) potest facere idem simul in diversis instantibus habere contrarias denominaciones, et per consequens contradictorias.

But the whole question seems to me a tangle of scholastic subtleties.

Some are unwilling to admit any limitation of God's power; some contend that He can do more than we can conceive; and as we conceive anything short of impossibility, His power extends farther. Others say that if God can make the same thing exist in different places with contrary attributes He can also make contrary attributes coexist in the same thing.

Sed iste evidencie non movent me ad hoc credendum. Prima enim est soluta. Quantum ad secundum, patet quod falsum assumitur. Nos enim possumus intelligere ipsum et omnia possibilia; immo, ut sophiste credunt, nos possumus intelligere infinitum plus esse quam ipse potest, sicud patet capiendo proposicionem talem "Infinitum plus quam deus potest est causatum a deo malo." Immo, cum nos intelligimus contradiccionem quam nos ponimus ipsum posse, et ultra contradiccionem non potest, sequitur quod nos intelligimus maximum magisterium in quod potest; et si nesciamus hoc sustinere, nec possimus illi assentire, ad quid ponimus illud esse necessarium? Scimus enim quod ex necessario non sequitur quicquam falsi, nec credimus aliquid sine evidencia non habente evidenciam eque fortem sibi contrariam. Sed non est ymaginabilis evidencia ad credendum idem simul esse et non esse; tum quia quacunque signata deduci potest, quod non est evidencia (cum non potest ducere in credulitatem); tum quia, si esset evi-

But if we can as a fact conceive a proposition concerning what God certainly cannot do, then there is no limit to our conceptions. We can conceive what a contradiction is; if we cannot, what do we mean by saying that God's power extends to it? We have no proof whatever to make us believe that the same thing is and is not.

4. *Sed inercia — Aliqui.* This sentence appears to be mutilated.

dencia ad copulativam, tunc esset evidencia ad primam partem sicud et ad secundam. Et per consequens, cum omnis evidencia movens ad unum contradictorium credendum, movet ad dissenciendum opposito scito esse tali, sequitur quod tota evidencia movet ad discredendum copulative. Et [si] credatur dicta copulativa sine evidencia movente, tunc est per se evidens cuius oppositum tota natura humana experitur, cum unanimiter profitetur primum principium esse per se evidens. Ideo certissimum est quod quantecunque potencie deus est, vel omne quod ipse potest facere, sicud omne verum, potest sine inconveniencia sustineri.

We therefore, if we believe that, believe without proof what has all human nature against it. Whatever be the effects of God's power, they must be maintainable without absurdity.

F. 82[b] Hoc tamen est certum quod omnia | potest, quia omnia que possunt esse, potest; et hoc est sibi proprium, cum contradiccionem claudat quicquam aliud posse omnia possibilia; quia creacionem et causacionem universitatis encium causatorum non potest alii communicare. Nec sequitur quod ego sim maioris vel tante potencie intellective quam ipse sit potencie active, quamvis possim maiora vel omnia intelligere que ipse potest causare. Si enim potencia intellectiva caperet magnitudinem ab intellecto proporcionaliter ut illud esset magnum, cum propriissimum obiectum intellectus sit deus, sequeretur quod quelibet potencia intellectiva equeparatur deo et potencia sua causativa sit minor seipso; quia non potest in se nec in aliquod tantum. Potencia igitur intellectiva est eo maior quo potest in perfecciorem actum intelligendi.

And God is Almighty, because He and He alone can do *all*, i. e. all that can be done.

That I can conceive all that God can do does not render me His equal in intelligence; it is not the object, but the perfection of the act, which counts here.

Ad tercium patet quod assertum est falsum. Nam etsi concedatur deum posse facere idem esse album et nigrum (et sic de ceteris denominacionibus que essent contrarie respectu eiusdem pro eodem loco et tempore) non tamen sunt contrarie pro diversis sitibus, ut potest dici. Nec credo quod potest facere duo instancia singularia simul esse, quia hoc est imposibile. Immo si, per impossibile, *a* et *b* essent duo instancia, et *c* esset in *a* et non in *b*; adhuc non simul esset et non esset; quia non sequitur: *c non est in b; igitur non est.* Nemo enim negat pro omni mensura temporanea, instantanea, evo, vel eternitate. Nec credo aliquos philosophos vel aliquem posse esse quod possit assentire contradiccioni scite esse tali.

III. The analogy does not hold. If God could make the same thing to be at once in two places, still the places are different. But two instants of time cannot exist at once; and if they could, this would prove nothing. No one can assent to a known contradiction; assent woutd affirm it to be no contradiction.

6. MS. si *deest.*

All arguments to the contrary are mere equivocations. There are three orders of being: actual, possible, and fictive. As we can know the actual, and also its negation, they say that both are beings, and therefore two contradictories coëxist.

Idem patet, quia concedentes idem simul esse et non esse negaverunt hoc esse contradiccionem, quia dixerunt quod fuit possibile et verum. Nec potuerunt habere evidencias ad sic credendum, nisi forte equivocaverint; sicud non est dubium quin fecerunt. Et forte in hoc stetit illorum equivocacio, secundum famosam distinccionem adhuc tentam: triplex est *esse*, scilicet *esse* actuale, *esse* potenciale, et *esse* intellectuale. Unde dixerunt, cum unus intelligit veritatem existentem, et alius intelligit suum contradictorium, et omne intellectum quodammodo habet *esse* (quia ad minimum *esse* intellectuale), sequitur quod duo contradictoria simul sunt. Et in ista equivocacione sunt multi moderni. Ideo Aristoteles dicit quod medium elenchicum arguendi contra eos est querere ab illis quid terminus signet, ne equivocent in signacionibus terminorum. Nam multis modis potest poni ens esse: vel complete, secundum *esse* totale; vel secundum partem, ut talia que possunt esse ex materia que iam est; vel non simpliciter *esse*, sed *esse* intellecta, qualia aliqui ponunt habere *esse* obiectivum.

To refute them we must ask what they mean by *Being;* whether something completely real, or ideal that may exist in an existing subject, or purely ideal. With these distinctions, it is impossible to grant that the same completely real thing is and at the same time is not. And if this is the meaning of the general proposition: Any being is and is not at the same time, it merely follows that the proposition is incredible. Any contradictory might follow from its admission; either that God exists, or that anything is God.

Supponitur igitur quod loquamur ut oportet de *esse* simpliciter actuali; et suppositis aliis significacionibus communibus, patet quod nullus concedit eandem rem in mundo simul esse [et non esse]. Si igitur hoc potest esse; per idem omne ens potest simul esse et non esse, quia tantum inconsequens sequitur de una sicud de quocunque, vel omnibus simul. Vel ponitur quod illud ens quod simul est et non est sit signatum huius proposicionis: omne ens simul est et non est; ex quo posito non sequitur nisi contradiccio, que in principio fuit concessa. Hoc igitur posito, patet quod habet concedere F. 83[a] totum dictum suum esse falsum, ut Aristoteles arguit, et | quod nemo debet credere sibi, quia ponit sicud nemo potest credere. Et ut breviter dicam, nihil est cogitabile proponi, quia illud habet concedere tanquam sequens; quia sibi est quelibet proposicio vel significacio

23. MS. nullis. 24. MS. et non esse *deest*.

5. *Actuale*, what exists independently of our mind and out of our mind; *potenciale*, what exists only in our mind, but independent thereof; *intellectuale*, what exists in our mind, and of which the intelligibility depends upon our mind. 17. *Sed esse.* Two or three words are wanting here, but the sense of the phrase is obvious. I should supply ... secundum quid ut talia...

indifferens: ut idem est sibi proponere quod *deus est*, et proponere quod nihil potest esse; vel *quidlibet est deus*. Cum enim omne ens ymaginabile est idemtificatum alteri, omne signatum signat convertibiliter cum alio; et si negaverit antecedens, vel quidlibet aliud proponendum, habet concedere suum oppositum esse; et cum quidlibet simul est et non est, habet concedere illud non esse et oppositum negatum esse: immo habet concedere et non habet concedere; et cum non possit reprobari ista opinio, nisi per deducens ad inconsequens, patet quod si homo studuerit mille annis, non potest efficacius arguere contra illam quam ponendo talem casum, nec deducere ad maius inconsequens quam concedit in principio.

The sense of any term might be interchanged with that of any other; we must deny what we grant, and grant that we deny it; there is no way of refuting, but by showing inconsistency, but here inconsistency is at its maximum at the very outset.

Ideo est dubium apud logicos utrum debeat arguere contra talem; et pro certo videtur mihi quod non, quia, sive bene respondeat sive male, non esset possibile deducere eum ad maius inconsequens quam quod male respondit; quod idem concessit et negavit; vel quod sic non est ut dicit. Et ipse, consequenter respondendo, potest libere eligere, concedere vel negare quodlibet propositum. Debet enim concedere quod hoc negavit, immo quod quidlibet non est, et debet addere suum contradictorium, quod hoc nunquam negavit; quia necesse est eum bene respondisse. Ideo videtur quod stultius est alloqui talem, quam bestiam, puerum, vel dementem.

Such persons ought not to be argued with, for they cannot be made to contradict themselves more than they do.

Redeundo igitur ad confirmacionem secundi argumenti, conceditur [quod] de multis sumus dubii [an] deus illa potest vel non; ut sunt talia; deus potest esse asinus, ipse potest producere alium mundum, vel cum isto, vel adnihilando istum; et sic de infinitis aliis, quorum una pars tenetur a subtilibus philosophis et alia pars tenetur ab aliis. Et sic patet quod infinita sunt necessaria, quorum quodlibet ignoramus, immo quorum nullum possemus scire, nisi possemus esse inmortales et glorificati, videndo in speculo primo causante intuitive tales veritates. Nam (ut taceam de pretericionibus necessariis, ut sunt tales; *a* lapis fuit tunc generatus, collisit *b* in fundo maris) patet hoc de veritatibus eternis quarum sciencia proficeret, et quas cupimus cognoscere;

A return to the second objection. There are many things to which God's power may or may not extend, and which we cannot know certainly.

18. MS. c̑w. 29. MS. quod *deest; ib.* an *deest.*

Yet we can know in general that there are possible things and things impossible; and that God's power extends to the former alone.

It seems that things are impossible because His power does not extend to them, not vice versa.

ut sunt tales: "Hoc deus potest" et "Hoc non potest". Tamen confuse cognoscimus omnia possibilia, et solum talia potest deus; et omnia impossibilia, et solum talia non potest. Difficultas tamen est, utrum deus ideo non potest facere me esse asinum, quia ego non possum esse asinus, vel contra. Et videtur quod econtra; ideo sic non potest esse, quia deus non potest sic causare. Nam, si affirmacio sit causa affirmacionis, tunc negacio est causa negacionis, ut patet primo posteriorum; sed *deum posse quodcunque possibile* est causa quare illud est impossibile. Minor patet ex hoc quod *deum posse* est prima veritas causans omnem aliam, et per consequens est causa cuiuscunque possibilis.

For God's existence is the positive cause on which these negations depend, and His power makes them to be impossible, which amounts to saying that it does not extend to making them possible.

Similiter, inpossibilitas affirmacionis est privacio, et omnis privacionis est dare affirmativam causam que affirmative sit ipsa prior. Igitur ad minimum, *deum* | *esse* F. 83[b] est causa talis inpossibilis; et per consequens *deum posse in hoc* est causa huiusmodi. Et idem est, deum posse in negacionem et non posse in affirmacionem, ut idem est: deum posse facere quod inpossibile sit me non fuisse, et non posse facere quod ego possum non fuisse.

The general reply, however, takes it the other way round.

Averrhoës thinks that impossibility of becoming causes impossibility of making.

In oppositum est vulgariter responsio, que respondet querenti quare deus non potest in contradiccionem: Quia illud non potest fieri. Unde commentator (8vo phisicorum) vult quod deus non diminuitur in potencia, quamvis non possit impossibile. Ac si necessitaret quod est ex natura inpossibilis et non ex se, quod non potest in illud. Sicud enim aliquod est per se formaliter necessarium, sic aliquod est per se formaliter inpossibile oppositum illi necessario. Similiter deus potest facere me mori per *b* horam et lapsa *b* hora non poterit illud propter inpotenciam reducendi idem tempus in numero. Igitur aliqua erit completa causa illius non potencie, et nulla particulariter significanda, nisi impossibilitas illius motus propter lapsum temporis. Igitur inpossibilitas fiendi est causa inpossibilitatis faciendi.

A difficult question this; one on which the greatest philosophers disagree.

I am of opinion

Ista videtur mihi difficultas, cum tres precipui philosophi fuerant in ista materia diversimode opinati, ut patet per doctorem profundum (1° libro capitulo 13°)

2. MS. *Before* tamen, hoc. 22. MS. wlgariter. 25. MS. wlt *and so in general for* vu.

27. *Se* refers here, I believe, to God.

videtur tamen mihi pro nunc probabile [quod] utrumque est reciproce causa alterius: ut, *deum non posse hoc* est quasi quedam forma negativa dependens ex hoc impossibili quasi ex materia; et *hoc esse impossibile* dependet ex non potencia dei tanquam ex forma. Et sic tenet doctor subtilis quod principiative est *hoc impossibile* ex intellectu divino; quia, posito intellectu divino producente *hoc* in *esse* intelligibili, etsi nihil absolutum producat ad extra, *est hoc inpossibile.* Et ideo dicit quod non formaliter per omnipotenciam dei est hoc inpossibile. Et patet responsio utroque. Ulterius, credo quod deus non potest esse asinus; nec valet locus *a simili*, quo arguitur ipsum per idem posse esse asinum quo hominem. Cuius racionem relinquo theologis; sed si possit esse asinus, grave esset ymaginari quomodo cognosceretur hoc, nisi (ut theologi ponunt aliqua cognosci) per revelacionem. Sed ego non credam tali revelacioni.

that each causes the other mutually, and agree with Duns Scotus.

Ad tercium patet ex dictis quod idem est *necessario hoc esse* et *inpossibile esse hoc non esse.* Ideo deus est impossibile esse ipsum non esse, quia est necesse esse ipsum esse; quod idem est, ideo me non esse asinum esse. Necessarium est *impossibile esse me esse asinum;* sed non est primum vel summum necessarium vel inpossibile, quia habet affirmacionem priorem causacione, sed non consequencia. Et sic est hoc principium morale verum quod quam bonum est aliquod ens, tam mala esset eius privacio, si non loco illius succederet aliquod bonum suplens; ut, quam bonum est mihi habere Socratem amicum, tam malum esset mihi carere eius amicicia per mortem eius, per translacionem ad maius dominium, vel aliunde, si non fieret suplecio loco deperdicionis sue amicicie; quia illud malum est privacio comodi ex eius amicicia. | F. 84[a] Quod si ex morte eius provideatur mihi aliunde de maiori bono quam habui de eius amicicia, et adquisicio dominii cedat mihi in maius

A further refutation of (III.) The Necessary is the same as the impossibility of its negation.

It is not quite true that the privation of any good thing is as bad as the thing itself is good;

for instance, we may lose a friend, but gain yet more by that loss.

1. MS. quod *deest.* 13. MS. ipsnm per idem ipsum. 15. MS. cognosceret. 31. MS. dm̅i *and further.*

12. *Asinus.* The question seems rather blasphemous; it is strikingly mediaeval. That it was possible for *God to be man* by hypostatic union, caused it to be asked whether it was possible for the same union to take place with other creatures besides man. St. Thomas and most Schoolmen are of a contrary opinion from Wyclif.

commodum de familiaritate quam prius habui amicicia, tunc mors et adquisicio dominii prosunt mihi. Et ideo dicitur quod quidam plus prosunt moriendo quam prosunt vivendo; et octavo ethicorum dicitur quod in casu debet velle amicum suum fore, dum autem perdendo amiciciam propter adquisicionem maioris boni. Et sic videtur mihi quod privacio boni non [est] formaliter mala, quia non esset mala, nisi occasione illius non succedat tantum bonum.

It is clear enough that if you posit absolute non-existence, you get all sorts of contradictory inferences.

Ulterius, quantum ad deduccionem inconsequentis patet mihi satis quod si nihil est, non aliqualiter est, et per consequens non inpossibile est hominem esse asinum; et ultra necesse est hominem esse asinum et deum esse, et negans consequencias istas concedet alia inconsequencia mihi. Ideo constat mihi quod nemo umquam inprobabit illas sequelas: nihil est, igitur aliquid est; nihil est igitur etc. Et verum est quod nihil est; et sic de ceteris. Ego enim non intelligo per condicionalem, nisi quod non possit *sic* esse (demonstrando signatum antecedentis) nisi *sic* sit (demonstrando signatum consequentis). Et intelligo *posse* quandam esse potenciam; nec est inconsequens multa esse necessaria que opporteat credere ex testibus, quia iuxta dicta tercio libro scibile mensurat scienciam de eodem, etc.

Every conditional proposition must imply the impossibility of the antecedent, when the consequent is denied.

CAPITULUM QUARTUM.

Is quality an absolute accident? No; for some accidents cannot possibly exist by themselves (v. g. relations), and all must be alike in this respect in order to distinguish

Isto premisso, restat generaliter et specialiter dubitandum si qualitas sit res absoluta que posset per se existere sine substancia. Et videtur quod non: nam omne accidens est univoce accidens cum altero; sed aliqua sunt accidencia que claudit contradiccionem esse sine substancia illis subiecta, ut patet de respectibus; igitur

7. MS. est *deest.* 10. MS. 9'tuꝭ *pro* consequentis. 17. MS. *after* igitur, a°. 18, 19. MS. 9le *pro* condicionalem. 25. MS. Capitulum etc. *deest; large initial I in black ink.*

5. *Dum autem.* Evidently corrupt. 27. *Qualitas.* Wyclif apparently proves his point against *quality;* but his arguments attack all absolute accidents. In the Scholastic system, quantity alone was thought to be an absolute accident. It was a force which gave extension to the substance (vis extensiva substantive), naturally existing in a subject, yet having enough entity to be able to exist — though by a miracle — without a subject.

per idem, omnia accidencia sunt huiusmodi. Maior patet per hoc quod aliqua est racio quare ens est accidens, eo quod ens in quantum accidens habet aliquam proprietatem distinguentem ipsum a substancia; quia aliter omnis substancia que accidentaliter inesset alteri esset accidens.

them from substances, otherwise, if one substance happened to belong to another, it would be an accident.

Confirmatur tripliciter: primo sic. Quacunque substancia signata, claudit contradiccionem ipsam fore accidens; igitur. cum tantam et repugnanciam contingit reperire inter accidens et substanciam sicud inter substanciam et accidens, videtur quod nullum accidens potest fieri substancia. Patet illud per conversionem, eo quod nullum accidens posset [esse] substancia, nisi substancia posset esse accidens; et probabitur postmodum quod qualitas non posset per se existere, nisi posset esse substancia.

For (1) no substance can become an accident; therefore no accident a substance; but if quality were able to exist by itself, it would be a substance.

Similiter, quam per se corpus vel anima est substancia, tam per se quodlibet genus accidentis est accidens: igitur nulla qualitas potest esse non accidens. Assertum probatur per hoc quod iste terminus, *ens*, dividitur in substanciam et accidens; et accidens dividitur in per se opposita; quia aliter non valeret divisio, [ut] unum membrum per accidens contineatur sub relico, sicud dicunt omnes ponentes omne accidens esse quali-
F. 84b tatem, quam ponunt posse per se existere, | et per consequens nullum accidens accidentaliter est accidens.

(2) As a substance cannot be other than a substance, so an accident cannot be other than an accident: therefore it cannot possibly exist by itself, or its definition would include substance.

Similiter, omne ens predicabile, et specialiter omne tale quod est res absoluta accidentaliter existens quodcunque, presupponit ipsum per se existere in aliqua specie; sed omnis qualitas est res absoluta accidentaliter existens qualitas et accidens: igitur omnis talis est per se in aliqua specie; et per consequens in alico genere: et non dabitur nisi genus substancie. Maior patet ex dictis proximo capitulo; et de racione. Si enim *a* successive fuerit nunc accidens, nunc non accidens, manens continue id quod est, tunc eius essencia et quiditas manet continue, et per consequens, cum multa secum conveniunt in perfeccione essenciali, sequitur quod est danda species in qua per se est.

(3) Every thing, absolute accidents included, must belong to a species, and if so, these accidents belong to the genus substance.

Item, si omnis qualitas posset per se existere, posset esse multis substanciis perfeccior; consequens inpossibile. Et consequencia sic probatur. Quamcunque accionem

Again, if a quality could exist by itself, it would be more perfect

5. MS. a^{te} *pro* alteri. 13. MS. esse *deest*. 19, 20. MS. divisus.
20. MS. in substanciam et substanciam. 21. MS. ut *deest*.

than many a substance, since material substances can only act by means of their qualities, and their qualities could act alone.

habet substancia materialis, habet mediantibus qualitatibus quo sunt eque potencie aut instrumenta, et omnes tales qualitates per adversarium possunt per se esse et agere. Sicud modo igitur omni accioni talis substancie quantumlibet perfectam contingit per se fieri per qualitatem, cum perfecio proprii operis sit signum infallibiliter indicans perfeccionem essencialem operantis, sequitur quod cuilibet tali substancie sua propria qualitas sit pariter perfecta.

For (1) no absolute accident can give more perfection than it has itself; yet, according to this theory, quality would do so. Nothing can be more perfect on account of what it possesses, than the thing possessed is itself perfect.

Confirmatur tripliciter: primo sic. Impossibile est aliquam rem absolutam plus quicquam perficere quam illa essencialiter sit perfecta; sed quelibet qualitas est res absoluta plus perficiens substanciam quam ipsa de se sit perfecta; igitur tantam perfeccionem est qualitas de sua essencia. Non enim potest quicquam per se melius se causare; nec est aliquid magis bonum propter rem habitam quam illa sit in se bona. Loquamur igitur de perfeccione, bonitate, aut melioracione, quam qualitas per se causat, non communicando cum perfeccione quam substancia habet de sui essencia; et patet quod talis est danda, cum qualitas sit res absoluta, non includens in sui *esse* substanciam.

(2) Substance, according to its definition, is what underlies accidents; now, if quality could possibly act by itself, it could *a fortiori* be acted upon; and therefore receive motion, &c.; this would imply that it underlies the accident of motion.

Similiter, talis quantitas, si per se esset de possibili, posset transmutari; ut moveri localiter, rarefieri, condensari, cum posset agere, quod est plus quam pati: igitur posset per se substare accidentibus, et per consequens esse substancia. Tale enim supponitur a philosophis esse substancia de virtute vocabilis. Caliditas enim possibilis, cum tanta albedine per se existens, posset moveri localiter, et sic subici motui, rarefieri, condensari, et sic subici quantitati et alteracioni, ex hoc quod intenderetur et remitteretur.

And (3) any quality might be an essential part of substance, i. e. its substantial form. For take away the form of fire, and leave only matter with heat, &c., existing independently of matter; these would supply the place of form.

Similiter, talis qualitas ex posicione posset esse pars substancie; igitur substancia. Antecedens sic: talis qualitas, iam dependens a substancia dependencia naturali, potest esse independens ab illa; igitur, per idem, substancia potest dependere ab illa. Si enim de dependenti potest fieri independens, ex duobus inpertinentibus potest fieri quod unum dependeat ab altero et non conveniencius quam ut a sua forma, cum qualitas non possit esse per se efficiens multa, vel finis substancie. Igitur relinquitur quod qualitas posset esse forma essencialis substancie. Si enim deus uniret materie prime possibili

42. MS. pe[l]. *pro* possibili.

caliditatem, siccitatem et quecunque cetera accidencia que sunt in igne sine forma substanciali alia, quid F. 85ª sufficeret ignis noster | facere quod tale non sufficeret?

Item, iuxta istud sequitur neminem quicquam infalli-biliter posse scire: quod est inpossibile, octavo libro. Et consequencia sic probatur. Omnis demonstracio naturalis est ab apparencia sensitiva effectus convincientis eius causam; sed non est possibile talem infallibiliter concludere: igitur etc. Minor probatur ex opinione: nam secundum opinionem omnis qualitas prima et secunda, spiritualis vel corporalis, sicud omnis quantitas vel relicum accidens quod est in mundo posset manere et agere sicud modo, cum hoc quod totus mundus corumperetur, sic quod non esset alia nisi deus et homo. Et certum est quod homo tunc crederet solem et celestia esse, ut modo [eodem] crederet nata coruptibilia et eterna esse; ut modo eodem sentiret frigus, calorem et omnia accidencia que modo sentit; immo nutriretur per dura cibaria que converterentur in accidencia cum quibus sua anima copularetur eque ydonee sicud modo; quare igitur non forent talia accidencia partes sui, cum per illa sufficiat ambulare, ridere, et breviter quemcunque actum corporeum vel incorporeum facere sicud modo? Non igitur solum esset anima, sed unum compositum.

Again, in this theory, all certain knowledge would disappear; for we judge of a cause by its effect, and as all sense impressions might proceed from accidents without a substance, we could not know whether this did not actually occur.

Confirmatur tripliciter; primo sic. Quandocunque natura potest cum paucioribus mediis in finem aliquem non multiplicat plura, cum non sit superflui operatrix. Sed natura potest facere ita bonum mundum et utilem vel congruum suo fini, etsi non producat res latentes distinctas a vocatis accidentibus, ut sequitur ex illa opinione: igitur superfluit addere plura. Minor patet ex hoc quod omnibus accidentibus servatis, coruptis substanciis que sunt in mundo, non est fingendum aliquod officium quoad accionem, decorem universi, vel ad complacenciam dei, quin vocata accidencia sufficerent in illud. Immo, cum idem in numero sit quodlibet sic multiplicabile, superfluit ponere multa numeraliter de-

For (1) nature does not employ unnecessary means to attain its ends; if they could just as well be attained by accidents without substances, why should substances exist?

4. MS. mem̃. 7. MS. cōmciens. 16. MS. eodem *deest.* 16. 17. MS. cor[ua] et e[ta]. 17. MS. cum *pro* eodem. 27. MS. aliq[or]. 31. MS. enim *pro* non.

26--28. *Quandocunque.* This principle was called Ockam's razor for getting rid of superfluous entities. It is usually put thus: *Frustra fit per plura, quod per pauciora fieri potest.*

stincta, sed sufficit pro omni evidencia salvanda solum unum esse, ut dixerunt Parmenides et Millissius.

(2) It would follow from the theory that the production of an accident is not the same thing as a change in its subject, but is the creation of a new entity independent of its subject, like the human soul.

Similiter, cum omnis res potest ubicumque libet generari sine hoc quod informet subiectum, sequitur quod generans accidentis talis multum distinguitur ab alteracione subiecti; potest enim esse generacio qualitatis huiusmodi, sine hoc quod informet; et potest postmodum successive informare, et sic aliquid alterari sine adquisicione qualitatis. Et per consequens, quandocunque generacio qualitatis concomitatur eius informacionem et inherenciam, subiectum movetur duobus modis in partibus; et sic generacio accidentis non esset generacio secundum quid substancie (sicud dicit Aristoteles, primo de generacione), set esset creacio rei absolute sine concausacione alicuius comproducentis, sicud est de produccione anime; que, quamvis producatur in materia, tamen sine aliqua dependencia vel essenciali concausacione a suo subiecto. Et sic, secundum istam viam, est de qualibet qualitate.

And (3) not the feeling substance, but its accident, would feel. The sensation of whiteness might exist by itself, and not be experienced by its subject, according to this theory.

Similiter, iuxta illud sequitur quod nulla substancia sit sensibilis, sed solum accidens; nam *a* albedo in Socrate est una res absoluta, ex cuius sensacione non sequitur subiectum sentiri; et sic est de omni subiecto sensibilis qualitatis. Igitur, cum non | [potest] sentiri F. 85b nisi senciendo qualitatem eiusdem, sequitur quod etc. Antecedens sic: stat qualitatem sentiri et non informare subiectum, vel posito subiecto vel ipso corupto; igitur, eius sensacio est inpertinens sensacioni subiecti. Requiritur enim actus distinctus ad subiecti cognicionem; et ille transcendit omnem cognicionem sensus, cum cognicio sensus est par in hominibus et brutis; sed ipsa non habent cognicionem de subiecto insensibiliter transmutato, puta vel corupto, vel non informato, preter cognicionem quam prius habuerat: igitur nec homo quo ad sensum. Non enim videtur quod qualitates plus inevitabiliter gignant cognicionem sui subiecti a quo non essencialiter dependent, quam congnicionem sue essencialis cause, ut dei, etsi continue sint alie tales cause.

The absurdity of this position demonstrated by an example.

Item, ponitur quod intellectus agens (qui ponitur una qualitas, puta potencia anime) eliciat actum contemplacionis prime cause ipsa potencia per se existente, et

3. MS. res ab. 19. MS. quantitate. 24. MS. ffm^1 *pro* sensibilis; *ib.* potest *deest.* 25. MS. etc. *deest.*

videat Socrates utrumque, quorum primum sit *a* et secundum *b*, et patet quod *a* est alterabile et felicitabile ita perfecte sicud aliquis homo mundi. Gaudet enim naturaliter de obiecto quod cognoscit et appetit ita plene sicud felix specularius; nec subiacet miseriis quales homo contrahit a corpore: igitur est felicior homine, et per consequens illo perfeccior. Socrates igitur cognoscens illam felicitatem, multum laboraret rogando potenciam ut impertiretur sibi *b* fore, per quam plus perficeretur quam alia substancia citra deum. Si igitur finis sit melior hiis que sunt ad finem, longe melior est *b*, felicitas gracia cuius est tota vita hominis, quam ille vel eius vita.

Hinc dicitur quod omnia illa argumenta procedunt si casus positi essent possibiles quoad naturam, sed modo sunt solum absolute possibiles quoad deum; et sic tolluntur omnia argumenta facta; ut puta, primum tollitur per hoc quod nullum accidens potest naturaliter sine miraculo esse sine subiecto, et sic posset accidens esse substancia et econtra, sed non naturaliter; et sic per se qualitas est accidens quoad naturam; sed non quoad deum. Est tamen dare speciem sibi essencialis, sed illa non est nomen inpositum.

Answers to these arguments.
a) The cases given are not absolutely impossible to God.
An accident might by miracle exist without a subject.

Et ad secundum argumentum negat consequenciam; quia nulla qualitas posset per se habere talem operacionem, [ut] supleret vicem subiecti; et sic non sequitur quod mira sic agens sit tante potencie aut sic perfectum. Ad primam confirmacionem dicit quod quelibet perfeccio accidentalis sit insubstancialis; et ad secundam dicit quod non posset sic se habere sine suplente vicem subiecti; ad tercium dicunt quod nulla qualitas potest esse pars substancie, quia de racione substancie est non inherere nec habere essencialem [relacionem] subiecto cui inhereat; et de racione accidentalis est inherere vel equevalenter.

b) It is denied that any accident can take the place of a substance by itself, and therefore the argument of its perfection must fall.
No accidental perfection can be substantial; quality cannot underlie another accident without some Power that takes the place of the subject.

Et ad tercium dicit quod dupliciter contingit hominem infallibiliter cognoscere: vel excludendo potenciam fallacie per accionem solummodo naturalem, vel excludendo
F. 86a fallibilitatem supernaturalem. | Secundo modo non contingit hominem veritate affirmativa de causato infallibiliter cognoscere; sed primo modo bene potest. Ad

c) We can be infallible in two ways: either by setting aside natural sources of error or supernatural sources; but the latter does not give us positive truth.

21. MS. sed sunt. 26. MS. ut *deest.* 31. MS. quid quod. 33. MS. relacionem *deest.* 36, 37. MS. hominem et fallibiliter.

The imaginary world of accidents would be like, but not so good as our substantial world; for it has pleased God to create diverse kinds of substances. The accident is evolved, not created; but if God supplied the place of a subject, that would be creation.

primam confirmacionem dicit quod mundus ymaginatus non esset ita bonus, ut iste quamvis sufficeret in omnem accionem et apparenciam in quam sufficit iste, cum hoc esset per deum supernaturabiliter suplentem vicem subiecti. Ipse igitur, gracia communicandi bonitatem suam causat genera substanciarum, et hoc est melius et sibi placencius. Ad secundam, concedit conclusionem quoad secunde cause modum; sed dicit quod subiectum est causa materialis accidentis et sic (naturaliter sequitur) informat generacionem accidentis. Quod si deus supleret vicem subiecti, tunc accidens crearetur. Ad tercium dicit quod sequitur naturaliter subiectum sentiri, sentito eius accidente; sed posito casu possibili supernaturali, non sentiretur subiectum, sed verum accidens.

By nature it is the subject that feels through its accident; by miracle, the accident itself might be made to feel. Such is the general drift of the answer; but we see that there are accidents which cannot be separated from their substance. The accident of quality is *the substance being in this or that wise.* When you make an absolute accident of it, you must add another accident to join it to the substance; this other accident suffices without more ado. This theory has but the slightest

Istam responsionem ponunt theologi, alii uno, et alii alio superaddito aut variato; sed certum est quod illud multum discrepat ab excipientibus philosophorum de accidentibus. Nam ex ista responsione sequitur quod est dare qualitatem et accidencia que deus non posset de potencia absoluta facere per se esse, nec subiecta taliter accidentaliter se habere sine talibus. Igitur superfluit ponere alia accidencia. Aristoteles sic dicit: *Substanciam esse aliqualem* est accidens; et nec tale potest esse sine substancia, nec substancia potest actualiter agere aut se habere sine tali; igitur etc. Ponendo enim qualitatem rem absolutam, adhuc impertinens est formaliter ad modum accidentalem denominacionis subiecti; oportet igitur, ponendo talem absolutum, ponere ad accidens quod sit informacio subiecti per huiusmodi absolutum. Igitur, si substancia potest salvari actualiter aliqualis sine tali absoluto, superfluit illud ponere. Et illa racio est mihi evidens.

Similiter, iuxta opinionem non est tibi nisi topice, et suasione, chrismali cognosculo quod est aliquod tale accidens absolutum; sed bene scitur quod cum omnibus evidenciis iam habitis stat oppositum. Igitur non scitur

16. MS. supperaddendo aut variando. 17. MS. excipib̄ȝ. 19. MS. t᷎ (eciam ?) *pro* et. 22. MS. aıσ sic a^ci. 24. MS. dicit *pro* aut. 30. MS. ale *pro* aliqualis. 34. MS. X̃li.

33. *Est tibi . . . . cognosculo.* Granted that *cognosculum* may mean *an inkling*, perhaps this form may be grammatically the same as Est mihi dolori.

a sic opinante quin sic naturale nullum est tale accidens; sed si credatur, hoc erit solum fide et opinione. Antecedens patet tripliciter; primo, quia, iuxta opinionem, deus posset concurrere cum substancia, causando omnem apparenciam vel efficienciam quam modo substancia causat sine tali accidente absoluto; et secundo posset tale absolutum agere sicud modo, cum hoc quod non sit accidens sic in substancia, ut in continente, defective. Et tercio posset esse quod non esset aliqua talis substancia, sed quod accidens integraret mundum ita conformissimum quoad sensibilem apparenciam. Pono igitur quemcunque philosophum concedentem quocunque illorum trium modorum esse possibiliter posse esse; aut quarto modo ut posito, vel quinto modo, ut ego dico; et inveniet quintum modum maxime consonum racioni. Illum enim oportet ponere, ex quo ponitur substancia sic actualiter qualis. Et illa non habundat in superfluis, cum ponit omnem rem esse substanciam, et accidencia esse modos substanciarum; et non habebitur medium ad eligendum quartam opinionem F. 86b pro naturali, et aliquam trium | viarum pro supernaturali. Si enim fuisset ordinatum sic a deo fore infringibile eternaliter, sic fuisset pure naturale; et quod dicit quarta posicio fuisset de superfluo supernaturali; sed quis scit an uno illorum modorum fuit, an altero, cum quelibet eorum sit deo eque possibilis? Ideo apparet infatue assertum ab opinione quod quelibet via preter suam est supernaturalis.

power to persuade, and every reason leads us to believe its contrary. There are no natural grounds for it; it is merely an opinion, based upon faith. God is supposed able to compete with the substance, causing the appearances which it causes naturally; or the accidents themselves cause them; or the whole world might be accident without substance. My opinion is more reasonable than any of these; quality is the substance itself, *as* being thus or thus. Every *thing* is a substance; accidents are but its modes. Which of these opinions is true? each is equally possible to God.

Similiter, quoad responsionem videtur mihi quod non satisfacit argumentis in responsione. Namque ad primum argumentum patet quod sic opinans non potest cognoscere infallibiliter miraculum; nec scit infallibiliter utrum miraculum esset quod qualitatem informaret, vel esset; quia bene scit quod probabile est esse de communi cursu nature quod qualitas sit sine subiecto, aut quod non sit tale absolutum, stantibus apercius naturalibus sicud modo. Et tunc foret miraculum talem qualitatem informare; quia per se a deo preter cursum nature: et hoc est miraculum. Non igitur scitur quod si sic fieret,

Besides, the answers to the objections are not satisfactory. It were impossible to know whether the miracle consists in making the accidents exist without or with a subject; if either is possible, either may be according to nature, and the reverse would be a miracle.

39. MS. fiare.

14. *Quarto.* I can find no trace of what this fourth opinion really was.

hoc esset miraculum, quia scitur cognoscibilem esse impossibilem. Ulterius considera quam leve dictum est quod accidens potest esse substancia et quod caliditas per se est accidens, et tamen potest sine condicione esse non accidens. Facilius enim esset hominem fore asinum, cum minus differant.

Being is essentially divided into substance and accident, and thus neither can become the other; if that were possible, there would no longer be any essential perfection, nor degrees of perfection in the world. Substance and accident would be mere names that might be given at random to anything.

Ulterius considera de essenciali specie, quod auctores diviserunt ens et sua membra usque ad speciem specialissimam sufficienter per opposita, ut declarabitur principio naturalium; sic quod ex opposito essencialiter distinguntur substancia et accidens; et quicquid est substancia, de essencia eius est quod sit substancia. Quia, si quidlibet posset mutaret in quidlibet, nulla esset perfeccio essencialis, nec unum esset relico essencialiter perfeccius, et perversetur totus ordo nature, cum nullus finis sit melior modus ad finem. Cum igitur sint per se species talium rerum, ille sunt cognoscibiles ab homine, et illa nomina imponibilia sic per accidens speciebus. Non enim cognoscitur debite quid est accidentale, nisi precognita quid sit substanciale.

We are here groping like blind men; is the action of accident and substance one? but there must be two, independent of each other, since their sources are independent. Yet there can be but one, since God, sustaining the accident alone in its operation, does no more than when He sustains it with its substance.

Similiter, quoad solucionem secundi argumenti, patet ex dictis quod nemo sic opinans scit quod talis operacio accidentis sit naturaliter operacio substancie, nisi coniectura levi, sicud cecus proicit baculum; quia certum est quod sic opinans habet dicere quod sunt due acciones, qualitatis et subiecti; et due difficultates, cum accio qualitatis posset manere, accione substancie cessante et econtra; et eque, sicut oportet deum concausare ad unam, oportet ipsum concausare ad aliam ad hoc [ut] perficiatur. Nec posset substancia in talem accionem, nisi deus suppleret vicem accidentis, sicud nec econtra. Posito igitur quod *a* substancia, et *b* qualitas, agant eque difficiles acciones, patet quod deus facit utrumque accionem totaliter, nec plus concausat corupta substancia, et *b* continuante eandem accionem, quam concausat utroque manente; sicud eque potens est homo conservatus a deo sine celo, sicud esset celo conservante. Nihil enim posset quicquid facere, nisi deus supleret vicem infinitorum que possent illud conservare. |

5. MS. aʒıᵐ *generally* album. 10. MS. p' ñlm̄. 14. MS. nisi vel *pro* nec unum. 18. MS. impossibilia? 29. MS. ɔcↄr *and below; ib.* ut *deest.*

37. *Sine celo.* Without the influence of the *Primum mobile.*

F. 87[a] Ulterius, quoad primam confirmacionem, patet quod speculacio vel felicitas non denominat hominem, nisi ipsum esse felicem aut speculantem; et certum est quod *hominem esse* non est ita bonum sicud *ipsum esse felicem;* et hoc invenies universaliter in omni accidente, quod denominacio sua communicatur cum denominante substancie quam presupponit. Ex quo sequitur quod simpliciter pocius facit accidens suum subiectum quam illius subiecti forma substancialis. [Nemo] enim dubitat quin simpliciter eligibilius est esse felicem quam esse hominem; et per consequens melius. Quoad solucionem secunde confirmacionis, patet quod accidens non indiget subiecto conservante, cum esset naturaliter sine illo, ita quod si conservet, hoc est actualiter sicud qualitas conservat subiectum ut calor hominem, sicut anima causat compositum. Primo ad solucionem tercie confirmacionis, patet quod non potest cognosci ab homine quiditas substancie, nisi talis res per se existens et agens conformiter ut substancia, esset substancia; nam, admisso hoc, essent infinita accidencia: ut patet de accione, quantitate, et aliis respectibus. Igitur esset aliqua substancia que substaret illis. Si igitur deus potest transmutare adeo naturam qualitatis, quod potest facere illam per se esse et agere, multo magis vel a pari potest unire illam materie prime, quam excedit in perfeccione; et facere quodammodo unum ex illis. Sic enim facit de rebus tantum distantibus. Non igitur potest isti vie ponere raciones essenciales, cum omnia talia sunt accidencia quoad deum.

Happiness merely means 'a man being happy', and it is surely a quality which adds something to 'man'.

If a quality be separable from its snbject, the latter only sustains it actually, as a fact, not necessarily.

If any thing exists by itself and acts just like a substance, it *is* a substance: if not, there is no way to know what it is.

If God can make an accident exist by itself, He can still more easily unite it to primordial matter, which is less perfect.

Similiter, quoad solucionem tercii argumenti, videtur mirabile quod deus sit per se magis fallax quam aliqua res causata. Modicam enim certitudinem haberet homo in eius doctrina adherendo sic per locum ab auctoritate, si sit plus deceptivus hominis quam aliqua res causata. Nec igitur imputaretur homini error talis, nec posset esse racio quare deus immediate deciperet; sed omnem

The answers imply that God is capable of deceiving us, and is more deceitful than anything in the world.

6. MS. den͞oi^te. 8. MS. perfectis *pro* pocius. 9. MS. nemo *deest.* 19. MS. quin *altered to* mihi. 22. MS. substarent.

19. This goes well to the root of the matter; it is a principle that could not fail, sooner or later, to set Wyclif in opposition with the dogma of Transubstantiation. See what I have said at length on the Scholastic idea of reality in De Simonia, Introduction.

decepcionem possibilem communicare potest causato, cum non sit magnum ipsum excedere in deceptitate. Et semper est in qualibet tali responsione peticio ignoti de naturali et spirituali, ut docebitur octavo libro.

The answer to the argument about a world of accidents is a theological juggle. It would go to prove an endless number of created spirits, if this world were one of substances only *because* more perfect. A natural philosopher ought never to posit more things where fewer suffice to explain all. Substances and their modes are amply sufficient. No argument can prove such a vast multitude of accidental entities; and therefore we ought naturally to conclude that such do not exist.

Quantum ad solucionem prime instancie, patet quod est quedam theologizacio. Per idem enim determinatur quod deus, gracia communicanda bonitatem suam, causaret infinitas intelligencias, ut dixerunt Avicenna et Algazel; immo, cum maxima sit cuicunque philosopho naturali quod non sint plura phisologice ponenda, ubi pauciora sufficiunt pro omni signo salvando naturaliter concludente: et omne argumentum ab effectu captum ad probandum talia accidentia esse, potest salvari, ponendo illa non esse res absolutas, [sed] modos substanciarum, ut patuit et patebit. Sequitur quod non sit phisologicum ponere accidencia huiusmodi absoluta: et illa maxima asserta probari potest. Nam supponendum est deum et naturam semper meliori modo et breviori agere, ubi argumentum non convincit oppositum. Igitur, cum nullum argumentum probat tantam multitudinem rerum, videtur esse probandum | quod non sunt res F. 87[b] tales, sed modi substanciarum. Sic enim salvari possunt omnis experiencie certitudo sue naturalis, et non iuxta opinionem oppositam, que nihil scit, sed quadam levi coniectura suspicatur veritates.

Quality, according to Aristotle, makes a being to be *such*; but an absolute accident does not, whether separate from its subject, or therein (at least intrinsically and immediately).

Quantum ad solucionem secunde confirmacionis, patet quod non sequitur opinionem Aristotelis, qui diceret quod informacio tali qualitatis esset accidens quo formaliter subiectum esset quale. Ipsa enim posita, vel absoluta ponitur, vel aufertur corespondenter quod subiectum est *tale;* et per consequens ipsa immediate et formaliter denominans subiectum esse tale est qualitas, et non illa res absoluta que remote facit subiectum accidentaliter quale, ut deus et anima. Quandocunque aliqua res secundum se totam producitur, sic quod materia non fuit in potencia res talis: tunc creatur, sicud adnihilatur si secundum se totam corumperetur et in nullam talem accionem potest causatum, vel facit subiectum recipiens quod productum non creatur.

15. MS. sed *deest.* 22. MS. plandj *pro* probandum.

Quantum ad solucionem secunde confirmacionis, videtur mihi quod non satisfacit. Ponit enim sequelam naturalem esse consequenciam impossibilem. Certum enim est quod stat et actum senciendi qualitatis, si sit absoluta res mediate naturaliter, sine sensacione sui subiecti, ut alibi docebitur. Non autem potest sic esse, si qualitas sit *substanciam esse qualem*. Et patet quare accidencia, que sunt modi subiectorum, inducunt in cognicionem illorum; non autem de necessitate vera res absoluta causata inducit in cognicionem cuiuscunque sue cause, quamvis ipsa cognoscatur. Bruta enim cognoscunt quiditates talium accidencium, sicud cognoscuntur quiditates hominum, bestiarum, et mixtorum quibus nutriuntur et de quibus habent experiencias. Et certum est quod illa non cognoscunt nisi de substancia quod sit talis vel talis, ut calida, dulcis, etc. Igitur data accidencia, cognita et brutis, sunt modi substanciarum. Non enim cognoscit brutum quod talis res absoluta est accidens, nec (ut credo) aliqua res mundi. Si tamen esset qualitas res absoluta, sequitur cum veris quod omne senciens haberet intencionem absolutam prius naturaliter signantem qualitatem quam sit intencio signans substanciam. Et ultra sequitur cum veris quod omne sic senciens cognoscit substanciam signatam distingui ab accidente, eo quod cognoscit utrumque actum, et apprehensum utroque cognoscit esse. Et ex illo sequitur ulterius quod non stat sentire accidens, et postmodum subiectum corumpi, stante utraque intencione apprehensa, nisi cognoscatur subiectum corumpi: quod est inpossibile. Et consequencia patet per hoc quod quelibet sensus cognoscens suam cognicionem, cognoscit privacionem substancie cognoscibilis, cum oppositorum idem sit disciplina; ut, cognoscendo quod album movetur, satis percipit visu, post motum, privacionem cognoscibilis motus: et sic universaliter de cuiuscunque sensualis cognoscibilis privacione [per] adnihilacionem substancie sensibilis, stantibus accidentibus.

The answer that we, and not the quality of sensation, experience feeling, implies that the consequence I naturally drew is impossible. If the act of feeling (by which I am thus) is an absolute entity, it is separable and can feel without me. This difficulty does not exist in the other theory. Animals know what things are, and how they are — hot, sweet &c. This knowledge is of modes of substances; for they certainly have no idea of absolute accidents, as they should, if the theory were true. We have two apprehensions, one of the accidents, another of the substance; if the subject could disappear, the accidents remaining, the second act ought also to disappear; and we should know its existence by that disappearance, since contradictories are apprehended by the same act.

24. MS. 9g$^{\widehat{ocm}}$. 32. MS. oppo^{t9}; *ib.* scit. 36. MS. per *deest.*

REPLICACIO

DE UNIVERSALIBUS.

In Cod. Holmiens.: Tractatus Wyklefi methaphysici per manus Mag. Joh. Hus de an. 1398.

A 77^a B 102^a | Presentem agrediendo replicacionis materiam in 3^s partes, distingo eam secundum tria puncta eiusdem replicacionis fundamentalia: quarum prima pars cuiusdam supposicionis materiam ennarrat; secunda duarum conclusionum cum quibusdam anectendis sentenciam explanat; tercia quedam correlaria earundem conclusionum exarat.

This work consists of three parts: The examination of an assumption, of two opposite conclusions, and several corollaries.

Posuit igitur magister meus reverendus primo in sua determinacione, pro supposicione, istud: *aliquid esse hominem* est humanitas alicuius, et *aliquid currere*, est cursus alicuius: et sic de aliis. Probavit hoc sic; [id] quo aliquid est homo, hoc est *ipsum esse hominem;* sed humanitas est huius modi, igitur supposicio vera. Primam partem probat sic; quia *esse hominem aliquid* est actus substancialis quo aliquid est homo; sic *Sortem currere* est veritas qua verum est quod Sors currit; et talis est cursus Sortis, cum a cursu Sortis Sortes currit.

Wyclif's assumption is that humanity is *something being a man*, and so of all like terms. Proved thus: Humanity is that by which anything is a man; ∴, it is *its being a man.* For this, *by which*, is a substantial actuality, intrinsic to *man*. Thus, Socrates running is Socrates' run: the running makes it true that he runs.

Contra quam supposicionem posui conclusionem primam istam: nichil quod est *currere,* est cursus alicuius. Probatur. Quodlibet ens quod vere dicitur currere, est currere; nullus cursus alicuius est ens quod vere dicitur currere; ergo, *aliquid currere* non est cursus alicuius; pari racione, et *quodlibet currere* non est cursus

This I deny. That which is running, is not a run of anybody. For *running* is not a being of which we can say that *it runs.*

7. quorum A. 10. questoria A. 11. exclarat A. 15. id *deest* AB. 18. probavit B.

A = Cod. Holmiens. B = MS. Univ. Prag. III. G. 10. f. 102^a—119^a.

alicuius. Maior patet, quia omne ens quod vere dicitur currere, est currere; et si non, dabitur causa quare non. Sed minor probatur; quia nihil vere dicitur currere nisi quod currit; sed nullus cursus alicuius currit, ut notum est.

It follows that Wyclif's assumption cannot be upheld.

Ex ista conclusione intuli corrollarium tale: id quod magister posuit pro supposicione, scilicet, *aliquid esse hominem* est humanitas alicuius, et *aliquid currere* est cursus alicuius, non est sustinendum; quia ex conclusione dicta, que vera est, sequitur oppositum contrarium illius quod posuit pro supposicione.

"Humanity is that by which anything is a man;" yes, but not as a part of man; as the whole.

Sed ad racionem qua arguebat sic: "quo aliquid est homo, hoc est *ipsum esse hominem;* sed humanitas est huiusmodi [etc.];" capiendo humanitatem pro quidditate parciali hominis, negatur maior universaliter; intelligendo eam, capiendo humanitatem pro quidditate totali hominis, conceditur maior et minor. Et tunc per hoc nihil arguitur ad propositum, eciam quando arguit sic: "*Sortem currere* est veritas, qua verum est quod Sors currit;" conceditur: "et eciam est cursus Sortis" negatur illa: nam *Sortem currere* est Sors currens, et non cursus Sortis. Et quando assumitur a cursu Sortis, *Sors currit*, conceditur; et si infertur; ergo *Sortem currere est cursus alicuius*, negatur consequencia.

"Socrates running makes it true that he runs," yes; but it does not follow that it is, therefore, *his run*.

Wyclif denies that running is not a run, unless we equivocate between running in two senses. What is truly said to be is a being; but it does not follow that what is truly said to be running is a run.

Reverendus magister replicando negavit istam: *nichil quod est currere est cursus alicuius.* Subiunxit causam: quia opus naturale in viventibus est generare sibi simile (2° de anima). Et ad racionem qua persuasi eandem, dixit, quando arguitur: *quodlibet ens quod vere dicitur currere est currere*, non equivocando *currere*, negavit hoc. Et quando arguebam: quodlibet ens quod vere dicitur esse, est *esse;* igitur eciam et sic quod dicitur currere est *currere*, negavit consequenciam. Et causam negacionis subiunxit istam: quia *esse* dicit actum substancialem rei qui cum reliquis est idem; *currere* autem actum accidentalem; igitur stat totum substanciale rei esse idem et eiusdem essencie cum re; non sic autem

12. quam A. 14. etc. *deest* AB. 17. concedatur A. 19. quia B. 20. tum *pro* eciam A. 22. accursu A. 23. 9^r = concedetur A. 24. contra A. 30. concedendo A. 34. distinguit A. 35. rebus (?) *pro* reliquis AB.

3. *Currere.* A part of the argument is wanting here. See a little further at the refutation.

de *esse* accidentali. Eciam negavit minorem: scilicet, *nullus cursus alicuius est ens quod vere dicitur currere;* A 77b et quando arguebam pro minori (sic: | nichil vere dicitur currere nisi quod currit) negavit illam; et causam negacionis posuit illam, quia opus [naturale in viventibus] est generare; igitur dicitur generare, et tamen non generat. Et quando intuli in eadem conclusione mea prima quod "*esse hominem* est humanitas, et *currere alicuius* est cursus alicuius, non est sustinendum;" respondebat quod verum esset, si conclusio mea prima esset vera; sed quia non, igitur etc. Et quando respondebam ad racionem sue supposicionis, concedendo quod *Sortem currere* est veritas qua verum est quod Sors currit, et ulterius negando quod talis veritas est cursus Sortis (et subiungebam quod *Sortem currere* est Sors currens); et quando negavi illacionem: "igitur *Sortem currere* est cursus alicuius"; arguebat ad probandam illam consequenciam, sic: idem est veritas rei et entitas universaliter; sic igitur [quia] *Sortem currere* est veritas qua verum est quod Sors currit (ut ego concessi) wult magister quod *Sors currit* erit entitas, qua Sors currit; et talis est cursus Sortis; quia cursus Sortis est talis entitas a qua Sors currit. Sic arguenda est entitas a qua Sors est currens.

He points out that 'to generate' is truly called a natural action in living beings; yet 'natural action' does not generate; thus my conclusion is false.

Wyclif's point is that the truth of anything and its entity are identical. As therefore, *A runs* is the truth about A's running, therefore it is an entity by which A runs.

Ad quam racionem primam suam respondebam quando arguebat sic: Opus naturale in viventibus est generare sibi simile (2° de anima). Distinxi illam; nam, capiendo opus pro re operata, tunc opus naturale est generare sibi simile, quia tunc opus naturale est res operata naturaliter, qua eadem res est generare sibi simile, quia tunc generat sibi simile, sicud homo; sed iste sensus non est hic ad propositum. Sed capiendo opus pro actu operantis, negavi illam primam "opus naturale etc." Sed opus quo vivens naturaliter generans sibi simile, ut vivere, dicitur formaliter, naturaliter generare sibi simile est naturale viventi. Et sic debet intelligi illud philosophi, 2° de anima, quando dicit quod naturale opus est viventibus generare sibi simile. Sed quando arguebam, "quodcunque dicitur esse est *esse;* igitur quodcunque

But I take a distinction as to the example he gives. If 'a natural action' means what is done, I grant it, but this sense is irrelevant. If it means the act of the living being, I deny it.

Again, Wyclif denies my analogy between *being* and

1. accidentale B; *ib.* negat B. 2. unus B. 5. naturale in viventibus *deest* AB. 6. tm̃ B. 7. ex *pro* in A. 9. sustinendus B. 11. etc. *deest* A; *ib.* eciam (?) *pro* et A. 15. subiungebant AB. 19. quia *deest* AB. 20 est *deest* B. 21. Sortem A. 24. currit est A. 28—29. tunc — tunc *deest* A. 30. materialiter B. 33. primam A.

running, saying that the latter, implies an accidental act; but this is to beg the question, and my argument remains. Does he mean that *to run* implies an accident, from which it differs, as 'a white thing' implies the accident of whiteness which it is not? This were again to beg the question.

vere dicitur currere est *currere*," negavit consequenciam, et assignavit talem causam; quia *esse* dicit actum substancialem, qui idem est cum re cuius est actus; sed *currere* dicit actum accidentalem, qui non est idem cum re cuius est actus. Hic magister petit in solucione, quia assumit hoc pro causa quod deberet probare; ideo negavi illam causam tamquam impertinentem ad propositum; scilicet quod *currere* est actus accidentalis, et *esse* actus substancialis. Et sic argumentum meum adhuc stat salvum; et magister meus vellet intelligere illam partem cause, scilicet "*currere* dicit actum accidentalem" sic: scilicet, quod *connotat actum accidentalem*, per hoc non habet quod *currere* est actus accidentalis, et quod *currere* non est currens; sicud *album* connotat albedinem, et album non est albedo. Quis enim vellet concedere quod *album* esset albedo, ad illum sensum quod eadem essencia secundum speciem est communis albo et albedini? Sed hoc iterum esset petere in materia proposita.

Wyclif's argument about generation being an action supposes it not to be the thing done, but the doing; and in that sense it is false.

Et quando ulterius arguebam: "nichil vere dicitur currere, nisi quod currit," negavit causam ex tali causa: Opus dicitur generare et tamen non generat. Respondebam, negando quod opus est generare, capiendo opus pro actu operantis, qualiter ipse sumpsit in proposito, et qualiter verba philosophi in 2° de anima, que videntur hoc innuere, sint intelligenda prius expressis. Et quando arguebat, probando consequenciam negatam, scilicet: "a cursu Sortis Sors currit; igitur *Sortem currere* est cursus alicuius," concessi quod idem est veritas rei et entitas universaliter | et quando inferebat sibi: "igitur A 78a
Sortem currere est veritas, qua verum est quod Sors currit; *Sortem currere* erit entitas qua verum est quod Sors currit;" negavi consequenciam. Sed bene sequitur: ergo *Sortem currere* est entitas, quo verum est quod Sors currit.

To run is not a running any more than, according to

Et quod *currere* non sit cursus alicuius, arguitur specialiter, sic. Sicud se habet *discere* ad disciplinam

1. conclusionem B. 7. causam *deest* B. 17. sensum substancialem A. 21. illam B. 26. in mutacione A; *ib.* sic *pro* sint A; *ib.* prius est expressus A. 28. accursu A. 31. Sor currit A. 32. verum est quod *deest* A. 33—35. negavi—currit *deest* B.

35. *Sors currit.* I cannot understand the difference between the two propositions. Noting the *universaliter* a few lines above, we might read, instead of *Sors currit*, *aliquid currit.*

et *docere* ad doctrinam, sic se habet *currere* ad cursum; sed *discere* non est disciplina, nec *docere* est doctrina: igitur nec *currere* est cursus. Consequencia tenet a simili; sed antecedens pro prima parte notum est. Sed pro secunda parte patet ex 3° phisicorum tractatu primo capitulo ultimo, ubi philosophus dicit: "at vero, neque si doccio et doctrina idem, et *discere* et *docere* idem sunt;" in quo textu secundum commentatorem, Egidium. et Scotum, philosophus videtur dicere quod idem in re sunt doctrina et disciplina, et idem in re non sunt *discere* et *docere*. Ex quo sequitur quod *discere* non est disciplina, et *docere* non est doctrina. Et per consequens *currere* non est cursus. Innuit philosophus in eadem litera quod eadem est distancia ab hoc in hoc et e contrario. Sed non idem est in re distare hoc ab hoc, et distare hoc ab hoc, e converso; et ex consequencia *distare* non est distancia; igitur nec *currere* est cursus.

Aristotle, *to learn* is learning, or *to teach* is doctrine,

or (although distance from one point to another is the same) *to be distant* is distance.

Quantum ad 2^m, posuit magister reverendus pro conclusione prima istud: Universale est. Probavit eam sic: Humanitas universalis est, igitur etc. Antecedens probat sic: si ego sum homo, omnis homo est homo; igitur necessarium est, ad *me esse hominem*, omnem hominem esse hominem; quia, si non, sit quod ego sim homo, sine hoc quod omnis homo est homo, igitur non, si ego sum homo, omnis homo est homo; quod est contra antecedens, ad *me esse;* ex consequente, necessarium est, ad *me esse hominem*, omnem hominem esse hominem: igitur ens necessarium est, *omnem hominem esse hominem*, ad *me esse* hominem; quod est omnem hominem esse hominem; quod est humanitas. Sed non humanitas mea est *omnem hominem esse hominem*, nec aliqua singulariter alia, nec collecta: igitur communis.

Wyclif's first argument in favour of the Universals, is that if I am a man every man must be a man;

and since the one is true, the other necessarily is so too; but my being a man is not humanity; therefore we must posit the Universal Humanity.

2° pro eadem conclusione arguebat sic. Proprie prius naturaliter est prima causa quam *me esse* et quam *hominem esse;* igitur per idem naturaliter est hominem esse; et essenciale est ad *me esse*, hominem esse: igitur eque primo naturaliter est me esse hominem, sicud

Again, the existence of universal humanity is necessary to mine; my existence is therefore, either together with, prior to, or consequent

7. docendo A. 16. e contrario A; *ib.* consequenti B. 19. probat causa A. 20. etc. *deest* A. 26. ad me esse A; *deest* B; *ib.* contingente B. 27. esse hominem ad me A. 35. et quam: per idem naturaliter est me esse et B. 37. e consequencia pono A; *ib.* me esse et hominem esse B.

8. *Commentatorem*, Averrhoës. 37. *Eque primo*. is rendered in the side notes by *together with;* because, in the argu-

upon that of Universal Humanity. Not the first, for then if any man existed, I should exist. Not the second; for then humanity would not be essential to my existence. Therefore universal humanity precedes mine in nature.

hominem esse; vel prius naturaliter, vel posterius naturaliter. Si primum, tunc quam primo naturaliter homo est, ego sum; igitur, si homo est, ego sum: quod est impossibile. Et patet consequencia; quia si est homo, et ego non sum, tunc non quam primo in natura est *hominem esse*, est *me esse.* Si prius natura est *me esse,* quam *hominem esse:* igitur naturaliter prius sum quam sum homo: quod est impossibile, cum tunc non erit mihi essenciale esse hominem. Si posterius natura est *me esse* quam *hominem esse,* tunc prius est *hominem esse,* quam *me esse:* quocunque priori dato preter communem humanitatem est impertinens.

Six other arguments, briefly stated.

3° confirmat sic: essencialiter mea singularis humanitas est humanitas vel convertibiliter vel non. 4° quecunque albedo intensior vel maior et essencialiter perfeccior esset minus intensa. 5° non scirem determinate omnem piscem maritimum esse. 6° non scirem omnem ignem esse calidum determinate, nec verum nec veritates. 7° illa predicacio est accidentalis: *humanitas est singularis;* igitur naturaliter prius est humanitas quam singularis humanitas. 8° prius naturaliter est humanitas quam mea humanitas singularis. Et quamvis magister meus posuit ultimas sex raciones sub compendio, postea tamen manifestatur earum | intencio. A 78^{b}

I affirm there are no real Universal entities. General argument: If there were any, they would be universal in their existence (thatness) or in their essence (whatness) or in both together; none of these is true.

Contra quam conclusionem posui meam conclusionem 2dam, scilicet istam: *Nullum universale reale in essendo est.* Arguebam pro ea sic: si est universale in essendo reale, vel est universale 2m eius *esse*, vel 2m eius essenciam, vel 2m eius *esse* et essenciam. Sed nullum illorum est verum: igitur conclusio vera. Consequencia est nota: sed antecedens pro prima sui parte probatur, quia pluribus modis non contingit esse universale in essendo reale. Sed antecedens pro 2a sui parte probatur.

If there were things universal in their existence, then the same thatness would exist in many, and the existence of one would be that of another;

Et primo quod non est universale in essendo reale secundum eius *esse*, quia tunc aliquod *esse* realiter esset in multis suppositis, vel aptum esset esse realiter in

2. pono *pro* primo A. 5. pono A. 13. singulariter A. 16. unius A. 19, 20. singulariter A. 21. 22. singulariter A. 24. manifestabitur A; *ib.* eorum B. 33. proprii A. 36. suppositis in multis B.

ment, the question is not whether my singular Humanity and the Universal Humanity are prior in time, but in nature, as to dependency of one on the other. 12. *Humanitatem.* Probably some words are wanting immediately after this.

multis suppositis; et sic posset stare quod *esse* unius rei esset *esse* alterius rei ab ea realiter et suppositaliter distincte; quod magister meus reputavit impossibile esse, cum in una responsione dixit quod non eadem anima numero esset in capite et in pede; quia alias idem *esse* unius rei in numero esset *esse* alterius rei ab eo realiter distincta; cum subiunxit: quorum *esse* idem numero est, illa sunt idem numero.

which Wyclif himself grants to be impossible, saying that where existence is identical, there is numerical identity.

Sed quod non est universale in essendo reale 2^m eius essenciam probatur: quia tunc posset stare unam esse essenciam eandem in numero in multis suppositis realiter a se invicem distinctis. Ex quo sequitur quod posset stare aliqua differre que non differunt: quod est virtualis contradiccio.

Things universal in their essence are impossible; for one and the same essence cannot exist in different subjects; they would differ and not differ at the same time.

Sed quod non est universale reale in essendo 2^m eius essenciam et *esse* simul, pari racione potest convinci.

The third alternative fails for the same reasons.

Et confirmatur. Vel universale in essendo reale, et suum singulare differunt, vel non (per contradiccionem). Si differunt, tunc universale non est suum singulare, vel universale non est singulare: que ambo sunt contra intencionem conclusionis secunde magistri mei. Si universale in essendo et suum singulare non differunt, tunc universale non est naturaliter prius suo singulari: quod est contra racionem 2^{am} magistri mei in qua vult quod natura prius est *hominem esse* quam *me esse*. Sed quod hoc sequitur patet: quia idem non est se ipso prius et posterius naturaliter.

Further: Either the Universal differs entitatively from its singular (so that one is *not* the other) or it does not.

If the first, either it is not its own singular, or is not singular.

If the second, the Universal cannot be prior to its singular.

3° arguitur ad idem, sic: Si esset universale in essendo reale, naturaliter prius esset suo singulari (ut magister meusmet vult); sed nullum universale in essendo reale naturaliter est prius suo singulari: igitur nullum universale reale in essendo est. Consequencia est nota de se; sed antecedens pro prima sui parte patet ex racione 2^a, quam magister meus aduxit pro probacione sue conclusionis prime. Sed pro secunda parte probatur; quia solum 3^{bus} modis alterum altero dicitur *prius* naturaliter, ut habetur ex 5° methaphysice: scilicet secundum dependenciam, vel secundum inherenciam accidentis in suo subiecto, vel secundum modum potencie ad actum. Non primum, quia singulare non dependet

The Universal must be naturally prior to its singular, if it have any nature or entity of its own Now it can only be prior 1° as an effect depending on its cause; but as they are both identical, there is no dependency;

4. quod cum B; *ib.* dixi B. 10. quod B. 13. different B. 16. similis A. 24. et qui B. 34. consequenciam A; quâ B. 38. inherencia B.

2° or as an accident on its substance; but the universal is not the substance of its singular; 3° or as the act depends upon its possibility; which relation differs from that of Universal and Singular.

a suo universali eo quod sunt idem in numero (secundum conclusionem secundam magistri mei); et, quia idem non dependet a se ipso, igitur singulare non dependet a suo universali. Non penes secundum modum, quia tunc singulare prerequireret suum universale sicud accidens suum subiectum, quod ad propositum non est pertinens; quoniam iste modus non est . . . . inter subiectum et suum | accidens, qualiter non est de foro A 79a presenti. Non penes 3^{m} modum, quia ille est impertinens ad prioritatem nature que est inter universale et suum singulare.

Suppose there is, but one phoenix in the world; there are the universal and the singular *phoenicities*, the former naturally prior to the latter, which is neither Phoenicity in itself nor not. For if it were, then it would be the same as the Universal on which it depends; and if it were not, there would be more than one *phoenicity*, which contradicts the hypothesis. In this case *phoenicity* would no longer be a Universal, i. e. capable of existing in many, for so long as there was but one, this capacity would not exist.

4° ad idem: sit casus, quod non sit nisi unica fenix in mundo; tunc fenicitas universalis est, et fenicitas singularis est, tunc naturaliter prius est fenicitas universalis fenicitate singulari. Ergo naturaliter prius est fenicitas universalis fenicitate singulari, que est ipsamet fenicitas, vel fenicitate singulari que non est ipsamet fenicitas. Si primum, sequitur quod fenicitas que tunc esset illa, esset naturaliter prior et posterior se ipsa, eo quod secundum casum, tunc non esset nisi unica fenix in numero; non secundum, quia tunc essent plures fenicitates naturaliter distincte: quod est contra casum.

5° stante eodem casu, fenicitas est universale in essendo reale: ergo vel realiter fenicitas est in multis vel apta nata est esse in multis suppositis. Consequencia tenet ex *quid nominis* universalis realis in essendo: sed consequens in eodem casu est falsum; ergo et illud ex quo sequitur. Sed quod consequens sit falsum patet sic: quia tunc fenicitas non esset in multis suppositis realiter, eo quod tunc non essent plures fenicitates. Sed quod tunc talis fenicitas non esset apta nata esse realiter in multis suppositis, probatur: quia illa fenicitas que tunc esset, non erit realiter in multis suppositis secundum aptitudinem.

7. *after* est autem A, *deest* B; *no gap in either MS.* 10. negatur (?) *pro* nature AB. 12. non *deest* A. 18. Sic A. 21. animo (?) *pro* non A. 21, 22. fenices B. 24. nihil (?) *pro* vel AB. 32. que fenicitas A.

12. *Fenix.* This Phoenix difficulty seems to have worried Wyclif considerably. He alludes to it twice in Logica (vol. II, pp. 37, 53) and goes into it at length in other philosophical works, not yet published. 26. *Quid nominis* means a definition which merely gives the meaning of a word used.

6° si universale in essendo reale est, tunc est incorruptibile, sicud magister meusmet vult; sed cum, secundum eum, universale reale est, queritur ergo in illa proposicione *universale est incorruptibile*, utrum sumitur *li* "universale" pro se, vel pro alio? Non pro se; quia tunc illa esset falsa (ut notum est). Et, si pro alio, vel pro deo, vel pro non deo. Quod non pro deo, patet: quia sic non est ad propositum; quia secundum magistrum, deitas non est universalis vel universale. Si pro eo non deo, tunc, stante supposicione vere istius proposicionis, aliquid aliud a deo esset incorruptibile; quod magister meus non admitteret.

Is the Universal an unchangeable entity?

Wyclif says so; but only God, he says, is unchangeable: all other things may pass from being to non-being; and yet God is not a Universal!

7° sequitur quod consequencia non valeret que est syllogismus expositorius: *Sorteitas est corruptibile; universale est Sorteitas; igitur universale est corruptibile;* quia consequens istius est falsum, ut wult magister. Et maior notorie est vera; et minor probatur. Sorteitas est humanitas, et humanitas est universale; igitur Sorteitas est universale. Ergo, per conversionem simplicem, universale est Sorteitas.

A given human nature is a universal, and therefore unchangeable according to this theory; yet it evidently is liable to dissolution.

8° universale addit aliquid realiter super suum singulare, vel non. Si non, tunc nullum esset universale reale in essendo, esset universale secundum consideracionem, vel significacionem, vel causalitatem. Si aliud supperadditur, detur illud; et arguitur, ut prius, quia illud superadditum est singulare, vel non, in essendo.

If a universal adds nothing real to its singular, it is not a reality; if it adds anything, what does it add? something singular or universal?

9° sequitur quod ista regula philosophi posita in antepredicamentis esset falsa, quando alterum de altero predicatur, ut de subiecto. Tunc patet quod hec regula patitur instanciam circa universalia, arguendo: Sorteitas est humanitas; humanitas est universale; universale est incorruptibile: igitur Sorteitas est incorruptibile. Consequens falsum, ut notum est, tam secundum ponentes universalia realia, quam secundum ponentes contrarium.

The doctrine of Universals would falsify the rules of syllogistic reasoning.

1, 2. incorporale A. 4. incorporale A. 11. incorporale A. 12. admittet B. 14. corporale A. 21. realitatis B. 22. erit B. 23. in *deest* B; *ib.* et *pro* esset B. 24. causalitatum A. 28. quoniam A. 29. quia A. 30. esse *pro* circa A; *ib.* ordo B. 32. incorporale A; *ib.* incorporale A. 33. possibilitates (?) A.

1. *Incorruptibile,* means, in Scholastic language, all that does not undergo intrinsic change. The heavens, which were supposed only to change in so far as they revolved, were incorruptible. But Wyclif seems to have understood 'change' in the broadest possible way.

A thing cannot possibly be included in itself, as the universal is included in its singular, making one with it.

Sequitur quod idem realiter est in se ipso conclusum ad idemptitatem numeralem, quod est impossibile. Patet assumptum sic; quia universale est in suo singulari, secundum magistrum meum; sed idem numero est singulare et suum | universale, ut eciam met atestatur; A 79b igitur sequitur propositum.

Therefore the assertion that the Universals exist really is false.

Ex ista conclusione cum eius probacione sequitur quod id quod magister posuit pro conclusione prima ad sui intencionem non est sustinendum. Patet, quia dicit quod universale reale est, et mea conclusio ponit oppositum illius quo ad intencionem magistri mei, quia dicit quod nullum universale reale est, etc.

Refutation of the arguments in their favour.

We must admit the universal man, if we admit a singular, but only as a proposition necessarily following therefrom, not as a necessary entity or existence.

If a chimera runs, it necessarily moves; it does not follow categorically that *it moves*. You cannot get the necessity of a thing out of the necessity of a proposition. A man cannot exist without any animal existing, but it is not necessary for a man to be an animal.

Sed ad raciones magistri mei quibus nititur persuadere oppositum conclusionis mee. Ad primam, cum arguit: "humanitas universalis est," negavi illam; et quando assumpsit: si ego sum homo, omnis homo est homo, concessi; et quando inferebat; igitur necessarium est ad *me esse hominem* omnem hominem esse hominem, distinxi illam; vel consequens intelligitur logicaliter, scilicet, quod sit proposicio necessaria: Si ego sum homo, ergo omnis homo est homo. Et sic intelligendo consequens concessi. Sed intelligendo consequens realiter, scilicet sic quod aliquod ens realiter necessarium est ad *me esse hominem*, omnem hominem esse hominem, negavi ipsum; quia sic contingens est ad *me esse hominem*, hominem esse. Eciam, si chymera currit, chymera movetur; et tamen non necessarium est ad *chymeram currere*, chymeram moveri, ymmo impossibile est, intelligendo realiter. Nam sic arguendo, magister meus pretendit arguere necessitatem rei ex necessitate proposicionis; qui modus arguendi ad propositum non est conveniens: quare negavi consequenciam in illo sensu. Nec eadem consequencia valet in secundo sensu; quare similiter negavi. Sed quando assumpsit: "si non, tunc potest esse me esse hominem, sine hoc quod omnis homo est"; nego illam. Nam non potest esse homo sine hoc quod sit animal; et tamen non est necessarium

1. conclusio A. 3. argumentum A. 5. meta *next line* testatur B. 10, 11. obiectum A. 11. conclusio A. 14. obiectum A. 22. intendo A. 23. realiter *deest* B. 25. consequentis A. 28, 29. intendo A. 33. illo B.

37. *Non est necessarium.* As it is not necessary for a man to exist, it is not necessary for a man to be actually an animal. Such is, as I conceive, the meaning of this subtlety.

hominem esse animal; quia pro aliquo tempore potest hoc esse quod homo non sit animal; et sic contingens est hominem esse animal; quamvis necessarium est secundum naturam quod homo est animal.

In the argument as to the natural priority or posteriority of singular and universal humanity,

Ad 2^{am}, quando arguebat: "proprie prius naturaliter est primam causam esse quam me esse, et quam hominem esse; igitur per idem naturaliter est me esse et per idem naturaliter est hominem esse", concessi; et "essenciale est *ad me esse*, hominem esse" concessi; "igitur, tam primo naturaliter est me esse sicud hominem esse, vel prius vel posterius naturaliter," concessi consequenciam, et subiunxi quod eque primo est naturaliter me esse et hominem esse. Et quando inferebat: "igitur quam primo naturaliter homo est, ego sum;" concessi consequenciam et consequens. Et quando intulit: "igitur, si homo est, ego sum," negavi consequenciam. Nam in simili non valet: *eque primo naturaliter est Sors et Plato: igitur, si Sors est, Plato est.* Eciam non sequitur: "eque primo naturaliter est equus et hircus; igitur, si equus est, hircus est:" nec e converso etc. Et cum probabat sic: "Si est homo et ego non sum, tunc non quam primo in natura est *hominem esse*, est *me esse*:" concessi. Et quando intulit: Igitur prior consequencia fuit bona; negavi consequenciam. Unde bene stat in casu quod pro certo tempore non est eque primo in natura *me esse*, sicud *hominem esse*, scilicet, tempore illo quo non ero; sed non est iam sic de facto quod non eque primo sum in natura sicud *hominem esse.*

I say that neither is prior or posterior in nature.

But it does not follow thence that if any man exists, I exist.

True, a man *might* exist without my existing;

but since I exist, that is not so as a fact.

Ad terciam: "essencialiter mea humanitas singularis est humanitas," concessi; et quando assumebat: "vel convertibiliter, vel non," distinxi: quod vel intelligitur loycaliter, quod ista duo convertuntur ad invicem; scilicet, *li* "mea singularis humanitas" et "humanitas," A 80^{a} in illo | sensu negavi quod essencialiter mea singularis humanitas est humanitas convertibiliter. Sed intelligendo realiter, isto modo scilicet quod essencialiter *sic* est quod "*res illa que est* singularis mea humanitas est

Are *humanity* and *my humanity* interchangeable terms? Not logically, so that one means the other; But the thing which *is* my humanity is interchangeable with that which is universal humanity.

2. consequentis A. 13. et igitur A. 16. illam B. 17. simul B. 25. casus *pro* eque. 27. casus A. 33. singulariter A. 34. singulariter A. 35. intendo A. 37. singulariter A.

28. *Hominem esse.* This reply to Wyclif is singularly weak. If there were no other reply possible, Universalists would certainly have the best of the argument, here at least.

humanitas convertibiliter, vel non," in isto sensu concessi quod mea humanitas singularis est *humanitas* convertibiliter. Et "si tunc," ulterius sic argueretur "mea humanitas et humanitas sunt idem convertibiliter; ergo mea humanitas et humanitas sunt simul vertibiliter;"

But I do not grant that my humanity becomes all that universal humanity becomes, or is wherever the latter is;

concessi consequenciam. Et quando arguitur ulterius; ergo in quodcunque vertitur humanitas vertitur et mea humanitas; vel si inferetur, "ergo ubicunque est humanitas, ibi est mea singularis humanitas;" ambas consequencias negavi. Nam non sequitur: "homo et animal sunt simul vertibiliter, ergo in quodcunque vertibile est animal, vertibile est homo;" nec sequitur "ergo ubicunque est animal est homo;

it only follows that what is common to both changes simultaneously and is whatever either is.

sed bene sequitur ex primo antecedente, "ergo humanitas et humanitas mea sunt aliqua que, in quodcunque vertibile est mea humanitas, in illud vertibile est humanitas, et econtra." Et ex eodem bene sequitur: "ergo mea humanitas et humanitas sunt aliqua, que, ubicunque est humanitas, est mea humanitas."

I simply deny the 4th, 5th (and 6th) arguments.

Ad 4^{am}: Quecunque albedo intensior vel maior esset essencialiter perfeccior esset minus intensa: negavi illam.

Ad 5^{am}: ergo nescirem determinate omnem piscem maritimam esse: negavi consequenciam.

I also deny the 7th argument.

Ad septimam: illa est predicacio accidentalis; *humanitas est singularis;* igitur naturaliter prius est humanitas quam humanitas singularis: negavi consequenciam. Nam non sequitur: "illa est predicacio accidentalis, *homo est ad aliquid;* igitur naturaliter est prius homo quam *ad aliquid.*"

As to the 8th, I grant that the term *humanity* has logical priority over the term, *my humanity*, but not that the things represented by these terms have any priority one over the other.

Ad 8^{am}: naturaliter prius est humanitas quam mea humanitas singularis: distinxi illam; vel illa intelligitur loycaliter (et tunc sensus est quod ille terminus *humanitas* est prius naturaliter loycaliter superius ad illum terminum *mea humanitas;* singularis) et in illo sensu concessi eam; sed realiter intelligendo eam, tunc sensus eius esset quod humanitas esset realis naturaliter prius quam humanitas aliqua singularis realis; quod falsum est, et sic negavi in illo sensu.

7. id A; *ib.* vertibiliter *twice* A. 9. singulariter A. 11. id A. 15. homo *after* est A, *deest* B. 18. qua A. 31. singulariter A. 35. intendo A.

25. *Ad septimam.* The 6th argument is left unanswered; no doubt it is denied, like the 4th and 5th.

Wyclif's replies to the arguments *contra*.

Magister meus, respondendo ad argumenta que adduxi pro probacione conclusionis mee ad primum argumentum respondendo, negat istam: nullum universale reale in essendo est. Et quando arguebam: Si universale reale in essendo est, vel secundum eius *esse*, vel secundum essenciam vel secundum utrumque, concessit omnibus illis modis. Et quando arguebam, "non secundum *esse*, quia tunc aliquid esset realiter in multis suppositis, vel aptum esset esse in multis suppositis;" et cum inferebam quod staret quod *esse* unius rei esset *esse* alterius rei ab ea realiter et suppositaliter distincte, dicit quod hoc est possibile, et subiunxit ulterius quod *esse* rei secundum quod suppositaliter existit, quod illud idem in numero esset *esse* alterius rei, hoc esset inconveniens, ita quod sic duo haberent unum *esse* reale specificum, et duo *esse* individua.

He says that the Universal and the singular have the same existence and essence; that this is possible; it would only be impossible for a *thatness* to belong, whilst numerically the same, to two different beings.

Ad 2^m: "universale et singulare suum differunt vel non," dixit quod quedam est differencia formalis, sicud albus et musicus differunt formaliter, licet idem numero fuit *album* et *musicum*. Sed quedam est differencia essencialis, sicud qua homo et asinus differunt; quedam A 80^b realis non essencialis, sicud quidam | dicunt accidencium et substanciarum. Secundum hanc ergo distinccionem concessit quod universale differt a suo singulari primo modo. Subiunxit quod non sequitur: "universale differt a suo singulari, ergo universale non est suum singulare;" sed bene sequitur quod universale secundum aliquam racionem vel disposicionem vel formam non est suum singulare; sed secundum essenciam et realitatem est suum singulare. Et hoc dixit verum, quia universale est communicabile pluribus et secundum talem communicabilitatem non est suum singulare. Et non sequitur ultra quod igitur non sit singulare. Concluditur igitur quod universale differt a suo singulari, quia homo et Sors sunt universale et singulare; et differunt.

Wyclif, in answer to the question whether the universal differs from its singular, replies that they differ partly and are partly the same as *a white man* is not the same thing as a musician, yet one may *be* the other.

Ad 3^m: "si universale reale est, ipsum est naturaliter prius suo singulari," concedit; et quando assumpsi, "vel secundum dependenciam vel secundum inherenciam accidentis ad subiectum, vel secundum motum potencie

The Universal is prior to its singular, as the cause is prior to the effect, if that is meant

2. proposicione A. 14. inconsequens A. 15. haberet AB. 16. indifferencia A. 18. contra *pro* quedam A. 20. contra A. 22. distinguunt A. 22, 23. accidenciam et substanciarum (!) AB. 24, 25. priore *pro* primo modo. 32. sequitur non B. 39. vel B.

by *dependency;* but the term is wrongly employed.

ad actum," respondit quod secundum causam est prius et non proprie secundum dependenciam, nisi *prius secundum causam,* et *prius secundum dependenciam* sumerentur pro eodem; quod tamen proprie non est verum. Nam philosophus nullibi mencionem [facit] de prioritate secundum dependenciam 5° methaphysice. Sed bene innuit prioritatem secundum causam; et sic universale est prius secundum causam suo singulari. Et si arguitur: "et universale idem est in numero cum suo singulari," verum est, "et nichil idem in numero causat se," negat consequenciam.

Wyclif grants that the Universal is one being with its singular, which it nevertheless causes.

As to the 'Phoenix' difficulty, he admits that the singular *phoenicity* is not the *universal phoenicity,*

Ad 4^{am}: "sit casus quod [non] sit nisi unica fenix;" admisit. "Tunc fenicitas universalis est, et fenicitas singularis est," concessit. "Igitur naturaliter prius est fenicitas universalis fenicitate singulari," concessit consequenciam. Et quando intuli ulterius, "igitur naturaliter prius est fenicitas universalis fenicitate singulari, que est ipsa fenicitas universalis, vel naturaliter prius est fenicitate singulari, que est fenicitas singularis, etc." respondit quod est prius naturaliter fenicitate singulari, que fenicitas singularis non est fenicitas universalis. Subiunxit igitur: si tunc inferetur, "igitur sunt plures fenicitates naturaliter distincte, quod est contra casum, negavit consequenciam. Et dixit: Non sequitur, "fenicitas universalis est, et fenicitas singularis est, et fenicitas universalis non est fenicitas singularis, igitur plures fenicitates sunt;" bene tamen sequeretur, si fenicitas universalis non esset ens quod est fenicitas singularis; sed illud dixit esse falsum.

which is prior thereto,

yet he denies that there are two distinct phoenicities;

there would be, if the two did not make up one and the same entity, the same phoenix.

He also denies that the universal *phoenicity* would not be able to exist in many individuals.

Ad 5^{am}: stante eodem casu, "fenicitas est universale reale;" concessit; "igitur est in multis realiter vel aptum est esse in multis realiter," concessit quod aptum est esse in multis; et quando arguebam quod non, quia fenicitas que iam est non erit secundum aptitudinem in multis fenicibus, negavit hoc.

He admits that the Universal is unchangeable and changeable

Ad 6^{am}: "si universale est universale, est incorruptibile;" concessit consequenciam secundum predicacionem

1. ca^{m} = casum? B. 4. quia tunc B. 5. recommendat *pro* mencionem A; *ib.* facit *deest* AB. 6. Si B. 10. negavit B. 12. sic *before* casus B; *ib.* non *deest* AB. 18. plis *pro* universalis B. 22. igitur *after* subiunxit *deest* B. 23. causam A. 25. ut *pro* et B. 35. fenicitatibus A. 36. incorporale *and so everywhere for* incorruptibile A.

24. *Negavit.* On this point, Wyclif seems to have hesitated. See Logica, Vol. II, pp. 53, 54; also Introduction, pp. XV—XVII.

formalem universale esse incorruptibile; subiunxit quod cum hoc stat quod universale est corruptibile in predicacione, non formali, sed essenciali. Dixit ulterius: ymmo sic multa universalia sunt corruptibilia, quia multa universalia sunt res suorum individuorum, que sunt corruptibilia. Et quando querebam pro quo supposuit universale in illa proposicione: universale est incorruptibile; respondit quod pro generacione substancie. Et dixit quod illud est incorruptibile.

in two different ways; formally and in itself unchangeable, with regard to the essence of its subject, it may be changeable.

Ad septimam: sequitur quod hec consequencia non valeret: "Sorteitas est corruptibile; universale est Sorteitas; igitur universale est corruptibile;" dixit quod valet. Et quando dicebam: "antecedens verum, consequens falsum," negavit. Et dixit consequens esse verum predicacione particulari secundum essenciam, sicud antecedens.

The expositorial syllogism given above, concludes truly, he says, but with reference only to a singular subject.

A 81[a] Ad 8[vam]: "vel universale addit aliquid | super singulare, vel non," dicebat quod addit unum singulare super reliquum, quandoque secundum actum, quandoque secundum aptitudinem. Subiunxit: "universale autem in singulari existens est idem in eodem, et non plus nec minus in illo;" sed ex hoc non sequitur quod non sit universale.

The Universal, he asserts, adds a singularity to its singular, with which it forms one being; but this singularity is universal.

Ad nonam sequitur quod illa regula non esset generaliter vera. Quando alterum de altero predicatur; ut de subiecto etc. negavit consequenciam; et quando dixi: "circa universalia non tenet," hoc negavit. Et quando arguebam: "Sorteitas est humanitas, et humanitas est universale, et universale est incorruptibile; igitur Sorteitas est incorruptibile;" respondit: "Admisso quod consequencia non valet, non arguitur per regulam." Et quando dixi: "in omnibus istis predicatur predicatum de suo subiecto," dixit quod non, quia hic humanitas est universale; predicatur predicatum ut in subiecto et non ut de subiecto etc.

He does not grant that the law of predication fails here,

because in such cases we do not predicate anything *of* a subject, but something *in* a subject, i. e. the Universal.

Ad decimam: "sequitur quod idem esset realiter in se ipso quo ad ydemptitatem numeralem; quod est impossibile," respondebat, admisso quod consequencia de forma sit bona, tamen quo ad presens negavit eam. Et

He says that, though the universal and its singular make one, yet one includes the other,

5. sui A. 6. sunt *deest* B; *ib.* conclusione *pro* quo. 8. generato A; gnaͦ B. 10. hic A. 15. pregicacione *twice* AB; *ib.* particulari *deest* AB. 17. add.dit A. 21. non *deest* B. 26. et sic A; *ib.* tunc *pro* circa A. 37. conclusio A; *ib.* naturalem A.

quando arguebam: "universale est in suo singulo; sed idem in numero est universale et singulare suum; igitur sequitur propositum;" negavit consequenciam; et pro negacione consequencie adiunxit istam similitudinem, dicens: "partes sunt priores suo toto, et partes sunt idem in numero cum suo toto; igitur idem est prius se ipso." Dixit: "antecedens pro utraque parte est verum, et consequens impossibile; quia tunc aliquid pro aliqua mensura esset, pro qua ipsum non esset: quod est implicacio contradiccionis." Et quando intuli pro corollario quod prima conclusio ad intencionem suam esset falsa, dixit: "verum est, si conclusio mea cum probacionibus suis haberet processum."

as parts make one with their whole, and are prior thereto in nature.

As he did not deny the force of my argument, I asked whether his conclusion could stand: he said, Yes, if my proofs are good.

Sed ad argumentum primum quo volui probare quod nullum universale reale in essendo est, concessit quod universale reale est secundum *esse* et essenciam; et quando intuli: "tunc posset stare quod *esse* unius rei esset *esse* alterius rei ab eo suppositaliter realiter distincte," concessit. Sed hoc est contra argumentum magistri, quo voluit probare quod impossibile est eandem animam in numero esse in manu et in pede (quod proposuit in prima responsione); licet magister meus addidit illa "*secundum quod suppositaliter est, esse* unius rei non est *esse* alterius rei, ab ea realiter suppositaliter distincte." Sed hoc prius non addidit. Posset tamen argui contra illam solucionem: "Si *esse* unius rei est *esse* alterius rei ab ea realiter suppositaliter distincte ut sic, ergo precise idem *esse* rei unius est precise *esse* rei alterius ab ea suppositaliter distincte [vel non]. Si primum, sequitur quod omni modo quo una res est, alia res est, et sic res suppositaliter distincte non essent suppositaliter distincte: quod est implicacio contradiccionis. Si secundum, tunc non est verum quod *esse* unius rei est *esse* alterius rei ab ea suppositaliter distincte, nisi ad istum intellectum, quod *esse* unius rei est simile in specie vel genere *esse* alterius rei ab ea suppositaliter distincte. Et per hoc non habetur quod talis res est universalis in essendo, vel universale in essendo, quoad eius *esse* vel quoad eius essenciam.

To my argument that with real universals the existence of one thing would be that of another, he at first admitted that it might be so; then, not to contradict himself,

said that the existence of things *quà* individuals is distinct.

It might be urged that, if the existence of different individuals is precisely the same in all, then in every way, and also *quà* individuals;

if not, then all that remains is a likeness between different existing things, which is not identity in being.

3. conclusionem A. 7. esse B. 8. et per B. 9. quod contra *pro* pro qua A. 14. quod A. 23. sensu B. 29. vel non *deest* AB. 30. conclusio A. 33. secundo AB. 36. ab ea *deest* B.

Sed ad secundum, quando argueram "universale et suum singulare differunt vel non," respondit quod idem numero est universale et suum singulare, et differunt A 81[b] secundum | racionem, sed non differunt differencia essenciali reali. Contra quam solucionem arguebam sic: "sequitur quod non esset universale reale, nisi secundum racionem formalem, quia proprie universale reale est, quod idem numero realiter est in multis suppositis, vel aptum est esse in multis suppositis: quod tamen magister meus negat, quamvis concedat quod idem secundum speciem est in multis suppositis. Et sic videtur ire ad verba, quando ponit quod universale reale in essendo est, quando ponit quod eadem humanitas est in Sorte et Platone; que opinio facit, quod non ponit universalia realia in essendo. Nam dicit magister meus quod non est deitas universalis nec communis, quia non potest esse alia deitas quam est nunc eiusdem speciei et racionis secum. Et in illo magister videtur dicere quod humanitas universalis est, quia humanitas est; et potest esse humanitas alia in numero eiusdem speciei secum, sed hoc non arguit universalitatem humanitatis in essendo, ut satis evidens est. Ex qua responsione magistri ulterius sequitur quod nulla res eadem in numero secundum numerum est in multis rebus suppositaliter distinctis. Ex quo ulterius habetur quod universalitas non est realiter universalitas, nisi quoad racionem; non tamen intendo per racionem deffinicionem, sed rem subiectam racioni; et ita communiter eciam alia universalia.

Sed ad 3[um] respondit quod universale naturaliter est prius suo singulari, quamvis idem in numero est universale et suum singulare. Contra illam solucionem arguebam sic: "ex illo sequitur quod non secundum rem universale naturaliter est prius suo singulari, sed solum secundum racionem." Nam secundum philosophum (5° metaphysice) illud dicitur realiter naturaliter prius

His position that the Universal and its singular are one in number, different in thought, but not really and essentially, is untenable.

This would make the Universal not real, but only a form of thought.

Wyclif thus would seem only verbally to admit the reality of Universals, and their identity in various individuals.

Deity is not a universal.

That there may be a singular and a universal humanity does not prove the real entity of the latter.

In different individuals there can be nothing identically the same; the identity is made by our mind.

I also controvert Wyclif's position, that the Universal, identical with its singular, is prior in existence thereto.

If it is identical, then it is only prior in thought, not in existence.

10. concedit A. 14. in Platone B; *ib.* quam A; quā B. 24. suppositis A. 26. differenciam B. 27. differentem A. 30—33. prius suo singulari — prius suo singulari *deest* B. 35. materialiter B.

11. *Ire ad verba.* I have nowhere met with this expression, but I render it in the side-notes according to the most probable sense. 17. *Deitas.* This is no doubt brought in because Wyclif often uses the doctrine of the Trinity — one Deity in three persons, or individuals — to explain his doctrine.

Aristotle says that priority of nature means independence of another, dependent on that which is prior.

altero, quorum alterum sine altero esse non potest, sed bene e converso. Nam ponit philosophus 5° metaphysice, de prioritate secundum naturam, hec verba: “alia vero secundum naturam et substanciam, et quecunque contingit esse sine aliis, illa autem non sine eis. Qua deffinicione usus est Plato.” Constat autem ex hiis verbis philosophi quod universale non est realiter naturaliter prius suo singulari secundum primum modum prioritatis secundum naturam. Et certum est quod non penes secundum modum, nec secundum tercium modum universale naturaliter est prius suo singulari realiter. Igitur, secundum primum modum prioritatis philosophi, universale naturaliter est prius suo singulari; quare responsio magistri non videtur esse salva.

Wyclif says that if only one phoenix exists, *singular phoenicity is not universal phoenicity.*

But they must be, if each stands for the same being; and if they stand for something else, for what?

Ad 4^{am} respondebat: “stante quod sit nisi unica fenix, tunc fenicitas universalis non est fenicitas singularis. Contra quam responsionem arguebam sic: “Stante eodem casu, tunc in ista, fenicitas universalis non est fenicitas singularis: ergo subiectum et predicatum supponunt precise pro eodem in numero, vel non. Si primum, tunc est falsa: *fenicitas universalis non est fenicitas singularis*, eo quod secundum casum tunc non esset nisi una fenicitas. Si secundum, queritur pro quo supponit plus unum quam alterum; et non est reperibile aliquid assignandum, prioribus responsionibus omnibus salvis.

If the same essence which exists really in one, exists aptitudinally in many, this 'being apt' is surely not a reality;

and if only a thing of the mind, how can it be a universal entity?

Ad 5^{am} respondebat (stante casu priori de fenice) quod fenicitas que iam est realiter secundum aptitudinem erit in multis suppositis. Contra quam responsionem arguebam sic: vel talis fenicitas erit secundum aptitudinem in multis suppositis, vel secundum rem, vel non. Non secundum rem, quia, secundum magistrum, sic non est universale, sed cognitum universaliter; ut posuit in responsione prima. Si non secundum rem, tunc secundum speciem | et racionem, ut magister meus A 82ª dicit. Sed tunc, proprie loquendo, fenicitas non est universale in essendo, quod est contra principale dictum magistri. Nisi dicat quod modus essendi est universalis, ex eo quod est vel potest esse alius modus essendi numero eiusdem speciei cum illo modo essendi qui iam est. Sed hoc non arguit universalitatem in essendo.

2. cuiusmodo A. 5. hiis eis A. 6. divisione A. 19. vel conclusio *pro* ergo. 20. vel in A; *ib.* non *after* tunc B. 22. causam A. 31. magistrum *deest* B.

Quod clare patet intuenti dictam responsionem. Et ita magister meus concordat iam mecum quod non est universale in essendo secundum numerum, sed bene secundum racionem et speciem; et iam est communis oppinio ponencium universalitatem in rebus.

Wyclif, therefore, agrees with me here.

Ad 6^{am} dicit quod universalia multa post datum tempus non erunt. Contra illam arguebam sic: sequitur quod aliqua sunt que non erunt, et aliqua fuerunt que non sunt. Cuius oppositum magister ponit, dicens: quidquid erit, est, et quidquid fuit, est; et quidquid est, erit. Et assumptum patet de universalibus que post datum tempus non erunt. Ulterius dixit quod in illa proposicione: *universale est incorruptibile*, ibi *li* "universale" stat pro generativo substancie: queritur ergo: vel tale generatum est deus vel oracio? Et sic adhuc stat argumentum quod aliud a deo erit incorruptibile; cuius oppositum videtur magister sentire.

He contradicts himself when he affirms that universals cease to exist.

Ad 7^{am} respondit quod universale est incorruptibile, et talis [proposicio] est vera secundum predicacionem secundum essenciam. Et, quia magister meus vult quod universale est incorruptibile secundum predicacionem formalem, contra hoc arguebam sic: vel duo subiecta dictarum proposicionum supponunt precise pro eodem, vel non. Si precise pro eodem, idem in numero est corruptibile et incorruptibile; quod videtur implicare. Si non supponunt precise pro eodem, tunc aliquid erit universale quod non erit singulare, cuius oppositum habetur conclusione secunda et eius probacione.

His contention that the Universal is changeless as an essential predication is worthless; for Universal, (when we say, The universal changes), would then neither stand for the same thing, nor for something different.

Ad 8^{am} respondebat (quando argueram: "vel universale addit aliquid realiter supra singulare suum, vel non") — dixit quod universale addit unum singulare super reliquum, quandoque secundum actum, quandoque secundum aptitudinem. Contra quam responsionem arguebam sic: Sequitur quod non est idem numero universale et suum singulare. Probavi sic: quia, secundum magistrum, universale aliquid realiter addit super suum singulare, et sic universale est suum sin-

It is inconsistent at one time to say that the universal adds something real to its singular,

and at another to affirm that it is numerically identical therewith.

7. arguebatur A. 9. obiectum A. 11. argumentum A. 14. generalissimo A; g'na^{mo} generativo? B. 15. ero B. 17. obiectum A. 19. proposicio *deest* AB. 22. ergo *pro* duo A. 23, 24. pro eodem — pro eodem *deest* B. 27. obiectum A. 32. aftu B.

25. *Implicare. Contradiccionem* is understood.

10*

gulare, et sic universale est suum singulare et plus; quia est suum singulare cum addito realiter super suum singulare. Sed hoc est contra magistrum, ubi dicit quod universale in singulari est singulare suum, et nec plus neque minus.

It is false that in '*Humanity is universal*', *Universal* is not predicated of humanity as its subject.

Ad 9^{am} respondit quod in ista proposicione, *humanitas est universale*, predicatum predicatur ut in subiecto non ut de subiecto: quod est falsum. Patet prima pars assumpti; quia, que sunt in subiecto nichil prohibet nomen predicari; de quo predicatur racionem vero impossibile est de eisdem predicari, ut habetur in predicamentis. Sed secunda pars patet respiciendo racionem illius, quod est universale. Arguebam sic: ad idem principale hic predicatur superius in predicando de suo inferiori; igitur predicatum ibi predicatur ut de subiecto. Consequencia tenet, quia hoc est predicari ut de subiecto; sed antecedens patet, ex *quid nominis* | illius quod est in predicando; et supposita responsione magistri mei ad precedencia. A 82^{b}

For *humanity*, being included in the idea *universal*, is therefore its subject, according to the general rule.

I reject Wyclif's example of parts being prior to their whole by priority of nature.

Ad 10^{am} respondit: "partes sunt idem numero cum suo toto." Contra hoc arguebam sic: si partes sunt idem numero cum suo toto, et sunt priores suo toto, maxime essent priores suo toto, prioritate nature, quia solum talis prioritas est hic pertinens ad propositum. Ergo primo modo vel secundo vel tercio modo. Non secundo nec tercio modo, quia sunt impertinentes modi ad propositum. Nec eciam primo modo; quia tunc staret esse illas partes, non existente toto, quod idem numero est cum illis partibus: quod est impossibile, quia tunc idem esset et non esset. Patet consequencia: prius naturaliter alterum altero est primo modo, quia potest esse sine illa.

For then they would be parts of which the whole might be non-existent: but to be a part supposes a whole.

Wyclif argues that the universal is singular,

Posuit magister istam conclusionem secundam; *universale est singulare*. Arguebat pro ea sic: illa humanitas est humanitas; igitur humanitas est ista etc., 2° sic: si est separatum, habet esse indivisum a quolibet alio divisum: igitur est individuum. Contra hanc conclusionem posui meam conclusionem terciam istam: *nullum univer-*

2. rea$^{t?}$ = realitatis B. 7, 8. ut non B. 9. assumpta A. 11. habentur B. 12. respondendo A. 30. sequela (?) A.

11. *Predicamentis.* This unintelligible sentence is no doubt corrupt.

sale in essendo reale est suum singulare. Probatur: Nullum universale reale est (ut ponit mea conclusio prima): igitur conclusio vera. Consequencia nota est, similiter et antecedens. Et confirmatur: Si est universale in essendo reale, ipsum magis verisimiliter non esset singulare in essendo; eo quod *esse* realiter universaliter et *esse* realiter singulariter opponerentur, ut patet per raciones utriusque *esse.* Intuli ex illa conclusione corollarium quod id quod magister ponit pro secunda conclusione non est sustinendum, etc.

which I deny, because universal being and singular being are contrary to each other.

Sed ad racionem primam qua voluit probare suam conclusionem, quando arguit sic; "ista humanitas est humanitas," concessi; demonstrata humanitate, "igitur humanitas est *ista* humanitas," concessi consequenciam, demonstrata eadem humanitate. Et si argueret: "eciam est universalis (vel universale)", negavi illam.

When he points to any singular humanity, saying: *This is Humanity,* I grant it only in the sense that it is *this* humanity.

Ad 2^{am}: "si est separatum, habet esse indivisum in se, et a quolibet alio divisum," negavi consequenciam; quia Plato vel Burleo, qui posuit universalia separata a singularibus non indiguit concedere talem consequenciam. Sed ad racionem qua volui probare istam conclusionem terciam, respondit quod *esse* universaliter realiter et esse singulariter realiter opponuntur, sicud relativa; et talia eidem possunt inesse, sicud eidem inest *esse istum hominem* et *esse hominem,* ut in relativis eidem inest *esse patrem* et *esse illum filium;* et primum est universale et secundum singulare.

I do not admit that the difference of the Universal from its singular implies that it has a separate entity of its own. Wyclif asserts that the Universal and its singular are only opposed as relative terms are, v. g. father and son.

Et contra solucionem meam sui primi argumenti, quando negavi istam consequenciam, "si ego sum homo, omnis homo est homo; igitur necessarium est, ad *me esse hominem, omnem hominem esse hominem*" (et circa hoc dixi: "non potest esse homo sine hoc quod sit animal, et tamen non est necessarium hominem esse animal"); dixit quod male do instanciam; sed sic non potest esse homo sine hoc quod sit animal. Et tamen necessarium non est, ad *esse hominem,* animal esse, quia est ista necessaria simpliciter: "si homo est, animal est;" igitur est necessitas simpliciter habitudinis, qua,

He objects to my saying that it is not necessary for a man to be an animal, since that is essential to man.

But it is essential only hypothetically; for it is not necessary for a man to be at

3. consequencia A. 7. apponerentur A. 9. corellarie B. 19. Purley B. 21. voluit AB. 27. et *deest* B. 28. articuli A. 36. ad me A, *deest* B.

19. I have left the name as it stands in A, but Purley looks more like an English name. Perhaps it is a mistake for Burley. Cf. p. 153, l. 5.

all, unless we first posit his existence.

ad hominem esse (cum esset) esset animal esse. Et est simile; "Sors, quando est, necesse est esse;" licet Sors non sit, ut aliqui dicunt.

As to my example of the Chimera, he denies the analogy, because a chimera is an absurdity, which man is not.

If a chimera were possible, he says, the conclusion would follow, just as for man;

it matters not one whit that this is a pure fiction of the mind, if the consequence is necessary.

Subiunxit quod dedi instanciam: non sequitur [ex], "si chymera currit, chymera movetur", quod igitur | necessarium est, ad *chymeram currere*, chymeram moveri, A 83ᵃ respondit quod prior sua consequencia tenet in virtute ipothesis illius, quia necesse est posse esse me esse hominem, qualiter non est hic; et ergo non est simile. Aliter dixit posse responderi quod est absoluta necessitas, ad hoc quod chymera currit, chymera movetur, dato quod aliqualiter esset apprehensibile *chymeram currere*. Et quando dixi quod ibi arguitur a specie reali ad speciem loycalem, et ergo talis consequencia est impertinens ad probandum quod universale reale est; respondit: planum est, posito quod sic esset, adhuc esset consequencia bona; quia argueretur a fundamento ad fundatum. Et subiunxit: "nisi consequencia necessaria in signato haberet signatum primarium necessarium ex parte rei, non esset necessaria, alias diceretur quod ista est necessaria: *chymera est;* quia non oportet ita esse ex parte rei, si proposicio est necessaria". Et addidit: "Eciam nesciretur quid deus sciret, sciendo quod si chymera currit chymera movetur, non existentibus proposicionibus; vel eciam, sciendo quod chimera non est, vel quod vacuum non est, cum non essent proposiciones. Et opposuit: Deberemus ergo studere significaciones et consignificaciones talium vocabulorum, et haberemus scienciam talium: *Vacuum non est,* sine ulterioribus fatigacionibus; quia, cum sciremus voces tales et significaciones et consignificaciones, et non relinqueretur amplius scibile, haberemus propositum.

What would become of God's omniscience if such propositions, necessarily true, did not exist?

I said that it does not follow, though my entity and human entity

Ad 2ᵐ suum articulum, quando dixi quod eque primo naturaliter est *me esse* et *hominem esse*, et quando concessi: "igitur eque primo naturaliter [ut] est homo, ego

2. Sors quando *deest* B. 3. differant A. 4. ex *deest* AB. 10. posset B. 16. placitum (?) A. 18. fundtū = fundamentum B. 19. signo B. 21. arguitur A. 29. talem A. 32. amplius *deest* B. 35. consequencia *pro* eque A; *ib.* ut *deest* AB.

23. *Nesciretur.* Because (I suppose), if a proposition could not be true unless its terms were possible, God would not know what was impossible nor (consequently) what was possible; and so on. But I admit that this explanation savours of subtlety.

sum"; et ulterius negavi consequenciam: "igitur, si homo est, ego sum." Contra hoc arguebat sic: eque primo naturaliter est *me esse* et *hominem esse*: igitur simul naturaliter est *me esse* et *hominem esse*. Vel ergo primo modo simultatis, vel secundo, vel tercio. Sed necessario non tercio modo; igitur *hominem esse* et *me esse* sunt simul naturaliter secundo modo vel primo modo. Sed secundo modo simul naturaliter sunt que se consecuntur, et neutrum est causa alterius. Igitur, si eque primo naturaliter est *hominem esse* et *me esse*, sequitur ergo quod, si homo est, ego sum. Consequencia tenet ex virtute illius medii, quia solum duobus modis aliqua sunt simul natura.

are on a par, that if any man exists, I exist.

Wyclif attempts to prove it; for if I admit parity of mutual connection, it necessarily follows.

[Si] non secundo modo simul natura est *hominem esse* et *me esse*; necessario sequitur quod si eque primo naturaliter est *hominem esse* cum *me esse*, quod, si homo est, ego sum. Ad idem arguebat sic: essencialis est habitudo *hominem esse* ad *me esse*; igitur, si eque primo, naturaliter est *hominem esse* et *me esse*, tunc in ordine essenciali *me esse* ad primam causam, et *hominem esse* ad eandem eque primo sunt. Ex quo ulterius arguitur; in ordine essenciali eque primo naturaliter sunt *me esse* et *hominem esse*. Vel ergo eodem ordine penitus, vel non. Si penitus in eodem ordine, igitur non stabit in eodem ordine essenciali *esse hominem* sine *me esse*, vel nisi sit *me esse*. Igitur consequencia fuit bona. Si non penitus in eodem ordine est utrumque illorum, igitur erit ordo essencialis eius quod est *hominem esse* ad primam causam, in quo non erit *me esse*; et in quocunque ordine essenciali ad primam causam est *me esse*, in eodem non erit *hominem esse*. Sequitur quod in ordine essenciali est prius *hominem esse* quam *me esse*,
A 83b sic ergo ad *me esse* requiritur *hominem esse*, et non requiritur ad *hominem esse*, *me esse*. Utrobique uniformiter intelligendo *hominem esse*, essencialis est prioritas *hominem esse* ad *me esse*. Alias, non variando in intelleccione consequentis, sicud sequitur "ego sum, ergo homo est" sic deberet sequi "homo est, igitur ego sum". Sed quando dedi instanciam: "non sequitur: eque primo naturaliter est asinus et hircus; igitur, si asinus est, hircus est;" respondit quod non simpliciter eque primo

If there be only a parity

of essential relation,

and both are of the same rank as beings, the existence of one will require that of the other; if not, then *man* will have a certain relation to the First Cause, which *I* have not.

And then *my* being is presupposed that of *a man*, and not vice versâ, as would be the case in the hypothesis of parity.

My example of *an ass* and *a goat* fails, because they

14. Si *deest* AB. 30. oracione B. 34, 35. universaliter B. 35. intendo A.

may be on a par as being disparate; besides, all beings are in reality prior or posterior in nature to each other, as they approach more or less to Divine Perfection.

naturaliter sunt simul in natura, licet bene simul sunt in natura sub eodem genere tercio modo simultatis. Arguebat pro illo quia, cum prima causa in ordine universi simpliciter primum gradum essendi essencialem habeat, res que sunt perfecciores essencialiter aliis de tanto minus distant ab ea, scilicet, prima causa. Cum igitur quelibet species due universi diversificantur in perfeccione essenciali, erit una secundum suum gradum essencialem propinquior prime cause quam reliqua; et cum gradus essendi essencialis ponat rem in ordine essenciali, sequitur quod nec res diversarum specierum sunt eque primo in natura; secundum autem individuale *esse*, habent ordinem accidentalem.

My admission that *humanity* and *my humanity* are interchangeable terms, implies, according to Wyclif, that one is the essence of the other.

Ad 3^{am}: quando concessi "simul vertibiliter in toto sunt humanitas et mea humanitas singularis," negavi illam consequenciam, "igitur in quodcunque vertibile est humanitas, in idem et mea". Arguit: "sequitur quod omnis homo mea singulari humanitate esset homo."

He affirms that each degree of intensity of a quality gives it more essential perfection; and that our knowledge that fire is hot proves the universal entity of heat.

Ad 4^{am}, quando negavi: "tunc albedo intensior esset perfeccior, saltem minus intensa," contra hoc arguit sic: "unus gradus albedinis addit perfeccionem essencialem super priorem, et non communicat in eadem, igitur amplioris perfeccionis essencialis resultat".

Ad 5^{am} et 6^{am} respondebat quod vult sic arguere: "contingit de communi cursu scire determinate omnem ignem esse calidum;" et tunc dixit quod determinate sciatur, et non dabitur nisi caliditas communis igni.

He denies the analogy of the example, which leads me to say that universal is not prior to singular humanity; properly stated, it makes for his contention.

Ad 7^{am}, quando negavi hanc consequenciam: "hoc est predicacio accidentalis, *humanitas est singularis*, igitur prius naturaliter est humanitas quam sit humanitas singularis," (et dedi instanciam, quia non sequitur, "hec est predicacio accidentalis, *homo est ad aliquid*, igitur naturaliter prius est homo quam ad aliquid"), dixit magister, admisso quod non valet consequencia, non tamen dedi instanciam. Sed dixit debere me sic arguere; "hec est predicacio accidentalis; *homo est ad aliquid;* igitur naturaliter est prius *hominem esse* quam *hominem esse ad aliquid*. Et sic tunc antecedens est verum, consequens est verum. Subiunxit, "quia prius naturaliter est res secundum *esse* essenciale quam secundum accidentale; ut patet 5° metaphysice". Sed quando ad ra-

3. oroe B. 8. et *pro* erit A. 11. mille *pro* nec B. 28. hoc A. 36. hoc A.

cionem respondebam, qua arguebat quod universale est singulare, negando istam consequenciam: "si est separatum, habet esse indivisum a se et a quolibet alio divisum; igitur est individuum," quia dixi quod Plato et Burley negassent eam, tam primo quam eciam secundo: arguit pro illa consequencia; cum sit unum ens et non plura, erit indivisum in se, et non erit alia; cum alia secum erunt, erit indivisum ab aliis; igitur consequencia fuit bona.

He urges that the Universal, if it be not its singular, has an entity of its own, because it is one and not many, though together with many.

Ad racionem, quando arguebam probando quod nullum universale reale est singulare, respondit quod universale A 84a et singulare opponuntur relative. Contra quod arguebam sic: sequitur quod, sicud ad invicem relativa sunt simul natura, ita universale et suum singulare. Patet, quia (ex predicamentis philosophi) omnia relativa sunt simul natura, saltem que sunt ad invicem relativa. Et talia dicuntur ad convertenciam, ut patet ibidem; sed universale et suum singulare non sunt simul natura. Nec dicuntur ad convertenciam, ut magister meus intendit deducere in argumento suo secundo, quo nititur probare quod universale in essendo reale est; ymmo dixit quod naturaliter prius est humanitas quam mea humanitas. Ergo non videtur quod universale et suum singulare sunt relative opposita.

He says that the opposition between the universal and its singular is that of relation, if so, there would be no priority, but parity of nature.

Which is against Wyclif's position.

In replicacione contra solucionem meam ad suum primum argumentum, dixit: "Sive homo sit, sive homo non sit, necessarium est ad hominem esse, animal esse." Probat sic: "ista est simpliciter necessaria; *Si homo est, animal est.*" Respondendo ad eam, negavi instanciam, et dixi quod talis non est necessaria simpliciter, sed sub condicione est necessaria. Sed quando dedi instanciam: "In modo suo arguendi non sequitur, si chymera currit, chymera movetur; igitur necessarium est ad chymeram currere, chymeram moveri;" dixit quod non est simile ad argumentum suum, scilicet, "Si ego sum homo, omnis homo est homo;" igitur necessarium est ad *me esse hominem, omnem hominem esse hominem.*" Et assignavit causam, quia sua consequencia tenet in virtute istius ipothesis: "necessario est me posse esse hominem," qualiter non est in secundo argumento meo de chymera.

He says: Whether a man exists or does not, it is simply necessary, that if a man exists, an animal should exist. And I say that the necessity is not simple, but conditional upon the *fact* of a man's existing. There is, he asserts, no parity between this and the case of the Chimera, because *a man* is possible, and *a Chimera* is not.

1. contra A. 7. et *pro* erit A. 17. dūr B. 19. consequenciam A. 28. probat A. 39. necessarie A; necessaria B.

But this does not prove necessity of existence,

Sed adhuc consequencia magistri non valet; nam non sequitur: Si Sors currit, Sors movetur: ergo necessarium est ad *Sortem currere*, Sortem moveri. Quod argumentum suum cum solucione sua non probat aliquid pro sui intencione, sic patet: quia ypothesis virtute cuius debet tenere argumentum suum, debet intelligi realiter vel loycaliter: realiter intelligendo, negavi eam; scilicet, quia necesse est posse esse me esse hominem, quia nullum ens necessarium est *posse esse me esse hominem*. Loycaliter intelligendo eam, concessi eam, et per illum sensum nihil hic arguitur ad propositum. Primus sensus est falsus, eo quod nullomodo necessarium est ad *Sortem currere*, Sortem moveri; sed contingens est ad *Sortem currere*, Sortem moveri; semper intelligendo *realiter*, sicud contingens est *Sortem currere*, ad *Sortem moveri*, ergo adhuc stat solucio mea.

only logical necessity, or that of consequence. The *possibility* of my existence is not a necessary *existing* thing. Running implies movement; but this neither proves running nor movement to exist.

I admit that animality is contingent to humanity, but in the sense of real existence.

Ad argumentum suum primum, quando dixit quod non do instanciam, quando dico, "Non potest esse homo sine hoc quod sit animal; et tamen non est necessarium hominem esse animal" (ymmo non scripsi quod hoc esset instancia sui dicti, sed posui tamquam aliquid ex quo dici potest oppositum sui dicti); sed quando magister meus dicit quod deberem sic dare instanciam: "Non potest esse homo, sine hoc quod sit animal; et tamen non est necessarium ad *hominem esse*, animal esse"; dixi concedendo illam etc. non contingens est hominem esse, etsi contingens est hominem esse ad animal [esse], semper realiter intelligendo. Sed quando dixit quod hoc est falsum, negavi illam.

You cannot, by arguing from what includes to what is included, prove that the connection is a real entity.

Sed quando ulterius dixi in responsione, quod ubi arguitur a specie loycali ad speciem realem etc. consequencia est impertinens, respondit: "posito quod sic sit, adhuc esset bona consequencia." Negavi illam; et quando dixit: "quia ibi arguitur a fundamento ad fundatum, negavi illam responsionem; et racio est, quia sensus substancialis non est fundatum sensus veri, nisi quis in materia ista uteretur equivocacione. Sed in tali

5. sicut A; *ib.* dicit B. 10. intendendo A; *ib.* causam A. 11. vel hoc *pro* nichil hic A. 12. nullum AB. 14. super A. 15. sortem currit A. 22. obiectum A. 23. deberet A. 26. dixit AB; *ib.* concedo A; *ib.* consequentis A. 27. consequentis A; *ib.* esse *deest* AB. 28. super A. 29. illam *deest* A. 30. ibi AB. 32. respondet A. 34. quando *deest* A; *ib.* a fu͡to B. 35. racionem A. 36. flu͡s *pro* substancialis B.; *ib.* nisi veri nisi A. 37. communis A.

argumento quo arguebat: "antecedens est verum, con-
A 84b sequens falsum;" et quando arguebat: "nisi consequencia in signo haberet signatum primarium ex parte rei, non esset necessaria," negavi illam; quia hec proposicio est necessaria in signo: Si chimera currit, chymera movetur; et tamen non habet significatum primarium necessarium ex parte rei. Et quando assumpsit: "alias, ista esset necessaria: *Chymera est;*" et quando arguebat: "Non oportet esse necessarium ex parte rei, si proposicio est necessaria," concessi; et si inferetur: "igitur hec est necessaria: *Chymera est*," negavi consequenciam.

There may be a necessary connection between two unmeaning propositions; it does not follow that they are true, though Wyclif says it would.

Et quando ulterius arguebat: "eciam nesciretur quid deus sciret, sciendo quod si chymera currit, chymera movetur, non existentibus proposicionibus," dixi quod, non existente aliqua proposicione, deus non scit aliquid esse quod est ens; *si chymera currit chymera movetur;* sicud iam eciam non scit aliquid esse quod est ens: *si chymera currit, chymera movetur*, realiter loquendo. Et quando inferebat; debemus ergo solum studere significaciones et consignificaciones talium vocabulorum et haberemus scienciam talium: *si chymera currit, chymera movetur*, et: *vacuum non est;* negavi consequenciam, quia ad habendam scienciam de altera illorum, non sufficit habere solum significaciones, et consignificaciones terminorum ex quibus talis proposicio componitur, sed requiruntur adhuc alia, ut notum est in hoc exemplo. Nam multi sciunt significaciones illius proposicionis: "Nullus rex Boemie est in Praga," et tamen nescit eam, vel dubitat eam aliquis.

As to God's knowledge of such propositions, He certainly knows them not to be existing things.

A necessary connection between propositions does not imply that we can know the truth of the latter.

Sed contra hoc quod dixi in solucione argumenti sui secundi, scilicet, quod eque primo naturaliter est *me esse* et *hominem esse*, arguebat sic: "Eque primo naturaliter est *me esse* et *hominem esse;* igitur simul naturaliter est *me esse* et *hominem esse*. Concessi. Et quando intulit: "igitur secundo modo simultatis similiter

Wyclif's argument that singular and universal humanity are not on a par, only proves the logical priority of the Universal, and no more.

1. quomodo A. 3. in signata A. 5. in signata A. 6. habet *deest* A. 18. illa etc. *pro* iam eciam A. 20, 21. signatas et consignatas A. 28. natura A. 29. causa A. 30. ymmo AB; *ib.* causa A. 31. qua A. 36. similiter *both times* B.

29. *Praga*. It occurs frequently enough, in copies made by Bohemians, that the names of cities are changed, what is in the English MSS. Londinium becoming Praga. It may be so in the present case.

vel tercio modo simultatis naturaliter," respondebam negando consequenciam ad intencionem magistri mei; quia ipse intulit de secundo modo vel tercio modo simultatis loycaliter, quia pro probacione consequencie allegat modos simultatis naturaliter philosophi in predicamentis. Dixi igitur quod realiter, et non loycaliter, eque primo naturaliter sunt et simul naturaliter sunt *me esse* et *hominem esse*, quod est eque primo naturaliter esse me methaphysice et fisicaliter. Et racio est quia quodlibet illorum per idem naturaliter est, et non alterum altero est naturaliter prius nec posterius.

The singulars of the same species are neither prior nor posterior to each other, yet their parity is not of the kind Wyclif would force on us.

Sed quod modus arguendi magistri non valet, patet ex alio; quia *Sortem esse* et *Platonem esse*, eque primo naturaliter sunt. Racio est, quia quodlibet illorum per idem naturaliter est, et non alterum altero naturaliter prius est nec posterius; et tamen Sortem esse, et Platonem esse, non sunt simul naturaliter secundo modo vel tercio modo simultatis de quibus magister arguit.

He seems completely to ignore the distinction between logical and real parity, and as to there being only two modes of parity, I have already said there is a third.

Consequencia sua non valet, qua arguebat contra meum concessum: nam magister videtur arguere ac si non poneret distinccionem inter simultatem loycalem et simultatem naturalem methaphysicalem; quod non est faciendum. Et quando assumpsit: "Solum duobus modus aliqua sunt simul natura," negavi hoc; quia, quamvis loycaliter solum sunt duo modi simul natura, tamen ultra illos duos modos loycales, est tercius modus simultatis methaphysicalis, ut supra dictum est.

One man and the Universal Man, as to their relation with the First Cause, are on the same level.

Et quando arguebat ex alio: "Essencialis est habitudo ad *me esse, hominem esse*," concessi; et quando intulit; "si igitur eque primo naturaliter est *hominem esse* et *me* | *esse*, tunc in ordine essenciali *me esse* ad primam causam et *hominem esse* ad eandem, eque primo sunt," A 85a respondebam: "Si magister intendit loycaliter, negavi; si realiter, concessi;" et quando intulit: "Nihil ergo eodem ordine penitus vel non," dixi quod in eodem ordine penitus; et quando intulit: "Igitur non stabit in ordine essenciali *hominem esse* sine *me esse*," negavi consequenciam. Sed bene sequitur: "ergo aliquid quod est *hominem esse* in ordine essenciali non stabit, nisi

3, 4. similiter A. 4. commune A. 5. similiter B. 9. et *deest* AB. 11—16. posterius — posterius *deest* B. 18. *after* modo, naturaliter AB, *ib.* similiter A. 20. concessi A. 24. aliqualiter A. 28. habitando A. 31. orõe = oracione B. 35. eadem orõe B; *ib.* dicit *suppl.* B. 35, 36. eadem orõe B. 36. stabat A. 39. orõe B.

sit *me esse*." Et quando dixi in responsione ad idem argumentum; "eque primo est asinus et hircus," negavit hoc. Et quando replicavit: "Sic prima causa in ordine universi simpliciter primum gradum essendi essencialem habet," concessi; et quando assumpsit; "res que sunt perfecciores essencialiter de tanto minus ab ea distant," concessi. "Igitur, cum quelibet species universi diversificantur in perfeccione essenciali," respondebam: "Dato quod sit (quod tamen non credo) nihil tamen arguit ad propositum". Et quando ulterius assumpsit: "Igitur una secundum gradum suum essendi essencialem propinquior erit prime cause quam reliqua," concessi; "et gradus essendi essencialis ponit rem in ordine essenciali," concessi. "Sequitur quod nulle res diversarum specierum sunt eque primo naturaliter," negavi consequenciam. Sed bene sequitur quod nulle res diversarum specierum universi sunt eque primo in ordine essenciali universali premenitate perfeccionis essencialis. Ex quo ulterius non sequitur quod non sunt eque primo naturaliter: ymo due res, quarum una altera in perfeccione essenciali est prior, sunt simul naturaliter, et eque primo naturaliter. Et hoc potest ostendi ex secundo argumento magistri, quod probat quod universale reale in essendo est.

I admit that beings are nearer to or farther from Divine Perfection;

though this does not prove that none are equally distant.

Each has its own degree of essential perfection, yet two may be on the same level, in so far as one is independent of the other.

Et quando arguebam: "universale est naturaliter prius singulari; vel ergo naturaliter prius secundum dependenciam, vel secundum modum subiecti ad accidens, vel secundum modum potencie ad actum," respondebat quod universale est naturaliter prius suo singulari secundum causam, et non proprie secundum dependenciam. Contra hoc arguebam sic: Eadem prioritas est naturalis secundum causam et dependenciam, sicud eadem res est accio et passio. Nam motus, in quantum respicit illud a quo producitur, dicitur accio, sed in quantum respicit illud in quod producitur, dicitur passio; ut habetur ex 3° phisicorum, tractatu primo. Sic similiter

Wyclif makes a distinction between dependency and causality;

but this distinction is not admissible,

1. dixit B. 2. negavit B. 3. replicavi AB; *ib.* oroe͡ = oracione B. 6. perfecciones A; *ib.* unus A. 10. proposicionem A. 14. diversorum A. 16. diversorum A. 19. yma A. 20. in *deest* B. 27. momentum A. 28. momentum A. 29. est *deest* A. 31. que *pro* contra A; *ib.* naturale B. 36. 1° B.

18. Both MSS. have *premenitate.* It means no doubt the same as *praeëminentia.*

since causality and dependence upon a cause are in the same relation as action and passion.

prioritas naturalis in quantum respicit ad alteram causam, qua naturaliter est prius, dicitur prioritas secundum causam; in quantum respicit illud cui alterum naturaliter est prius, dicitur prioritas secundum dependenciam: igitur non oportuit fieri evasionem quomodo ad diversum modum prioritatis secundum dependenciam, et prioritatis secundum causam.

As far as reality goes, humanity and my humanity are the same thing;

That is, wherever is humanity, there is something of my humanity; and vice versâ.

Et quando dixi in solucione: "realiter convertibiliter idem sunt humanitas singularis et humanitas," replicat sic: "igitur simul vertibiliter in toto modo est mea singularis humanitas et humanitas." Concessi; quamvis non quelibet humanitas et mea singularis humanitas sunt simul vertibiliter in toto modo. Et quando inferebat: "igitur in quodcunque vertibile universale est humanitas, igitur et mea humanitas," negavi consequenciam. Et quando arguit: "Quandocunque in toto modo vertibiliter sunt duo, ubicunque est unum, ibi est alterum. Sed humanitas et mea singularis humanitas sunt in toto modo vertibiliter, ibi igitur, ubicunque est humanitas est mea singularis humanitas," negavi consequenciam, et dixi quod non est in *Darii;* sed bene sequitur: ergo humanitas | et mea humanitas sunt *alique*, que ubicunque est unum, ibi est alterum. Et hoc est verum. A 85b

A degree of whiteness is not essentially more perfect than another, for I deny that it adds anything essential to the whiteness that was before; every degree of whiteness is essentially the same, or at least that which is white is only accidentally changed.

Ad 4am, quando dixi quod una albedo non est essencialiter perfeccior minus intensa, replicat sic: "Unus gradus albedinis addit essencialem perfeccionem super priorem." Distinxi: quia ille intellexit quod unus gradus addit rem super alium gradum, qui est essencialiter perfeccior. Si intellexit quod additum facit agregatum essencialiter esse perfeccius quam fuit prior gradus albedinis, negavi eam; quia quelibet albedo eque perfecta est essencialiter cum qualibet alia albedine; et una non communicat cum alia. Dixi, intelligendo realiter, con-

1, 2. quod altera causa quam A; ad alteram tanquam B. 5. oportent A. 5, 6. divisum momentum A. 8. consequenter A. 10. similis A. 13. in toto modo *deest* B. 14. universale A. 16. quodcunque A. 16, 17. in toto modo *deest* B. 18. me A. 19. in toto modo *deest* B; *ib.* idem *pro* ibi AB. 26. unius A. 28. nihil AB. 31. perfeccionis A.

21. *Darii.* The Scholastic name for the syllogism in the first mode that has a particular affirmative conclusion. Every M is P; some S is M; ∴ some S is P. In this case it is: *What is interchangeable with Universal Humanity is wherever Humanity is; my humanity is interchangeable with Universal Humanity; therefore my humanity is wherever Humanity is.*

cessi: loycaliter intelligendo, negavi. Et quando intulit: "igitur amplior perfeccio essencialis resultabit," negavi consequenciam ad intellectum illum quod resultabit res essencialiter perfeccior.

That *all fire is hot* is true, but vaguely true, not determinately.

Ad 5^{am} arguit sic: "Contingit de communi cursu scire determinate omnem ignem esse calidum." Negavi illam, quia solum de communi cursu in confuso contingit scire omnem ignem calidum esse. Ulterius quando dixi: "Non sequitur. Hec est predicacio accidentalis: *humanitas est singularis;* igitur naturaliter prius est universalis humanitas quam singularis humanitas;" et dedi instanciam; "non sequitur: Hec est predicacio accidentalis, *homo est ad aliquid*, igitur naturaliter est prius homo quam est *ad aliquid;*" dixit magister quod non dedi instanciam, sed dixit [quod] deberem sic arguere: "hec est predicacio accidentalis: homo est *ad aliquid;* igitur naturaliter prius est *esse hominem* quam *hominem esse ad aliquid.*" Subiunxit: et sic antecedens est verum et consequens. Salva reverencia magistri, non debeo dare sic instanciam; quia ipsemet non arguit in tali forma, quia ipse arguit sic: "hec est predicacio accidentalis: humanitas est singularis; igitur naturaliter prius est humanitas quam humanitas mea singularis." Et non arguit sic, sicud iubet me arguere: Hec est predicacio accidentalis, *humanitas est singularis;* igitur naturaliter est prius *humanitatem esse* quam *humanitatem esse singularem.* Et dato quod sic arguisset, dicerem quod consequencia non valet. Nam non sequitur: hec est predicacio accidentalis: Hoc est ad aliquid; igitur naturaliter est prius *hominem esse* quam *hominem esse ad aliquid;* quia antecedens verum, et consequens falsum. Et quando allegat philosophum, 5° methaphysice, quod prius naturaliter est res 2^m esse essenciale, quam 2^m accidentale, dico quod philosophus voluit tantum dicere, quod *esse* essenciale rei naturaliter est prius illo accidente quod est *in illo esse;* quia omne accidens posterius est suo subiecto naturaliter, ut habetur 5° et 7° methaphysice.

Wyclif objects to the form of one of my arguments, and shows how it should be changed.

But it is absolutely analogous to one of his own arguments, and if it be faulty, his is faulty too.

And even were it changed, as he proposes, the conclusion both of his argument and of my analogous one would be false.

We cannot compare the singular and its universal to the accident in its substance.

Ulterius, quando negavi illam consequenciam: "Si est separatum, habet *esse* in se indivisum et a quolibet alio divisum: igitur est individuum;" replicavit sic: "cum sic unum est, et non plura, erit indivisum in se, et non

Because the Universal is one in many, it does not follow that it has physical entity.

2. resultavit B. 15 quod *deest* AB. 18. si (?) AB. 19. reveranda A. 27. argui sed A. 31. allegit A. 34. tamen A. 39. indixisus A; indivisis B; *ib.* et *deest* B. 40. divisus A.

erit alia, cum alia secum erint: erit indivisum ab aliis." Concessi. "Igitur consequencia fuit bona," negavi consequenciam.

I conclude (1) that Wyclif's fundamental assumption is false.

Et intuli corollaria, [primo] quod supposicio simplex non est ponenda quam ipse ponit pro fundamento universalium realium in essendo.

(2) That every singular term may become universal, every universal singular.

Sequitur 2° quod sicud non est dare terminum singularem qui non potest esse communis, stante primaria A 86a significacione; sic et communem, qui non potest esse singularis, stante primaria significacione. Patet, quia quilibet terminus singularis, stante primaria significacione, est singularis communis. Et est contra corrollarium eius secundum, quod est illud: Sicud est dare terminum singularem, qui non potest esse communis, stante primaria significacione, sic est dare terminum communem qui non potest esse singularis, stante primaria sua significacione.

(3) That a demonstrative pronoun, prefixed to a universal, renders it singular.

Sequitur 3° quod illud corollarium est falsum: Si ad talem terminum communem adderetur pronomen demonstrativum, non facit eum singularem; et nec potest esse medium syllogismi expositorii.

(4) That there is no formal distinction between the Universal and its singular, since the former is really a nonentity.

Sequitur 4°, quod non est distinccio formalis inter singulare et suum universale, intelligendo de universali reali in essendo. Patet, quia inter ens et non ens non est differencia formalis. Sed universale reale est non ens (ut potuit ex precedentibus), et hoc est contra corrollarium 4m.

(5) That a specific nature is not threefold, fourfold, &c.

Patet 5°, quod illud corrollarium est falsum: natura specifica non est trina sed est triplex, quadruplex, (et cetera) divise nature essencialiter distincte.

(6) That identity in the species does not mean absolute identity, any more than the identical word *king*, said of a dead, a living or a painted king, means the same thing.

Sequitur 6°: illa consequencia non valet, "Illa sunt eadem specie: ergo sunt eadem." Eciam hoc est contra eius correllarium sextum, in quo dicit: "Illa consequencia est bona, *illa sunt idem specie: ergo sunt idem*. Sed ad racionem qua persuadebat (sicud alias) divisio eiusdem, scilicet idem, esset sicud divisio

4. corpore A; *ib.* primo *deest* AB; *ib.* suppono fenix A. 5. consequencia A. 8. stante que A; qui B. 8, 9. prima sermone *and so on* A. 10. quod B. 14, 15. prima sermone A. 19. prolatum A. 23. intendo A. 25, 26. non-ens *deest* B. 30. negatur A. 31. significant A. 35. sic quod A. 36. divisis A.

34. *Sed ad racionem.* The last sentence is grammatically unintelligible, but the example given by the author at the end shows what is meant.

ista, alium aliud, lapis etc. negavi illam; quia *li* "rex" dividitur in regem vivum et regem mortuum, et depictum. Et tamen nec rex mortuus nec depictus est rex.

Explicit replicacio de universalibus, quam si quis bene perspexerit videbit multo meliores raciones pro eisdem, quam contra eadem. Prime enim directe procedunt; alie vero cum extraneis cavillacionibus.

4. rex etc. B. 6. conspexerit B. 7. ducere A. 8. extraneis avillacionibus *deest* A.

DE MATERIA ET FORMA.

CAPITULUM PRIMUM.

A 53ª | Cum materia et forma sint universalia mundi principia, restat de eis primo, tam propter ordinacionem quam gracia consequencium disserendum. Et cum materia non sit a nobis cognoscibilis, nisi per anologiam ad formam (1^{0} physicorum commento 6^{0}), ordo naturalis postulat primo de forma, post de materia pertractare.

Primo igitur supponitur pro diffinicione quid nominis termini, quod forma pro maxima sui communitate significat rem per quam vel secundum quam aliquid est formaliter quid, vel alicuius modi. Dicendum enim, secundum variam antiquorum sentenciam: ex formis quedam est extrinseca, ut forme exemplares; et quedam est intrinseca, ut forme a suis subiectis sustentate. Ille sunt in duplici ordine; quia quedam est forma substancialis, secundum quam subiectum est illud quod est, ut igneitate est datum elementum ignis; et sic de quacumque alia substancia. Et alia est forma accidentalis, ut singulorum generum accidencium.

Conveniunt autem omnes forme analoice in hoc quod quelibet denominat formatum, extendendo denominacionem ad quodlibet nomen substanciale vel accidentale. Sed

The world consisting of matter and form, and matter being unknowable save in relation to form, we must first define the latter. A nominal definition of Form is: that through which or according to which, any being is intrinsically *this*, or *in this wise*. Extrinsic form is the pattern according to which anything is made; intrinsic form exists in a subject, and is either substantial, making a thing *what* it is; or accidental, making it to be *as* it is. All are alike in this, that it is to them that the thing formed owes its name,

2. Cap. *deest* A; initial C *in red ink* AB. 4. *after* propter generacionem ordinem BDE. 5. qucm͡ *pro* consequenciam. 6. a nobis *crossed off* E. 7. 9to *pro* commento *everywhere in all the MSS.* 8. expostulat BE. 9. ergo presupponitur D. 11. vel secundum quam *deest* A. 14. quod formarum BCDE. 15. est *deest* CE; *ib.* forma in B; *ib.* forma in suo subiecto subiectata D; *ib.* sbictme A; subiectata B; *ib.* Et ille BDE. 19. alia *deest* E. 20. singulum CE. 23. quodcunque BDE.

A = Stockholm manuscript, which is taken as text. B = Prag. Univ. MS. VIII. F. 1. C = Prag. Univ. MS. III. G. 10. D = Prag. Univ. MS. VIII. G. 6. E = Prag. Univ. MS. IV. H. 9.

either by extrinsic or intrinsic determination, the former by the word *per* the latter by *secundum*, the use of which words is justified by Aristotle and Scripture.

discrepat forma exemplaris a forma intrinseca in hoc, quod nulla forma exemplaris ab intrinseco, sed ab extrinseco denominat illud cuius est exemplar; e contra autem est de quacunque forma intrinseca. Et illam differenciam suppono, ex modo loquendi Aristotelis et scripture, signari per has duas preposiciones, *per* et *secundum quod*. Nam *per* significat circumstanciam cause efficientis vel exemplantis; ut patet secundo physicorum, et ad Rom. 11° *ex ipso, et, per ipsum et in ipso sunt omnia*. *Per* enim ponitur ad designandum formas exemplares in Verbo. *Secundum quod* autem significat circumstanciam cause formalis; ut patet in descripcione qualitatis. Idem patet de accione, per autorem sex principiorum; et conformem modum loquendi habet scriptura, prima ad Chor. 6°. *Si quis non acquiescit ei, que secundum pietatem est doctrine.*

Rom. XI, 36. 1 Tim. VI, 3.

As exemplars or pattern-forms are prior to forms in their subjects, we shall deal with them first.

Supponendo igitur istam distinccionem circumstancie causalis assignari per istas proposiciones, posui subdistinccionem, quod "forma est res *per* quam vel *secundum* quam, etc." Et prius indubie est forma exemplaris, exemplans creaturam, quam forma intrinsece inexistens eidem. Ideo est prior naturalis consideracio de forma exemplari quam de forma exemplata.

We can predicate of any subject in two ways only: essentially and accidentally, *what* it is and *how* it is. Substantial form is that by which a substance is what it is.

Ulterius notandum est quod essencia specifica, vel natura, tantum capit duplicem predicacionem formalem, scilicet, essencialem et accidentalem; ut, "*substancia* est eque formaliter *ignis*." Et cum non sit accidentale alicui subiecto quod sit ignis, vel presupponat ei aliam quiditatem, | patet quod igneitate est illud substancialiter quod est. Et hoc presupponitur, de vi vocis, esse forma substancialis, scilicet, forma *qua substancialiter est substancia id quod est.*

A 53b

3. ad cuius A; ad quod E. 4. est *deest* ACD. 6. signanter BE. 7. quam BE. 9. 2° *pro* 11° ACDE; *ib.* et *after* ipso *deest* AC. 11. quam BD; quod *deest* C. 13. Et idem BD. 15. ad *deest* B; *ib.* quia AC. 16. doctrina ACE. 17. ip° quod facit diffinicionem *before* supponendo C. 18. signari BD; *ib.* illas D; *ib.* preposiciones BE. 24. fa =| *pro* essencia specifica E; *ib.* sba = substancia *pro* specifica BD. 25, 26. scilicet formalem D. 27. alteri A. 28. aliquam D. 29. substancialiter *deest* E; substancialiter id B. 30. hec ABC; *ib.* presupponit C; *ib.* esse *deest* D.

13. *Autorem sex principiorum.* Gilbert de la Porée. 15. Ad Chor. 6° should be Ad Timotheum VI, 3. Si quis aliter docet et non acquiescet sanis sermonibus Domini nostri Jesu Christi, et ei, quae secundum pietatem est, doctrinae.

Sed cum novem genera accidencium, quorum duo prima, que sunt accidencia quodammodo absoluta, scilicet, quantitas et qualitas, que habent propter suam famositatem nomina concreta contra alia accidencia, (scilicet, quantum et quale); cetera autem, propter suam latenciam ac parvitatem existencie, carent huiusmodi nominibus; sed omnia genera accidencium conveniunt in hoc, quia sunt *modi substancie,* includendo analoyce omnia novem genera accidencium. Quamvis autem probabiliter visum sit multis quod omnis forma substancialis est modus essencialis, sicut forma accidentalis est modus accidentalis, tamen famosius limitatur modus ad formam accidentalem, et ut reor, ne nimis inaniter solicitaremur circa quiditatem talis modi; cum non propter *esse*, sed propter *inesse* ordinaverint gramatici talia composita: *huiusmodi*, *alicuiusmodi,* et cetera, componi ex duobus generibus, ad denotandum quod idem est querere de quiditatibus talium modorum, et querere quomodo accidentis subiectum se habeat: ut querere, *quid est albedo*, et querere *qualiter subiectum oportet se habere ad hoc quod sit album;* cum ipsum *esse album* sit albedo; et ita generaliter de quolibet alio accidente. Patet sentencia, secundo posteriorum, cap. 1°, ubi ostenditur quod generaliter est idem querere, *quid est?* de passione, et querere, *propter quid est?* de subiecto, eo quod ad utramque questionem est eadem responsio. Ut, querenti *quid est eclypsis lune?* dicitur quod est *defectus luminis in luna propter diametralem interposicionem terre inter solem et lunam.* Et querenti *quare luna eclipsatur?* dicitur eadem sentencia, quia hec est racio *quia deficit in lumine, ex diametrali interposicione terre inter solem et lunam.*

As to accidental forms, though some are more, others less important, all agree in that they are modes of a substance.

And the word *mode* is rightly given to them, not to substantial forms, because their whole entity consists in their subject existing in such or such a way. To ask, What is whiteness? is to ask how certain substances impress the eye.

What, asked of a phenomenon, has the same answer as *why* asked of its subject. What is an eclipse of the moon? for instance, means: Why is the moon eclipsed?

Et ita invenies generaliter de qualibet forma accidentali, positiva vel privativa, quod quelibet dicit subiectum et superaddit subiecto modum contingentem. Unde Augustinus, *De natura summi boni,* 2° dicit, "Deus nec habere

Every accidental form implies a subject to which it adds a mode of being. Augustine, though he denies that

1. duo *deest* A. 2. quodammodo *deest* A. 4. contra alia *deest* ABDE; *ib.* accidentalia BDE. 5. quale etc. BCD; *ib.* carenciam E. 6 aut BCD. 9. enim C; *after* probabiliter DE. 13. solicitemur B. 14. propric D; habeant *in marg.* D. 15. propter *deest* BCD. 16. c^m *pro* cetera A. 17. gtis A; 9tis D; gtis E; *ib.* denominandum E; *ib.* idem querere est E. 17—20. querere — ut querere *deest* AC. 19. querere *deest* B. 19, 20. et idem est querere *pro* ut querere E. 21. de quiditate predicacionibus D; de predicacionibus B. 21. se *deest* A. 22. alio *deest* E. 24. idem querere est E. 28, 29. propter — lunam *in marg.* E. 33. genera C. 34. quia B; *ib* i *pro* et A. 36. 22° BDE; 2° C; *ib.* dicit *deest* DE; *ib.* autem nec BCDE.

there can be any mode in God, in the sense of an accident, yet admits that He can be called the Supreme Mode i. e. the Supreme Form.

modum dicendus est quoniam ab eo modus omnibus rebus tribuitur." Sensus tamen Augustini ibidem est quod omnis modus est forma, et e converso. Sic enim scribitur consequenter ibidem: "Neque rursus moderatum oportet dici deum, tanquam modum ab aliquo acceperit. Si enim dicimus ipsum esse summum modum, forte aliquid dicimus; si tamen in eo quod dicimus summum modum, intelligimus summum bonum. Omnis enim modus, in quantum modus est, bonus est. Unde omnia moderata, modesta, vel modificata dici sine laude non possunt."

He says that a mode, in this sense, is necessary to goodness and order; that nothing can be modified without it; and that this is the same as beauty, goodness and form. In this he agrees with Scripture.

Sensus autem istius sancti est conformiter ad scripturam | tria dicere; *primo*, quod nihil potest esse bonum A 54 vel ordinatum sine modo; *secundo*, quod claudit repugnanciam in terminis aliquid esse modestum, aliquid moderatum vel modificatum sine modo *quo* sit formaliter huiusmodi; et *tercio*, quod talis modus sit modestia, ordo, pulchritudo, bonitas, vel forma. Et sic interpretatur illud apostoli ad phi. 4°: "Modestia vestra nota sit omnibus hominibus;" et prima ad Thim. 3°: "Oportet episcopum irreprehensibilem esse, non percussorem, sed modestum." Et sic de qualibet scriptura. Unde Augustinus, in *De natura boni*, 33°, sic scribit: "Malus ergo modus vel mala species, vel malus ordo, aut ideo dicuntur, quia aliter sunt quam esse debent; aut, quia hiis rebus non accomodantur quibus accomodanda sunt. Contingit enim idem fieri a duobus; ab uno quidem bene, propter ordinem et modum, et ab alia male, propter deficienciam ordinis, speciei, vel modi." Idem brevissime et saluberrime docet Apostolus, prima ad Chor. 14°: "*Omnia autem honeste et secundum ordinem fiant in vobis;*" et Proverbiorum 23°: "*Noli laborare ut diteris, sed prudencie tue pone modum.*" Quod igitur famosior significacio est artare modum ad formam accidentalem, et conveniens Aristoteli (7° Methaphysice secundo), patet convenientibus

Phi. IV, 5. I. Tim. III, 2. I. Cor. XIV, 40. Prov. XXIII, 3.

But it is clear that *mode* is usually taken for an accidental form.

2. enim DE. 4. rursum C. 5. accepit CE; acciperet D. 6. fieri unum *pro* summum AC. 12. est *deest* CD. 13. est tria C. 16. vel *before* moderatum. 17. quod omnis talis BD. 18. intelligitur C. 19. illud 4° C. 21. ipm̄ *pro* episcopum D. 22. quolibet scripture CE; quotlibet scripture BD. 23. 23° BCDE. 24. ffs A. 25, 26. quia non omnino BDE. 26. non *deest* A. 27. idem *deest* D; *ib.* a bono D. 28. ab *deest* B; aliter *pro* ab alio E; *ib.* defectum BCDE. 30. ad *deest* BD; *ib.* 4° ACE. 31. fint A. 32. nec ABCDE; *ib.* discere ACE; dicere BD; *ib.* paciencie AC. 33. quia B. 35. secundum ABC.

in illa significacione descripcio *quid nominis* forme superius posita, situs et ordo terminorum; nec aliter describi potest in sua maxima communitate, propter anologiam parcium.

If we go through all the categories of accidents, we shall find they are forms, either by which a substance is said to have dimensions, simultaneous or successive;

Ex dictis finaliter capi potest descripcio cuiuslibet forme communis; ut patet exemplariter de formis accidentalibus. Nam quantitas est forma accidentalis secundum quam substancia dicitur esse quanta; ut substancia discrete multa est formaliter multa per naturam. Substancia materialis est mole magna secundum lineam, superficiem, vel corporeitatem; et mundus est successive quantus et diurnus secundum tempus. Qualitas est forma accidentalis secundum quam substancia dicitur formaliter qualis et accidentaliter virtuosa, potens, vel sana, calida vel rotunda. Relacio est forma accidentalis, secundum quam dicitur substancia formaliter alteri relata. Accio est forma secundum quam dicimus formaliter substanciam agere, passio substanciam pati; et correspondenter de aliis.

or to be virtuous, powerful, etc.: or to be related, active or passive.

Nec oportet timere instancias sophisticas, quibus aliqui instant quod non oportet, si aliquid sit virtuosum vel aliter accidentatum, quod dicatur huiusmodi. Nam claudit contradiccionem aliquam creaturam esse alicuius modi, nisi deus eam prius naturaliter dicat huiusmodi, quam sit huiusmodi. Et preterea, cum quelibet res realiter et proprie dicit se, ut patet alibi ex racione et testimonio scripturarum, patet quod claudit contradiccionem
A 54b aliquod accidens inesse suo | subiecto, cum hoc quod non dicat suum subiectum sic esse accidentatum. Et illum sensum ex famositate sic acceperunt philosophi sine contencione. Et patet quod contencio de quiditate formarum accidentalium stat pro magna parte in equivocacionibus terminorum; unde quando homines inceperunt philosophari, aliqui negarunt accidencia; ut

Sophists may object that a man may be virtuous, and not be *said* to be virtuous; but God at least calls him so; and every being tells of itself.

Every accident, by the fact that it exists in its subject, proclaims it to be thus modified.

The dispute about the entity of accidents is chiefly one of words.

1. desc'pĉo A. 6. vel *pro* ut ABCD. 9. torma ABCD. 10. naturalis ABC. 11. i *pro* et B. 12. quantus per tempus D. 14. id est *pro* et E. 15. vel frigida E. 17. forma *deest* CD. 18. pro alio *pro* passio AC; *ib.* subiectum BCDE. 22. aliter *deest* AC. 23. modi *deest* AC. 26. et *before* proprie *deest* D; *ib.* aliter ACD; *ib.* racione et *deest* E. 29. sic *deest* BD. 33. ut ABCE. 34. phy^{m} — philosophiam C.

27. *Alibi.* There is something of this doctrine in *Logica* (see vol. I, p. 77, l. 23—27; vol. II, p. 202, l. 18—20), but Wyclif probably alludes to some other work, not yet published.

At the outset, some denied all accidents, others doubted whether they had any entity or not. Later, it was found that *entity* has not the same, but a like meaning, when said of substance and of accident; the entity of an accident is its belonging to another entity. It is difficult to understand Scripture, if we do not admit a distinction between accident and substance. Of two extreme opinions, one holds that a thing must exist by itself, and therefore an accident is nothing; the other, that every creature is an accident, and God alone a substance;

patet primo physicorum. Aliqui dubitaverunt, si accidencia sunt encia, ut patet 7° Methaphysice, commento tercio. Unde (sicut habet textus Aristotelis) et forte dubitabit aliquis utrum vadere, et sedere, et unumquodque eorum sit ens; similiter autem et aliis talibus. Talium enim nichil est secundum se aptum [esse], separari scilicet a substancia. Sed post, subtilius philosophantes, invenerunt quod ens dicitur anoloyce de substancia et accidente; et distinxerunt novem genera accidencium, que non sunt encia, nisi quia *entis;* ut patet 7° Methaphysicorum secundo.

Et revera, multum indisponuntur ad intelligendum veritates scripture qui nesciunt distinguere inter ista. Unde Augustinus (De Incarnacione, sexto, capitulo 1°), inquit: "*Qui nescit discernere inter equum et albedinem eius, quomodo in altissima trinitate discernet inter unum simplicem deum et multas eius relaciones?*" Unde opiniones modernas pro magna parte reor stare in equivocacionibus terminorum. Unde unus dicit quod nullum accidens est ens, quia statuit sibi saltem verbaliter, quod ens significat solum illud quod potest per se esse. Aliam opinionem audivi, que est conformior virtuti sermonis, dicentem quod claudit contradiccionem aliquam creaturam esse, nisi sit accidens cuius substancia, omnem creaturam induens et sustentans, est deus. Et si allegantur verba philosophorum et scripture, dicit quod methaforice et inproprie dicitur substancia de quacumque creatura, cum quelibet accidit deo, sicud divicie accidunt homini. Ideo, distingwendo substanciam et accidens ex opposito, nulla creatura est substancia, sed large, inproprie ac figurative.

2. i E; *ib.* ut *deest* AC. 3. sic E. 5. et in D. 6. enim eorum ACDE; *ib.* aptum natum BDE; *ib.* nec *pro* esse ABCDE. 6, 7. se pari C; separari scilicet a D. 7. scilicet *deest* ABCE. 11. metaphysice BD. 14. Aug9 u͡l Auff, E; *ib.* v͡i = verbi CD. 15. qui inquit AE; *ib.* nesciunt D; *ib.* distingwere B; *ib.* inter *deest* E. 16. distingwet BD. 19. ut *pro* unde BD. 20. statuunt ABD; *ib.* saltem *deest* E. 20, 21. ens formaliter D. 22. 1,0℮ = significacionis? D. 25. intuens DE; induens *above* D. 26. vel D. 27. dicatur B. 29. exo^{to} A.

25. *Deus.* This is highly interesting. Modern writers have bitterly denounced Scholastics for their subservience to authority. Now here we find, in the full swing of Scholasticism, an opinion fundamentally the same as that of Spinoza, who, it is well known, considered God as the only substance, of which all other things were accidents. It is curious, too, how this opinion, whilst verbally admitting authority, manages to explain it away.

De virtute sermonis vocat, apostolus virtutem fidei *sub-*
Hebr. XI, 1. *stanciam*, ut patet ad Ebr. 2°. Et sic loquitur scola de *substancia* actus, aut eius qualitate. Et quo ad verba philosophorum distingwencium inter substanciam et accidens ex opposito, dicunt quod philosophi false locuntur de virtute sermonis; cum eque dicant philosophi quod quantitas est subiectum qualitatis, et qualitas subiectum relacionis: et ita de generibus accidencium. Et cum negandum est eas de virtute sermonis esse substancias, correspondenter res primi predicamenti tam accidentaliter inherent deo, sicut quantitas inheret sibi. Ideo solus deus est substancia.

In quotlibet talibus opinionibus, notum est quod equivocant, non admittentes antiquas sentencias et significaciones terminorum; vel aliter opinantur plane in-
A 55ª possibile. Tales autem contenciones in novitate | verborum fundate non decent theologum, ut patet prima ad Thim. 6°.
I. Tim. VI, 20. Ideo pepigi fedus cum me ipso, quod amplius non acciperem occasionem infructuose contendere in talibus, sed supponam famosam significacionem terminorum ac distinccionem encium conformiter ad antiquos philosophos et scripturam, quod tota universitas creata, licet sit accidens deo, tamen ipsa dividitur in substanciam et accidens. Substancia est res prime cathegorie, quod, licet non possit esse nisi a deo, tamen inter genera encium creata est prius substancia aliis. Ideo anoloyce et famose sortitur nomen substancie, et [alia] sibi ordinata sunt. Sic claudit contradiccionem substanciam esse, nisi deo insit; et illius novem accidentibus suppono anoloyce appropriari nomen accidentis vel forme accidentalis; et privaciones illis oppositas suppono esse equivoce formas accidentales.

Ex istis patet quod idem esset ponere qualitatem vel quamcunque aliam formam esse in subiecto cum hoc

it explains Scripture texts by saying that *substance* may be meant figuratively, and the authority of philosophers by pointing out that, in the Categories, certain accidents are as substances to others, which depend on them; and thus what we call substances depend on God. I admit neither of these doctrines, which savour of unprofitable novelty; but, keeping to the plain meaning of Scripture and philosophy, maintain that the world, though as an accident to God, is itself divided into substances and accidents. As created substance cannot exist without being in God, so the nine other categories cannot exist without being in a substance. It is as absurd to suppose a quality in a subject which it does not 'inform', as to suppose the subject having that quality without that form.

1. f,oꝑ D; *ib.* neronice A; de virtute fidei E. 2. ad debe 9 2° D. 6. f,oꝑ D. 10. cum BE. 13. aliis A. 14, 15. f,ⁿᵉˢ D. 16. continuaciones B. 17. fūdate A; *ib.* docent A; *ib.* theologi AB. 18. pipegi D. 19. contendendi BD. 20. si *pro* sed A. 21. gencium A. 24. et BDE. 25. in *pro* a BC; insit DE. 26. accidencium D; *ib.* primum ABCDE; *ib.* alia *deest* ABCDE; *ib.* sicud *pro* sibi C; sic E. 27, 28. ordinate ABCDE. 28. sicud *pro* sic BC; aliam sicut D 29. in deo C; *ib.* illis ACDE; *ib.* novem *deest* BD. 31. eciam esse D. 32. est ACE; *ib.* quantitatem D.

2. The mistake is no doubt due to a confusion between Roman and Arabic numerals.

quod non informet, deo suspendente actum informacionis, ac si poneretur quod deus faciat sic quod substancia sit accidentaliter qualis, vel taliter formata, sine hoc quod habeat ipsam formam. Nec audivi aliquando argumenta directe contra oppiniones huiusmodi formarum procedencia, nisi sentencia concluserit illum sensum quod nulla talia sint res inherentes, que possint per se existere. Illud probant multe famose raciones, tam modernorum quam antiquorum, eque efficaciter de qualitate, sicud de quantitate vel quocunque alio genere respectivo. Sed cum conclusio sit concedenda tanquam necessaria (ut sepe dicit Augustinus de qualitate et quocunque alio accidente) racionabiliter cessaret contencio. Sed non est color, si talia accidencia non possunt per se existere, quod tunc non existunt.

All arguments to the contrary make for this: that no accidents can exist by themselves. This should put an end to the controversy, but not bring us to conclude that they do not exist.

Scio tamen quod multe pulcre veritates circumstant difficultates [circa] novem genera accidencium, quia cuncte res difficiles. Sed cuncte difficultates huiusmodi sunt (ex doctrina veritatis et eius professorum) satis solubiles ad laudem veritatis eiusdem. Amodo ergo non contendem circa huiusmodi accidenciam metaphysicam, nisi audivero novas argucias actenus inauditas. Sed puto me scire quod hoc non eveniet antequam archangelus in novissima tuba cecinerit; et tunc non erit necesse arguendo contendere.

There are many difficulties accidents, all of which may be solved; but I will not discuss them any further until new arguments are brought forward; and that, I think, will not be till Doomsday.

CAPITULUM SECUNDUM.

Post illud rudimentum premissum de significacione *quid nominis* terminorum, restat, realitati amplius accedendum, videre sensum formarum ydealium vel exemplarium. Pro quo notandum quod in deo sunt quotlibet forme exemplares, eterne, per quas oportet creaturas produci in existencia sui generis. Et quelibet earum est essencialiter idem cum natura divina, secundum racionem

We must now study ideal forms, of which there are in God an innumerable multitude, which identical with Him in essence, distinguishable from Him by our mind, are the patterns after which all things are produced;

2. faciat sic quod *deest* ABCE. 4. aliqua BC. 5. dirte AB. *ib.* opposiciones C; posiciones D. 7. possunt B; *ib.* per se *deest* E. 8. Et illud BD. 10. r'vo A. 13. accidentatum D; *ib.* contradiccio A. 14. sed *pro* si BC; quod A. 15. quia *pro* quod A. 17. diffiles DE; *ib.* circa *deest* ABCDE; *ib.* vel *pro* quia ABCE. 18. diffiniles = diffinibiles? C. 19. processorum D. 20. solules = solubiles? BDE; soles = sociabiles, sodales? A. 21. concedam ABE; *ib.* metaforam ABC; meca DE. 22. nisi *deest* C; *ib.* audi ergo C. 23. evenit C. 24. tunc post A; ex post CE; et tunc povo D. 25. etc. etc. D; *after* contendere *in marg.* prdomi druzy wroh. 26. Cap. *deest*; *larger initial* P *in red ink* A. 27. rrailtu A. 28, 29. accidendum ABCDE. 29. ydearum A. 31. ceteras A. 32. Et *deest* A.

distingwuntur ab invicem et a deo, ut patet in materia de ydeis que est correlata. Ex cuius sensu plane sequitur quod deus est forma cuiuslibet creature; quam sentenciam egregie declarat dominus lincolniensis in quadam epistola, partes huius materie | [A 55b] perscrutans usque ad fundamentum in ea. Primo itaque capiendum est ex dictis, cum quelibet persona divina sit formaliter alicuiusmodi, hoc est, alicuius terminus communis, et non potest esse talis alicuius, nisi sit forma, qua ipsa est huiusmodi, sequitur quod est dare formam qua quelibet persona divina est deus. Cum igitur quelibet persona divina sit deus deitate formaliter, sequitur quod deitas sit forma communis cuilibet istarum trium personarum; et cum nulla istarum trium personarum sit deus accidentaliter, vel habens in composicionem sue essencie potenciam ante actum, sequitur quod dicta deitas est quelibet istarum personarum; et per consequens quelibet personarum divinarum est essencialiter et ab intrinseco forma increata. Generaliter enim, quandocumque aliquid est formaliter alicuiusmodi, et non accidentaliter, sed essencialiter, tunc forma est eadem essencia cum formato. Ut si mobile motu movetur, et non accidentaliter sed essencialiter, tunc iste motus quo movetur formaliter est idem essencialiter cum isto mobili. Ex isto concordati sunt philosophi dicentes quod subiectum, quantitate quantum, habeat quantitatem formam inherentem, formam distinctam, cum nunc potest esse maius, nunc minus. Illa autem quantitas, cum sic quanta (et non sibi accidentaliter) est formaliter quanta seipsa. Sic, igitur, cum deus sit summe per se formosus et bonus, palam sequitur quod deus sit illa forma, scilicet, formositas, bonitasque formaliter.

God is thus the Form of all beings; and the Godhead is the Form common to all three Persons of the Trinity, each apart being that Form.

For as quantity, if it existed by itself, would have a magnitude that was not distinct from itself, so God is self-subsistent form and goodness.

2. que est correlata *deest* ACD. 7.—9. alicuiusmodi — alicuius *deest* ACD; *at bottom of page B.* 9. formaliter E; quia AB; *ib.* ipse AE; ipsum BCE. 10. divina *deest* BDE. 11. divina *deest* C. 13. cuiuslibet E. 18, 19. persona divina BCDE. 20. modi *deest* ABCD; *ib.* et *deest* D; *ib.* sed essencialiter D. 20—23. tunc — tunc *deest* AE. 24. Et ex opposito B; *ib.* corrupti ABCE. 25. dicentes *deest* ACDE. 26. habeant C. 27. magis D. 28. sit ABCE. 30. forma D; *ib.* est seipsa ABCE; *ib.* igitur (1r) E. 31. scilicet *deest* BCDE. 32. et bonitas C; *ib.* qua formatur BCD.

2. *De Ideis.* is the title of the last tractate but one of the second book of Wyclif's great philosophical work *De Ente;* the present tractate is in all probability later than that work. 4. The subject of Grosseteste's first letter is 'quid de hoc verbo sentenciam: Deus est prima forma et forma omnium? (Rob. Grosseteste, Epistolae, Rolls Series, p. 1.)

This doctrine is confirmed by Holy Writ.

Et illum sensum plane innuit apostolus ad phi. 2° Phi. II, 6. ubi de Cristo nostro deo dicit: "*Qui cum in forma dei esset, non rapinam arbitratus est esse se equalem deo.*"

Three noteworthy points: (1) that Christ has taken Divine honours on Himself.

Pro cuius intellectu sunt tria notanda; *primum*, quod apostolus supponit Cristum sepe assumpsisse honorem divinum; ut patet in confessione Angelorum et hominum divinitatem eius clarificancium, in faccione miraculorum potestate ac virtute propria, et in multis subtilibus assercionibus in persona propria. Ex quibus palam sequitur ipsum esse deum: quia formaliter sequitur *quod dedit illi pater, maius omnibus est;* ergo cui illud datur est verus deus. Et antecedens asseruit Cristus Judeis. Joh. 10°. Joh. X, 29. Illud autem eternaliter "*datum est nomen super omne nomen*" de quo ad Phi. ubi supra. Phi. II, 9. Ex quo nomine apostolus arguit ipsum esse deum. Ad Hebreos 1°: Hebr. I, 4. "*Tanto melior angelis effectus est, quanto differencius [pre] illis nomen hereditavit.*"

(2) That any one assuming what he has no right to commits robbery; though in the case of Divine honours, only in intention.

Preter, *secundo* notandum quod quandocunque aliquis recipit vel usurpat sibi quod non est suum, invito domino, ista accepcio est rapina; ut si quis realiter acciperet sibi divinos honores, sicud usurpare arbitratus est Herodes (Actuum 12°) cui populus acclamabat *dei voces*, Act. XII, 22. sicud eciam faciet anticristus; ut patet 2ª ad Thesalonicenses 2° ubi dicit quod "*in templo sedebit, ostendens se, tanquam ipse sit deus*". 2. Thess. II, 4. Certum namque est quod non potest esse de voluntate dei quod alius adoretur latria; | A 56ª quia Ysa. 42 scribitur, "*Gloriam meam alteri non dabo.*" Is. XLII, 8. Igitur, quicumque alius a deo arbitratur se esse latria colendum ut deum, arbitratur implicite rapinam; quia si talis vere haberet illum honorem, raperet ipsum a deo, ipso invito, et per consequens, ipsum esse equalem deo est rapina. Taliter enim loquitur scriptura cum complexis; et patet quare dicit "*arbitratus est*", et non dicit quod "*non fecit rapinam*" talem; quia notum

1. Et secundum ACDE; *ib.* intendit D. 5. sic *pro* sepe A; sese BC: sepe *corr.* sese E. 8. confitenciam BCE. 10. se ipsum BE. 11. sibi *pro* illi AC; *ib.* magis ACDE; *ib.* ille *pro* est BC. 16. a͡nglus AC; *ib.* diucius D; *ib.* ibi D. *ib.* pre *deest omnes MS.* 17 hereditabit D. 18. p͡r (pa^ter ?) ACDE; *ib.* quantumcunque ABCE. 19, 20. suo illa *pro* domino ista. 21. mores vel honores A; h͡nores vel hono'es C; *ib.* sic E. 23, 24. timotheum D. 25. esset AC. 27. ysa *deest* C; *ib.* nona^mo 2° D; *ib.* sequitur *in marg.* B. 28. Patet igitur quod BCE. 29. implicare C. 30. tunc BCDE; *ib.* reciperet ACE. 33. creberrime cum BDE; *ib.* creberrime *after* complexis C.

est cuilibet fideli quod nemo potest *facere* talem rapinam.

(3) That if Christ assumed Divine honours to which He had a right,

Tercio, notandum est quod intencionis apostoli est probare Cristum non inplicasse rapinam honoris divini quem arbitratus est sibi attribui. Et antecedens ad hoc probandum est quod Cristus fuit in forma dei. Mos enim scripture et philosophorum est dicere quod aliquid est *in* forma data, quando ipsum *est* forma illa; ut racionale mortale est in motu hoc (in labore, sanitate, vel alia tali forma), quando ipsum est formaliter huiusmodi. Sic eciam Cristus fuit in forma dei, id est, in deitate, cum fuit deus; ut apostolus ibi supponit. Ex quo formaliter sequitur quod, arbitrando sibi divinos honores, arbitratus est sibi solum illud attribui quod ex debito fuit suum. Non ergo, ut sic, inplicuit rapinam, ut patet ex secundo notabili.

He really was God.

Deity is therefore common to the whole Trinity;

Ex isto patet quod deitas est forma communis cuilibet trium personarum, quia aliter inefficaciter caperet apostolus Cristum fuisse in forma dei, ad probandum quod, accipiendo et asserendo se esse equalem deo, accipit illud quod eternaliter necessario fuit suum, ut exposuit Augustinus super Joh. Omelia 48ª.

but the word Form, applied to God, sometimes means the Person of the Word. As the form emanates from matter, and terminates with it in the existence of the compound; so the Son emanates from the Father, who is to him as memory is to the knowledge which it

Sed advertendum quod, licet forma dei accipiatur communiter pro deitate vel essencia cuilibet harum trium personarum, tamen forma dei aliquando accipitur personaliter, appropriate pro verbo. Sicut enim in creatura, vestigiante trinitatem increatam, ex materia emanat forma per efficaciam extrinseci, et ex eis constat tercium in quo finaliter quietantur, que omnia sunt una substancia (ut prius docebatur) sic infinito modo, nobis inenarabili, causatur ex patre ut sit filius ab intra et non ab extrinseco agente, ut fit forma in materia. Filius igitur est verbum, diccio, vel forma, vel manifestacio creature formose. Et hinc doctores dicunt patrem, non memoriam

3. intencio C; intenciones AC; *ib.* sunt A. 5. adhuc D. 8. formaliter E. 9. ho = homo *pro* hoc BCE. 11. et *pro* id est ACDE. 12. scripsit A. 16. no^{11} A. 17. cuiuslibet C 18. harum trium BCD. 19. at assumendum D. 20. et asserendo *deest* D; *ib.* accepit E; acciperet AE. 21. exponit BD. 22. 49ª D; 98ª ? E. 23—25. forma dei — forma dei *deest* C. 27. que est vestigium trinitatis increate BDE; *ib.* ex intra A; *ib.* emanans C. 29. quietatur CE; *ib.* una substancie D; sunt *pro* substancia E. 30. post docebitur BCDE; *ib.* infinitum A. 31. expresse AC. 33. est *deest* AC. 34. hic B; *ib.* per DE; *ib.* mam (materiam ?) ABDE; materiam *(full)* C.

engenders; and the Holy Spirit connects them both in One Essence.

sed ut memoriam. Vocant eum tamen memoriam actualissimam, semper gignentem actu sapienciam vel noticiam sibi parem; et illa est filius; et in spiritu sancto, qui est nexus amborum, consistit quoad personalem produccionem ad intra; sicud ex composicione materie cum forma terminatur creata essencia. Iste autem | tres res omnino in deo sunt sic pares, ut sint A 56^b
penitus eadem essencia, ut alias declaratum est.

Confirmation of this from texts of Scripture. Grosseteste, therefore, says that God is an eternal, absolute Form, in this following Augustine.

Isti autem sensui alludit apostolus ad Rom. 11° dicens Rom. XI, 36.
"*Quoniam ex ipso* (quoad patrem), *et per ipsum* (quoad filium), *et in ipso* (quoad spiritum sanctum) sunt omnia)". Et hic vocat apostolus deum verbum "*splendorem patris*" et "*figuram substancie eius*", ad Hebr. 1°. Hebr. I, 3.

Habito isto quod deus est eternaliter forma absoluta, declarat lincolniensis (ubi supra) quod deus est exemplaris forma cuiuslibet creatura: "*Si queris*", inquit, "*quid movet me ad ponendum deum esse formam, respondeo quod magna magni Augustini auctoritas.*" Et allegat ad hoc tria dicta Augustini, quorum primum est libero arbitrio, capitulo 2°, ubi diffuse declarat Augustinus quod oportet omnem creaturam formari forma incomunicabili et eterna. Secundum dictum est Augustini, 11° de confessione, cap. 32°; et tercium est 13° cap. ubi plane docet dictam conclusionem, sicud et lincolniensis, triplici racione. Sed quia diversi sunt, insensibilia non potentes concipere, alii autem laborant in equivocacione vel anologia huius nominis, *forma:* ideo declarat differenciam inter formam exemplarem et formam intrinsecam, partem qualitativam formati. Dicitur enim primo forma, exemplar ad quod respicit artifex, ut ad eius imitacionem vel similitudinem formet suum artificium, sicut pes ligneus ad quem respicit sutor, ut

A form is the pattern which the artificer follows in making anything; and this sense is frequent in Scripture.

1. meoria A; mam *above* B; memoriam C. 2. propter *pro* semper AD; *ib.* cognoscentem ADE. 4. est *deest* C; *ib.* existit A; *ib.* quantum ad *pro* quoad BD. 7. omnia D. 7, 8. sint penitus *deest* AC; ut sic D. 11, 12. sunt omnia *deest* ACE. 12. dictum *pro* deum CE. 13. eius *deest* AC. 14. absolute BC. 17. probandum AD. 18. magni *deest* D; *ib.* eciam E. 20. est *deest* ABC; *ib.* 8° B; 18° AC. 22. est *deest* AC. 23. 5° BD; XI, 5° *above* E; *ib.* ca° 2° BCD; p'° E. 24. plato (plo) *pro* plane C. 25. dȝ A. 28. declarare A; declaratur differencia C. 32. poligres *pro* pes ligneus ABCDE.

23. *Aug. Confessions.* l. XI, 30, and l. XIII, 2. Grosseteste gives no other references. 32. *Pes ligneus.* Nothing can be made of the abbreviation; yet it evidently stands for *pes ligneus.* See De Ente predicamentali, p. 261, l. 20—22; and Intr. XXII.

secundum ipsum formet soleam, dicitur forma solee; et sic vita bonorum ad cuius similitudinem mores vite nostre formamus, dicitur nobis forma vivendi, ut patet ad philippenses. 3°: "*Imitatores mei estote fratres, et observate eos qui ita ambulant, sicut habetis* formam *nostram;*" et prima ad thesalonicenses, 1° comendat eos (I. Thess. I, 6, 17.) in hec verba, "*Et vos imitatores facti estis domini accipientes verbum in multa tribulacione, ut* forma *facti sitis in omnibus credentibus in Macedonia.*" Et idem patet prime Petri. 5° "forma *facti gregis ex animo*". Non (I. Petr. V, 3.) igitur est extraneum a scriptura exemplar tale vocare formam exemplandi. Quod si dictum exemplar habet cum dictis condicionibus exemplandi formam concavitati inversam (ut sigillum), vel formam convexitati eversam (ut exemplar campane), vel alterius sensibilis per cuius applicacionem capit essenciam artificialem, tunc verius format exemplar exemplati talis.

And as this pattern or model approaches more closely to the form of the thing which is to be, the greater is its perfection.

Ex istis ymaginacionibus ad invisibilia ascendendo, capiet intellectus totam universitatem creatam esse aquam (A 57ª) fluidissimam, que cito flueret | in nichilum, si ab arte summi artificis et opificis desisteret sustentari. Intelige ergo deum opificem esse idem essencialiter cum sua arte, illabi in intima cuiuslibet creature, pura voluntate creantem totam universitatem quam induit secundum exemplaria sue artis, et non deserit, sed manet continue eis illapsu, conservans omnem creaturam in sua essencia, tam quoad formas substanciales quam eciam accidentales ab arte exemplante continue dependentes; et facit eas continue suo exemplari finaliter innitentes; sic, inquam, trinitas increata penetrat exemplariter quamlibet creaturam in pulcerima statura, mensura et pondere, ut dicit Augustinus (4° super Genesi ad literam) et alii doctores concorditer exponunt, et notata materia *de*

Imagine the created Universe as a fluid that by itself would at once flow away to nothingness, and the Artificer of all, present in all creatures, shaping them according to His art, and continuously upholding them, so that the Trinity penetrates everything, giving it size, beauty, measure and weight.

2. est exemplar ad C; *in marg.* E. 3. patet *deest* AC. 4. mei *deest* ACD. 5. observatores C; *ib.* eos *deest* C. 6. vestram CD. 7, 8. excipietes A; *corr. above* B; excipientes C. 11. gregi ABCD. 12. exa^tl D; *ib.* dictum *deest* ABCE. 14. immersam DE; *ib.* immersam D. 16. res execuam *pro* essenciam artificialem BD; *ib.* tc A. 17. foret ABDE; *ib.* etc. *pro* talis B; *deest* CE. 21. artificis *deest* D; *ib.* et *deest* CD; *ib.* Intelliget B. 22. 2° DC; *ib.* dictum BC; *ib.* esse *deest* BCDE; *ib.* eundem D. 26. illapsum C; illapsus BD; *ib.* existencia CD. 27. *before* accidentales ad formas C. 29. eos C. 30. principiat et exemplat BD. 31. pulceria A; pulcerrimo numero BD; *ib.* statura *deest* BD. 32. dicit *deest* ACD; *ib.* supra Genesim D. 33. nota D; vocatur *(quite plain)* C; *ib.* ante *pro* materia A.

ydeis; quoniam oportet creaturam procedere in existenciam conformiter exemplaribus tam increatis quam non increatis.

Thus God is not only a Form in Himself, but also as forming all that is good and beautiful in His creatures. Aristotle and Averrhoes agree in ascribing all actions primarily to the First Form of all.

Et patet quod deus nedum est essencialiter vel personaliter forma secundum quam intrinsecus est formosus, sed exemplar formans extrinsecus et efficiens formositatem cuiuslibet creature. Unde, in hoc concordati sunt philosophus et commentator; septimo methaphysice commento 9°, dicit quod acciones formarum provenient ab accione prime forme que non est in materia, et est primus motor; et (libro 12° commento 37) dividit commentator formas in substanciales et accidentales; substanciales autem dividit in materiales et inmateriales; *et in hoc genere formarum inmaterialium*, inquit commentator, *collocantur, ut animatum et desideratum.*

CAPITULUM TERCIUM.

We now deal with substantial forms. A substance, in a wide sense, is any self-existent thing; but we restrict it here to generic self-existence.

As all creatures depend on God, so all accidents depend on their substances, both as to being and as to being known.

Restat consequenter tractare de formis mediis, scilicet, de formis substancialibus creaturarum. Patet autem ex dictis quod quelibet huiusmodi forma substancialis est forma intrinseca substancie create, qua est formaliter id quod est. Quamvis, extensive loquendo de substancia, quodlibet per se existens in genere posset dici aliquid et substancia (ut patebit posterius); tamen, propter anoloycam famositatem, suppono intencionem *substancie* restringi ad res per se in primo genere. Sicud enim tota universitas creaturarum inheret ipsi deo, et respectu sui pocius dicitur *entis* quam *ens*, sic tota universitas generum accidencium inheret cathegorice substancie, et non dicuntur encia, nisi quia sunt modi entis a quo sustentantur in existencia et intelleccione, ut patet

1. quando ADE; qm̃ = quoniam BC; *ib.* existenciam creature ABDE. 2. conformibus BDE; a formis BDE. 2—3. tam creatis quam in creatis C. 6. exemplariter C. 7, 8. philosophi et commentatores ABE. 9. ad accionem ACE. 14. commentator *deest* A. 15. etc. sequitur aliud capitolum C. 16. *in fine cap.* Buh Wssudy *in red ink* A; cap. *deest* A; *initial* R *in red ink* ABE. 22. quelibet ABE; quomodolibet C; *ib.* aliquod C. 23. ut *deest* AD; *ib.* patet C. 24. substanciam AE. 25. restringenti D; *ib.* proprio B. 26. ipsi *deest* BD. 27. dicit D. 28. cathegorie B. 29. quia nisi ABCDE.

25. *Primo genere.* The first genus of the Categories is Substance, as distinguished from the nine genera of accidents. God though self-existent, does not belong to a genus, nor underlie accidents.

7° Methaphysice; quia nec deus nec creatura posset ipsa intelligere, nisi cointellecta substancia. Ideo vere dicit philosophus (in eodem) quod substancia est nobis prior accidente *cognicione quiditativa*, cum nemo cognoscat quid sit accidens, nisi prius cognoscat quomodo substancia est modificata; prior *diffinicione loyca*, cum oportet, specificando substancias accidentis, capere significacionem specialem per quam unum accidens differt a reliqua (nec est ista prioritas solum naturalis, sed temporalis; quamvis noticia, si est de accidentibus, sit nobis prior in tempore; vel posset dici quod substancia | A 57^{b} est prior cognicione nature ipso accidente, et hoc nature prime, que cognoscit omnia sicut sunt; et sic substancia diffinicione qualificatur in suis generibus et differenciis). Et tercio, quotcunque significata, cum tota multitudine suorum accidencium, oportet tamen temporaliter precedere illam multitudinem, saltem secundum aliquod singulare; et iste sensus, sive fuerit philosophi, sive non, est tamen philosophicus, quia *primo* est res in cognicione nature, *secundo* in suo genere (et per consequens in sua diffinicione) ac *tercio* in suis accidentibus, ut successiva transmutacione; et istis tribus modis precedet substancia accidens ordinate.

Thus substance precedes accident (1) as to the knowledge of its whatness, (2) as to its logical definition, and (3) in time, at least as regards some particular accidents.

Est autem duplex forma substancialis: vel pure per se stans, sive natura alia subiectante; ut substancie quoad molem indivisibiles et intelligibiles quoad operacionem, que sunt creature deo proxime, quas philosophi ab innata accione vocant intelligencias, et nostri ab officio vocant eos angelos, quoniam oportet hoc supponere. Iste autem, cum sint formaliter substancie, non habent

There are two kinds of substantial forms; one self-subsistent and requiring no subject to sustain it; these are creatures very nigh to God, called Intelligences by

3. nobis est C. 4. agnoscat B. 5. est D; *ib.* agnoscat B. 6. est accidentaliter B; accidente DE. 7, 8. substanciam BCD. 11. prima B; *ib.* possit C. 13. pure *pro* prime BCD; *ib.* sic substancia *deest* ABCE. 14. diffinicione *deest* ABCE; *ib.* que limitantur ACE; qua limitantur B; *ib.* generibus *deest* AC. 15. quecunque C; *ib.* si'g^{ta} A. 16. specialiter *pro* temporaliter AE. 18. sin^{re} A. 19. phific9 D. 20. ne *or* re = racione? A. 24. 9^{x} = complex D. 26. passionem *pro* operacionem ACE. 29. eas B.

18. Substance cannot be without any accidents, nor an accident without a substance; but the former may be without this or that particular accident at a certain time. 29. *Supponere*. From this point, the collation of E has been done very rapidly. Though it is one of the best MSS., yet, coming after so many others, its variants are less important. Still, as there was the chance that a whole paragraph might be wanting in all the other MSS, E had to be looked through.

philosophers, on account of their innate activity of thought, and by us Angels, because of their office. But it is an error to suppose with Avicebron that they are composed of a spiritual matter and form; it is true that they are made up of possibility and actuality of existence; but this possibility is purely ideal, and is one with the Divine Essence.

potenciam ad actum tanquam duas naturas, sed sunt forme pure in abstracto quibus sunt formaliter id quod sunt; ut patet ex dictis. Unde Avicebron et alii, volentes ipsas et quamlibet creaturam componi ex materia spirituali et forma sibi proporcionata, equivocant in signis. Nam verum est quod quelibet creatura habet *posse* ex quo producitur in existencia creature; quod quidem *posse*, cum sit eternum et absolute necessarium, est natura divina, per consequens cum nulla creatura componens, sed *esse* intelligibili creature correspondens. Non igitur propter illud *posse* dicitur creatura esse ex duabus naturis; nec sortitur idem *posse* digne nomen materie: sed est in existencia creature corporee fundamentum quoddam *posse* temporale propinquum, ex quo potest fieri aliquod corporeum, generacione vel specie transmutativum nature prioris; et illud *posse* vocatur materia de qua locuntur philosophi, ut patet posterius. Unde, quia corpus celeste non est expertum *esse* in potencia, ut ex eius transmutacione cedat secundum naturam in corpus alterius speciei, inventi sunt philosophi ponere ipsum puram formam, et non componi ipsum ex materia et forma, ut oportet corpora sublunaria. Et hinc commentator, in suo libello *de substancia orbis*, dicit quod *subiectum celi non est dignum sortiri nomen materie*. Certum est tamen quod omnis substancia corporea componitur ex materia et forma; quia omnis talis existencia naturaliter prius existit, antequam sit in tali vel tali specie; ut patebit posterius. Nec moveat quod intelligencia non est forma, eo quod ipsa est inmaterialis, et forma dicitur relative ad formatam materiam. Nam falsum assumitur, cum forma dicitur simpliciter relative ad formatum ut causa ad causatum, aut materia ad materiatum; cum deus absolute et necessitate est forma, sicud essencia sui ipsius. Angeli autem exemplariter formantur a Deo, et intrinsece a se ipsis, cum eadem indivisibilis natura sit forma et formatum. Nec sequitur

Whereas matter is a corporeal potentiality apt to be transmuted in many ways; which made Averrhoës say that the heavens are not of matter, because not transmutable; this is false. It is also false that, form being correlative with matter, these Intelligences are not forms.

Nor are they formed by themselves, except as a figure of speech, the form and that which is formed being identical.

1. nec A; *ib.* sic AC. 4. et *deest* AC. 6. talis *pro* quelibet AB. 7. in *deest* C; *ib.* existenciam AB. 9. et per B; *ib.* cu̅ı̅ *pro* cum A. 10. vite *pro* intelligibile A. 11. esse *deest*; *a gap* B. 12. forter A; *ib.* illud B; *ib. after* materie, sut A. 13. est *deest* D; *ib.* fundatum ABC. 15. vel substancie vel speciei *pro* generacione vel specie A; generacione vel *deest* BC. 22. corruptibilia D. 25, 26. componatur B. 26. essencia B. 28. ut *deest* A; *ib.* patet BC; ut p9 p3 D. 29. cum forma AB. 30. formatum A. 30—32. formatam — formatum *deest* A. 33. cum *deest* ACD; *ib.* necessario B. 36. natura *deest* A.

ex hoc quod idem causat se; sicud non sequitur: natura
A 58ª dei est deus, igitur deus causat se etc. | Sunt enim talia intransitive intelligenda: "essencia, bonitas, vel inmensitas dei est deus"; "quiditas vel diffinicio hominis est homo". Et sic de ceteris.

Habito ergo quod quelibet intelligencia sit forma essencialis, restat discutere de forma nature corporee, quam commentator, 1° Physicorum, vocat partem qualitativam; et patet ex dictis quod quelibet substancia corporea habet talem formam, eo quod formaliter est in specie predicata in eo *quod quid est;* et per consequens habet universalem singulariter, per quam est formaliter id quod est; et illa est forma ex descripcione superius proposita: ut ignis datus est formaliter ignis igneitate quadam, lapis lapiditate, et sic de aliis. Talibus enim, propter eorum latenciam, non sunt specialia nomina inposita; ideo licitum est philosophis fingere nomina a concretis substancialibus, sicud faciunt: ut patet per Ursonem, aphorismo ultimo, et alios recte philosophantes de formis substancialibus. Et plane patet quod oportet omnem philosophum rectilogum ponere talem formam. Nam nullus negabit quin datum individuum sit aer vel ferrum vel planta, aut aliud huiusmodi. Et ultra non negabit sapiens logicam vel metaphysicam quin tale individuum sit essencialiter et per se et non accidentaliter aer vel ferrum vel planta vel aliud huiusmodi. Ex quo patet quod *ipsum esse aerem, ferrum*, etc., sit substanciale; et ista veritas est forma quam ponunt philosophi. Ergo talis forma substancialis est ponenda.

Et patet quanto philosophi moderni difficultent iuvenes incipientes philosophari, fingendo quod forma substancialis sit una res potens per se existere coniuncta cum

As to corporeal forms, they are that by which anything is essentially that which it is.

Thus a given fire is fire by its igneity, a stone is a stone by its stoniness, and so on; for we may coin abstract words out of concrete ones *ad libitum* to name the form of each thing.

For any individual being must be air or iron, &c.; and *its being air* &c., is aerity, which is its form.

The fiction of a form which exists in combination with matter, making a

2. etc. *deest* BD. 9. tractatis BD; *ib.* dictis *in marg.* B. 12. universalia AB; unam C; *ib.* singularem D; *ib.* que *pro* per quam AB; formam qua *pro* per quam C. 13. inquid A; id quid B; forma *in marg.* B; *ib.* et illa et ista C. 14. posita C. 18. cunctis AB; *ib.* sicud ACD. 19. amphiorismi D. 20. patet quam plane BD; quod plane C. 23. vel *pro* aut B; vel aliquid D. 23—27. huiusmodi — huiusmodi *deest* A. 24. et *pro* vel C. 26. ferrum planta C. 29. *after* est, forma A. 30. quantum BD. 31. fugiẽdo A.

19. Urso's Aphorisms. See *De Compositione Hominis*, 71.
29. *Talis forma.* This is called by Scholastics the *abstract* form, which stands for the *whole* essence taken abstractedly. But they also admit a concrete form which is only a *part* of the substance: this Wyclif certainly seems to deny in the following paragraph.

whole, like a tunic and its fur, is a conception only likely to render the study of philosophy harder.

materia, ex quibus coextensis fit unum, sicud ex tunica et furrura. Nam certum est quod omnes homines mundi non possunt talem formam convincere; sed convincere formam datam satis est. Periculum ideo est, cum ponere plura sine evidencia sit superfluum, ubi pauciora sufficiunt. Patet quanto degenerant a philosophia, qui tales formas ponunt.

Such forms are not susceptible of increase or diminution, since they are substantial; Averrhoës therefore, when he says that the forms of the elements remain in the compound, but are less intense, quite misconstrues Aristotle. Fire cannot be more or less fire than it is.

Secundo, patet quod nulla forma substancialis suscipit magis et minus, cum nichil secundum substanciam possit intendi et remitti; ut probat Aristoteles in predicamentis, cap. *De Substancia*, et racio satis convincit; et patet quam sinistre Averrois concepit Aristotelem (3° De celo, commento 67), formas substanciales elementorum ponendo manere in mixto, sub *esse* remisso, tanquam quedam media inter substancias et accidencia. Nam, cum idem sit *forma intendi* et *subiectum esse intensum formaliter;* patet quod, si forma substancialis ignis intenditur, tunc possibile est quod aliquid sit alio magis ignis; ut, si albedo intenditur, tunc aliquid est alio magis album. Et ita generaliter de qualibet forma intensa. Consequens autem est inpossibile, cum tunc *esse ignem* foret accidens, eo quod, uno gradu existente forma accidentali, tota forma est tunc accidentalis, cum, secundum sua principia, idem sit iudicium de toto et de partibus in talibus; ut, quamvis *esse quantum* non possit separari a substancia, tamen *esse* sic contractum potest adesse vel abesse. | Ideo ponunt philosophi totum A 58b genus quantitatis esse accidens. Correspondenter, si *esse sic aut sic intense ignem* sit accidentale, tunc *esse* simpliciter ignem esset accidentale, et per consequens oporteret ponere substanciam in actu per formam substancialem, cui adveniret accidentaliter intensio aut remissio forme ignis; et per consequens forma ignis adveniens sic enti in actu foret accidens.

If it could, it would be an accident of the genus of quantity.

If it were accidental for fire to be more or less what it is, its very being would be accidental.

Form is extended into parts in its

Tercio, patet veridica sentencia lincolniensis, 1° posteriorum cap. 11°, ponentis formam substancialem

1. tūca A; aqua BD. 2. furmera A; farina B; *ib.* quam *pro* nam AD. 4. dictam BC; *ib.* patulum BD; *ib.* est *deest* A; *ib.* componere A: ponere C. 6. quante D. 8. substancia B. 10. ponit BC 12. quod eciam AC; *ib.* conceperit AD; concipit BD; *ib.* celi AC. 13. elementorum *deest* B. 16. et *deest* C. 18—20. *Pro* aliquid sit — album, aliquid est alio ignis ut albedo intenditur, tunc aliquid erit alio magis vel minus album DE. 18. esset ACD. 19. alio *deest* C. 20. magis vel minus BC. 22. uno *deest* BCD; *ib.* gradu forme BD; *ib.* exnte A. 23. forma *before* accidentali *deest* BD; *ib.* est *deest* D. 25. parte AC. 26. *before* tamen, quia ABD; *ib.* quantum BCD. 29. ignem *deest* ABC. 30. esse ignem BD. 31. actum ABC. 36. 5to BD; *in marg.* B.

(elementi, vel elementati), extensam partibiliter induci quoad subiectum, sed non quoad partes intensivas, vel naturam forme. Ut si signetur una essencia que fieret ignis; cum natura ordinate procedit, primo pars eius minor et postea maior fiet ignis. Et per consequens *esse ignem* vel *igneitas*, (quod idem est) adveniet date essencie partibiliter quoad subiectum; et idem contingit de quacunque forma substanciali extensa quam natura potest successive producere.

subject, but not in itself, or as regards intensity.

Unde commentatur, 12 Methaphysice, commento 19°, vocans levitatem formam substancialem ignis, ex infecta radice abutitur termino. Nam levitas est commune aëri, igni, et quotlibet mixtis ipsis participiantibus; et potest intendi et remitti. Ideo non est illud quo ignis est formaliter illud, sed accidens consequens ad ignem et aerem ac mixta illis participata, per quod deferuntur ad loca sua naturalia, sicud gravitas naturaliter locat terram ac elementa particularia. Unde, sicut corpus naturaliter prius est, quam sit locale, cum subiectum precedit passionem, sic prius naturaliter est ignis, quam grave vel leve. Gravitas igitur, vel levitas, sunt qualitates sensibiles sensu tactus (ut dicit philosophus, secundo de generacione, cap. tercio, concorditer ad experienciam), et non forme substanciales. Nec tunc movet multum quod gravitas ageret in sensum appositum et levitas in sensum suppositum, per locum *a simili* de accione caliditatis et frigiditatis; quia quelibet qualitas activa habet suam legem agendi; ut [patet] discurrendo per omnes qualitates sensibiles. Et idem dictat racio senciendum de quibuslibet sensibilibus; ut ignis, licet vigorosius calefaciat suprapositum quam suppositum, tamen non calefacit orbem celestem, nec forte calefaceret conbustibile

Averrhoës, starting from a false principle, commits an abuse of language in saying that lightness is the substantial form of fire; for it is an accident common to air and many compounds, and its idea *depends* on the position of its subject: but substance naturally comes *before* position.

The objection that gravity and lightness act, and are therefore substantial forms, has little worth.

When we say that gravity *acts* one way, lightness the other, remember that when things are

1. ut *pro* vel C; *ib.* extensa A. 2. non ergo A. 3. fiet CD. 4. eius *deest* BD. 7. 9tı̂ᵗ A. 13. partibus A. 16. partita AD. 18. pticicla D. 22. Aristoteles BCD. 25. oppositum A. 26. locum *pro* sensum B. 27. caliditas actualiter AC. 28. patet *deest* ABCDE. 29. ascois = asecucionis? *pro* senciendum A. 30. insensibilibus ACD. 31. vel *pro* quam ABCDE.

25. *Qualitas ageret.* The objection is as follows: only substantial forms *act;* now lightness acts, pulling a balloon upwards. Wyclif's answer might be put thus: When the hydrogen in the balloon has got to its proper place in the air, there is no longer any action, yet the lightness is the same. It is, therefore, not lightness that acts, but the substantial form of hydrogen, tending to its proper place.

in their right place, neither acts at all. Accidents are not properly active, but substances are active by their means.

ibi positum propter appetitum quem habet ad tenendum se in loco suo naturali. Correspondenter omnino, grave vel leve habet legem naturalem ex levitate propellere incidens quod inpedit eius locacionem, et non aliud iuxtapositum. Non enim sunt qualitates active sensui similes, secundum philosophum, sicud nec alie qualitates sensitive. Ideo non ponderantes istam consideracionem per locum *ab insufficienti similitudine vel ymaginacione*, [fingunt] quod dicte forme sunt res potentes per se existere: quod est impossibile. Ideo, ut alibi patet, activa non sunt accidencia, nisi ad sensum equivocum; quia substancie | sunt secundum huiusmodi accidencia sic active. A 59[a]

However, Averrhoës may be understood to mean by *substantial* that which is an inseparable property of any substance; and in this sense he would be right.

Iste autem cui placeret insistere ad glosandum Commentatorem posset dicere quod intelligit per *substanciale* istud quod inseparabiliter consequitur naturam rei. Unde, quia levitas et caliditas inseparabiliter assecuntur ignem, ideo possunt dici forme ignis, ad hunc sensum substanciales. Certum namque est ex regula commentatoris, quod nec caliditas, nec levitas est forma qua ignis est formaliter id quod est; quia 8° Methaphysice, commento 5°, vere dicitur quod nulla forma que est accidens inherens alicui subiecto est realiter substancia; ut patet de igneitate et consimilibus.

CAPITULUM QUARTUM.

Objections to this theory. I. The same individual essence would now be one thing, now another, and specific differences would be utterly destroyed. That which, v. g. now has the form of fire might

Contra hanc doctrinem de forma instatur, primo, per hoc quod ponitur eandem essenciam in numero nunc esse ignem, nunc aerem: et sic de quolibet elemento vel elementato, et per consequens nulla talia corpora differunt in specie, cum ignis erit aqua, et sic reciproce. Sequitur enim expositorie: Ista essencia erit ignis; et ista eadem essencia erit aqua: ergo ignis erit aqua. Et isti sentencie videtur consonare scriptura de conversione

1. ad *deest* ABC; *ib.* tenendo B. 3. et leve D. 4. locacio A. 5, 6. sui sil͡is A; ͡filis BCD. 6. alique D. 7. due *pro* sensitive BD; secunde C; *ib.* non *deest* ABCD. 8. *after* insufficienti, divisione A: *ib.* ymaginaria C. 9. fingunt *deest* ABCDE. 10, 11. accidencia non sunt activa CD. 12, 13. sic active *deest* ABD. 14. isti D; *ib.* placet ABD. 16. rei *deest* ABC. 17. consecuntur BD. 18. possent B. 19. re[a] A. 23. subiecto *deest* ABC. 24. *in fine* etc. CD; Averoys osra haczye *in marg. in red ink* A. 25. Cap. *deest* A; *initial* C *in red ink* B. 26. hec dicta BD. 30. esset A. 31. exposicione D; *ib.* esset A.

Gen. XIX, 26 — Ex. IV, 3 — Jo. II, 9

unius substancie in aliam; ut uxor Loth dicitur conversa in statuam salis, Gen. 3°, virga Moysis in serpentem Exod. 4°, aqua, nedum conversa, sed *facta* vinum, Joh. 2°; et sic de quotlibet conversionibus ex dictis scripture, que videntur sonare quod subiectum unius nature fit subiectum alterius nature.

afterwards have the form of water. Scripture speaks of Lot's wife as *changed* into salt, and of water *made* wine.

Et confirmacio istius est, quod omnis mutacio requirit subiectum; et, cum ipsum (quidquid fuerit) est ad minimum substancia, videtur quod forma adveniens est sibi accidentalis, cum adest et abest preter subiecti corrupcionem. Confirmacio secunda est, quod omnis motus successivus dicit subiectum successive moveri isto motu; sed omnis generacio substancialis est motus successivus (ut patet ex dictis): ergo, oportet subiectum successive moveri isto motu.

Now, if it is the *same* essence, it must be a substance, and the supervening form will be accidental. Besides, its supervention would imply succession, which could not be without a pre-existing subject.

Pro solucione istius, opus est loyca et methaphysica. Ideo notandum quod essencia dicit rem absolute, sine contraccione ad genus aliquod per aliquam formam, sicut *esse* eius contractum significat mere, sine aliqua tali contraccione. Et ideo deus Exod. 3° signanter docuit illum eximium philosophum Moysen quod *esse* fuit nomen suum: ubi sic dicit: "*Si dixerint mihi, quod est nomen eius? quid dicam? dixit ad Moysen, Ego sum qui sum; sic dices filiis Israël: Qui est, misit me ad vos.* Et sequitur: *Hoc nomen mihi est in eternum, et hoc memoriale meum in generacione et generacionem.*" Cuius dicti subtilitatem sanctus Dyonisius (de divinis nominibus, cap. 1°), et quotlibet alii precipui philosophi admirantur, considerantes racione invincibili quod nullum nomen in genere per se est nature divine conveniens, quia quodlibet decem generum | connotat creatam racionem. Ideo Avicenna et Algazel, inter raciones quas dicunt deo competere, dicunt (sicud et beatus Dyonisius, ubi supra) quod deus non est substancia. Et idem declarat Augu-

Ex. III, 13—15 — A 59^b^

Answer. We must note that *essence* signifies a thing without reference to any genus.

God's name is *He that Is*,

precisely because no generic term can stand for Him, who is beyond all genera.

And in this sense God is not a substance.

1. speciei A; *ib.* et ut B; *ib.* dicitur *deest* A. 2. Moysi AB. 4. de *deest* AC; *ib.* et *pro* ex AC. 5. quia *pro* que C; *ib.* quia *pro* quod ABCD. 6. sit? ACD. 12, 13. isto motu *deest* ACD. 19. *after* eius, sīgt A; *ib.* concretum C; *ib.* m'e A. 22. dicitur BD; *ib.* dixerit C. 23. dominus BCD. 26. in omni ABC; *ib.* et in D. 29. nullum *deest* A. 33. et *deest* BC. 34. ibidem D.

34. *Deus non est substancia.* Modern Scholastics have invented the term *Supersubstantia*, to designate God; but all agree that the limitations implied by the usual definitions of substance fail here.

Grammatically speaking, substance (or subject) is the same as essence; quality is everything that can be said of a subject.

stinus, 7° de trinitate, 31° et 32°. Et hoc est quod balbuciendo locuntur gramatici ignorantes *quid nominis* significare *substanciam cum qualitate (propria, vel communi)* intelligendo per *substanciam*, essenciam, vel absolute naturam; et per *qualitatem*, quamcunque formam, substancialem vel accidentalem; ut: *homo* dicit essenciam et connotat humanitatem; *humanitas* autem dicit istam communem humanitatem et essenciam cui inest; et ita generaliter, de quocunque nomine cathegorico positivo. Pronomina autem et verba substantiva ponunt gramatici significare meram substanciam, sine connotacione huiusmodi qualitativa.

Digression concerning the distinction between existence and essence.

Et super illam consideracionem credo sanctum Thomam et alios loquentes de *esse* et essencia pro magna parte fundari. Quorum conformis et sana sentencia est, quod in deo est idem *esse* et essencia omnino, quia in illo non est potencia ante actum, nec contraccio per formam potencialem superadendam possibili essencie. In qualibet autem creatura est distinccio, saltem racionis, inter *esse* et essenciam, cum essencia dicit mere rem sine contraccione per formam, vel racionem alicuius generis; sed *esse*, cum sit actus essencie create, dicit contracte formam vel racionem alicuius generis. Ideo dicunt quod essencia, ens et *esse* differunt secundum racionem, sicut lux, lucens, et lucere. Quidquid autem sit de hoc exemplo et sensu, concedendum de *esse* et essencia videtur mihi quod omne *esse* sit essencia, et econtra; distingwuntur tamen secundum racionem in creaturis, cum *esse* habitum per formam aut racionem specialem alicuius generis presupponit essenciam, et non econtra; cum *esse* con-

I consider that the distinction between existence and essence is one of reason; for though each is the other, existence presupposes the idea of essence.

3. que cum D. 8. humanitatem *deest* D. 9. ka^{ce} C. 11. significare *deest* ABC. 12. qualitatum CD. 14. ente ABD. 15. 9fois A; concors BCD. 18. possibilem *pro* possibili BCD. 21—23. generis — generis *deest* A. 25. quomodocunque CD.

13. *Sanctum Thomam.* This question, not easy to set forth in untechnical terms, marks a great split amongst Scholastics. St. Thomas and the whole Thomist school hold that the *actual* (not *possible*) essence of any existing creature is really distinct from its existence, and that in God alone these are identical. Scotists and most of the modern school, including Suarez, affirm the contrary. The question, though seemingly idle, has a great bearing on Theology. St. Thomas was so convinced of the truth of his view, that he uses it to prove many of God's attributes, notably infinitude. See Sum. c. Gent. l. I. cap. XXVIII, XLIII and S. Theol. 1ª Pars, qu. VII, art. 1.

tracte dicit huiusmodi racionem. Exemplum est de specie et individuo, que distingwuntur secundum racionem incommunicabilitatis, tamen omnis species est individuum, et econtra; et talem distinccionem racionis ponunt quidam inter essenciam divinam et personam. Unde ad pauca respiciunt, qui arguunt; *a* et *b* distingwuntur; ergo, *a* non est *b;* vel econtra. Nam satis est ad aliquam distinccionem, scilicet ad distinccionem secundum racionem aliquam secundum quam unum non est reliquum; nec sequitur ex isto quod idem distingwuntur a se. Licet enim Sor senex differt a se puero, non tamen differt a se.

The species and the individual thus differ, one being common to many, the other not; yet one is the other. It does not follow, therefore, that where there is distinction, there are different entities.

Istis premissis, conceditur quod eadem essencia, eciam in numero, est nunc ignis, nunc aqua; et sic de qualibet specie substancie materialis. Nec ex hoc sequitur non equivocantibus quod ignis formaliter possit esse aqua; et sic de ceteris speciebus. Et de predicacione formali, propter eius famositatem suppono quod limitate fiat locucio; sic enim locuntur philosophi et maior pars scole, abicientes alias predicaciones; de quibus tamen postmodum, cap. 6 et septimo. Suppono igitur quod nomen *essencie* sit commune ad significandum naturam, quacunque qualitate substanciali vel accidentali qualificatam; quia aliter pateremur nimis magnam penuriam
A 60ª in loquendo de | essencia materie prime. Non enim habemus aliquod nomen absolutum ad exprimendum rem manentem in transmutacionibus formarum substancialium competentibus. Igitur videtur dici talis res essencia, cum nomen *essencie* dicit anoloyce deum et quamcunque rem per se in genere, connotacione alicuius generalis vel specialis qualitatis. Non enim dicit, *quid* res est, aut *cuiusmodi* est; sed solum dicit quod *est:* que est prima questio de re, ex secundo posteriorum.

I fully admit that the same essence is now fire, now water; but not that fire, as such, can be water.

Essence means anything that is, without any reference whatever to its suchness; otherwise it would not be possible to speak of primordial matter; no word implying suchness would be adequate to express it. *Essence* thus does not say what anything is, only that it is.

2. quia D; *ib.* in *deest* BCD. 3. et *suppl.* CD. 6. si a BCD. 7. tunc BCD. 9. *after* aliquam: quod alterum sit secundum racionem aliquam B; *ib.* unum *deest* CD. 11. senex *deest* ABC. 13. eciam *deest* D. 19. philosophus C. 20. obicientes D. 21. 5to D; *ib.* erit sermo *pro* et septimo BCD; *ib.* iterum BCD. 22. essenciale A; *ib.* designandum BD. 23, 24. qualificata B. 26. naturaliter *pro* aliquod CA. 27. intransmutabilem A. 28. 9peteͤʳ? A; 9pet͡et' D; competent' E. 29. essenciale ACD 30. generacione AC. 32. aut *deest* C; *ib.* a'cuiᵍ mo͡i C.

25. *Materie prime.* Primordial matter, in the very words of Aristotle, is neither *this thing*, nor *such*, nor *so great*, nor has it any determining attribute whatever: it has only the potentiality of becoming anything.

However, its sense is often restricted to substance alone.

Nomen tamen essencie secundum famositatem et anologiam quandoque contrahitur, sicud nomen entis, ad significandum substanciam appropriate.

This essence is eternal, and cannot cease to be, save by annihilation, which is impossible. And the very same essence, if it has the form of fire, is fire; if of water, is water &c. "*That which* is fire will be water," does not imply that fire will be water.

Redeundo igitur, concedendo quod essencia ignis erit aqua, vel signata essencia materiali per aquam, dico quod oportet illam esse perpetuam, cum non possit desinere esse, nisi per annichilacionem, que non potest esse. Et illam essenciam contingit nunc esse ignem per induccionem igneitatis, nunc aquam per induccionem aqueitatis; et sic de ceteris formis materialibus; sed non sequitur: ista essencia erit aqua, et ista essencia erit ignis; ergo ignis erit aqua; sed satis est quod illud quod est ille ignis erit aqua. Exemplum patet in *supernaturalibus*, in *naturalibus*, et *mixtum.*

Of this non-sequence I shall give examples in the supernatural order, in the natural, and in both. The same essence is the Father and the Son; yet the Father is not the Son. The same essence is at one time Peter, at another Paul; yet Peter is not Paul. The Person of the Word is a human nature and a Divine Nature; yet the human nature is not the Divine Nature. And thus it does not follow that fire will be water.

In *supernaturalibus;* sicud non sequitur: "Ista essencia est iste pater, et ista eadem essencia est iste filius; ergo, iste pater est iste filius." Secundum exemplum *naturale* est. Hoc non sequitur: "Ista natura specifica erit Petrus, et ista eadem natura specifica erit Paulus: igitur, Paulus erit Petrus." Defectus autem istorum argumentorum declaratus est alibi satis diffuse, cum medium sit commune ad utrumque extremum; quod est contra naturam silogismorum expositoriorum. Exemplum tercium *mixtum* est hoc; non sequitur: Suppositum verbi est natura humana, et hoc idem suppositum est natura divina (ut post declarabitur); igitur natura humana est natura divina. Non sequitur, ut post patebit. Non ergo sequitur: "Hoc erit ignis et hoc erit aqua: ergo ignis erit aqua", licet demonstratur essencia singularis, quia eadem essencia in numero est communis ad quotlibet corpora, eciam distincta specie, cum forme substanciales, sicud et species, *a posteriori* insunt essencie: cum pars prima omnium rerum creatarum sit *esse*, ut dicit auctor de Causis, 4ª proposicione.

Conversion or change may mean (1) transmutation from

Quo ad conversiones de quibus loquitur scriptura, notandum est quod tripliciter in genere dicitur conversio

1. et *deest* B. 1, 2. analogam C. 4. conceditur BCD; *ib.* sit AC. 14. mixtū A. 16. iste *deest* D. 17. In naturalibus *pro* Hoc B. 20. autem Descns? utrobique D; utriusque C. 22. extremorum BD; *ib.* sed *pro* quod ACD. 23. *after* naturam: phi A; *ib.* expositorum C. 24. Hoc suppositum BD. 25. erit C; *ib.* erit BCD. 26. erit CD. 27. ut post patebit *struck out* D. 31. corpoa C; *ib.* specifice B. 32. pars *deest* ABD. 33. prima *deest* C; primum A; *ib.* creaturarum C. 34. 14ª E. 36. trx A; triplex BC.

34. *Auctor de Causis.* Alpharabicus. See *Sermones*, III, 255, *note.*

unius rei in aliam; *primo*, quando eadem essencia secundum transmutacionem materie, nunc est corpus unius speciei, nunc alterius; ut patet in exemplis positis, et quotlibet similibus. Et ista est conversio substancialis propter communicacionem materie. *Secundo*, quando idem subiectum convertitur ab una forma sibi accidentali in aliam; et taliter convertitur viciosus. Et huius conversionis tot sunt subdivisiones, quot sunt genera formarum accidentalium; ut patet respicienti scripturam. Unde, Jeremie 3° scribitur, "*Ecce dies veniunt, dicit dominus, convertam conversionem populi mei.*" Tales autem sunt conversiones locorum, posicionum vel ordinum, ita quod omnis mutacio dicitur conversio, et specialiter si sonat in bonum. Et *tercio* dicuntur nedum |

A 60[b] subiecta sed forme converti in formas, quando una succedit post aliam, sicut Aristoteles dicit *ex nocte fieri*

Tob. II, 6 *diem.* Et sic loquitur scriptura, Thobie, 2° "*Dies festi vestri convertentur in lamentacionem et luctum.*" Et patet quomodo intelligitur Augustinus, in De Immortalitate anime 19°: "*Cum per animam corpus subsistat, ipsa in corpus verti nullo modo potest.*" Et racio istorum est, quia una est substancia inmaterialis et alia substancia materialis; ideo non communicant in materia vel subiecto, vel altero duorum modorum quo unum convertitur in reliquum; et tercius modus nature incorruptibili non potest competere.

one substantial form to another, as in the examples above quoted from Holy Writ.

Or (2) the same subject, losing one accidental form to gain another; as in conversion from vice to virtue; change of place, &c.

Or (3) one form giving place to another, as night to day.

In this sense Augustine says that the soul cannot be changed into the body, the latter existing only by the former.

Et quoad primam auctoritatem respondet Augustinus in De mirabilibus sacre scripture cap. 18°, declarans auctorem nature in uxore Loth non fecisse aliquid contra naturam; pro quo declarando capit quod multe sunt partes salse in homine; patet hoc de lacrimis, sputo, fleumate salso, et urina. Potens ergo rerum gubernator faciliter posset modicam partem ad naturam salis latentem in mulieris corpore in partem tenuem superficialem diffundere. Nec solicitemur utrum subtile

As to Lot's wife, Augustine thinks that the surface of her body might have been incrusted with the salt that was within it previously; that would suffice for the change.

3. et *deest* D. 5. 2° modo CD. 10. ve^{ut} A. 12. eciam BD. 14. et *deest* C. 15. substancia BD. 17. scriptura theologie ACD. 18. mihi ABC; *ib.* convertitur AB; convertuntur CD. 19. demōrli^{te} ABE. 20. ipsum AC. 23, 24. substancia C. 24. zdo℮ *pro* duorum D: *ib.* quo *deest* ABC; *ib.* convertatur BCD. 29. aucto^{te} A; auctoritatem D; *ib.* uxorem ABC. 31. flē; *in marg.* false B. 32. fleu^{te} A; et fleumate B.

10. Jer. XXXIII, 7 is the nearest approach to this text that I can find.

humidum fuerit exspiratum, vel latuerit intrinsecus; aut si tota substancia corporis fuerit versa in sal, vel tantum pars tenuis in superficie; et sic de variis questionibus

The answer is the same as concerns the other changes: God Almighty is able to produce any form that is educible from matter.

inpertinentibus, quas querimus hodie. Nam satis est quod ipsa secundum corpus versa est in statuam salis. Et correspondenter dicitur de conversione virge in serpentem, de conversione aque in vinum, et quacunque conversione substanciali de qua loquitur scriptura. Facillimum namque est auctori nature capere minucias elementorum vel inordinate sparsas vel noviter generatas, et armonice componere illas, ut forma serpentis vel vini, vel quecunque alia de potencia materie educibilis, statim resultet; cum nichil ibi creatur, sed vel generatur pure naturaliter, vel prius generatur aliter situaliter.

If an alchemist succeeds in mixing his elements aright, God at once gives them the form of gold; for He it is who works as prime Artificer in all things. God could make a man of a stone, since He can give a soul to anything.

Quod si alchimicus vel magus scit aptare mineras elementorum conmixtas proporcionaliter ad formam auri, vel alicuius alterius mixti, dator forme non invidus promptissime dabit formam. Et ille principaliter generat; alii autem a natura vel artificio instrumentaliter disponunt materiam. Et sic patet veritas sentencie ex asumpto Mt. 3° "*Potens est deus de lapidibus istis suscitare filios Abrahe.*" Matth. III, 9 Cum enim anima potest uniri cuicunque materie, servata proporcione ad universam materiam, facile est deo proporcionare materiam lapidis in corpus hominis cuiuscunque per unionem anime cum eodem. Nec obstat isti sensui quod sanctus propheta intellexit mistice, quod deus potest idem de induratis iudeis, ut lapides, vel de gentilibus contratiis, qui vocantur petra in scriptura, suscitare homines spiritualiter per graciam,

A change may be either real or supposed; as when Nabuchodonosor fancied himself to be a brute animal.

faciendo eos filios Abrahe per imitacionem. Talis enim suscitacio per graciam direccius manifestaret | A 61ª divinam potenciam. Ex istis coligi potest quod dupliciter contingit intelligere transformacionem; vel substancialiter, vel

1. fuit BD; *ib.* latuit BD. 2. salem *(sic)* CD. 4. pertinentibus AC. 9. mineras A. 10. vel *deest* AB 11. ĩspe^{tis} vi^{m} A; *ib.* vel *deest* ABD. 13. relucet *in marg.* BE; *ib.* vel *deest* D. 14. generatum BD; *ib.* a^{r} A; alr BC; *ib.* situatur D. 15. quod *deest* ABD; *ib.* *after* si *a blank space for three words; ib.* alchkimicus (!) E; *ib.* magu9 C; *ib.* apportare D; *ib.* municias; *under* mineras B. 17. commixti B. 19. aliquando *pro* alii; *ib.* ĩſcl^{ter} A. 20. sic *deest* ABC. 20, 21. quo aſſup^{to} illo Ma^{e} 3° D. 21. inquit de BCD. 24. faciliter D; *ib.* eadem BCD. 26. obstet; *corr. in red ink* A; obest BCD. 27. idem *deest* B; vel *pro* idem D; *ib.* vel D. 28. vel *deest* D; *ib.* gentibus A; *ib.* 9̃tiis A; convertendis BCD; *ib.* petre ABD. 30. mutacionem C. 31. manifestare D. 31, 32. graciam potenciam D.

accidentaliter. Sic enim dicitur transformacio duplex quando homo transformatur, vel transformatur secundum rem vel opinionem vel utrumque, in vitam bestialem. Et talis creditur transmutacio Nabuchodonosor, Daniel 4°. Mansit enim suppositum humane nature per illud septennium; sed deus in pena peccati percussit eum tanta mania, quod putaret se secundum corpus conversum in bestiam, ut contingit multis inanimatis. Possibile est eciam corpus hominis converti in corpus avis, vel cuiuscunque alterius mixti; sed generaliter post mortem convertitur in terram, et sunt eadem elementa. Et ista vocatur transformacio substancialis, que non ponit possibilitatem huius, quod homo sit formaliter bestia, vel individuum unius speciei, individuum relique; cum non sit possibile idem numero secundum formam converti in aliud ultime singularitatis, eo quod forma non potest converti in formam, si non equivocetur. Illud tamen secundum naturam potest converti in quodcunque, manens idem secundum materiam, ut post dicetur. De conversione autem panis in corpus Christi, quam ecclesia vocat transsubstanciacionem, est longus sermo, et mihi adhuc inscrutabilis.

Dan. IV, 30

But a man's body may, after his death, become a bird or any other being.

This transformation is substantial, and does not imply that a man, remaining a man, becomes a brute.

I will not here go into the question of Transubstantiation, which I have not yet solved.

Ulterius conceditur quod omnis generacio forme substancialis materialis, cum sit mutacio, requirit subiectum mutari; ut patet de virtute sermonis, cum omnis motus dicit mobile moveri, quod oportet esse aliquid, et non pure nichil. Ideo dicunt philosophi concorditer quod subiectum talis generacionis est materia prima. Sicut enim accidentalis transmutacio forme materialis requirit subiectum in actu ens, ita transmutacio forme substancialis requirit subiectum ens in potencia, scilicet

I admit that every substantial change is a change in the subject itself; that which remains unchanged is primal matter, or pure potentiality. Movement requires a complete, transmutation an incomplete entity.

1. sicut D. 2. quando *deest* A; *ib.* vel transformatur *deest* D. 4. X° A. 6. permisit A. 7. causata(?) *pro* tanta A; *ib.* avaricia *pro* mania D; *ib.* putavit C. 8. maniacis C; animatis D. 9. vel *deest* D. 11. converti C; *ib.* terra A; *ib.* *after* converti in terra: est c̄a elementa, et illa vocatur transformacio, *with a line in red ink drawn through* A; *ib.* eadem in causa E. 12. substancialis *deest* A; *ib.* posseit BD; possit C. 14. huius C; *ib.* relique *struck out* D. 15 unum in numero idem E. 15.—17. converti — converti *deest* A. 16. illud *pro* aliud C; *ib.* singularis C. 17. equivoce ABC. 18. materiam *in marg.* B. 20. autem *deest* BDE; *ib.* in corpus *deest* AC. 29. accidentalis *deest* ABC; *in marg.* D; *ib.* forme materialis *deest* ABD. 30. subiectum *deest* D. 31. scilicet *deest* BCD.

8. Is not *inanimatis* a translation of the common expression: Out of their minds?

Thus the generation of a substance is not properly a movement, nor an alteration.

materiam primam, ut dicitur 1° physicorum, et primo de generacione. Et ideo, cum omnis motus proprie dictus requirit subiectum ens actu per totum tempus ipsius motus, ex 5° physicorum, bene dicunt perypatetici quod generacio substancie non est motus proprie dictus, nec alteracio, ut dixerunt antiqui distingwentes inter formam substancialem et accidentalem.

I never well understood what this meant, until I was enlightened by Scripture and the Fathers, especially Augustine.

Ista verba etsi sepe audivi et balbuciendo protuli, quando incepi philosophari, legendo libros Aristotelis, longe tamen fui a sensu verborum, sicud forte alii mihi similes, quousque fui paululum illustratus in noticia materie prime secundum sensum scripture a sanctis doctoribus mihi expositum,

After pointing out the various senses of *Substance*, and assuming the creation of the world, I shall expound what I have learned.

et specialiter a beato Augustino, exponente illud Gen. 1° *"In principio creavit Deus celum et terram."* Gen. I, 1 Pro ista sentencia declaranda, conformiter ad scripturam in qua omnis veritas philosophica, premittenda est, *primo,* huius nominis, *substancia,* equivocacio. *Secundo,* supponendus est philosophicus articulus fidei de produccione mundi. *Tercio,* declarabitur sentencia scripture et philosophorum de materia prima.

(1) Any answer to the question What? is sometimes called the substance of a thing; i. e. its whatness, or essence.

Pro quo notandum quod substancia nunc accipitur analoyce pro cuiuscunque rei quiditate, sive sit substancia, sive quodcunque accidens. "*Substancia*", inquit Comentator, 5° Methaphysice commento 15° "*dicitur de illo quod datur ad interrogacionem | factam per Quid?* A 61b *de unaquaque re; et hoc est substancia uniuscuiusque rei.*" Et conformiter loquitur apostolus, vocando *substanciam, fidem.* Et communitas scole vocat genus cuiusque rei per se in genere, substanciam eius; ut patet de accidentibus et similibus.

(2) God, a being self-existent, is called a substance, with the understood assumption of the dependence of all creatures upon Him.

Secundo modo, valde equivoce dicitur deus substancia, essencia, vel natura, eo quod est ens per se stans, natura; et equivoce est ens in conparacione ad creaturam, et equivoce est per se, ut patet ex primo posteriorum de 4ta significacione rei *per se.* Deus enim, secundum Lincolniensem, est per se negative, intelligendo talem proposicionem: *Sed quelibet*

1, 2. et — generacione *deest* CD. 3. ipsius *deest* BCD. 4. *before* bene: unde *struck out* A; unde bene BD. 10. *after* forte: et BD; *ib.* mei *pro* mihi B; alij 4 m' C; *deest* D. 11. secundum *deest* D. 12. sensum *deest* A. 15. magis est *pro* conformiter — qua D. 18. phi^{c9} ar^{lus} A. 19. Et tercio BD. 22. *before* analoyce: nunc C. 24. commento *deest* BD; *ib.* dicitur *deest;* ſup C. 25. per B. 26. rerum BCD. 32. nam et D. 33. per se *deest* AB. 36. c^{talem} = causalem *pro* talem D.

creatura sibi inheret. Et iste est sensus beati Augustini, et concorditer aliorum philosophorum ponencium quod deus est prius naturaliter quam aliquod genus. Et sic est principium cuiuslibet generis. *Tercio*, dicitur substancia de quacunque re primi generis, sive fuerit singularis (quam Aristoteles vocat in predicamentis substanciam primam, ut commentator exponit 5° Methaphysice, 15° commento), sive fuerit universalis; ut genus, species, et differencia; ut eciam loquitur Aristoteles cum Commentatore, 7° Methaphysice, commento 7° et 33°. Et illa vocatur substancia secunda in predicamentis; et dividitur in genus, speciem et differenciam, ut patet 7° Methaphysice. Substancia autem singularis, sive corporea, ut corpora simplicia, sive incorporea, ut spiritus creatus, conceditur (ut nota), a communitate scole. *Quarto* modo, dicitur substancia pro quocunque quod est fundamentum alteri; ut superficies albedini, linea curvitati et quantitas et qualitas relacioni; et ut reor, ad huiusmodi similitudinem vocat scriptura utriusque testamenti bona fortune homini adiacencia *substanciam hominis*, quia debent sibi subici pro necessitatibus corporis relevandis Unde Prov. 3° scribitur: *honora deum de tua substancia;* et Luc. 15ᵃ *da mihi porcionis substanciam que me contingit.* Sed *quinto* ac *sexto* accipitur pro materia et forma valde equivoce a priori. Et propter illam equivocacionem declarandam concordati sunt greci vocare materiam, formam et compositum ypostasim, usiasim, et usiam. Latini eciam quidam vocant materiam *subsistenciam*, formam *subinsistenciam* et appropriate compositum *substanciam*, ut patet aphorismo ultimo Ursonis. Et hinc concordati sunt philosophi, cum solum res que potest per se esse sit in prima cathegoria, et nec materia potest per se esse, patet quod non sit per se in genere substancie, cum non sit formaliter natura completa, sed pars nature; sed ut pocius univoce sub-

Prov. III, 9

Luc. XV, 12

(3) Everything in the first category, whether singular or universal, is a substance; universal substance being divided into genera, species and differences. The existence of singular substances is generally admitted by all philosophers as a known thing.

(4) Anything that is required by another to exist goes by the name of substance; as wealth is called a man's substance, because it ministers to his wants.

(5) Form and (6) matter are often called substance, though in widely different senses.

Matter indeed, unable to exist without any form, only belongs to this category as being that of which a substance consists.

4. tercio modo BD; *ib. after* dicitur: de A. 8. commento *deest* B. 9. diffinicio C. 12. distinguitur D; *ib.* diffinicionem BC. 18. et *before* ut *deest* AC. 19. huiusmodi *deest* AC. 23. 14ᵃ A; *ib.* proporcionis D. 25. ap'ori A. 26. grammatici C. 28. vfyofy C; *ib.* ufyam C. 29. sbsistᵃᵐ *(very illegible)* A; supersistenciam BD; superstanciam E; *ib.* pp'eᵗᵉ A. 30. ultimo *deest* C. 33. patet *deest* BCE; *ib.* cum E. 35. nec *pro* sed ut BD; *ib.* ponimus A. 35, 1. substanciam D.

28. *Usiasim*. See *Logica*, III, 120.

stancia cum corpore vel spiritu, quam deus: sed per reduccionem, ut in genere substancie cuius est principium, sicud deus in quolibet genere et qualibet creatura.

We must assume that the world was created by God at the first instant of time, as philosophy and Scripture teach us.

Secundo, suppono auctorem nature in primo instanti temporis creasse universam naturam corpoream, cuius unam partem formavit in celum, aliam in terram; et sic de porcionibus quorumcunque corporum cuiuscunque speciei. Patet illud ex dictis philosophie de creacione mundi, quomodo oportet ipsum processisse in effeccionem per creacionem a deo in primo | instanti temporis. Patet A 62a
eciam illud ex irrefragibili testimonio sacre scripture, Gen. 1° *In principio Deus creavit celum et terram*, tum exposicione sanctorum, et specialiter sancti Augustini, 12° de Confessione, ubi subtiliter et philosophice declarat illam sentenciam.

It follows that the essence of things existed before the things themselves, since it belonged to no species by itself, only by means of forms. The reception of any form presupposes the existence of something able to receive it; for the question *Whether this is?* precedes the question *What is this?*

Ex istis patet, *tercio*, quod essencia vel natura corporea prius est antequam est ignis, aer vel quecunque species substancie, quia non est in aliqua specie, nisi per aliquam formam substancialem, qua est formaliter quid, ut patet rectilogo; sed priusquam est sub quacunque tali forma, naturaliter est; ergo prius est quam in aliqua specie. Minor patet ex hoc quod ad *esse* sub tali specie presupponit *esse* receptivum talis forme; et per consequens presupponitur essencia. Deus igitur naturaliter produxit essenciam corpoream in existenciam, antequam foret eadem in quacunque luce (vel *forma;* quod idem est). Et hoc est quod dicunt philosophi: quod sicud questio, *si est?* precedit questionem *quid est?* ita essencia presupponit quiditatem, non tempore sed natura. Essencia igitur in potencia, ex se indifferens ad quamcunque formam, est materia prima, de qua

Matter is the foundation of a substance, an existing receptivity.

locuntur philosophi. Et sic prima materia, quam Commentator vocat fundamentum nature, dicitur esse principium dicte essencie, pro primo instanti nature; et supperaddit potenciam, vel capacitatem ad totum genus

2. substancie *deest* C. 8. cuiuscumque BC. 9. sicud patet *pro* patet illud BD; *ib.* philosophice BD. 10. quoniam B; *ib.* effectum D. 12. infringibili BD; *ib.* sacre *deest* A. 13. cum B. 18. *after* prius est: vel eciam ipsa natura corporea *struck through with red ink* A; *not struck through* C. 20. que ACD. 21. rtilogo A. 22. prius ergo prius ABD. 26. *after* in existenciam: corpoream *struck through with red ink* A. 27. formavit BD; *ib.* eam D. 30. precedit BCD. 31. i por A; ut i ponr B; igitur ponitur CD. 34. dicit D. 35. illo BD. 36. passionem ACD.

forme corporee. Et patet quomodo intelligitur illud Aristotelis 5° Methaphysice, 8° commento, quod *materia prima nec est secundum se vel formaliter quid, quantum, nec quale, nec aliquod aliorum encium predicabilium.* Ipsa enim est ante formam, a qua capit esse quid vel quomodolibet aliter accidentata.

> This explains Aristotle's definition of matter.

Ex istis claret mihi quare generacio substancie non est motus proprie dictus; quia omnis talis motus presupponit naturaliter unum aliquid, et substanciam per se in specie, quod illo motu formaliter moveatur. Sed respectu nullius generacionis huiusmodi est tale subiectum significabile. Ideo nulla talis generacio est motus proprie dictus; quia omnis talis motus presupponit naturaliter unum aliquid, id est substanciam per se in specie, que illo motu moveatur formaliter. Sed in generacione, corpus ex quo aliquid generatur corrumpitur adveniente nova forma, et per consequens non defert talem motum. Et essencia [est] communis utrique terminorum solum secundum *esse* primum et non secundum *esse quid;* cum aliquid sit prius, aliquid posterius. Ideo non est dare *quid* moveretur, licet sit dare rem que movetur. Patet igitur veridica sentencia Aristotelis, primo Physicorum, commento sexto, quod *sicut motus quo aquiritur forma accidentalis requirit ens in actu, sic motus quo aquiritur forma substancialis requirit subiectum ens in potencia et naturam corpoream precedentem naturaliter omnem formam huiusmodi.* Et patet quod subiectum pro tali mensura nature non est substancia nisi equivoce, ad primum sensum, et non ad tercium; cum non secundum tale *esse* sit per se in genere, sed presuppositum ad genus substancie corporee. Et ulterius, quando argumentatur formam esse huiusmodi accidens, conceditur aliquo modo, ut divicie accedunt homini, et universitas creata accedit deo modo quo loquitur scriptura, vere ponens quod omnia contingencia accidunt alicui stabili fundamento. Unde Prov. 12° "*Non contristabit iustum*
Prov. XII, 21 A 62b *quidquid ei* acciderit;" ubi notum est | non solum fieri

> It is quite clear now why the production of substance is not a movement, for that which is moved must be complete as an actual substance,
>
> and that which is produced requires only the possibility of its production; what is common in the change of one substance into another is a potential existing thing.
>
> Matter is not properly the substance which it underlies, except in the first sense above given.
>
> It may be objected that form is an accident to matter.
>
> So it is, taken thus; but we suppose that accidental

2. Aristotelis *deest* D; *ib.* 8° 8° D; *ib.* commento *deest* BCD. 3. vel *pro* nec BCD. 5. recipiet *in marg.* B; caperet CD. 9. id est *pro* et BD. 12. sigle = signale? A. 14. et *pro* id est AC. 16. aliud BD. 18. est *deest* ABCD. 20. esse *deest* A; *ib. after* prius: et aliquid BD; et aliud C. 21. moveatur BD. 26. ad naturam C; *ib.* id est B; incorpoream ACD. 27. quod tale BCD. 29. secundum *pro* primum C. 33. quo *pro* aliquo D. 33–34. aliquo — modo *deest* AC. 35. contingenter ABC. 37. quid CD; *ib.* accidet D.

forms supervene only on complete substances.

distinccionem pro forma inherente. Verumtamen non est dare aliquod subiectum per se quod vocatur a philosophis ens in actu, cui accidat prima forma substancialis; et solum talis forma, accidens rei in actu, que prius naturaliter est *quid*, vocatur forma accidentalis alicuius novem generum.

Every form implies a subject; if absolutely potential, the form gives something substantial to its subject; if the subject be actual already, what it adds is accidental.

Et patet quomodo intelligendus est commentator 7° Methaphysice, commento 4° et 5°, ubi dicit *quamlibet formam esse disposicionem essencie*; et formam principiantem substanciam vocat *disposicionem substancialem;* formam autem presupponentem quiditatem substancie, vocat disposicionem accidentalem. Omnes enim forme in natura presupponunt subiectum, et in hoc conveniunt quod quelibet est contingens, vel accidentaliter adveniens subiecto; ut patet 7° Metaphysice, commento 8°. Patet eciam quomodo intelligitur commentator 7° Methaphysice, commento 18° quod "*si materia prima haberet de se aliquam formam, nullam substancialem reciperet; quia omne quod advenit enti in actu est accidens.*" Tales sunt multe proposiciones antiquitus famose, quarum sensus expositus est propinquus per se notis.

If it be said that the receptivity possessed by matter is a form, and therefore we have a complete substance generated: I reply that every form implies both the subject *and* the thing produced which the subject underlies. Nor can we suppose that in the interval between the arrival of one form and the disparition of the other, matter does not exist; for it exists as the subject of the change taking place. We cannot conceive movement save as being in something actual and permanent.

Et si queratur quid generatur tali forma receptiva, si est generaliter passiva, dicitur quod claudit contradiccionem aliquam talem formam esse, nisi denominet subiectum, et aliquod generari formaliter; et illud est substancia, que in fine est primo completa. Illa enim successive et partibiliter generatur. Et si instetur quod talis substancia interim non est, ergo non subiectat generacionem; negatur assumptum, quia est tam secundum naturam quam secundum partem quantitativam. Et sic habet *esse* successivum dum est in *generari*, secundum quod *esse* subiectat generacionem huiusmodi successivam. Verumtamen inpossibile est motum esse, nisi innitatur alicui fixo, habenti *esse* permanens; et ista essencia denominatur *moveri* dicta generacione, denominante *dictam substanciam* generari; et ita *generari*, vel generacio de-

1. distribucionem BD. 3. illa *pro* prima BCD. 4. forma est A. 5. quod AD. 15—17. 8°—18° *deest* BD. 15. 14to D. 17. primo C. 19. in *deest* C. 20. proposiciones philosophice BD; habite C; *ib.* antiquitate D; *ib.* quia C. 21. propinqus A; propinquior BD. 22. queritur BC; *ib.* quar C; *ib.* respectiva ABCD; *ib.* quod *pro* si. 23. generalicio B. 25. et *before* aliquod *deest* AC; *ib.* formaliter *deest* BD. 26. primo est AC. 27. particulariter C. 30. materiam CD; *ib.* qualitativam E. 21. generacione BD. 32. *after* Verumtamen cum BCD. 35, 36. dum cunct dictam causam A. 36. generatur A; generaliter CD; *ib.* vel *deest* D.

nominat subiectum suum proximum specialiter generari. Subiectum autem motus generacionis vel augmentacionis denominat generaliter *maiorari*. Commentator tamen vocat illam generacionem "denominacionem secundum quid"; quia sicud res, quando calescit, non fit, licet fiat calida, sic materia prima induit formam et fit materia ignis, quod est sibi accidentale. Nec tamen est possibile quod materia prima sit formaliter ignis, vel quecunque substancia (loquendo formaliter et univoce), licet sit eadem essencia que est materia, forma, et compositum; ut patebit post, in solucione argumentorum loycalium concernencium istam materiam.

Here we have not absolute but relative generation; a thing heated does not become a thing, but it becomes hot. Other objections will be solved later.

Ex illis potest patere sentencia quam dixi in materia de trinitate, quod in qualibet natura corporea nobis relucet, licet obscure, vestigium trinitatis. Non enim est possibile aliquod esse corpusculum, nisi ipsum habeat essenciam que communiter sit materia, forma, et compositum (vel composicio) simul, sicud essencia divina est pater et filius et spiritus sanctus; ita quod materia correspondet patri, *ex quo* est filius, sicud *ex* materia est forma; forma autem correspondet filio; et amborum composicio correspondet spiritui sancto, qui est amor patris ad filium. Non tamen intelligendum est quod una A 63a persona divina appropriate | causat materiam, et alia appropriate causat formam, cum opera trinitatis sunt ad extra indivisa; quia claudit contradiccionem unam illarum personarum quidquid operari, nisi ipsum sit cooperatum a qualibet earum communiter, verumtamen speciale respresentacione exemplata. Inducit nos materia in cognicionem patris, et forma cognicionem filii, et composicio cognicionem spiritus sancti. Et cum relativorum noticie se mutuo gignunt, patet quod harum naturarum noticia arguit secundarie noticiam alicuius persone colorate.

We see that in all material bodies there is a vestige of the Trinity. Matter is that of which the form and the compound result, as the Father is that of which the Son and the Spirit are; form corresponding to the Son, and the compound to the Spirit; though all three Persons concurred in the creation of each.

2. vel augmentacionis *deest* ABC. 3. autem BD. 4. denominacionem generacionem BD. 6. fiet C; *ib.* sicut D; *ib.* primum ABC; *ib.* et sic *pro* et fit D. 8. forma AC. 11. patet C. 12. 9t'nciu A; 9c'eneciu B. 13. Et ex BD. 14. creatura D. 22. eorundem *pro* correspondet A. 26. quod ABCD. 29. reputacione A; *ib.* Induit AC. 29. in *deest* CD. 33. fcdaie = secundarie A. 33. corroborate B; colo'ata *in marg.* B; corrobete; colorate *in marg.* D.

2. *Motus generacionis.* Generation (or production) is a sort of movement, according to Aristotle. 14. *De Trinitate.* The fourth treatise of the second Book of *De Ente,* not yet published. 34. *Colorate* seems to be nonsense, but I have let it stand, as the other readings are no better.

Yet there is a great difference between the Trinity and its vestige; matter, form and compound are unequal in perfection, and not coeval; the Divine Persons are equal in all things.

A body is not triune but threefold; it is not, like our soul, the image of the Trinity, only its vestige.

Differencia autem magna est in illo vestigio exemplato ad formam trinitatis, cum hic sint due nature, quarum prior est perpetua et imperfecta; secunda est temporalis et priore perfeccior. Tercia autem est perfectissima, et finis utriusque. In hac autem trinitate benedicta nichil est natura prius aut posterius; nichil in bonitate, potencia aut duracione, aut in virtute, inmensitate vel alio attributo magis aut minus: Ideo dicunt doctores sancti quod corpus non est trinum sed triplex, propter ternarium naturarum, que non possunt esse in deo. Non ergo est corpus ymago vel ad ymaginem trinitatis, sicud homo interior, sed vestigium trinitatis, per quod recte philosophantes manuduci possunt ad convincendum deum esse trinum et unum. Et sic possunt demonstrare a signo ex qualibet creatura. Unde contendentes in ista conclusione expediret primo a bassiore incipere, ut a loyca de universalibus et de gradibus individuacionis, a sentencia philosophica de materia, forma, et composito, ac tercio methaphysica entis in communi, cum eius tribus quasi passionibus, scilicet, uno, vero et bono. Tunc enim essent capaces huius doctrine perspicue.

But we ought first to study less sublime matters, and ascend gradually.

CAPITULUM QUINTUM.

A second objection is that either matter and form are not distinct, or we must deny the value of the expositorial syllogism.

Secundo, principaliter instatur per hoc quod innui, quamlibet naturam corpoream esse eque simplicem, et per consequens nec materiam nec formam esse distinctas naturas in corpore. Sequitur enim expositorie: "illa natura singularissima est tam materia quam forma (ut superius innui); ergo materia est forma." Aliter enim pari evidencia diceretur quod nullibi valet silogismus expositorius; et per consequens, cum iste sit principium sylogismi in veritate, periret omnis forma sylogistica.

4. Illa *pro* tercia A. 7. inmensitate *deest* ABCD. 15. concedentes ABC. 16. affiori A; alciori B; abbassiori C; ab alciori D. 18. de *deest* ACD. 20. communibus *pro* quasi BD. 21. Cap. 5 *next line after* doctrine: quamlibet perspicue naturam D; *in marg. in red ink* Boh Dav Wuclefowy nebeske kralewstwye A. 22. Capitulum quintum *deest; initial* S *in red ink* AB. 23. invi^{t} C; innuitur BD. 27. simplicissima D. 28. innuitur BCD. 31. in vero A; quelibet per consequens *pro* in vero C.

30. The expositorial syllogism has all its terms singular, the middle term having the force, though not the form, of universality. Thus: *This man is Lord Salisbury*; *This man is Prime minister of England: Lord Salisbury is Prime minister of Eng-*

Nec valet illud triplex exemplum positum superius ad declarandum defectum huius sylogismi, cum sic induceretur ignotum. Nam essenciam divinam esse trinam solum fide supra vires naturales concipimus. Et secundum exemplum de universalibus videtur esse inprobatum ab Aristotele, et communiter philosophancium ab inicio. Et quoad tercium exemplum de humanitate in Cristo, quod sit persona verbi assumens, communitas scole moderne dicit hoc esse inpossibile. Non igitur manuducuntur per illud triplex exemplum ad negandum sylogismum expositorium, cum multa sunt concedenda in materia de trinitate beata, que sunt neganda in materia creata. Et confirmatur ex hoc quod, si materia et forma sunt due nature distincte, tunc plus differunt quam duo
A 63b individua eiusdem speciei specialissime, quoniam omnia talia sunt eiusdem nature. Si ergo duo individua non possunt ydemptificari in aliquo tercio individuo singulari, multo minus dicte due nature, plus differentes. Sed videtur, cum materia sit substancia longa, lata et profunda, sicud et forma materialis coextensa, quod utrumque sit corpus, et sic duo corpora incommunicancia coextensa sunt. Et per consequens termini predicati de illis naturis tam disparibus forent species ex opposito distincte in genere corporis, cum res per eos signate plus differunt quam homo et asinus; quia illi communicant in proprio genere, non sic autem materia et forma. Nec facit situalis extensio convenienciam in essencia, quia sic beatus extensus cum celo, subiectum cum accidente, vel unum unius generis cum alio, faceret convenienciam in natura. Nec facit convenienciam quoad illud compositum, quia tunc dicerentur partes eterogenee, sicud elementa specie distincta. Ymmo, secundum philosophos, ex substancia et accidente est unum agregatum compositum.

For the examples above given explain the unknown by the unknown. The Trinity is a mystery of faith; the reality of universals is denied by most philosophers; and the doctrine of Christ's humanity being the Word is also generally rejected.

If matter and form are two distinct natures, they differ more than two individuals of the same species.

Both being extended things, they are bodies; thus two very different bodies occupy the same part of space; which occupation by no means implies their forming one compound,

of which they would be merely heterogeneous parts.

2, 3. sit inducere A. 3. per ignocius CD; per ignorans ABC. 4. fides AC. 5. esse *deest* B. 6. per communitatem C; zquire D. 7. ab recco B; ab r'teo D. 8. personam B; *ib.* ut communitas BD. 11. non sunt A. 12. sed *pro* que ABCE. 12, 13. in materia creata *deest* AD. 13. et *before* confirmatur *deest* BD. 15. specificative A. 16. sunt *deest* D. 18. magis B. 19. quod materia cum ABC. 24. distinccione D; *ib.* prius ABC. 25. conveniunt BC. 29. faceret ad ABC. 30. inconvenienciam AC. 31. integrat idem *pro* illud BCD; *ib.* differunt BCD. 32. specifice B. 33. fit D.

land. It is called the principle or basis of all syllogisms, because every syllogism may be supposed to be made up of a number of these.

Answer. Neither matter nor form nor compound is identical one with another, though they form the same essence.

Ad illud dicitur quod necesse est eamdem essenciam singularem esse materiam, formam, et compositum ex hiis; et tamen nullum eorum est reliquum formaliter. Pro cuius declaracione necesse est prelibatam sentenciam de universalibus et distinccione formarum accidentalium supponere, quia aliter non caperetur sentencia philosophorum in hac parte. Quibus suppositis cum sentencia supra dicta de materia prima, oportet *primo* notare distinccionem nature, *secundo*, oportet notare distinccionem de simplicitate, et *tercio* ponere distinccionem sive differenciam inter materiam et formam substancialem: quibus habitis, patebit responsio.

We shall first note the various senses of the word *nature*, then those of *simplicity;* and finally, point out the distinction between matter and form.

Nature has seven significations. (1) It means any essence whatever.

Pro quo notandum secundum philosophum, 5° Methaphysice, cap. 1°, quod "*natura*" est equivocum ad septem. *Primo* namque omnis essencia vel substancia dicitur natura; et sic anoloyce competit deo et cuicunque per se in genere, scilicet, ut dictum est de substancia.

(2) It is taken for *substance* in the first category.

Secundo, accipitur pro re per se in primo predicamento, sive fuerit substancia corporea, sive incorporea, sive universalis, sive singularis. Et isto modo loquitur communiter scola theologorum de natura angelica et humana, cum ceteris naturis substanciarum. Et sic loquitur commentator 11° Methaphysice, commento 4to, vocando humanitatem naturam hominis; et illo modo dicunt theologi humanitatem integram, constitutam ex corpore et anima, esse assumptam a Verbo, ut patet in simbolo et per Augustinum, 83 questionum, questione 81, et alibi in multis locis. Natura sic accepta est contraccior quam natura primo modo dicta.

(3) For *matter,* (4) for *form;*

Tercio modo dicitur natura, vel creatura, pro materia; et *quarto* modo pro forma; ut patet secundo physicorum, et primo. Et ille significaciones sunt equivoce respectu priorum, cum materia non possit de dei potencia esse sine forma, nec forma materialis sine materia.

(5) for whatever action proceeds from nature;

Quinto accipitur natura pro genitura, vel pro nativitate, vel pro quocunque alio motu procedente a natura. Sic enim significant abstracta conformis terminacionis.

(6) for anything resulting from such action;

Sexto modo accipitur essen-

1. nc͠ce = necessitate? A. 3. corpus ABC; cor℮ = eorum *or* corpus D. 4. est superius BCD. 5. et de C. 6. supponere *in marg.* A; *deest* BCD. 9. nature *deest* ACD. 10, 11. distinccionem sive *deest* BC. 16. convenit BCD. 17. scilicet *deest* BD; *ib.* de *deest* D. 23. 7° CD. 26. rem *pro* esse C. 27. q͡onn q͡oue 98^{m} E. 30. capitur *pro* creature BC. 31. et *deest* C. 35. n͡ti^{te} A; natim^{te} B. 37. modo *deest* C.

cialiter vel materialiter pro effectu producto a natura; et *septimo* pro passione consequente speciem.

Pro *secundo* dicitur quod, quot modis dicitur "*compositum*", quod tot modis A 64ª | oppositis potest intelligi "*simplex*". In summo igitur gradu simplicitatis est natura divina, excludens possibilitatem ad quamcunque composicionem ex partibus, vel variacionem in accidentibus; et taliter claudit repugnanciam aliquam creaturam esse simplicem. Et tamen quelibet creatura per se est in genere indivisibilis quoad molem; ut spiritus creatus componitur ex genere et differencia, tanquam suis partibus quiditativis, licet non habeat partes quantitativas; tum eciam quia quelibet creatura est mobilis, cum sit de nichilo. Cristus igitur, qui potest nunc gaudere, nunc tristari de cunctis affectibus et actibus intrinsecus, non est tam simplex ut deus, qui non potest incipere vel desinere sic affici, intelligere, cognoscere, vel velle. In secundo gradu sunt spiritus creati et alia indivisibilia quoad partes quantitativas; ut punctus, instans, et similia. In tercio gradu sunt materia et forme substanciales vel accidentales, non habentes partes quantitativas disparium naturarum. Et sic loquitur auctor sex principiorum, cap. 1° describens formam, dum addit gradum pro differencia, quod est consistens in simplici essencia. In quarto gradu sunt quatuor elementa, quorum quelibet pars quantitativa est eiusdem nature cum toto; in isto gradu sunt multa omogenia, quorum quelibet pars quantitativa per se sensibiliter est eiusdem nature cum suo toto, ut caro, os, nervus et cetera. In talibus enim elementa sunt commixta ultra discrecionem humani sensus. Alie autem sunt significaciones mistice de simplicitate, quas oportet hic propter impertinenciam ob-

and (7) for a specific passivity.

Simple has as many senses as *compound.*

God is supreme and absolute simplicity.

But every creature is in its generic whatness an indivisible thing, consisting only of genus and difference.

The simplicity of Christ's nature is, therefore, less than that of God.

In the second rank are all created spirits and whatever has no quantitative parts.

Matter and form are in the third class of simplicity, each having integral parts, but of the same nature with the whole.

The elements are less simple yet;

2. supplimodo BC. 5. simplicitatis *deest* AB; simplex ABC. 9. quia BDE; *ib.* et *pro* est ACD. 12. sed *pro* licet D; *ib.* tamen C. 13. natura creata BCD; *ib.* est *deest* C. 14. vel *pro* nunc BD. 15. affectionibus BD. 16. potest *deest* BC. 17. afficiere BD; *ib.* velle potest BD. 18. vel *pro* et B; *ib.* intelligibilia AC; vel indivisibilia BDC. 19. in *deest* C. 21. dispariarum *(sic)* C. 22. pu'bior℮ C. 25. elementa tam multa C. 28. suo *deest* BCD. 29. nervus *deest* A; v'nus D. 30. distinccionem B.

18. *Alia indivisibilia.* This would puzzle a modern philosopher, who admits nothing to exist really but mind and matter, the latter certainly divisible. No doubt Wyclif had the Universals in mind when he wrote this. 29. *Caro.* There must here be a gap in all the MSS. For flesh is indubitably a compound body; yet Wyclif seems to be speaking of the elements.

There is also the mystical sense of simplicity, which is opposed to duplicity.

mittere; ut omne creatum quod recte correspondet suo numero indivisibili, eterno, sine obliquitate ad turpitudinem vel inequalitatem, vocatur simplex spiritualiter. Job II, 3 Sic enim beatus Job commendatus est de simplicitate excludente duplicitatem cordis. Sermo suus fuit *est, est, non, non,* iuxta doctrinam Salvatoris Matth. quinto; et Matth. V, 37 sic commendatur simplicitas oculi interioris hominis Mt. 6° *Si oculus tuus fuerit simplex;* et quidquid fuerit Matth. VI, 22 *sine plica* mendacitatis vel dolositatis dicitur mistice *simplex*. Unde simplex ethimologice dicitur quasi *sine plica*.

Now the distinction between matter and form is that the former *is* the fundamental essence, *qua* capable of of receiving any form, and of generating it; and the latter *is* that essence, *qua* generable in matter and apt with it to produce the complete substances.

Istis duabus significacionibus habitis, dicitur quod cuilibet possessori veritatis est patula distinccio inter materiam primam et formam materialem, licet utraque habeat eandem essenciam pro fundamento. Nam aliud est datam essenciam esse ipsam, ut sit ignis, vel alia substancia, et aliud est eam esse actualiter ignem vel talem substanciam, cum ipsa prima veritas sit materia, et secunda, forma. Patet differencia, cum materia sit perpetua, ingenerabilis, cuiuscunque speciei forme materialis sustentiva et susceptiva, ut presuppositum est in natura. Econtra autem est forma ex tali materia generabilis, ex cuius disposicione indivisibili et secundum formam est substancia, formaliter et actualiter, *illud quid*. Secundum materiam autem non est *illud quod est*, sed est in potencia ut sit illud; et sic de quotlibet

I suppose that those who deny accidental forms must also deny substantial forms and primal matter.

differenciis quas philosophi exquisite discuciunt. Verumtamen reor quod quicunque negaverit formam accidentalem communiter, et forte evidencius negare debet materiam primam | et quamlibet materialem formam A 64b substancialem.

Sed quia non de talibus est nobis sermo, ex supposicione et prefacione superius premissis, patet cuicunque professori veritatis predicta distinccio; et patet evidencia in qua deducti sunt philosophi ad concedendum materiam primam esse potenciam, ut patet 1° physicorum. Nam cum materia sit natura abstracta, fundata in

1. recte *deest* D. 3. equalitatem AC. 4. Joh. ABC. 5. simplicitatem *pro* duplicitatem BD. 6. quinto *deest* ACD. 7. communiter A; *ib.* hominis *deest* CD. 8. etc. BD; *ib.* et breviter BCD. 9. plica *deest* A; *ib.* mendacitate A; *ib.* dolositate A. 12. veritatis *deest* D. 14. eandem *deest* AC. 15. ipsam *pro* in potencia A. 17. illa *pro* ipsa B. 19. indivisibilis ABC. 20. subiectiva *pro* susceptiva AC; *ib.* et *pro* ut C. 21. est *deest* C. 22. indisposicione ABC. 23. illud *deest* D. 24. quid *deest* B; *ib.* idem C; aut C; *ib.* est *deest* C. 29, 30. mlem forlem sbalem AC. 33. et *deest* C; *ib.* premissa B. 34. traducti B; inducti C. 37. natura AC.

essencia, est illud quo essencia est formaliter formalis. Unde Augustinus, qui profundius scrutatus est istam materiam in *De vera religione*, 35°, postquam probaverat mundum esse creatum, eo quod fiebat ex inferiori materia, sic scribit de dicta materia: "*Bonum est*", inquit, "*esse formatum nonnullum, igitur bonum est ut capacitas forme; et ideo omnium bonorum auctor, qui prescivit formam, ipse scivit eciam posse eam formari.*" Et idem plane patet, *De fide et simbolo*, cap. 1°; et communiter ubi loquitur de materia. Ex istis premissis, patet quod illa essencia que est tam materia quam forma, pro illo instanti nature vel mensura prior est naturaliter, quia non actualiter forma sive simplex sine composicione parcium diversarum naturarum; sed pro quocumque instanti nature vel temporis quo habet formam substancialem pro actu quo ponitur in *esse* generis, componitur ex diversis naturis, et cadit in proporcionalem composicionem.

Augustine's doctrine is that as it is good for something having a form to exist, it is also good that the receptivity of that form should exist.

The simple essence, therefore, which is matter and form, is prior in nature to either, but when it has this form or that, it is no longer simple, but a compound.

Conceditur igitur quod illa essencia, quandocunque est, est composita ex naturis disparibus; per consequens componitur perpetue ex disparibus naturis, cum claudit contradiccionem illam esse, nisi fuerit formata.

We therefore grant that at any time of its existence it is composite.

Ad primam dicitur quod oppositum sequitur, cum homo secundum naturam corpoream sit compositiva pars mundi quo ad diversitatem naturarum; quod innuit nobis Moyses recitans nobis hominem secundum corpus ultimo factum, nedum quia homo debet dominari toti nature corruptive, sed quia presupponit ad eius composicionem alias species corporearum rerum. Et ideo signanter ponit Moyses hominem secundum tempus ultimo productum. Et si forte anima fuerit primo pro-

Man in his bodily nature is the most complex being in the universe, as we see by the testimony of Moses.

1, 2. fudał ut =|a B; fundamentalis C; fundabilis D; ut essencia CD. 1. essencia *after* quo *deest* C; *ib.* formabilis B. 3. regili°ᵉ D; *ib.* patva't AD; p'va't D. 4. fuisse CD. 5. boni ABC. 6. ut sit BD. 8. prestitit BC; *ib.* fecit BCD; *ib.* eam *deest* ACD. 9. scivit; patet *above, in red ink* A; dicitur BC. 10. consequenter AC. 11. illa est B. 12, 13. mensuratur illa prioritate naturali B; prioritatis naturalis est *deest* CD. 13. qua B; *ib.* sic B. 17, 18. *after* proporcionalem: universalem D. 19. quecunque ABD. 20. est *before* composita *deest* ACD; *ib.* et per BC. 24. compositiva ACD. 25. quod ad A; *ib.* diversitatem diversarium B; *ib.* quod *deest* ABD. 26. veritates notabiles *pro* recitans nobis AC.

2. *Essencia.* I am not sure whether the word *forma* ought not to be added after *essencia.* 13. *Sine.* This might be changed to *sive*, but the sense is not clear with either reading. Every form is and must be simple; as it stands, the sentence is a pleonasm, but not an inconsistency.

ducta, cum spirituali celo, natura tamen componens hominem ex tot manieribus corporum, preexigit preparacionem componencium; nec introduceret hominem in perfectum dominum in orbem, nisi preparato dominio preparacionis. Talem igitur subtilem et decentem originem nature innuit nobis Moyses per faccionem sexto die.

The essence of a body is simple in the aforesaid sense, and is nevertheless made up of matter and form, so that the same essence possesses the two diverse qualities of *being able to have* a given form, and of *actually having it.*

Therefore, in all but the first sense of the word, the essence is neither matter, form, nor compound; but in the first sense it is.

Redeundo ad propositum, patet ex predictis de simplicitate, essenciam corpoream esse simplicem suo modo, et tamen compositam ex diversis naturis, ut materia et forma; (non quod materia haberet appropriate locum suum, sicud res que possunt per se existere quantitative, componentes aliquod tercium qualitative intelligendo), quod eidem essencie insunt hec duo: *posse* suscipere quamcunque formam materialem, et *habere* actualiter eamdem formam. In elemento igitur est talis essencia simplicior, et in mixto est composicior, cum sit quelibet natura corporea que est substancia, saltem illa communis. Et sic, quando dicitur quod ista natura singu | larissima est tanquam forma, oportet intelligere (A 65[a]) naturam primo modo dictam, ut pure dicit essenciam; quia accipiendo naturam secundo modo pro substancia per se in genere, aut tercio vel quarto modo quo parte qualificativa rei, non est verum quod talis natura est materia forma et composicio; sed ista natura que est communis essencia, est ille tres nature; scilicet; materia, et forma, et compositum. Nam, ut dictum est supra, Deus pro primo instanti temporis cognoscit essenciam cui inseparabiliter inest, quod ipsa est capax cuiuscumque forme substantialis corporee; et illa capacitas est materia prima. Quando autem est actualiter aqua, ignis vel aliquid talium corporum universi, tunc inest sibi forma substancialis, que est *illam esse* ignem (vel aliam speciem corporis). Si igitur queratur que essencia est, *illam esse capacem* cuiuscumque talis forme, aut que essencia est, *illam eamdem essenciam esse actualiter* ignem vel tale aliquod formaliter, non invenitur nisi prima pura essencia demonstrata, cui iste due nature insunt, scilicet,

What is there common to this *capacity for receiving* a form, and to this *actuality of having* it, save the pure abstract essence of the thing?

1. composicionis CD. 2. extat AC. 3. introducet ACD. 4. Dini[m] D; *ib.* Dmo͡ AC; Dini° D. 4, 5. nisi d'mo preparacionis BD. 5. ec[ne] (ce[ne]?) *pro* originem A; ordinem B. 9. componi CD. 12. quantitative *deest* D. 13. integrando A; *ib.* et hec C. 14. dandam D; *ib.* ex *pro* in A. 16. compositum D; *ib.* sic *pro* cum sit D. 18. materia D. 19. simplicissima *corr. below* D; *ib.* intelligi BD. 20. dicat D. 23. qualitativa ABC. 23—24. materia natura forma esset composicior A. 25. ter minus C. 26. composicio BCD. 27. produxit *pro* cognoscit BC; *deest* D. 28. nſe͡ *pro* inest D. 32. capacitatem ABD.

esse in potencia ad actum et *esse actualiter* quid huiusmodi. Hec itaque duo eidem essencie singulari fundamentaliter insunt, sicut eidem homini inest *esse risibile,* quod est passio corporea, et *esse intellectivum,* quod est passio incorporea; quia, cum dicte due nature (scilicet potencia et actus) non presupponunt illam essenciam ut *quid*, sed ut ens creatum absolutum possibile per se esse; ideo non sunt passiones vel accidencia alicuius novem generum. Unde, sicut aliud est *esse risibile* et aliud est *esse intellectivum,* licet eidem essencie insunt; sic aliud est materia que est *illam essenciam esse in potencia ut sit ignis,* et aliud est eadem forma, que est *eamdem essenciam esse actualiter ignem.*

In this they both inhere, as the ability to laugh and the ability to understand inhere in the same man, without being the same one with the other.

Et patet quomodo talis natura vel substancia equivoce dicitur natura vel substancia respectu tocius compositi. Et patet plane quod talis essencia est communis ad *illam esse in potencia* et ad *illam esse actualiter* illud, quorum primum est materia, et secundum forma.

We cannot, therefore, call such an essence a 'nature', or a substance, in the same sense as we call the compound so.

Ex quo clare sequitur ulterius quod non valet paraloysmus vocatus expositorius, cuius medium est commune ad utrumque extremum. Nec est color ex isto quod nullibi valet syloysmus expositorius; ut nullus literatus negabit istum esse paraloysmum: *Leccio mea hodierna est me legere, et leccio mea hesterna est me legere: igitur leccio mea hesterna est leccio mea hodierna.* Correspondenter, dato *esse* illo (quod est, essencia demonstrata), est commune ad *esse* ignem et aquam vel quodlibet corporum reliquorum.

This clearly shows the fallacy of the so-called expositorial syllogism. It does not follow that no expositorial syllogism is valid; but there are syllogisms, expositorial in form, that no one could possibly admit.

Item, non sequitur quod iste forme non distinguuntur, licet eadem sit essencia. Et si asseritur quod tot sunt materie prime, quot sunt forme sensibiles (quia tot sunt potencie; et per consequens, cum forma corruptiva desinat esse potencia, sequitur quod materie prime sunt corruptibiles): hic dicitur quod materia prima dicit datam puram essenciam, et capacitatem in genere ad quamcunque formam substancialem corpoream; ideo, in qualibet huiusmodi essencia, est una materia adequata.

Nor does it follow that various forms do not differ, because they are based on the same common essence. If it be said that there must be as many primal matters as there are forms, we point out that matter is the pure essence *qua* capable of receiving *any* forms.

2. due nature due essencie D. 3. essenciale *pro* esse risibile ACD. 4. est *pro* esse D. 7. ois (eis?) *pro* ut ens A; ut eis C. 8. esse *deest* D. 8. aliquid D; *ib.* visibile A. 10. essencie *deest* C. 14, 15. valde equivoce BC. 23. est *pro* valet ABC. 24. mea *deest* D. 26. mea *before* hodierna *deest* BCD. 27. datam rem esse *pro* dato esse illo BD; dato rem esse quod C. 30. Ideo BD; *ib.* quin BCD; *ib.* non *deest* BD. 31. arguitur BD. 37. in genere corpoream B.

Yet if we consider primal matter as the essence with its relation to form, this too is true, and has been ably defended, whether we admit that such kinds of primal matter may disappear from existence, or not.

Inveniuntur subtilissimi expositores, ut Magister Valtherus Burley et alii, qui dicunt quod materia prima potest dicere datam essenciam cum disposicione vel potencia ad datam formam; | et sic sunt tot materie prime que dicuntur agregate ex essencia et relacione, quot sunt forme in potencia. Et sic intelligunt Aristotelem, 5° methaphysica, 5°, quod unumquodque corporum sit ex propria materia. Nec sequitur quod talis materia possit corrumpi, cum semper manet ad recipiendam formam; sicud patet ampliantibus verba. Illi autem qui non ampliant ista verba, non est inconveniens sed consonum quod materia propinqua agregata ex materia prima et disposicione huiusmodi relativa corrumpatur secundum partem, disposione huiusmodi corupta; forma ergo variatur ad variacionem temporis sue generacionis, ut dictum est in materia *de individuacione*. Sed remota materia, manet eadem (in numero scilicet) essencia. A 65b

I am accused of proving the unknown by what is more unknown; but even in Aristotle's time it was known that the Universal is common to all its subjects. Now it is not so, and men are driven to affirm that matter and form are self-existent.

Et quoad illud obiectum de induccione, ignotum per ignocius, dicitur quod olym tempore Aristotelis fuit notum cuicunque, quod universale est commune cuicunque eius supposito. Et per illam consideracionem loycam dispositi erant loyci ad cognoscendum materiam et formam ydemptificari in eadem essencia; modo autem, propter inmersionem in singularibus, reputatur illud esse inpossibile. Et inconvenienter dicitur (cum pudet negare materiam et formam substancialem) quod quelibet materia vel forma substancialis potest per se existere; cum sint nature integre, coextense, ponentes absolutas essencias condistinctas, quia modicus error in principiis abducit distancius a via veritatis. Nego ergo quod intencio Aristotelis est negare universalia ex parte rei.

The Holy Trinity is the cause of the threefold entity of matter, form

Quoad illud dictum de trinitate increata, certum est quod illa eadem trinitas, essencia ydemtifica, est causa quare materia et forma et composicio sunt eadem

1, 2. Walterq de Wyroloy C. 2. de burley BDE. 5. agregata C. 7. commento B. 8. forma materia A; *ib.* nam *or* non *pro* nec D. 9. maneat B; *ib.* retinendam B. 10. sic AC. 15. sine CD. 17. sicud BCD. 18. dicitur D; *ib.* individuacione A. 19. obiectum *pro* olym A. 20, 21. unicuique D. 23. potenciam *pro* formam AC. 24. inversionem B. 25. hinc convenienter D. 27. natura *pro* materia AC. 28. extense D. 29. absolutas *deest* D. 30. principio CD. 34. illa *deest* D; *ib.* ydemptica A; ydemptifica B. 35. eadem *deest* A.

16. Probably *De Individuatione Temporis* or *De Tempore* (6th Tractate of Book 1rst of *De Ente*) not yet published.

singularis essencia. Et quia hodie necessitati sumus ex fide (saltem vocatenus) illud concedere, ideo ipsum est nobis medium ad removendum illud quod olim fuit a philosophis famosissime acceptatum. Nec est possibile invenire defectum argumenti in materia theoloyca, quin conformem contingit reperire in materia creata, cum ex effecta manuducti possumus demonstrare a signo posteriori ad convincendum deum esse trinum.

and compound, we must grant this, and every argument against my doctrine is an attack upon the Trinity.

Quoad tercium exemplum, certum est quod illud fuit tempore Aristotelis et usque incarnacionem veritatis ignoratum, et est hodie a communitate theologorum verbaliter negatum. Ideo non induci illud [ut] nobis nocius ad notificandum dictam trinitatem de materia et forma substancie; sed iuxta posui tanquam posterius declarandum, ut evidencius detur sibi fides pro loco sue declaracionis in eadem essencia singulari ymaginata, ut in confirmacione tangitur quod sunt due nature integre, habentes proprias essencias coextense; quod tamen est inpossibile, ut post patebit.

As to Christ's incarnation, it was certainly unknown of old times, and I brought it forward merely as an illustration.

Ulterius, quoad confirmacionem, dicitur quod sicud materia et forma non sunt per se in genere, sic nec differunt differencia per se in genere, sed differencia extra genus. Ut, cum potencia et actus dividunt totum genus entis ex opposito, ut patet 9° methaphysice 2^c, cum omnis potencia, secundum commentatorem, forma dicitur, videtur mihi quod materia et forma plus differunt differencia racionis quam quecunque supposita eiusdem generis, licet conveniant in eodem supposito singulari essencialiter. Prima pars patet eo quod iste sunt raciones plus dispares: naturam substancie *posse* in quamcunque formam substancialem, et illam *esse* actualiter formatam, quam sunt raciones individuorum eiusdem generis; cum omne genus predicamentale secundum quodlibet eius suppositum dividitur sic in potenciam et actum, ut ponit philosophus, ubi supra. |

Matter and form differ more than any subject of the same genus, but by a logical difference only, like potentiality and actuality which is a cross division applicable to the whole of Being.

1. singulariter A. 6. cum *deest* AC. 7. manuduci C: *ib.* asig° A. 9. quod *pro* fuit A. 10. veritatem incarnacionis B. 11. ignoratam C. 12. ut *deest* ABCD. 13, 14. nobis nocius *deest* AC. 15. ad declarandam BD. 18. existencias D; *ib.* co *deest* BD. 21. non C. 23. totum *deest* ABC. 28. subiecto *pro* supposito D. 29. essencialiter in BCD. 31. et in C. 35. et in B.

15. *Declarandum.* In Wyclif's *De Benedicta Incarnatione*, already published (edited by E. Harris). The present work is therefore anterior.

This does not hinder their being one in the same subject, and thence the union of Deity and humanity is credible to us. The argument which would identify matter with form, because each has three dimensions in space, is worthless. Mere occupation of space is not substantiality; but self-subsistence is. It is against all philosophy to make of matter and form two species of substances.

Et tamen in quacunque substancia sunt illa idem A 66ᵃ essencialiter, ut qualitas et relacio, licet differant in genere, tamen sunt idem subiecto. Et unio naturarum tam disparium in eodem supposito inducit philosophos ad credendum possibilitatem unionis nature divine et humane in eodem supposito. Nec valet sequens argumentum consimile de ydemptificacione; nec sequitur quod dicte nature sunt formaliter corpora, etsi sunt longe, late, et profunde; quia corpus de genere substancie preexigit cum illa condicione, se esse substanciam, id est, de primo genere per se potentem existere; quod non potest competere formaliter alteri istarum naturarum. Illi autem qui solum attendunt ad terminos concedunt quod forma substancialis corporea et materia prima sunt due species substancie: quod est contra philosophiam, ut postea patebit.

CAPITULUM SEXTUM.

The third objection is against the formlessness and simplicity of our 'created essence'. Formless in this theory, it must have some form or other, if it be an entity and created; it could not be utterly without goodness, beauty, and order. Granted it is threefold, as I say; then it is not simple, but composite; and if matter is that essence, then matter is both matter, form and compound.

Tercio principaliter argumentatur contra sepe dicta de informitate materie vel simplicitate essencie create. Videtur enim quod claudit contradiccionem essenciam talem esse informem; quia eo ipso quod est, est formata; et eo quod est formata, non est informis. Confirmatur tripliciter, *primo* ex hoc quod quelibet talis essencia semper est formata et aliquando est informis: igitur simul est formata et informis. *Item*, quam cito creata est a spiritu sancto, tam cito est bona, pulcra et ordinata; et quam primo est huiusmodi est formata; igitur, quam primo est a spiritu sancto est formata, igitur simul est formata et informis. Sed quam primo naturaliter est ens ab essencia divina, est bonum a persona patris, est bonum a persona filii, est eciam bonum similiter a persona spiritus sancti: ergo non prius naturaliter est essencia quam bonum. *Item*, si essencia talis communis sit materia, forma et compositum tunc ipso est compositum, et per consequens est

1. sint C. 2. q̃uas A; *ib.* differunt A. 5. unionis *deest* D. 6. ut *pro* nec C; *ib.* videtur *pro* valet AC. 8. sint BC. 11. et rem *pro* id est A. 13. actum dicunt *pro* attendunt AC. 16. patebit, etc. C; *in fine cap.* haha *in red ink* A; capitulum sextum *deest* A; *initial* T *in red ink* B. 22. Igitur BD; etc. D. 25. similiter ABC. 26. creatura B. 29. igitur—sed *deest* AD; *ib.* sicut D. 35. tunc—et *deest* BC.

res composita, quia essencia composita (ex quo sequitur quod tam materia quam forma est compositum ex materia et forma). Non igitur est dare tres naturas distinctas, secundum quas essencia est triplex, modo quo ponitur; sed sequitur quod tam materia quam forma est compositum ex seipsa.

I answer (1) that matter cannot exist without form, yet (2) it must exist without form in some measure. (1) For every being by the fact that it is created, requires some form, some determination; and matter requires a substantial form whereby it should be a substance. Otherwise it could not exist for a single instant of time.

Hic dicitur quod, sicud materia prima non potest esse de dei potencia, nisi actuata fuerit vel formata, sic non potest esse, nisi pro aliqua mensura sit informis. Patet prima pars ex hoc, cum non possit esse, nisi fuerit a tota trinitate, et per consequens ordinata, moderata, vel formosa; cum igitur *esse* tale ponit formam analogam (ut patet sepe per Augustinum) sequitur prima pars. Nec solum sequitur materiam primam de quanto est creata, esse formatam forma analoga extra genus, sed et forma substanciali contrahente ad genus substancie; quia non posset manere per tempus vel istans temporis, nisi esset quanta, situata et quotlibet accidentibus talibus accidentata; et omnia talia accidencia presupponunt substanciam; que sit aliquid cui formaliter inexistant, ut patet ex dictis tercio capitulo. Ergo materia prima, cum non possit esse pro tempore vel instanti temporis, nisi sit forma substanciali actuata (aliter enim posset esse cum hoc quod non esset aliquid, eo quod non est quid, nisi per formam substancialem) quamvis ergo prius naturaliter sit essencia bona, vera, antequam forma substanciali actuata; illa tamen prioritas nature non implicat quod talis essencia possit manere cum hoc quod non esset aliqua forma substanciali formata: ut patet generaliter de prioritate nature subiecti ad suam passionem, et multis similibus in quibus inest naturalis prioritas quoad causacionem, et non quoad
A 66b consequenciam, ut | vere dicit Aristoteles in capitulo *De priori*.

(2) *In some measure* signifies natural priority, by which one thing is in its nature before another.

Et secunda pars conclusionis requirit convenienciam in loyca in significationibus terminorum; ut, si aliquid sit natura prius quam reliquum, tunc est dare mensuram vel gradum prioritatis naturalis, materialis, vel instans

9. nec B. 10. posset BD. 11. foret D. 12. omne BD. 14. solum *deest* ACD; *in marg.* B. 15. esse *twice* C. 20. sic alicui *pro* sit aliquid cui AC; *ib.* formaliter *deest* ACD. 23. esset D. 26. natura D; *ib.* est D. 27—29. substanciali—substanciali *deest* D. 30. substancie D. 31. est *pro* inest BD. 34. prioritate BD. 36. *after* loyca et *pro* in B; *ib.* in sermonibus C. 38. gradus C; *ib.* instantes *pro* instans ACD.

To be without form means to be capable of form and naturally prior thereto, since I understand the words in this signification.

And thus it is clear that primal matter being capable of capable of form and naturally prior thereto, exists in some measure without form, or independently of it. This I call an instant not of time, but of nature; and in that instant matter exists without form.

nature (que omnia in idem sonant) secundum quam mensuram unum est prius reliquo in natura. In hoc enim nullus qui non wult gratis contendere dissentit in animo. *Secundo*, suppono quod *esse informe* significat rem formabilem sine forma substanciali existere pro aliqua mensura pro qua non formatur forma substanciali. Patet quod supposicio debet admitti, cum nomen sit vox significativa ad placitum; et sic utuntur auctores termino, ut patebit. Istis duobus suppositis, patet *tercio*, quod materia prima non possit esse, nisi prius esset naturaliter substancialiter formabilis quam formata, cum ideo est formata quia formabilis. Ergo, iuxta primam supposicionem est mensura naturalis, vel instans nature, pro quo est formabilis, et non pro illo est formata. Si enim pro isto instanti nature esset substancialiter formata, tunc pro illo non esset prius naturaliter formabilis quam formata. Ergo, iuxta secundam supposicionem, materiam esse informem dicit illam pro aliqua mensura pro qua non formatur. Patet quod sequitur ex posicione quod materia prima, pro illo instanti nature pro quo est formabilis et non formatur, sit informis. Unde Augustinus, 8° super Gen. 19°: "*Deus format materiam primam quam nec alius nec ullus, sed omnino ipse informem at formabilem instituit, ut formacionem suam non tempore, sed origine, preveniret.*" Nec aliter Deus posset scire se creaturum mundum, vel creacionem eius fore, vel *non esse* mundi precedere suum *esse*. Et patet secunda pars conclusionis.

Thus the objection supposes what is impossible, viz., that "because matter is always formed it is not without form"; in order to receive a form, it must *previously* be formless. Of course matter, in what measure soever it is actually formed, is not formless;

Et patet quod minor argumenti principalis est impossibilis, scilicet, "eo ipso quod materia prima est formata, non est informis"; quia necesse est eam esse formatam ex prima parte conclusionis, et necesse est eam esse informem ex secunda parte conclusionis eiusdem. Ideo planum est istam reduplicativam esse impossibilem: "*eo ipso quod materia prima est formata non est informis*"; cum non possit esse formata, nisi prius sit informis. Verumtamen bene sequitur ut neces-

2. naturam B. 3. ᴐcede' D; *ib.* in *deest* AC. 5. formalem ACD; *ib.* sine *above in red ink* A; *deest* BD. 9. terminorum C; *ib.* ptcbt (pccbt?) 11. naturaliter *deest* D; *ib.* formalis AC. 11, 12. formabilis—formabilis *in marg.* E. 12. cum ergo BD; *ib.* per D. 14. formalis ACD; *ib.* et materia BD. 16. est *pro* non esset AC. 19. expositorie BD. 21. formalis ACD. 26. se se BD; *ib.* pcactm² *pro* creaturum D. 30. scilicet *deest* D; *ib.* cum est BD. 32. et *deest* ABC. 37. quod ut C.

sarium quod, si materia prima pro aliqua mensura sit formata, tunc pro illa mensura non est informis; sed non sequitur: "materia prima pro nulla mensura temporis est informis, ergo non est informis."

but a measure of time can be distinguished from that of nature.

Per hoc patet responsio ad confirmacionem primam. Nam supposito quod aliquando ille terminus "aliquando" limitetur iuxta famosius significatum, quod significet mensuram temporalem, patet quod minor est neganda, cum non pro mensura temporis, sed pro mensura nature, que est prior omni mensura temporis, est informis.

If we limit *aliquando,* as it usually is limited, to mean time, then we simply deny that matter is formless in that sense.

Et ille est sensus Augustini, 12° de *Confessione*, ubi, priusquam declarat angelum et materiam primam esse creaturam dei, et per consequens mutabilem, non eternum, licet utrumque sit supra tempus, sic recapitulat assertive: "*Istis consideratis, quantum donas, deus meus, quantum me ad pulsandum excitas; quantum aperis pulsanti! Duo recipio que fecisti carencia temporis, cum tamen tibi neutrum coeternum sit. Unum quod ita for-*
A 67ª *matum sit, ut sine ullo* | *defectu contemplacionis, sine ullo intervallo immutacionis, quamvis mutabile, tamen non mutatum, tua eternitate atque incommutabilitate perfruatur; alterum quod ita informe erat ut ex qua forma in quam formam, vel stacionis vel mocionis, mutaretur cui ipsi subderetur non haberet; sed hoc ut informe esset non reliquisti, quoniam fecisti omnem diem in principio celum et terram, et hec duo que dicebam.*"

A quotation from Augustine's Confessions.

Intencio huius sancti est, ut patet quotlibet locis illius libri, quod materia prima creata est a deo pro mensura nature, non temporis, informis, et post naturaliter primo die ordinis formata luce corporea, id est forma: Et hoc asserit spiritum sanctum (significare) per veram proposicionem, Gen. 1° "*In principio creavit deus celum et terram*"; id est: *In verbo creavit deus spiritualem creaturam et corpoream.* Unde ordinate et mirabili subtilitate communiter eandem creaturam vocat

Explanation of this passage. The book of Genesis, in order to be understood, calls matter by the names of earth, water, abyss, which give the idea of formlessness, and says it was without form, void, and dark.

1. si—sit *deest* D. 3. illa *pro* nulla AC. 3, 4. *after* temporis non est AC. 6. aliquando *after* terminus *deest* AC. 7. limitate BD. 7, 8. famosiores significet mensuram BD. 12. ca° 12°; *above* primo BD. 13. declaravit BC; *ib.* primam *deest* D. 16. donat BD. 17. excusad, *(very illegible)* A; expulsandum *in marg.;* accusandum B. 18. carencia; correspondencia *below* D; *ib.* temporibus ABCD; temporis *in marg.* B. 22. 19mutate A. 23. c'at A. 25. ipi A; *ib.* subde'r B; sed habet ABD; *ib.* non informe C. 26. quin ABD. 31. in *pro* id est ACD. 32. ex *pro* et AC; *ib.* sentire CD. 34. et *pro* id est ABCD. 36. eandem tempore D.

dictam essenciam corpoream (sub racione qua est materia) *terram, aquam* et *abissum*, quia rudis populus non sufficiebat comprehendere naturam corpoream sub racione qua materia; ideo necesse habuit illam exprimere nominibus rerum sensibilium, que maxime accidunt ad informitatem. Nec false nominat, ut post dicetur; et ad testandum eius informitatem dicit eam inanem, vacuam et tenebrosam. Dicte autem privaciones non sunt nisi informitates materie huius. Post hoc (natura non tempore) facta est, prima die ordinis, lux in forma substanciali in primo instanti temporis et materia naturaliter, non temporaliter, ante idem instans.

Light signified substantial form created afterwards, not in time, but as a natural sequence.

Aristotle here agrees with Augustine.

When was matter formless? never in time, for that is a mode of being not measured by time.

Hec exposicio sancti Augustini cum illa eciam sentencia concordat Aristotelem 1° physicorum. "*Materia,*" inquit, "*se habet priusquam accipiat formam.*" Patet illa ex racione et scriptura cum testimonio illorum duorum philosophorum Augustini et Aristotelis quod oportet ut dicta materia sit informis. Et si queritur quando? dicitur quod nunquam; cum sic supra tempus est, sed pro mensura prioritatis naturalis ante tempus.

To be in any way or measure may mean (1) to be completely comprised in time, or space;

(2) to have a commencement together with time, or to begin after and not to be ended in time;

(3) to be everlasting, like the universe;

(4) to exist in time in general, but not in any particular part of time;

Pro quo notandum, ut alibi dictum est, cum declaracione quod septupliciter aliquid dicitur existere in mensura. *Uno* modo, quando includitur secundum eius principium et finem in uno indivisibili vel parte temporis, ut mutaciones subite, vel alia tempori inclusa; et illa dicuntur proprie esse in tempore, sicud idem illud dicitur proprie locatum quod est in loco secundum unumquodque ambitum. *Secundo* modo dicitur aliquid existere in tempore, quando ipsum incipit *cum* tempore, sed non temporaliter preceditur a tempore; vel incipit *in* tempore, sed non finitur *a* tempore; ut terra primo producta, et anima posterius creata. *Tercio* modo dicitur aliquid esse, quod est sempiternum; ut mundus et quotlibet eius partes; quas Augustinus dicit factas *cum* tempore, sed non *in* tempore. Talia tamen sunt in quolibet instanti temporis. *Quarto* modo dicitur aliquid existere quando est in totali tempore, sed non simpliciter in aliquo instanti vel parte temporis; ut est talis veritas: *Omne tempus vel instans temporis est.* Non enim

4. necessario B. 6. informitati BD. 7. attestandum BD. 9. huius *deest* C; *ib.* prioritas *pro* post hoc ABC. 13. Hic est BD. 13. Aristotetes D; *ib.* 1° phys. 6° D. 17. Augustino et Aristotele A. 17, 18. oportet esse D. 18. dicitur *pro* queritur AC. 20. est ante BD. 21, 22. cum declaracione *deest* D. 22. septu^ter AC. 26. idem B. 28. habitum; *corr. in marg.* D. 35. Talia *deest* D.

est possibile illam veritatem simpliciter esse in parte temporis, cum residua pars temporis includit quotlibet A 67b instancia | que non sunt in parte data. Sic enim est dare quotlibet veritates, quarum nulla potest esse in instanti, nec per tempus; ut est talis veritas: "*Illa sunt*" (demonstrando) quotcunque instancia inmediata. Quinto, dicitur ens esse quod non potest esse in tempore; ut sunt tales veritates, *mundum esse creandum, quodlibet instans esse futurum;* et sic de quotlibet similibus. Cum enim deus ante mundum sciverit in eternitate se esse producturum primum instans, patet quod illud fuit futurum, sed non in primo instanti vel unquam post; et in isto gradu est informitas materie prime. *Sexto* modo perfectissime et evidentissime dicitur aliquid in tempore esse, quod in cuiuslibet temporis quolibet instanti est secundum se totum et ante omne tempus, et post omne tempus; quod solius dei est inter omnes naturas possibiles, cum solum illius nature formalis mensura sit eternitas.

(5) to exist out of time, as the truth of the world's future existence, &c.

Or (6) To exist completely at every instant, before all time, and after all time; which is God's measure of existence.

Ex istis patet quod vanum est querere quando essencia corporea, que est simplex, est informis. Oportet enim hanc esse pro mensura nature, et non pro aliquo instanti temporis. Nec talis veritas potest incipere vel desinere esse, cum non potest esse in instanti temporis. Quando autem minus sapui scripturam, et solum fluctuavi in tortura animi, nunc negando informitatem materie, nunc dicendo quod non est informis nisi quo ad illud instans nature, sed non ex hoc sequitur quod est informis; et sic intelligendo quod pro omni mensura *pro qua* [est] est informata, sed non de se. Et sic de quibuslibet de ceculis a veritate, que cecati circumpalpitantes veritatem langwide suspicantur.

It is, therefore, useless to ask *when* matter is formless, since this formlessness exists in the fifth sense of measured existence.

Before I studied Holy Writ, my answer to this objection used to be wavering and uncertain, for I was groping after truth in the dark.

Ad secundum: patet ex dictis quod conclusio est concedenda; nam eque primo natura, sicud creatura, est analoyce formosa, ad modum loquendi beati Dyonisii in *De divinis nominibus*, cap. 1°. Sed posterius natura est forma, vel formositas quam natura habet, ut est

I fully admit that all nature is beautiful, but with a different beauty when considered apart from, and when as having its form.

6. est *pro* sunt AC; *ib.* oimoda *pro* demonstrando ABC. 7. modo B; et isto modo *pro* quinto D; *ib.* *after* ens eo *pro* esse BC. 8. veritates *deest* BD. 10. sciuit A; scivit D. 12. vmquod A. 14. evaeme D. 20. vacuum BD. 22. hoc BD. 22, 23. quando *pro* instanti B. 25. ßm = sensum BD. 27. non *deest* AC; *ib.* nisi *deest* ABC. 28. est *pro* ad ABC. 29. intendendo ABC. 30. est *deest* ABCD. 31. dececiclis cecati *in marg.* A; circulis BD; cticlis C; de'ccitulis E; *ib.* ceciti = cecitati D. 34. prima A.

Matter, *qua* formless, is not a thing, that is, a substance; as angelic natures are all but Infinite, so matter is all but nothing; at any rate, in effect.

quid in genere. Unde, si queritur quid est materia prima, vel essencia pro mensura qua est informis, dicitur quod vere loquendo non est aliquid, quia non est quid pro ista mensura; quia aliquid dicit ethimoloyce quasi *aliud quid.* Et iste est sensus Augustini 12° de Confessione: 7°: "*Fecisti, domine, celum et terram, duo quidem: unum prope, te alterum prope nichil; unum quo superior tu es, alterum quo inferius nichil est.*" Nec oportet timere instancias sophisticas, quibus argumentatur quod materia prima non est prope nichil. Quod sic intelligitur: quod materia est prope nichil *in effectu;* multa enim sunt possibilia, que sunt nichil in effectu; et materia, que fit informis, est medium inter aliquid in effectu et nichil in effectu. Ideo, ut dicit cap. 6°, materia est medium inter formam et nichil. Et eumdem modum loquendi habet Aristoteles, 1° physicorum, 75° dicens, "Nos autem et ipsi dicimus, nichil fieri quidem simpliciter ex eo quod non est, sed tamen fieri ex eo quod non est ut secundum accidens." Ideo dicit philosophus quod antiqui, negantes generacionem substancie, non cognoverunt quomodo oportet latere quamdam naturam in potencia ad quamcunque formam, et pro mensura illius potencie esse quid secundum potenciam ante actum.

What is purely possible is nothing as to effect; primal matter is between something and nothing. Something cannot come out of pure nothingness, but of what happens not to be. Potentiality existing before actuality is at the root of the whole theory of generation.

Various degrees of priority, posited by Augustine.

Nec aliter concipit philosophus racionem materie prime nisi considerando gradum prioristicum nature precedere prioritatem temporis. Ideo Augustinus (12° de Confessione) nominanter ponit decem gradus prioritatis, dicens quod quicunque non intelligit eos, non est ydoneus ad intelligendum | [A 68] scripturam, Gen. 1° dicentem quod primo deus fecit materiam informem, et post formavit eamdem. Sunt autem alia priora *eternitate,* alia *tempore,* alia *eleccione,* alia *origine.*

Eternitate, sicud deus trinitas precedit universitatem creatam; *tempore,* sicud flos fructum, *eleccione* sicud fructus florem; *origine,* sicud sonus cantum. Et concordat Aristoteles, 5° metaphysice, 16°.

4. et ABD; quia *above in red ink* A: *ib.* quasi *deest* AC. 8. superius D. 10. prima *deest* D. 12. neca AC; multa *above* A. 13. cum sit BD. 14. media BD; mere C. 16. loquendi *deest* AC; *ib.* philosophus D. 18. sunt quidem nichil *pro* nichil fieri quidem A; *ib.* po'est AC. 19. sunt *pro* fieri A. 20. quod *above line* A. 21. se *pro* substancie AC. 23. non *above* esse B. 25. conciperet BD. 26. p'oristicu͡ A. 27. precedens A. 28. nout' ABD. 29, 30. est inydoneus BD. 30. intelligendam C; dicente D. 33. *before* origine: et alia BCD. 36. eleccione *pro* origine C.

Prioritas autem, qua deus, qui est principium primum, precedit omnem creaturam, non potest habere gradum sibi conformem, cum solus sit natura simpliciter eterna. Ab illo tamen exemplificatur quecunque prioritas per se cause cuiuscunque effectus, quem deus non potest per se producere sine coefficiencia date cause secunde; ut anima se habet respectu sui actus, et generaliter quecunque substancia respectu sui accidentis. Et talis vocatur prioritas in natura secundum causam in Predicamentis. Illa autem excludit unitatem requisitam ad genus; ut ens non est genus loycum ad substanciam et accidens, quia genus substancie est naturaliter prius quam genus accidentis; nec accidens est genus loycum ad *respectivum* et *absolutum;* quia totum accidens respectivum presupponit causaliter absolutum. Nec accidens absolutum est genus loycum ad quantitatem et qualitatem, quia totum genus qualitatis presupponit taliter causaliter qualitatem; et ita de aliis, que non communicant in partibus quantitativis vel subiectivis. Non sic autem de speciebus eiusdem generis. Et differt illa prioritas a prioritate universalioris ad minus universale, quia hoc *prius* non communicat in natura cum suo posteriori. Alia autem prioritas universalis est eadem natura que minus universale.

(1) Priority of everlastingness, of the First Principle, God.

That of cause and effect is analogous thereto.

But this is not included in any genus, since it divides all beings (as substance and accident) the latter being caused by the former, and accidents of various sorts are caused one by another.

This is different from the priority of the more over the less universal, since these have something of the same nature.

Secundo prioritas (temporis) hodie est tam famosa quod vulgus non concipit aliam. Unde, quam statim dicitur quod *a* fuit prius *b*, intelligitur, propter famositatem, quod fuit tempore illo prius.

(2) Temporal priority is so well known that many conceive no other.

Tercia prioritas, quam Augustinus vocat eleccionis, est generaliter cuiuscunque finis naturalis procedentis ex eius mediis origine preeminente ad eandem, cum finis huiusmodi sit melior hiis que sunt ad finem, et per consequens eligibilior. Et sic est compositum prius materia et forma, et generaliter totum prius sua parte, cum sit finis racione cuius natura intendit partem. Et patet, notando equivoce prioritatem elementi ad elementatum prioritate nature, et cum hac prioritate finis

(3) Priority of choice is that of a given end over a thing chosen in view of that end, since the end must be chosen first.

In this sense, every compound is prior to its matter and

1. qui *deest* BD. 2. alium gradum BD. 5. esse *pro* cause B. 6. efficiencia D. 7. alia *pro* anima C. 9, 10. p͠ntis A. 10. unionem CD. 15. c͡alr' A. 18. quantitatem D. 24. 9ne (commune?) A. 26. concepit D. 27. a'fuit D. 29. eleccionem AB. 30. est *deest* ABC; *ib.* fuerit *pro* finis A. 31. preeminencie ACD; *ib.* eadem CD; *ib.* c9 *pro* cum AC. 32. fit ABC. 34. vel formaliter BD; *ib.* prius *deest* BD. 36. elc͡ti A; elc͡i BD. 36, 37. eltᵐlu͡ B; elnᵗtu͡ D. 37. p'o'iᵗᵉ *thrice* D.

form, every whole to its parts. Thus it is quite possible for one being to be prior to another in nature, and posterior as to *choice*. An element is prior in nature to its compound, but as it exists to make the compound, it is posterior to it as to choice. Christ, who came after John Baptist, was before him in God's election which made Christ the Head of the Church.

ad sua media eciam prioritatem nature, quam Augustinus vocat prioritatem eleccionis, non est inconveniens, sed conveniens, quod in casu *a* sit prius naturaliter *b*, et e contra *b* prius naturaliter *a*, sed in dispari natura speciei prioritate. Et ad illa duo membra habet reduci prioritas originis et prioritas dignitatis vel honoris. Nam elementum et prius naturaliter quam elementatum ex eo compositum. E contra autem elementatum est prius dignitate vel perfeccione suo elemento, et principalius est intentum a natura; et ad huiusmodi similitudinem prelati vocatur in politicis subditis priores. Et sic intelligitur illud Joh. primo, dictum a Baptista de Cristo: "*Qui,* inquit, *post me venit*, *ante me factus est*." Cristus enim secundum humanitatem est factus prior tocius ecclesie; et sic ante Baptistam qui fuit sub priori | ut sentenciat Augustinus sermone 13° super Joh. notans quod scriptura non dicit "factus est *priusquam ego essem*", sed "*factus est*", inquit, "*ante* me"; ita quod *ante* significat prioritatem dignitatis, modo quo loquitur Aristoteles 5° methaphysice.

Jo. I, 27

A 68[b]

(4) Priority of origin presents some great difficulties; but it is that of the genus to its species, and of the species to its individuals. A sound is prior in this sense to the time of which it forms part, and which it originates; yet it is not prior in time.

Quarta autem prioritas est originis et generis; et propterea est difficillima ad intelligendum secundum Augustinum. Est autem generaliter prioritas generis ad suam speciem, et speciei ad suum individuum, prioritas originis, quam Aristoteles vocat prioritatem nature. Sic enim secundum Augustinum, sonus, qui est cantus formatus est prius origine cantu, quia sonus est prius natura quam est formatus cantus, cum cantus non formatur ut sit sonus, sed sonus ut sit cantus, non ymaginando quod sonus possit mora temporis proferri informis, et post formaretur in cantum, cum sit successivum; sed origine precedit sonus informis sonum formatum. "*Sic*" (inquit Augustinus) "*hoc exemplo qui potest intelligat materiam rerum primo factam informem, et post origine, non tempore, formatam*". Ista autem

Primal matter has like priority.

1. et *pro* eciam BD. 2, 3. secundum consequens *pro* sed conveniens AC. 5. specie AC; *ib.* et *deest* C. 6. ordinis BD. 7. electivum A; *ib.* electum A. 8. elem ratum *pro* elementatum C. 9. ectio͡ A. *ib.* prius AC. 10. anima *pro* a natura A; *ib.* similitudines B. 15. pab͡ta D; *ib.* sub prior ACD. 16. vocans; notans *above line* A. 18. ante; nam *above in red ink* A; nam C. 22. sunt AC. 28. naturaliter BC; *ib.* cantus *after* formatus *deest* BD. 35. prius ACD.

30. *Mora temporis.* I understand this to mean 'in a lapse', or 'in a certain duration, of time.' Sound is not previous *in time* to the time which consists of it.

prioritas originis, secundum Augustinum, habet membra equivoca; ut pater origine vel causa non precedit verbum natura, ut dicit Augustinus, in Questionibus veteris et nove legis, questione 122^{a}. Materia autem, origine et natura incompleta, precedit formam, et ambo compositum, licet hec tria sunt eadem essencialis natura. Genus igitur et quodlibet universalius origine precedit inferius, licet sit eadem natura, et in omnibus hiis tribus est quasi anologa similitudo. Ex istis patet quod nulla creatura est prius ens natura quam est bonum, cum bonitas essencialis creature sit unitas, entitas et veritas eiusdem. Verumtamen, antequam creatura habeat existenciam in genere, habet existenciam essencie vel nature, secundum quam est naturaliter priusquam est quid.

What is more universal naturally precedes the less universal; but transcendental attributes, equally universal with Being, are second to none.

Ad tercium dicitur quod racio currit sub equivocacione illius termini "*compositum*", qui potest supponere simpliciter pro natura integra ut unit in se materiam et formam tanquam duas naturas incompletas, qualificative componentes (et illa supposicio est famosa aput philosophos), vel personaliter pro essencia illa, ut sibi accidit separabiliter componi ex materia et a forma; vel tercio modo, pro altero componencium. Cum enim natura componit materiam cum forma, sequitur quod utraque est composita a dicta natura cum reliqua, et per consequens est compositum, licet non sit composita ex materia et forma, sed cum materia et forma. Secundo modo igitur sumitur in argumento pro essencia que accidentaliter sic componitur; primo modo nec materia nec forma est compositum, quia tunc esset composicio in abstracto; secundo et tercio modo tam materia quam forma est compositum, quia essencia que componitur; et propter equivocacionem vitandam, inveniuntur auctores ponere abstractum ad primum sensum. Et sic loquitur auctor sex principiorum, describendo formam, quod est hoc quod est contingens composicioni, id est, nature integre ex duabus naturis incompletis composite. Et ita
A 69^{a} videtur | dicta descripcio contingentis cuilibet forme substanciali superaddite, et cuilibet forme, cum sit

The opponent equivocates about the meaning of the word *compound;* which may mean either a complete nature containing others that are incomplete; or the essence that may happen to be made up of matter and form; or either of the elements of the compound; matter being together with form, it is consequently composite in a sense.

The argument takes it in the second sense; in the first, neither matter nor form is composite, in the others, both are so. Thus when a form is said to be contingent to a complete nature composed of two that are incomplete, it is superadded to substantial form.

3. naturaliter D; *ib.* et item in AC. 6. tercia sit ABD; *ib.* essencia vel BCD. 8. informis A. 10. natura creata A; quedam C; *ib.* ipsa est BD. 15. c^{r}rit A. 15, 16. subversionem A. 19. est *deest* D. 20. participialiter D; *ib.* potencia *pro* essencia AC; illa *deest* ABC. 21. sepa^{ter} A; *ib.* data *pro* a ADE. 22. tantum *pro* enim B. 24. in *pro* a C. 25. compositum BCD. 26. vel *pro* et ABC. 28. vel C. 30. modo AC. 32, 33. inveniuntur *deest;* auctores ponunt BD. 35. est *deest* ABC; *ib.* et *pro* id est AD. 37. generis D.

contingens nature corporee quod formam huiusmodi sibi adveniat.

Diverse meanings of the word *composition.*

Notandum tamen quod *composicio* quandoque dicit active actum componentis, qui est componere; quandoque passionem compositi; et hoc tripliciter: vel utrumque componencium componi cum reliquo, vel collective, ista componi ad invicem, vel tercio, unum esse compositum ex talibus; et isto modo sumitur composicio, cum dicitur quod materia et forma et composicio sunt una essencia vel natura. Et capit composicio subdivisionem, secundum divisionem parcium composicionem participancium; et patet quod ultima conclusio perfecta est concedenda. Sicud enim natura divina est compositum et tamen est simplicissima natura, et non potest componi vel esse composita, sic materia prima est res composita ex eadem materia et forma, que est essencia vel suppositum sic compositum; et tamen non componitur nec est composita ex materia et forma. Nam compositum est posterius natura quam alterum componencium; sed longe hoc ad concludendum quod materia aut componatur ex seipsa, aut quod sit prior, simplicior et perfeccior seipsa; correspondenter sicud dicitur in materia de incarnacione. Sicud enim essencia divina in supposito verbi assumpsit formam hominis sibi accidentalem, sic essencia corporea ante tempus creata, assumpsit et assumit sepe formas varias substanciales, licet sint sibi accidentales, ut patet alibi, etc.

Matter and form are composed of the same thing *which* is matter and form, i. e. of the abstract essence; and yet neither is composed; just as God consists of the Trinity, yet is the most simple of natures. There is also an analogy between the Incarnate Word, taking up flesh, and matter taking up forms.

CAPITULUM SEPTIMUM.

Can we say: The same primal matter will be fire, earth etc.? Certainly; for they are all the same essence, which is matter and form.

Consequenter restat videre si concedi debeat in predicacione secundum essenciam, quod materia prima erit ignis, terra, et sic de qualibet substancia corporea. Et patet quod sic, eo quod quelibet essencia est quodlibet tale corpus, et materia ac forma. Ergo, cum sufficit

1. quod formam huiusmodi *deest* AD. 2. sibi adiciat BD. 3. nota BC. 5. temporaliter ABCD. 6. compositi ACD. 7. simpliciter unum BCD. 8. quando BD. 9. et composicio *deest* AC. 10. et compositum C. 11. componencium *pro* composicionem AC. 12. ultima *in marg. in red ink* A; ultima multa A; *ib.* per factum *pro* perfecta A. 16. quia D. 18. composicio AC; *ib.* materia et forma et materia ABCD; *ib.* ut *pro* nam BD; vel *pro* nam C. 21. idem *pro* materia BD; *ib.* componat seipsam A. 21. seipsum BD. 21, 22, aut — seipsa *deest* A. 22. simpliciter B. 24. presupposita verbum A; verbo B. 27. etc. *twice* D. 28. Cap. *deest* A; *Initial* C *in red ink* AB. 30. est *pro* erit A. 31. aqua *pro* terra B.

hoc ad veritatem predicacionis secundum essenciam (ut patet in tractatu de universalibus, cap. 1°) sequitur verum esse, in predicacione secundum essenciam, tam materiam quam formam esse quodcunque corpus mundi. Confirmatur ex testimonio scripture, cap. 1° sepe allegato, ubi scriptura, iuxta exposicionem Augustini, intelligit per terram, aquam et abissum, materiam primam informem. Et revera est verisimile quod tam sanctus vir, tam ingeniosus, tam exercitatus in studio divino, et specialiter scripture illius, et deum tam devoto rogans (ut patet eiusdem 12° de confessione 10 et 16°) quod haberet rectam significacionem eiusdem scripture; specialiter cum tam confidenter asserit se esse illuminatum a deo, quod certe sciat hunc esse sensum sancti spiritus in hac scriptura Moysi sic intellexit verisimiliter sine . . . . . . cap. 19° confitendo decem veritates de materia prima, quas dicit ostensas a prima luce mencium.

This is proved by the first chapter of Genesis and its commentary by Augustine, a most holy and learned man, who explicitly states that he owed his illumination on this point to God Himself.

Prima veritas est ista. "*Verum est,*" inquit, "*quod unde sit aliquid, quodam genere locucionis, potest habere iam nomen illius rei que inde fit.*" Unde potuit vocari
A 69[b] celum et terra quelibet informitas, unde | factum est celum et terra; et illam confitetur esse veram sentenciam scripture infra, 29°.

He points out (1) that the source of a thing may be called by the name of that thing;

Gen. III, 19 Secundo confirmatur hoc testimonio primo, Gen. 3° ubi deus sic aloquitur Adam: "*In sudore wultus tui vesceris pane tuo, donec revertaris in terram de qua sumptus es, quia pulvis es, et in pulverem reverteris.*" Propter peccatum ipsius Ade homo versus est de limo in pulverem. Tercio, confirmatur ex loyca celestis evangeliste Joh. 2°, ubi narrat, ut supra tactum est, quod in primo miraculo Cristi architriclinius gustavit

(2) That God speaks of Adam, who once was clay *returning to* dust.

(3) That Christ, changing water into wine at Cana, only did suddenly what he is ever doing slowly in the vineyards.

4. quotcunque C. 7. et *deest* AC. 8. re ABCD; *ib.* est *deest* ABC. 10. de voto AB. 11. eiusdem ut patet B; *ib.* et quod *omnes* MS. 12. quot C; *ib.* habere AC; *ib.* rectum sensum BD. 14. a deo *deest* D; *ib.* certificat AC. 15. *after* intellexit quod CD; *ib. after* verisimiliter "ſine,,cu *with* "credit *in marg.* C. 16. *after* sine *a blank space for a word* A; *ib.* decimo octavo CD. 17. quod vı'sı'r cedd it ſy mo BD. 19. alia *pro* prima A. 20. bene *pro* unde AC; *ib.* aliud C. 21. nunc *pro* inde AC. 25. luc A; luce *pro* hoc BD; dupliciter *in marg.* D. 26. sic *deest* D. 27. vescieris BD; *ib.* ad *pro* in ACD. 28. as sumptus ABC. 29. perpetuum A; ppetm B; *ib.* p pccm C; *ib.* ipsius *deest* A; *ib.* homo apius A. 31. 2° ca° B; *ib.* tactum est *deest* D. 32. Cristi *deest* A.

2. *De Universalibus.* The fifth tractate of Wyclif's De Ente, Book I. Not yet published.

aquam vinum factam, quod exponit Augustinus, Johannis omelia 8[a], dicens quod non est mirum nisi quia insolitum de dicta conversione; ipse enim, die uno nupciarum, fecit hoc in sex ydriis quod omni anno facit in vitibus. Sicud enim quod ministri in ydriis fundunt in vinum convertitur; sic quod nubes fundunt in vinum convertitur opere eiusdem. Illud non miramur, quia omni anno fit idem. Dicit Urso in primo Aphorismorum suorum: Nec valet dicere quod non est intencionis Augustini dicere quod aqua erit vinum, vel res unius speciei erit res alterius speciei, quia intencionis sue frequentis est, 13° de confessione, quod tota natura corporalis est terra, aqua, abissus, et omne corpus quod ex ea formatum est. Unde 5° de trinitate 9° movet dubium quomodo accidens aliquod sit inseparabile, cum de racione accidentis sit contingenter inesse; et respondet sub hiis verbis: "*Et, si qua sunt accidencia inseparabilia, ut plume corvi, albedo nivis amittit cum tamen, non quidem quamdiu pluma est, sed quia non semper est. Quapropter ipsa materies mutabilis est, eo quod desinit esse illud animal, et illa pluma, totumque idem corpus nunc in terra mutatur et vertitur [et] amittit illum colorem.*" Ex illis planum est Augustinum sentire quod materia est nunc corpus unius speciei, nunc alterius. Unde, libro de inmortalitate anime 13°. "*Mutabilitas,*" inquit, "*non adimit corpori corpus esse, sed de specie in speciem transire facit motu ordinatissimo. Non enim quidpiam est, illius partes ad nichilum redigi sinuntur.*"

And Urso remarks that Augustine evidently intends to say here that water becomes wine, for his theory asserts the same of all things corporal. And speaking of what is called an inseparable accident, he says that they are separable in reality because they vanish with the substantial form which upholds them; the same body, *changed to earth*, loses its colour. "Mutability, he asserts, is not annihilation, but the passage of a body from one species to another."

Et patet quod ignorancia huiusmodi veritatum physicarum facit modernos parum pendere scripturam et inponere sanctis doctoribus ignoranciam loyce vel philosophie, vel asseruisse multa inpossibilia pro devocione.

Ignorance alone has made modern writers slight Scripture, and accuse the Holy Doctors of want of knowledge, and pious, but impossible assertions.

1. aquam *deest* AC; *ib.* exponit Joh^e; Aug9 C; *ib.* Johannis *deest* A. 2. dicit B; *ib.* quia *deest* A. 6. in vinum convertitur *deest* D; *ib.* sic quod nubes fundunt *in marg. D.* 8. fit et BCD; *ib.* dicit *deest* D. 11. et *pro* erit res A. 12. frequenter D. 14. quando movet BD. 15. dubium *deest* D. 17. quedam C; que D. 18. color *pro* albedo BD; *ib.* animis D; *ib.* cum? *pro* eum A. 19. qmdq, dem D; *ib.* quod B. 20. ex eo ABC. 21. esse *deest* D; *ib.* idem BD; *ib.* illis BD. 22. et *deest* ABCD. 23. illo AB. 24. erit BC. 25. anime *deest* C. 26. ad'm^t tit D; corpori *deest* D; *ib.* esse *pro* specie D. 27, 28. q, pia 28. simit^r A; sinitur B; sumitur D. 30. parvipendere D. 31. inponit D; *ib.* et *pro* vel D. 31, 32. phie A.

18. *Cum tamen.* Neither this nor the variant gives any sense. Some words must be wanting; and I am not in a position to verify the reference.

Non sic autem quando scriptura fuit in reverencia et utilitate, exemplar aliis, nedum ad recte vivendum, sed ad vere loquendum et philosophice sapiendum. Nunc autem dicimus auctores scripture fuisse incautos sermone, constituimus loycam nostram tanquam regulam rectificantem scripturam, et illam postponimus, cum tamen debet esse e contra. Nec tamen oportet multiplicare argumenta in ista materia; quia, dato quod eadem essencia est materia, forma et compositum, et quod forma, licet sit substancialis composicioni, est tamen accidentalis essencie, plane sequitur quod essencia ignis erit aqua; et sic de ceteris. Et ideo satis est hic pro documento deducere, testimonio habito insuspecto, ne videar ex capite A 70ᵃ proprio | theologizare, vel significaciones insolitas fingere.

Ex istis colligi potest evidencia concedendi quod simplex essencia corporea potest esse vicissim qualiscunque essencia corporalis, ut nunc homo, nunc terra, nunc semen, nunc fructus; et sic de quacunque natura corporea. Et iste sensus facilitat ad intelligendum scripturam, et concordat cum philosophis. Sic enim (Matth. IV, 3) dyabolus loquitur Cristo, Matth. 4°: "*Dic,*" inquit, "*ut lapides isti panes fiant.*" Nec dubium theologo quin dictus spiritus, qui fuit inicium precipuum viarum domini, scivit melius veritates physicas quam nunc viator, tum propter subtilitatem nature vivacis, ingenio non extincto, tum propter experiencias effectum quas vidit per tempus tam diurnum, tum propter revelacionem secretorum spirituum, ut allegat magister sentenciarum, distinccione 7ᵐᵃ per Ysidorum, li. 1° De summo bono, ca. 10; et Augustinum, 2° super Genesim, 26° cap. Nec mirum, quod longe subtiliora cognoscant demones, ut patet de maycis artibus, qui sciunt transformare et proporcionare agencia naturalia. Ymmo ipse cognovit illud primo, ut patet ibidem. Verisimile est ergo quod tam subtilis angelus, tam diligenter tentans hominem quem ex miraculis vidit tam subtilem philosophum, non proponeret

Holy Writ should be not only our model of life, but also of right thinking. Now we try to wrest Scripture to our own senses, and make our logic the standard to judge it by. But I merely quote Augustine as a favourable testimony; there is no doubt that if matter, form, and compound are one essence, then the same essence that is fire will be water. And it may become successively any bodily essence whatever. Scripture is rendered more intelligible by this very philosophical theory. For instance, Satan saying to Christ: "Let these stones *be made* bread", knew quite well what he was about, and that, if he proposed an impossibility, his temptation would have no force.

4. auctoritate ABC. 5. naturalem *pro* nostram A; *ib.* tanquam *deest* D. 5, 6 tanquam mensuram scripture D. 7. tamen *deest* B. 8. diccio AD; dicto C. 9. et *deest* ACD. 10. compositi A; componencium BD. 11. est A. 12. et *deest* BD; *ib.* directe *pro* pro documento D. 13. in supposito AD. 18. stamen ABC. 20. phis A. 21. 10 Dicit D. 26. tam *pro* tum D; *ib.* expediencias ACD. 27. tam *deest* BD; *ib.* tam *pro* tum D; *ib.* relevacionem D; *ib.* superiorum BCD. 28. sentenciarum *deest* D. 29. per *deest* D. 29. 1° *pro* 10 D. 30. Augustinus A. 31. cognoscunt ACD. 33. primo *deest* D; ib. *after* primo: contra philosophiam de Cristi A; Cristo C; patre A; dexpe . . 35. que *pro* quem AD. 36. physicum ABC; phm D.

sibi notorie inpossibilia, quia tunc non fecisset evidenciam ad sensum.

Again, the Apostle's statement that Levi, and Christ too, in the loins of Abraham, paid tithes to Melchisedech, is a striking confirmation of the theory;

Sic eciam loquitur apostolus ad hebreos, 7° docens preeminenciam sacerdocii Melchisedech super sacerdocium leviticum, eo quod Levi decimatus fuit in lumbis Abrahe solventis decimas Melchisedech, ut maiori. "*Adhuc enim*," inquit Apostolus "*in lumbis patris erat, quando obviavit [ei] Melchisedech.*" Cristus autem, licet fuisset in lumbis Abrahe, ut dicit scriptura, tamen non fuit decimatus, quia non ex racione seminali eorum, procreatus in utero virginis; et racio seminalis, non nuda essencia eis pertinuit, et propter veneranciam Cristi quam Abraham scivit prophetice esse in lumbis eius, fecit servum suum iurando manum ponere sub femore, non supra femur Abrahe, gen. 24° quia scivit illam massam substanciam assumendam esse speciosam formam pre filiis hominum, ut exponit Augustinus omelia. 43ª super Joh. Quotlibet talia dicte scripture que tam verbaliter quam sentencialiter sonant in dictam sentenciam.

Hebr. VII, 10

and there are many other similar texts of Scripture which also bear it out.

Gen. XXIV, 2

Ignorant men murmur, on hearing that the Scripture calls the same entity now earth and now water, or says that man is dust, together with other cavils.

Unde omnis natura vel essencia corporea vocatur in scriptura nunc terra, nunc aqua, secundum Augustinum; et hoc facit ignaros murmurare contra scripturam dicentem hominem esse terram, cum alia elementa et mixta sint in homine. Mirantur eciam quomodo sunt aque super celos, ut dicitur gen. 1° et ps. 148, ymaginando quod sunt res fluide, violente ibi detente, quales sunt aque nostre, vel attendunt quomodo illud chaos confusum, ex quo factus est mundus, vocatur gen. 1° tam terra quam aqua. Et sic secundum Augustinum, prima essencia corporea quidquid fuerit, potest | vocari eodem nomine, cum disposiciones superaddite sunt sibi accidentales, non addentes novam essenciam. Potest igitur ista essencia, licet quodammodo equivoce, vere vocari terra, aqua, abissus, materia, chaos, et sic de quolibet

Gen. I, 7 Ps. CXLVIII, 4

A 70ᵇ

But Augustine points out that the primal essence of bodily things may receive the names of that which it is the essence of, since every,

3. et *pro* eciam ABC. 5. *after* lumbis pris *struck through* A. 6. patris Abrahe C; *ib.* ad hoc et *pro* Abrahe D; *ib.* et solventes B. 8. quando Abraham ABCD; *ib.* ei *deest* ABCD. 9. fuit BD; *ib.* in *deest* D. 10. corporis *pro* eorum A. 12. reverenciam BD. 13. femor C. 16. sponsam forma *(sic)* BD. 19. quam *deest* ACD; *ib.* finaliter *deest* BC; finaliter A. 22, 23. quando dicimus B; dicentem *deest* AC. 23. aut BD. 24. sicud B. 25. supra BD; *ib.* 14ᵒ AC. 26. violete B. 27. nichil *pro* vel AC. 28. confusa D. 30. illa *pro* prima BCD. 33. sentencia D; *ib.* quodammodo licet BC; *ib.* vere *deest* AB.

30. *Vocari.* If a given man happens to be a carpenter and a butcher, I can call him by either name; if the same essence happens to be dust and man, I can say that man is dust.

quod in ipsa est in potencia, ut dicit Augustinus, 12° de Confessione, 14° veritate septima. "Unde est," inquit, "quod fit, unde fit aliquid potest quodammodo genere locucionis habere iam nomen eiusdem rei que inde fit."

supervening form is an accident that adds nothing new to the essence.

Sed contra illud sic argumentatur: data illa racione, nichil potest generari vel corrumpi; quod est contra scripturam, physicam et racionem experimentalem. Et confirmatur eo quod, si substancia generatur, ipsa incipit esse; et per consequens prius non fuit. Si vero corrumpitur, post non erit. Sed quocunque elemento vel elementato dato, ipsum fuit in mundi principio. Ergo nullum tale in aliquo instanti infra tempus incipit vel desinit esse.

Objection: This would make against doctrine of generation and dissolution; for when a substance is generated, it begins to be, and was not before. But according to this doctrine, every substance existed from the beginning.

Pro solucione illius et [ad] sentenciam auctorum concordandum, necesse est tria supponere. Primo, communicacionem essencie corporee tribus naturis, scilicet, materie, forme et compositi. Secundo, notanda est supposicionis personalis et simplicis distinccio et subdivisio: ut simpliciter loquendo ad modum loquendi Aristotelis et physicorum, album vel musicum generatur vel corrumpitur, quin subiectum incipit vel desinit esse album vel musicum: ut patet 1° physicorum. Quod tantum sonat apud eos, ac si sic diceretur quod subiectum esse album aut musicum sic incipit vel desinit; et hinc dicunt concorditer philosophi quod album et musicum sunt accidencia, ut patet per philosophum quotlibet locis, et per Augustinum in libro suo de falso grammatico. Si autem supponat subiectum pro substancia cui accidit talis qualitas, tunc vere dicunt, quod non album tali generacione, sed albedo incipit esse tali alteracione. Tercio, supponenda est distinccio triplicis predicacionis, scilicet formalis, causalis et secundum habitudinem; ut dictum est in tractatu de universalibus, cap. 1°. Theologus igitur qui admittit predicacionem secundum causam, concedendo de qualibet creatura

To answer this, note (1) that the same essence is common to matter, form, and compound; (2) that personal and impersonal supposition give quite distinct meanings to terms; a white man is a musician, but *to be white* is not *to be musical;*

and (3) that we may predicate one thing of another as its cause, or formally, or merely as its possession.

4. unde A. 5. prima *pro* illa A. 7. et *after* physicam *deest* AC. 8. consequencia BD; probatur ex BD. 10. est *pro* erit BCD. 13. ad *deest* ABCDE; *ib.* sentenciam *deest* B; sentencia ACDE. 14. concordante AC; concordandi B. 14, 13. commutacionem; *corr. in marg.* B. 17. et simplicis *twice* D. 18. loquendo *deest* BD. 19. in *pro* et AC; *ib.* vel *deest* D. 21. si^r A; simpliciter C. 22. tamen A; *ib.* diceret A. 24. dicunt per hoc D. 26. per *deest* B; *ib.* in libro suo *deest* AC; *ib.* flo A; *deest* BD. 28, 29. non quod AC. 29. tali generacione *deest* AC.

20. *Quin subiectum.* It is thus in the *MSS.*, but (unless we understand by *subiectum* the ideal universal, the *that which*) it is a flagrant absurdity. Mr. Matthew's suggestion, *quia*, totally changes the sense, but I incline to think he is right.

Causally, every creature exists and lives in God, and matter is essentially predicated of bodies.

quod ipsa secundum esse intelligibile est vita in deo (secundum illud Joh. primo; "*quod factum est in ipso vita erat*") ut declaratum est in materia de ydeis, consimiliter pari racione vel maiori habet concedere predicacionem secundum causam vel essencialem nature create de sua materia vel suo subiecto; potissime, cum non dicit supra essenciam simplicem, nisi disposicionem sibi accidentalem; ut patet 7° methaphysice 8°. Et in illa equivocacione laborant, qui contendunt contra scripturam et dicta philosophorum, dicendo quod sunt falsa de virtute sermonis, quando asserunt istam sentenciam.

Joh. I, 3, 4

Those who do not admit this contradict both Scripture and philosophy.

We say that, in essential or personal predication, all matter is perpetual, since it always remains what it was at first — a created being. In this senes it is said that all things were created together,

Istis premissis, dicitur quod, essencialiter vel personaliter intelligendo, concedendum est quamlibet materialem naturam esse perpetuam, quia creatam in primo instanti temporis; et manet continue creatura. Si enim aliquid est creatura, tunc est illud quod tempore suo creabatur et manet post in eternum, nunc corpus unius speciei, nunc alterius. Et sic intelligit Augustinus, 4° super Gen. ad literam cap. 121°, et Ecclesiastici 18° "*Qui vivit in eternum creavit omnia simul*". Nam omne corpus fiendum, factum est in primo instanti temporis quoad essenciam; cui essencie dedit deus raciones seminales, ut tempore administracionis producatur forma in suo tempore. Et breviter *esse* substanciale vel accidentale productum est in primo instanti temporis, vel in causis materialibus vel universalibus. Et sic intelligitur illud Ecclesiasticis 1° "*quid est quod | fuit? ipsum quod futurum est. Quid est, quod factum est? ipsum quod faciendum est: nichil novi sub sole. Nec valet quisquam dicere: hoc recens est.*"

Eccl. XVIII, 1

and that there is nothing new under the sun.

Eccl. I, 9, 10

A 71[a]

But if nature is taken to mean a compound of matter and form, then there are certainly new substances. Plato and Aristotle contradict each other, but from different points of view; the former rightly affirms that

Si autem simpliciter intelligitur natura pro composicione ex materia et forma, sic indubie fiunt et corrumpuntur substancie sublunares opere nature, modo quo loquitur scriptura et philosophi, ponentes generacionem et corrupcionem. Et in hoc equivocant Plato et Aristoteles de materia prima. Nam Plato in Timeo vere et catholice Aristoteli posuit quod aliqua pars materie

1. in vita D. 4. in materia *pro* vel maiori AC. 6. suo *deest* D; *ib.* vel potissime A; *ib.* tamen C. 9. otedut D. 13. intendendo AB. 14. naturam corpoream BCD. 18. *after* alterius: et sic de aliis BD. 19. illud *pro* et ACD; *ib.* 14° B. 23. amistcois A. 23, 24. suo specie BD. 24. omne BCD. 25. producendum A; prodiendum C. 27. Eccl[ci] A; Eccli[s] B; *ib.* quod *after* prius *deest* ACD. 28. perfectum ACD. 29. novum D; *ib.* oportet A; *ib.* quispp A. 30. est *deest* ACD. 31. intelligatur D. 37. *after* catholice: irrepugnanter BCD.

prime ignita, ignis est, et aliqua pars materie, terreitate actuata, terra est. Aristoteles autem, non admittens predicacionem essencialem, negat quod materia prima est composita substancia, vel quod ignis erit aqua, vel sic de quacunque transmutacione substancie; sed non negat sentenciam supra dictam. Et sic in multis laborant tam antiqui quam moderni in equivocacione signorum.

Primal matter, *quà* ignited, is fire; Aristotle denies that, but he takes primal matter as it is in itself, and therefore the contradiction is only apparent.

Data ergo substancia que generatur vel corrumpitur, conceditur quod illa incipit vel desinit esse; et quod, ante vel post talem mutacionem, non fuit: et tunc intelligitur simpliciter pro unione duarum naturarum ad invicem, et non pro altera earum; quia, secundum philosophum (7° metaphysice), nec materia nec forma simpliciter per se et proprie generatur, sed compositum quod per se est habens principia generacionis.

The substance which is generated begins to be at a given time, that is, the union of matter with form begins, and neither of these is properly said to be generated.

Et si queritur quid *hoc* fuit in principio mundi et eternaliter erit, demonstrando eamdem essenciam quam tu ponis generari vel corrumpi, dicitur quod contingit illud sane vel sinistre intelligi. Ideo, exemplativo sensu, dicit post quod hoc est ut *sic* et est ut *non*, ad modum loquendi Aristotelis in tali materia. Et sic sophistice volentes extorquere racionem, simpliciter potest eligi alterutra pars, negando reliquam ad sensum contradictorium; vel tercio, negando utrumque, ad sensus equivocos; et cum in equivocis non sit contradiccio, non conceditur falsum. Et illa responsio plus decet theologum, qui non affectat aparenciam sophisticam, ut non videatur redargui a male intelligentibus; sicud patet ex modo loquendi scripture et sanctorum doctorum": "*Wult*," inquit sapiens, "*et non wult piger*"; et Augustinus, 5° super genes. ad literam 14°, postquam declaravit quod deus nichil noscit nisi quod est, movet dubium quomodo creature erant et non erant antequam fierent: et respondet quod erant et non erant; erant in dei sciencia et non erant in sui natura. Cum enim in

What then is *that which* began with time, and will exist eternally? Is it or is it not, a given corruptible body? We may answer yes or no as we like;

or say it is neither one nor the other, i. e. in different senses. To a theologian who ought to avoid sophistical affectation, the latter answer is the best. Scripture gives us examples of the affirmation and negation of the same thing.

1. 1ᵉ *or* e' D; materia *deest* B; *ib. before* materie terre A; *ib.* terre AC. 4. quod *deest* D; *ib.* est *pro* erit AB. 8. correspondenter corrumpitur *(sic) pro* que generatur vel corrumpitur BD. 9. quando B. 10. talem *deest* ABC. 11. per unio D. 13. 13° nec B. 14. sppᵉ = specie? A; speᵉ = specifice C; *ib.* esset *pro* et B. 16. Et si accipitur quod BD; argumentatur *in marg.* B. 17. est A. 18. tu pōīs A. 19. explanato BD. 20. hoc *deest* AC. 24. 9dtoi'ᵐ A. 25. potest A; est BD. 26. concedit D. 28. ut *deest* D. 29. philosophorum *pro* scripture E. 31. 18° BD. 32. declarat AC. 33. erant *deest* D; *ib.* et non erant *deest* AC. 34. respondet quod *deest* ACD; respondent D. 35. Cum enim *deest* D.

With men who affect the subtlities of vain wisdom, I beat down their arguments by denials made in various senses; but I proceed otherwise with sincere seekers after truth.

equivocis non sit contra diccio (ut patet 1° elenchorum, 4°) et quia *esse* intelligibile et *esse existere* competit equivoce creaturis, non est dubium quod in istis non est contradiccio: creature eternaliter erant secundum *esse* intelligibile; et non eternaliter secundum existenciam. Vel sapientis aut acute disputantis nego eis negatum, modificans sensus earum, ut infructuositas intencionis earum magis appareat. Quando autem communico cum sensatis qui sensum appetunt, non vanam gloriam, facio e converso. Theologus autem debet inniti sensui et loyci scripture; et in illo, sedatis tumultibus sophisticis, quietari.

As to the argument that our doctrine would make everything to be everything else, and destroy the distinction of species, I reply that it is conformable to Scripture. Aristotle goes too far when he says that brass does not become a statue, but that the statue itself becomes realized. We say that an idol *is* stone, wood, &c. that fire is water, though not at the same time; the distinction between things proceeding from successive forms. If a man is, according to Job, rottenness and worms, why should he not be (as to bodily substance) identical with an ass?

Sed generando inconveniencia videtur contra physicam Aristotelis concedere quod ignis est aqua; quia per idem de possibili terra, vermis, et sic species confuse essent et permixte. Hic dicitur quod sensus predictus | non est A 71b
contra physicam, et usualiter scripture sunt consona que longe melius logisant quam Aristoteles. Ipse enim ad tantum innititur predicacioni formali (primo physicorum 61) quod negavit es esse statuam: "ex ere", inquit, "dicimus statuam fieri, non es statuam". Et 7° Methaphysice, 34°, dicit quod compositum ex substancia et accidente generatur per medium componencium, ut spera cuprea; et nichil est spera nisi cuprum. Nos autem consonancius dicimus quod ydolum est lapis et lignum; et correspondenter de aliis artificialibus; et quod ignis est aqua, sed non simul et semel et secundum idem. Et sic de individuis materialibus, stante distinccione specifica, que fit a forma. Aliter autem non diceret sapiens Ecclesiastes, ultimo, ubi docet hominem Eccl.
disponere se creatori in via presenti "*antequam*", inquit, XII, 7
"*revertatur pulvis in terram suam*". Nec video quod sit inpossibile quod homo secundum naturam corpoream

1. est ABCD. 2. existe' A. 3. est *deest* BD. 5. et *deest* ACD. 6. disputationis ABCD; neᵒ vis A. 7. eorum A? BD. 8. c͡ovinco A; ϙvinco D. 9. ϙm͡ = quoniam *pro* qui D; *ib.* facio *deest* AC. 10. autem theologus ABCD. 11. scripture *deest* B; *ib.* seda D. 14. et *pro* quia BD. 15. et *deest* D. 17. verba BD; vtalia sunt scripture C. 18. *after* melius *a blank space* A; *ib.* logizat A; logizant C; legizant D. 20. 61? A; 16° BD; *ib.* negat D; *ib.* es *deest* D. 22. 24 D. 24. cupra AC; *ib.* nulla AB; *ib.* vel B. 29. spectata AC. 32. revertetur ACD; *ib. after* suam: et spiritus dirigatur ad deum BCD.

6. The text is no doubt corrupt here, and the various readings are far from sufficient to make the meaning clear. My marginal note is only a guess.

Job XXV, 6 — Joh. I, 14

sit asinus aliquo tempore, cum sit "*putredo et vermis*", ut dicit Job 25; et (quod magis mirabile est) "*verbum caro factum est*", ut dicitur Joh. 1°. Non autem video quod sit possibile eamdem personam hominis simul esse hominem et asinum, vel quod eadem persona secundum formam sit res alterius speciei, sicud admittunt illi qui dicunt verbum divinum simul posse esse hominem et asinum. Et ita . . . . refugium in hoc quiesco, concedens scripturam de virtute sermonis, que vocat hominem terram vel aliam naturam de virtute sermonis. Et illum sensum innuit commentator, 12° Methaphysice assimilans materiam primam generi; quia, sicud genus simul et semel includit multa supposita distincta specie, sic materia prima est potencia multa supposita, distincta in specie actualiter pro diversis temporibus.

Not indeed whilst he is a man; and I reject as impossible the theory that God might be incarnate in several subjects at once.

My refuge is Scripture; I admit its expressions as literally true, in my doctrine. Averrhoës, assimilating matter to a genus, which may be many specifically different things, shares my view.

Sed ultimo obicitur iuxta hec quod per loycam concedendum esset patrem esse filium, humanitatem deitatem, et sic de ceteris que ponuntur de eadem essencia vel persona. Sic enim conceditur quod pater est idem essencialiter cum filio. Ad illud dicitur quod omnia talia sunt absolute inpossibilia. In talibus predicacio secundum essenciam non debet admitti nisi in concreatis, quibus abstrahitur una res in potencia ad formam sibi accidentalem. Ergo non pater essencialiter vel personaliter est filius, licet sit idem cum filio. Nec humanitas esset divinitas, nisi in quantum aliud est hominem esse ipsum quiditative, aut e contra. Ideo scriptura hoc previdens, quantum recolo non sic locuta est, vel si loquitur alicubi, loquitur propter scitum non extranee, et in alia parte expositorie exprimit sensum suum.

To the objection that this theory would identify the Father with the Son, I reply that we may not abstract Paternity from Godhead; forming one Essence, they must be predicated together. The Father is one with the Son, God is (in Christ) one with man; but Paternity is not Filiation, nor is humanity Deity.

2. 24 C; *ib.* materiale AD. 8. *after* ita, *a blank space for some words;* unum latens BCDE. 12. assignans ABC; *ib.* generari ABC. 14. in specie BD; *ib.* prima *pro* potencia A. 17. est *pro* esset D; *ib.* et *pro* esse D. 18. pn̄tʳ A; predicantur B. 21, 22. predicacionibus ABCD. 23. dꝫ A; concretis D; *ib.* obst'maʳ *pro* abstrahitur D. 26. deitas BD; *ib.* aliquid BCD. 27. homo esset BCD. 29. logitur *pro* loquitur *twice* B. 29, 30. propter — parte *deest;* exsequitur illud B. 29. ſcītu A. 30. et *deest* ACD. 31. *after* suum: et cetera sequuntur obiecciones etc. C.

8. If we read *quœro* for *quiesco*, we might fill the preceding gap with *unum latens.* As it is, the sense is not improved by adding these words.

CAPITULUM OCTAVUM.

Primal matter, it is objected, is formless in itself; now since it never is formless, it never is anything in itself.

Sed obicitur contra predicta, primo ex hoc quod materia prima, in quantum huiusmodi, est informis: cum ergo pro nullo instanti temporis potest esse informis, sequitur quod pro nullo instanti temporis potest esse materia prima.

But it does not follow that it has no distinct entity of its own.

Hic dicitur quod non est necesse materiam primam esse, quia satis est adhuc ipsam esse materiam, qua non sit prior, ipsam qualificative elementans, quoniam est necessarium semper sibi inesse. Non enim sequitur: non potest esse nisi sit informis, quia pro nulla mensura potest esse, nisi pro eadem sit informis; ut non est possibile creaturam esse nisi creetur, sic nec est possibile hominem esse virtuosum moraliter, nisi operetur virtuose pro tempore suo. Tamen non est color | ex isto inferri quod si pro aliqua mensura creatura est, A 72 tunc pro illa mensura creatur; et sic de virtuoso moraliter qui consistit in habitu. Materia ergo prima dicit *concretive* subiectum, ut est susceptivum qualiscunque forme pro tempore suo. Et sic est substancia et fundamentum nature subsistens omni predicacione forme universalis vel particularis nature corporee, ut patet 1° Physicorum 52°. Si autem intelligatur *abstractive*, pro informitate essencie corporee, ut loquitur Augustinus, non video quod talis informitas sit quid, quantum, vel aliquod ens positivum, sed sic est carencia, media inter aliquid et nichil in effectu. Et illa non potest subici alicui forme, cum fugaretur in adventu cuiuscunque forme, sicud privacio, que est tercium principium, de quo primo Physicorum. Ipsa enim, quamvis non possit propter suam violenciam ingredi composicionem cuius principium est antecedens, tamen vere dicitur a philosopho principium intrinsecum, cum subiectatur in materia, que est tota essencia compositi.

A creature is essentially created; yet who will say that it is created at each moment of its existence? And a man may be virtuous, even though not actually doing a virtuous deed. Matter, understood concretely, is a subject able to receive any form; as such, its entity corresponds to its receptivity. Understood abstractively, as not being form, it is a mere negation, a lack, and is nothing positive. Now this lack cannot underlie any form, since when the latter supervenes, it at once disappears; yet, like privation, it is an intrinsic principle of things, since it is an essential property of matter.

1. Capitulum octavum *deest* A; *Initial* S *in red ink* AB. 7. non *deest* DE. 8. *Before* quia *suppl.* materiam primam BD. 9. qui A; quod BCD. 13. creatoris ABD; *ib.* sicud BC; *ib.* non *pro* nec BD. 16. istis infere D. 17. tunc *deest* ACD; *ib.* creator C. 18. qui — habitu *deest* D. 19. contractive ACD. 20. esset ACD. 20, 21. fundatum ABCD. 21. fb q͡m (sub communi) D. 26. sit *pro* sic est ACD; *ib.* correspondencia BD. 28. fugere BD. 29. sit B; *ib.* tercium *deest* D. 30. posset CD. 31, 32. est principium BD. 32. tamen *deest* BC; *ib.* enim *pro* vere D.

Primal matter has by itself no form whatever; if it had, it would consist of matter and form, and this matter would be likewise composed; and so on for ever.

Ex istis patet quod claudit contradiccionem formalem materiam primam habere formam de se, et componi ex materia et forma substanciali. Tunc enim non esset materia prima, sed pars materialis, quia aliter esset processus in infinitum in materiis. Et sic vere dicit philosophus, 1° physicorum et 7° methaphysice, 8°, quod si de se haberet formam que sic fieret eius pars qualificativa, tunc non esset [in] potencia ad quamcunque formam, cum oportet recipiens denudari a natura recepti. Sufficit autem ad denudacionem de qua loquuntur philosophi, quod subiectum recipiens quamcunque formam, substancialem vel accidentalem, sit pro aliqua mensura nature vel temporis pro qua non habet formam huiusmodi ut materia prima, licet pro nulla mensura temporis sit informis, tamen pro mensura nature (que est supra tempus) pro qua nullam formam habet, sicud nec pro tali mensura est quid; et pro illa mensura denudatur a natura rei recepte posterius in tempore. Correspondenter essencia anime, cum recipit secundum intellectum possibilem speciem vel quamcunque intencionem cognoscibilem se ipsam conveniens, est tunc pro instanti temporis vel nature pro quo nullam formam talem habet; et correspondenter de virtutibus sensitivis. In cuius testificacionem virtutes organice non distincte percipiunt subtilitatem diaphanee cristalidis, nec auditus sonum tremulum aeris coronalis in meringa. Et sic de aliis sensibus, sive naturaliter dispositis sive indispositis.

But this *not having any form* is meant not in time, but as to the nature of matter itself, which is something that does not belong to time.

Thus the essence of the soul passing from thought to thought, it is deprived of actual thought, not at any instant of time, but in its nature as a potentiality of thimking.

Secundo obicitur per hoc quod, si materia pro mensura temporis sit informis, tunc pro illa mensura non est formata, et per consequens negacio forme precessit eius existenciam. Et cum non sit racio diversitatis quin idem sit de materia et qualibet creatura, sequitur quod cuiuslibet creature negacio precesserit eius existenciam, sic quod cuiuslibet creature *non esse* precesserit eius *esse*. Quod tripliciter confirmatur, primo ex hoc quod

Another difficulty is that the negation of form is true before the existence of matter, and indeed of any creature; its negation is true before its existence is so;

2—4. materiam — prima *deest* D. 2. id est *pro* et B; *ib.* compositum ABD. 3, 4. non esse materiam primam D. 4. vel *pro* quia AC. 6. 21° C; *ib.* 18° B. 7. si *pro* sic BD. 8. est ACD; *ib.* in *deest* ABCD. 9. recipiens *deest* D; esse B; *ib.* denudatum BD. 20. intellectivam potenciam BD. 21. sequens se ipsam esse B; conveniens se ipsam est *deest* A; sequens est ipsam CD; tunc C; esse D; *ib.* est tunc *deest* B. 21—23. est tunc — correspondenter *deest* D. 24. cuius instantis C; *ib.* cuius vi'tabq = veritatibus D; vi'tp = veritatis E. 24. destincte C. 25. dyafaniee x'talla no ut D. 26. conralis A; generabilis *pro* coronales BDE. 31, 32. per idem BC. 32. sic *pro* idem D. 33. precessit B. 34. precessit C; pre cessit D.

omnis generacio vel creacio creature est a *non esse* eius simpliciter ad eius *esse;* ut patet per philosophos et theologos. Ergo cuiuslibet creature non *esse* precessit suum *esse.* Similiter pro mensura quacunque fuit deum velle mundum vel existere ante mundum, vel ipsum non existere. Sed | pro mensura eternitatis fuit talis dei volicio; ergo et mundum existere vel non existere. Sed pro quacunque mensura veritatis est sic disiuncta contradictoriis, est alterum illorum. Ergo pro mensura eternitatis vel est dicta affirmacio, vel est dicta negacio. A 72[b]

and the world's non-existence is an eternal truth, though it is nothing at all.

Et cum affirmacio non potest tunc esse, quia tunc omnis creatura esset eterna, relinquitur quod dicta negacio fuit eterna futuricio. Ergo eternitas mundi a parte ante habet *non esse mundum* sibi coevum ante mundum, cum pro illo priori contingenti nichil fuit *non esse mundum.* Similiter in eternitate est verum quod iste mundus non existit; et per consequens verum est istum mundum pro mensura sua aliqua non existere,

And if it was eternally true, then there was a *when* in which it could be predicated of the world.

et per consequens aliquando non existere. Sic enim concedunt theologi precipui quod omnis creatura habet *esse* intelligibile eternum, secundum quod cognoscitur necessario a deo vel noticia simplicis apprehensionis (ut possibilia non existencia) vel intuitive, ut omnia tempore suo existencia.

But every creature has eternal existence in God, and has it therefore when it does not exist, as may be proved by Scripture.

Cum igitur omnis creatura cognita a deo habet *esse* intelligibile eternum, cum defectu existencie, sequitur quod habet cum deo *esse* intelligibile eternum, non coexistenciam precedentem. Et antecedens non negatur a catholico, cum, prima Petri primo, dicit apostolus Petrus quod deus elegit apostolos "*ante mundi constitucionem*". Et Ieremie primo dicitur quod deus nedum cognovit Ieremiam antequam fuit, sed antequam ipsum formaret in utero. I. Petr. I, 20

We may answer this in two different ways: (1) by admitting that non-existence is the *terminus a quo* of creation;

In ista materia est duplex responsio. Prima, concedens quod omnis creatura habet non existenciam eternam precedentem suum *esse existere,* ut sentenciant raciones et modi loquendi philosophorum limitancium terminos

1. ex eius non esse BD. 2. patet *deest* D. 5. inexistere AC; ut existere BD; *ib.* ante *deest* BD. 6. quacumque fuit BD; *ib.* dei *deest* D. 6. et *deest* AC. 8. patet *pro* pro ABC; *ib.* quod veritas C; *ib.* est *deest* AC; *ib.* sic distincta ex D; definita A; *ib.* distincta ex; disiuncta *in marg.* B. 11. sic tunc AC. 13. eternalitas BD. 17, 18. verum est istum *deest;* fuit AC. 18. sua B aliqua *deest* AC. 19. aliquod *pro* aliquando AC. 22. vel *deest* AC. 24. cognita *deest* D. 26. esse *deest* BD. 26, 27. intelligenciam eternam D. 27. existenciam B. 30. Et eciam D. 35. esse *deest* BD; *ib.* finant A.

generacionis et corrupcionis per *esse* et *non esse*, ut generacionis terminus *a quo* est *non esse* generati, et terminus *ad quem* est *esse* generati; ut patet in predicamentis, 5° physicorum, et primo generacione. E contra autem est de corrupcione. Addit eciam hec responsio, quod tales termini infinitati "*non esse* talis aut talis rei", non negant simpliciter *esse* talis rei pro omni mensura temporis vel nature. Unde, sicud non repugnat quod unum sit album pro una mensura temporis, et nigrum pro alia, sic nec hoc repugnat, sed oportet omnem creaturam primo habere non existenciam, id est, et *non esse* actuale extra deum, et post existen-
Eccl. ciam in *esse* actuale ad extra. Et hinc vere dicit scrip-
1, 2 tura ecclesiastis, quod omnia citra deum sunt vana et falsa de quanto pro aliqua mensura deficiunt ab existencia. Nam omnia creata habent *esse* intelligibile eternum, et absolute necessarium, ut patet 6° Gen. ad literam 13°; et illi superadditur existencia pro tempore suo, que existencia deficit eis pro mensura eternitatis. Et patet ista sentencia per beatum Dyonisium de mistica theoloyca, particula tercia, cap. 1°, ubi dicit quod omnium encium tam raciones positive quam negative dicunt deum; nec sunt iste negaciones omnibus affirmacionibus opposite, cum in omni creato sit suum *non esse* ante suum *esse*. Natura autem increata precedit omne *non esse*, ut sanctus Bartholomeus testatus est. Wult autem iste sanctus dicere quod omnis creatura habet *esse* possibile precedens eius existenciam; et cum illa potencia ponit
A 73a eiusdem creature non existenciam | patet quod in omni creatura non existencia precedit suam existenciam et suum *esse*. Actus autem, qui est deus, precedit potenciam, ut dicitur 9° methaphysice. Et cum ista existencia et ista non existencia creature sunt pro diversis mensuris, non sunt opposite, ut patet ex regula Aristotelis, primo elenchorum cap. 4°. Et sic vocant philosophi terminos generacionis et corrupcionis contradicciones in sua

adding, however, that negative terms like *non-being* do not simply deny all *being*, but only a certain degree and perfection of being, attained when that which was non-existent save in God, comes to exist outside of Him.

Every being has absolutely necessary existence in God's mind, to which, at the right time, actual existence *ad extra* is superadded.

Such is also the doctrine of Dionysius, who holds that every creature has in God an eternal existence of pure possibility, including its actual non-existence; and therefore the latter precedes its existence as and when created: but these do not contradict each other.

What is contradictory is the simultaneous

1. limitationis *pro* corrupcionis BD. 6. infiniti D. 7. non esse AC. 12. et *pro* id est AD. 13. extra deum D. 14, 15. ad existenciam AC. 17. patet *deest* D. 18. pro *deest* BD. 22. negative *in marg.* B. 24. *after* sit unum D. 27. potenciale BD. 31. autem *deest* D. 33. fint ACD. 34. ex r'a A. 36. contradictorios BD; *ib.* sui *deest* B.

20. *Dionysius.* There exist several spurious works of St. Dionysius the Areopagite, which had much vogue during the Middle Ages. The allusion to St. Bartholomew (l. 26) is propably taken from one of them.

position and denial of the same thing.

A being therefore may successively have two contradictory predicates.

communitate, quia sunt termini quorum unus est affirmacio, alius autem eiusdem rei negacio, quos repugnat eidem simul et semel inesse. Et sic dicunt tales mutaciones esse a contradictorio in contradictorium; et sic contradictoria inesse rei pro diversis mensuris; ut *me non existere* (quod est commune ad *me non existere* tunc aut tunc), contradicit huic: *me existere et desinit esse me existentem*, quia non potest esse pro tempore existencie mee, et contradiccio est ut sit cum existencia mea pro eodem tempore. Ideo dicitur quod contradiccio est eiusdem negacio sue affirmacioni.

(2) But as this answer, though approved by doctors of the Church, implies many positions not generally admitted, I prefer another, more available against sophistical quibbling. I deny that any non-existence ever was, is, or will be. From the restricted formlessness of primal matter you cannot conclude in general that it is formless, without any restrictions; for then you argue from the particular to the general. *Not an ass* does not include *Not an animal*, though *not white* implies *not white in any way*. Can we say: *X is blind* ∴ *X is not seeing*; or *X is white* ∴ *X is not black?*

Illud autem est valde difficile, implicans multa dicenda contra communem scolam, licet doctores sic loquantur. Et insuper, [ut] sophistarum audaciam probem, ut pomposius multiplicent suas argucias, ideo ego elegi pro loco et tempore responsionem secundam, subglosans dicta sanctorum per modificacionem necessariam, ut quod non existencia creature, coeterna cum deo, precessit suam existenciam; et illa manet, nulli veritati opposita secundum actum. Unde ista responsio, valens evitare apparenciam inconveniencie sophistice, negat quod alicuius nature non existencia est, fuit vel erit, et per consequens precessit eius existenciam. Nec sequitur: materia prima *pro illa* mensura non est formata, vel aliquid; igitur pro illa mensura est non formata; vel quod negacio sue formacionis fuit pro aliqua mensura; set bene sequitur quid materia sit non formata pro ista mensura. Sed ultra, non est color, si sit non formata pro ista mensura tunc non est formata, cum argumentatur ab inferiori ad superius, negacione precedente. Ac si sic argueretur. Tu es non asinus; ergo tu es non animal; et ita de consimilibus; cum sequitur, Petrus est non albus; igitur pro nulla mensura sui est albus. Et sic de consimilibus. Ex quo sequitur quod nulla talis affirmativa de predicato privativo aut contrario infert simpliciter affirmativam de predicato opposito

1. communi D. 3. et *deest* D. 4. esse *deest* BD. 5. contradiccio est a parte rei BD. 7. et A; aut B. 8. existente D; *ib.* tunc *pro* non AC. 10, 11. negacio est eiusdem contradiccio ABD. 12. inexplicans A. 13. locuntur D. 14. ut *deest* ABCD; *ib.* sophistis AC; *ib.* probem *deest* BD. 16. sub *deest* BD. 17. negacionum B; negancium C. 19. valet D. 20. prima *pro* ista BD; *ib.* volens C. 23. non precessit BCD. 24. prima *pro* illa ABD. 25, 26. vel — vel *deest* A. 26—28. mensura — mensura *deest* AD. 29. mensura *deest* D; *ib.* est non D. 32. est *pro* non BD; *ib.* con *deest* BD. 33. est *after* sui *deest* ABD. 34. non albus ABCD; *ib.* con *deest* B. 35. negativa affirmativo: affirmativa AB; *ib.* p'uato AB; *ib.* privato C. 36. oppositam affirmativam BD.

infinito; ut non sequitur: iste est cecus vel albus, ergo est non videns vel non niger: quia tunc esset non huiusmodi pro aliqua mensura. Sed bene sequitur ex tali antecedenti quod sit non videns tunc; sed tunc non sequeretur quod sit non videns; cum argumentatur ab inferiori ad superius, cum negacione precedente sive speciali materia bonam faciente consequenciam. Et per hoc respondetur ad terciam confirmacionem.

Ad primam dicitur quod dicta philosophorum sunt intelligenda modificative, ut generacio substancie est a non existencia simpliciter pro danda mensura, usque ad existenciam; et e contrario de corrupcione. Nec concedat aliquis contradictoria esse terminos generacionis vel corrupcionis. Nam iuxta restringentes, verba sunt vera, etsi dicatur quod negacio contradictoria precessit affirmacionem. Adhuc negantes veritates communes non habebunt nisi quod *rem esse* pro data mensura pre-
A 73b cessit suam existenciam pro mensura sequente. Et | hec non sunt contradictoria. Ideo satis est pro sensu philosophorum quod *esse* generacione productum sive effectum habet suum esse intelligibile pro mensura eternitatis (ut *mundum existere*, vel *ipsum non existere*), cum sit veritas absolute necessaria, idem essencialiter cum deo. Et pro illa mensura nec est *mundum existere*, nec pro illa mensura est *mundum non existere*, cum nec in eternitate nec in tempore est *mundum non existere;* quia tunc esset verum quod pro illa mensura mundus existit. Unde falsum assumitur quod veritas disiunctiva requirit pro omni mensura sui *esse* veritatem alterius partis; quia, licet pro nullo tempore vel instanti temporis possit esse talis veritas, nisi pro eodem sit *mundum existere* vel *non existere;* secus tamen est de instanti nature, ut patet eciam ceco methaphysico. Unde insipienter accipiunt aliqui quod unum et idem est iudicium de una mensura et qualibet, ad probandum ex isto sequi quod *esse* est medium inter contradictoria. Sic igitur, cum futuricione mundi eterna est ista negacio eciam coeterna,

What is said by philosophers of generation and corruption should be understood as meaning the passage *from* non-existence in a certain way, *to* existence in that way; not absolutely.

Thus we shall find simply that existence in one way precedes existence in another; and there is no contradiction.

Intelligible being is eternal; and that eternity is irrelevant both to the world's existence and to its non-existence in time.

"The world either exists or does not," is a disjunctive truth of which one or the other part must be true in all time; but the essence of intelligibility abstracts from time.

It is foolish to conclude from one order of existence to another.

1. non albus AC. 3. modi *deest* ACD. 4, 5. videns — videns *deest* AC. 4. ex hoc non D. 6. suum superius BD. 7. boni D. 10. cum modificacione BD. 12. e converso BCD. 15. contradictorio D. 15, 16. negacionem ABC. 20. vel C. 21. secundum *pro* suum BD; *ib.* certa mensura scilicet eternitatis cum C. 23. et *deest* D. 25, 26. non existere — non existere *deest* BD. 27. quod *deest* B; *ib.* mundus non BD. 28. *after* falsum: f = scilicet D. 29. fuia' *pro* sui D. 33. et in *pro* eciam ceco B; *ib.* metaphysica D. 34. aliqui *deest* D. 36. esse *deest* D. 37. eterna *deest* D.

mundum non existere pro mensura eternitatis. Nota tamen quod est dare quotlibet veritates disiunctivarum contingencium, que eternaliter sunt. Et tamen nec semper est una pars, nec altera semper nec in omni instanti temporis. Questio est talis: veritas absolute necessaria est vel affirmacio vel negacio; ut semper est, *me scribere* vel *non scribere.* Sequitur ergo quod idem est iudicium de omni significato disiunctive ex contradictoriis, cuius pars affirmativa significat veritatem temporalem. Unde isti termini: *numquam, aliquando,* sicud et isti termini, *semper* et *nunc,* sic significant, ut nunc est ita quod ego nascor, nec umquam erit ita quod non nascor; ideo veritates disiunctive distingwuntur veritate alterius partis.

Such a disjunctive truth, with one part modified by the idea of time, requires that the other part should be modified likewise.

Per hoc ad secundum argumentum conceditur quod deus scit hunc mundum pro aliqua mensura non existere; sed mundum pro data mensura non existere non est *aliquid* non existere, licet sit *aliquod* non existere tunc. Et ita conceditur, cum beato Augustino et precipuis doctoribus, quod omnis creatura habet *esse* intelligibile deo coeternum, cum formaliter sequitur: deus wult, cognoscit et intelligit hoc *esse,* quodcunque fuerit: ergo hoc est. Et antecedens est verum de omni possibili, ergo et consequens. Ideo, sicud alias declaravi, omne quod potest esse, est; sicud omne quod deus potest cognoscere, cognoscit. Et tamen filius meus potest esse et non esse, sicud et deus potest cognoscere me non sedere vel dampnari; et tamen non cognoscit sic: ut declaratum est in materia de ydeis. Conceditur igitur quod *me non existere* coeternum cum deo est absolute necessarium cum *esse* meo intelligibili coeternum. Sed hoc non est, nec potest esse, negacio existencie mee, sed est veritas quam deus absolute et necessario vidit, et me non existente, videt illam: *me non existere.* Me autem existente, eternaliter intuetur, cognoscendo me existere, et non cognoscendo me tum existere, sed cognoscendo me non esse sibi coeternum, cui potest accidere quod non existo, sed *esse* meo intelligibili potest

That God knows when the world does not exist does not imply its absolute non-existence.

Whatever God knows, is by the fact of His knowledge; yet God may know me as having a son, without that son's actually existing.

God's eternal knowledge of my non-existence is not a negation, but a true vision, corresponding to the time when I do not exist.

To my eternally intelligible being may be added the fact of temporal existence, as a happening.

1. non *pro* nota D. 2. est *deest* D. 5. que D. 7. medium A. 8, 9. una pars, scilicet BD. 12. vmq A; *ib.* est AC. 13. alicuius A; *ib.* partis cum sit BD. 14. tercium ABC; *ib.* argumentum *deest* AC. 17. ipsum *pro* aliquid BD; *ib.* ipsum *pro aliquod* BD. 20. indicat *pro* wult A. 22. hoc *deest* D. 25. meus *deest* ABC. 26. et *after* sicud *deest* AC. 27. dampnare AC. 30. coevum B. 31. sed *pro* nec AC. 32. est *deest* D. 33. videndo AC; *ib.* illam *deest* BD. 34. cognoscente ACD. 35. non *or* nunc? *pro* tum BC; non D. 37. pro intelligibili D.

accidere quod existo. Et sicud deus non aliud cognoscit cognoscendo me existere, nec perfeccius hoc intuendo quam cognosceret noscendo me noticia simplicis apprehensionis; sic nec aliud cognoscit, cognoscendo me non esse secum coeternum, et cum hoc cognoscendo | [A 74a] me existere. Unde sicud est fallacia accidentis: "Omnem hominem quem cognovi, nunc cognosco: Sortem album cognovi; ergo Sortem album nunc cognosco": sic hec est fallacia accidentis: "Omne quod potest deus cognoscere cognoscit; filium meum potest cognoscere, ergo filium meum cognoscit; tunc illum qui est filius meus, cognoscit, et per consequens ille habet existenciam in genere extra deum." Sic enim inplicat predicatum specialem existenciam creature in proprio genere; ut patet in materia de ydeis. Verumtamen ex talibus premissis concluditur verissime necessarium isto modo: "Omne quod potest deus cognoscere, cognoscit; hoc potest cognoscere (demonstrando illum qui potest esse filius meus); igitur illum cognoscit." Sed silogizando expresse in terminis accidentalibus, oportet sic capere in minore: "Filius meus est aliquid quod deus potest cognoscere," et cetera. Unde intelligitur quod filium meum cognoscit; quia, data minori, sequitur quod habeo filium. Et correspondenter ad omnes tales evidencias: "Omne quod potest esse, est; filius meus potest esse, igitur filius meus est;" non sequitur, quia vel oportet in minori capere quod filius meus est aliquid quod potest esse; vel aliter, demonstrando pronomine illud qui potest esse filius meus, vere concluditur quod hoc est. Quod est necessarium, quia habet *esse* intelligibile; sed falsum est quod filius meus habet *esse* intelligibile, quia tunc ille qui hic esset filius meus habet *esse* intelligibile, etsi alius est filius meus; tunc habet formalem existenciam in genere extra deum; ut patet ex grammatica subtili antiquorum doctorum in ista materia.

That God knows my son as existing, since He can know him as such, is a *fallacia accidentis.*

God knows my son as possibly existing; or if I am to have a son, as existing at some future time.

Other similar fallacies are answered in like manner.

Et correspondenter dicitur ad istum tercium paraloysmum. "Omne quod potest deus cognoscere, cog-

"God, who knows all that is possible, therefore knows that I am not teaching now."

1, 2. cognoscendo me — noscendo me *deest* D. 4. sic enim E; sicud enim A; *ib.* ali[d] C. 6. hoc est BD. 7. quem *deest* D. 8. est hic B. 10. medium D. 14. essenciam ABD. 19. illud B; *ib.* silo[do] A; *ib.* expresse *deest* D. 22. cetera *deest* D; *ib.* Et tunc bene infertur quod BCD; *ib.* meum *deest* D. 23. hēo A. 24. tales *pro* omnes BDE; *deest* AC; *ib.* evide'[as] A. 26. vel *deest* B. 28. meo pronomine AC; *ib.* illud quod A. 30. habet *deest* D; *ib.* esse *deest* D. 30–32. intelligibile — intelligibile *deest* A. 31. quia si B. 32. quia *before* etsi D. 36. istum *deest* BCD.

If my not teaching were a fact, the inference would be valid; as it stands, it is worthless, unless we understand by *my not teaching now* the mere possibility of such a thing; God knows me not to be teaching, supposing that I do not teach. God does not see that which is not, but He sees it to be possible; and the fact of His seeing it only when it exists does not argue a change in Him, since He is present in all time.

noscit; me non docere potest deus cognoscere; igitur me non docere cognoscit." Hoc non sequitur, sed oportet in minori capere quod *me non docere* est veritas quam deus potest cognoscere, et tunc formaliter ex falso silogizatur ad falsum; vel absolute capiendo sic: "Omne quod potest deus cognoscere, cognoscit: hoc potest deus cognoscere (demonstrando illud quod potest esse *me non docere*), ergo hoc deus cognoscit, quod est absolute necessarium, sicut me esse intellectum a deo est absolute necessarium, cui potest accidere quod scit me existere; et sic de qualibet creatura. Sic ergo doctrinam meam non esse deo coeternam est veritas absolute necessaria, cui potest accidere quod scit me non docere, posito quod non doceam. Et talis veritas est racio vel exemplar quod deus necessario videt, et videndo illud quod est essencialiter divina essencia, videt omnes creaturas, si sint in tempore suo; sed si non sint, non videt illas intuitive, sed videt illas posse esse, et de causato, licet non in *esse* creato. Nec est color in illo: Si deus non intuetur illum hominem, et potest intueri illum hominem, quod potest incipere vel desinere; sicud non sequitur in suo convertibili: Si deus non ordinat illum hominem esse et potest ordinare illum esse, tunc potest incipere vel desinere sic ordinare. Omnes enim creaturas, quantumlibet remotas, preteritas vel futuras deus intuetur, quia sunt in tempore suo; et solum deus intuetur. Alias autem possibiles, que non existunt in tempore suo, cognoscit | noticia simplicis apprehensionis, de quando cognoscit ista habere *esse* intelligibile, et posse existere, ut docet sanctus Thomas prima parte summe, questione 14ª, articulo 9º, et primo contra gentiles, 66º. A 74[b]

What is possible, but never exists, is known by Him, not in its existing, but in its possible essence.

1. non *before* docere *deest* D; *ib.* si *pro* sed A. 4, 5. sequitur aliud BD. 5. capiendo *deest* BD. 6. deus *deest* BD. 8. deus non D. 9, 10. necessarium — necessarium *deest* A; *at top of page* B. 11. ergo *deest* AC. 15. *before* deus qua B; quam D. 17. *before* in fiunt AB; *ib.* sed si non sint *deest* AC. 18. tanto CD. 19. creature BD. 20. possit B. 21. sic intueri D. 22. suo *deest* D; *ib.* hominem *deest* A. 23. illum hominem A; *ib.* quod *pro* tunc BD. 27. autem et ACD. 31. ut *pro* et AC; in C. 31. 34 B; 24 D; *ib. after* 66º D *runs on without even a blank space for the initial. In fine cap. in marg.* Rosumyeg. *in red ink.*

30. Sum. Theol. 1ª Pars, qu. XIV, 9 *in corpore articuli.* De Veritate Catholicae Fidei, l. I, c. 66. "Quod Deus cognoscit ea quae non sunt."

CAPITULUM NONUM.

Three further objections. (1) Every creature would be coëternal with God, on account of its intelligible being. (2) Every being consequently would last for ever.

Sed contra hec instatur tripliciter. Primo, videtur quod quelibet creatura sit deo coeterna: et per consequens multe sunt substancie coeterne. Nam quelibet creatura eternaliter habet esse intelligibile; et de quanto habet esse intelligibile, est. Ergo eternaliter est, et per consequens est eterna. Et per consequens sequitur omnem creaturam semper fuisse et semper fore, et per consequens esse sempiternam. Nam quandocunque aliquid habuit vel habebit esse intelligibile, tunc habet vel habuit esse. Sed quelibet creatura semper habet intelligibile esse, ergo semper habet esse. Tercio, ex eodem sequitur quod possibile est intuitum a deo, quia secundum *esse* intelligibile est vita eterna et illa est intuita a deo; igitur, et hoc est intuitum a deo, et per idem sequitur quod hoc idem habet *esse existere*, quia hoc est vita eterna, et ipsa habet *esse existere.* Igitur, hoc habet existenciam.

(3) And this being would moreover have actual existence.

To answer these, note *first* that pronouns and transcendental terms mean nothing but the essence without denoting any form whatever. Then, that all other nouns indicate a genus.

Pro solucione istorum, oportet supponere grammaticam et loycam sanctorum doctorum, quam eliciunt ex scriptura; primo, quod pronomina et termini transcendentes significant mere essencias sine connotacione specialis qualitatis aut forme substancialis vel accidentalis. Patet illud ex dictis superius.

Secundo supponitur quod nomina per se vel per accidens in genere connotant qualitatem, vel racionem generis, secundum quam creatura nata est existere extra deum.

Also that *to be*, is said either of anything thinkable, of the Possible, or of what actually exists; possibility and existence being one and the same in God.

Tercio, supponitur ampliacio huius verbi, *esse*, ad hec tria, scilicet, *esse* intelligibile, *esse* possibile, et *esse* in actuali *existere*, cum dicitur quasi *extra sistere:* quod dictum *esse* actuale, quod *esse* habent creature extra deum, et deus extra intellectum creatum. In deo autem omnino est idem *esse* et *existere*, cum intelligibilitas aut potencia in eo non precedit actum. E contra tamen

1. Capitulum nonum *deest*; *initial* S *in red ink* A. 2. hec instatur *deest* B; instatur *deest* D; *ib.* primo *deest* BD. 7. idem *pro* consequens B. 9. sempiternum AC; *ib.* quantumcunque B; non quamcunque D. 10, 11. esse — esse *deest* D. 13–14. a deo — a deo *deest* AD; *ib.* secundum esse intelligibile *deest* C. 25. suppono BD. 29. est BD. 30. pole pote = potenciale potencie BD. 31. actu AC. 32. dicit B; *ib.* cuiusmodi *pro* quod esse BD. 35. autem BD.

in creaturis est, cum prius naturaliter intelligibiles sunt et possibiles, quam actualiter existant.

So far as regards grammar. We must also note that when *to be* is employed without any modifying, it means actual existence; when modified, it signifies mere intelligibility.

Hiis tribus habitis de noticia grammatica, capiendum est de loyca quod termini denotantes qualitatem vel racionem generis subiecti huic verbo, *est* (illimitati aliunde) vel cuicunque verbo ipso inferiori, supponunt pro actuali existencia sui significati. Ut sic dicendo, "Filius meus *est*", vel "Homo *est* talis" denotatur quod talis res habet existenciam racione limitati subiecti connotantis formam qua res habet *esse* in genere. E contra autem, supposito pronomine vel termino transcendente, eo quod ipsum mere significat essenciam, sine connotacione huiusmodi racionis.

The first conclusion is therefore impossible, since no creature, as such, is eternal; if it were, it would be identical with God, who alone is everlasting, and has in Himself the exemplars of all that is, which, essencially God, are formally distinct from Him and each other.

Ex istis patet quod prima conclusio sit inpossibilis, cum nulla creatura sit eterna secundum racionem qua creatura est. Eterna dico simpliciter, sine principio vel fine; quia si esset sic eterna, tunc esset deus; et per consequens, cum subiectum limitat predicatum ad existenciam in genere proprio, sequitur quod non sit aliqua existencia rei in proprio genere, sed quelibet foret existencia divina. Tantum ergo est una substancia vel essencia vel natura eterna, que deus est, in qua sunt quotlibet raciones exemplares et veritates eterne, que omnes sunt idem essencialiter cum essencia divina, licet distinguantur formaliter invicem et a deo.

Many doctors admit that the intelligible being of creatures lives eternally in God. Others, limiting the word *creature* to one of the ten categories, deny this, but grant that everything is God, as to its mere intelligible being, though this intelligible

Inveniuntur autem quotlibet dicta sanctorum doctorum concedencium quod quelibet creatura habet *esse* intelligibile | eternum, et est vita eterna in deo, et sic deus. Et sic intelligunt ipsam secundum *esse* intelligibile. A 75a
Alii autem non admittunt quamlibet creaturam esse deum, propter limitacionem subiecti ad existenciam creature; sed cum termino mere denominante essenciam sine tali racione alicuius decem generum. Unde concedunt omnia que possunt existere, esse; et cum modificacione concedunt omnia secundum *esse* intelligibile esse deum; ut omne quod factum est erat vita in deo, licet nulla substancia, qualitas aut alia creatura fuit vita ista. Sed quelibet creatura secundum *esse* intelligibile

3. notata AC. 4. connotantes C. 5. racione D; *ib.* illicite A. 6. in singulari A. 8. etc. *pro* talis BD; et C. 9. habeat B; *ib.* limitantis ABD; *ib.* subiectis BD. 10. 9nons D. 11. supponenta A. 12. ipse A; ipsa BD. 14. est C. 16. deo BD. 17. sit *pro* esset sic AC; et sic C; *ib.* esset *pro* est AC. 18. cum *deest* BD. 23. ex res AC. 25. et *deest* AC. 28. sic sit BD. 29. eam B; bene C. 32. connotante BD; denotante C. 36. omne *pro* esse A. 37. quantitas et ABC. 38. sicud *pro* sed BCD.

est vita ista; et ex hoc non sequitur quod quelibet creatura est illa vita propter equivocacionem ex nominacione termini limitantis subiectum et varie supponendum Et sic negatur prima consequencia: "Quelibet creatura habet eternaliter *esse* intelligibile, et de quanto habet esse intelligibile, de tanto est; igitur quelibet creatura est eterna, vel eternaliter est." Bene tamen sequitur ex dictis premissis quod quelibet creatura *est*. Conceditur tamen quecunque creatura demonstrata et mere intellecta sine connotacione racionis creature, quod *hoc* est eternaliter, et per consequens *hoc* est ad intra deus. Et si queritur quid demonstro, dicitur quod racionem exemplarem, in deo, secundum quam deus est productivus huius creature; et per consequens deum ac istam creaturam, si ipsa aliquando est: Unde, hic est notanda fallacia: "Illa racio est deus, et illa racio est hec creatura: igitur hec creatura est deus."

being, living in God, is not identical with any creature.

It were false to infer that every creature is eternal, though we may infer that every creature *is* (in God).

What is that 'which is eternal? The patterns of all creatures; that is, God as the principle of all things.

Et istam loycam innuit nobis beatus Ioh. conclusione octava sui libri, dicens "*quod factum est in ipso vita erat*". Ponit autem terminum significantem multum, indubie propter notandum misterium, et simpliciter ad denotandum quod omnia facta a deo sunt universitas, una creata.

Addit autem terminum . . . . ad mere intelligendum ea et ad sciendum raciones vitales quas habent in deo, seclusa racione proprii generis; et ad denotandum quod prius naturaliter sunt substancie quam accidencia; ut homo naturaliter prius est essencia quam est homo vel substancia, ut patet ex dictis de informitate materie et cuiuslibet alterius creature. Sic enim essencia creature precedit suum *esse*.

Analysis of the text of St. John. He uses the term. *That which*, the most general of all, to indicate the mere essence of created things, abstracting from all the rest; and also to denote substance, which in its nature is prior to the accidents that it underlies.

Et tercio, ad limitandum quod universitas die septimo est completa in genere proprio, addit particulum pre-

The past tense (factum est) is used to imply

2, 3. ex nominacione *deest* D. 6. de tanto *deest* AC. 7. eternaliter BD. 8. dictis *deest* BD. 14. pducts A; *ib.* huiusmodi *before* si B. 15. si ipsa aliquando est *deest* AC. 21. quia simplicem; *corr. in marg.* B. 22. omnia ista BD; *ib.* a deo *deest* D; *ib.* unitas ACD; *in marg.* B. 23. creatura BC. 24. terminum *deest* D; *after* terminum *a blank space for two words* A; *ib.* mltu = intellectum BD; multu CE; *above* scilicet hoc pronomen est quod; *in marg.* quia 2m dicta prius pronomina significant mere essenciam etc. C. 28. naturaliter *deest* D; *ib.* est *deest* AC. 31. recedit D. 32. medio D.

24. The marginal notes in C lead me to conjecture that the gap should be filled by the words *significantem multum*. Wyclif evidently alludes to *quod* factum est.

the completed work of creation.

teriti temporis. Sic enim specificat Aristoteles (primo physicorum) inter fieri et factum *esse*.

Life, not indeed the limited life of things existing apart from God, but Divine Life itself — God knowing His creatures — is employed with great significancy.

Et quarto, ad exprimendum dicte universitatis *esse* intelligibile, addit beatus Joh. ewangelista. "In ipso vita erat"; non dicit in proprio genere, sed secundum *esse* intelligibile, quod habet in ipso verbo, vita erat. Et signanter addit *vita*, nam inpossibile est agens aliquid ad extra producere secundum proporcionalem racionem, ut corpora animata habent eis insitam vim, secundum quam possunt per applicacionem ad passum producere sibi simile. Inanimata autem vegetabilia, ut herbe et arbores, habent in se raciones seminales secundum quas possunt per se et per influencias celestes producere sibi similia, ut patet de constantibus seminalibus que producunt vivencia vita sibi simili; possunt et per se decidere semen liquidum et devinare in ipsum virtutem informativam, secundum quam sibi similem in specie producatur. Omnia tamen ista oportet moveri ab extrinseco ad actum generacionis; et cum non possit esse processus in infinitum | patet quod est devenire ad A 75[b] unum principium generans omnia ad extra producta; quod est deus. Et cum ipse ordinate et per consequens intelligendo hec omnia producit, est tam proporcionalis sibi quam productis. Sibi autem non esset proporcionale, si esset accidens distinctum, ut virtus informativa vel racio seminalis. Nec potest dici pars dei, cum ipse sit omnino indivisibilis; ideo relinquitur quod sit racio solum dicens essenciam que deus est. Et cum sit racio universe creature specialiter attendendo ad generalitatem creaturarum vitalium, in quibus sunt expressius huiusmodi raciones, et ad modum essendi dei producentis, non cogitabitur terminus apcior quo exprimetur racio eterna in deo secundum quam producit universitatem ad extra, quam iste terminus, *vita*. Sicud ergo homo fuit semen in lumbis patrum et quodlibet productum a causa secunda habet *esse* potenciale in illa, sic *esse* productum ad extra a causa prima oportet habere *esse*

Animals are able to reproduce their like, and plants also, but they all require some extrinsic determination;

God alone does this by Himself, not adding to Himself any accidental form, nor dividing His indivisibile nature into parts; thus this generation of exemplars is simply the Divine essence, and no better term can be found for it than life; the eternal actuality of creatures in God's thought,

1. falso *pro* sic AD; *ib.* spe[cat] A. 5. quod in ABC. 8. ad *deest* AC. 9. habent *deest* BD. 11. similem ACD. 13. per *deest* B. 14. seminali D. 15. vine[a] A; *ib.* vita sensibili BC; *ib.* ponunt AD. 16. devinae' A; divinare BD (diua'e?); derrua'e C (derivare?) 19. intrinseco B; *ib.* potest D. 21. generacionis generans C. 22. ipso E; *ib.* ordinante B; et *deesi*; per quem B; *ib.* perfecte C; p q E. 26. cum ipse sit *deest* A. 26. est C. 27. sit ſp dare C; *ib.* racionem ACD. 34, 35. non habuit *pro* homo fuit A. 36. secunda *deest* AC; *ib.* mundi *pro* in illa B.

proporcionale in ipsa, non *esse* materiale vel *esse* potenciale ut in materia, sed actualissime, eternaliter intellectum. Quod indubie essencialiter est vita. Non ergo sunt raciones mortue, nec raciones potenciales tantum ut in materia, nec raciones tantum intellective, sensitive, sed una vita, dans generaliter *esse* fundamentale omni creature.

on which the very possibility of them all depends.

Addit quinto non hoc verbum *fuit* vel *est*, sed hoc verbum *erat*, quod secundum modum loquendi grammaticorum est quasi medium inter presens et preteritum. Ponitur de forma eternaliter emanante a suo originante principio; ut verbum et raciones exemplares eternaliter originantur et causantur a deo, sed non simpliciter. Ideo dicit 1° Ioh. quod universitas facta ad extra in suo genere erat in deo secundum quamlibet partem mundi. Ideo primo ad Thi. 6° dicit apostolus quod deus vivificat omnia; et conformi verbo dicit Aristoteles in expressione formarum universalium; ut patet tractatu de universalibus de "quod quid *erat* esse". Et patet quod non ex indifferencia posita sunt universalia verba; in decem conclusionibus mistice theologie Johannis. *Quod erat* est signanter sexies replicatum.

I. Tim. VI, 13

The imperfect tense is used — a tense between the present and the perfect — to imply what is eternally both past and present.

This form is used by Aristotle to denote abstraction from time.

Utendo ergo modificacione huius Johannis tam alti theologi patet responsio ad secundum. Non enim licet michi pusillo ampliare modus loquendi in tam alta et subtili materia, concedendo asinum et quodlibet nominabile esse deum, specialiter inter illos qui non sunt nutriti in sensu posteriorum doctorum huiusmodi proposiciones concedencium. Sed concedo quod *esse* huiusmodi, secundum *esse* intelligibile vel vitale quod habet in deo est vita; et nego ex hoc sequi omnem creaturam semper fuisse vel fore; quia adverbium temporis limitat creature existenciam pro signata mensura temporali; ut, si aliquid tunc fuit vel erit, ipsum habuit vel habebit pro tunc existenciam. Et sic negatur quod "quando-

My answer is therefore quite clear; I cannot go so far as to assert the identity of everything with God, since I should risk being misunderstood; but, granting that intelligible being is life in God, I deny that the eternity of any creature follows thence, or that intelligible existence means existence at a certain time.

1. esse *after* vel *deest* B. 2. ut *deest* AC. 6. fundabile BD. 10. est *deest* C; *ib.* et *deest* ABD. 11. producitur *pro* ponitur ABD. 13. causancia AB. 19. quot quid erat D. 20. in *deest* BD. 22. esse D. 23. Joh. tam huius D. 24. m̄9 A; *ib.* ad sensum AC. 24, 25. n'i, *a word a half effaced pro* licet michi A. 29, 30. proposiciones concedencium BC. 34. esset *pro* erit AD; *ib.* vel *after* habuit *deest* AE. 35. ex *pro* pro AC; *ib.* negetur C. 35, 1. quodcunque BCD.

19. *Quid erat esse.* An expression translated literally from Aristotle: *ο τι ην ειναι*, and meaning the same as essence or whatness.

Though to run implies to be, yet not to run to church does not imply not to be at church.

cunque aliquid habet *esse* intelligibile, tunc habet *esse*". Nam, licet sequitur ab inferiori ad superius, vel pocius ab equo ad equum: Hoc habet *esse* intelligibile, igitur hoc habet *esse;* tamen non oportet, si tunc non habet *esse* intelligibile quod tunc non habet *esse.* Quamvis enim *currere* | sit inferius ad *esse*, sicud *currere* ad ecclesiam sit inferius ad *esse* ad ecclesiam, tamen non sequitur quod non curro ad ecclesiam, si non sum ad ecclesiam. Sed satis est quod sum ad ecclesiam in tempore suo. Sicud enim currere ad ecclesiam . . . . sic: "hoc nunc esse" infert "hoc esse pro mensura sua". Unde creditur esse possibile secundum ficticias philosophorum quod "hoc moveri ad *a* punctum" sit eternum a parte post, cum "hoc esse ad *a* punctum" (quod est superius) sit tantum instantaneum. A 76a

When we assert that a given possible thing *is*, the opponent asks us. "At what instant?" We reply, Never, but in the eternity to which its possibility belongs; the former is the negation of temporal existence, the latter affirms its existence in God's mind. But if it exists eternally, how can we deny its existence at any moment of time?

Correspondenter dicendum est iterum: Hoc instans est eternum, et hoc instans est vel esset intellectui intuitum: quod est equum ad *rem esse tantum instantaneum;* et quesito quando *hoc est* (demonstrando unum possibile quod non existit)? dicitur quod nunquam, sed in eternitate est, in qua est *esse* suum intelligibile. Unde non repugnat ista: "Hoc est, et hoc semper non est," propter limitacionem ad *esse* equivocum, scilicet ad *esse* intelligibile in eternitate, et ad *esse existere* in tempore: cui opponitur *nunquam esse*, vel *non existere* creature.

Et si queritur evidencia, unde tale possibile habet *esse* intelligibile in quolibet instanti temporis, quin per idem habet *esse* in instanti temporis, potissime cum omne *esse* intelligibile sit *esse*, nec aliquod tempus mensurare *esse* intelligibile creature: hic dicitur quod racio primi est, quia idem est rem habere *esse* intelligibile et instans intelligi in eodem tempore. Sed cum

1. habet esse aliquid AC. 2. sequatur BD. 4. non esse D. 6, 7. ad esse — ad esse *deest* BD. 6. sic *pro* sicud ABD. 8. si non curro D; non currere ABC; *ib. after* si nunc *pro* non ABD. 9. in *deest* BD. 10. *after* ecclesiam *a blank space of over one line* A. 11, 12. sic — unde *deest* A. 12. esse possibile *deest* A; *ib.* sicut secundum D. 13. nomen *pro* moveri AC; *ib.* ada C. 14. ante *pro* post BD; *above* post C; *ib.* hoc quod BD; esse quod BD; cum hoc quod est ada C. 15. sed infert *pro* sit C; *deest* D. 16. *after* dicendum, *a very illegible word* A. 16. est *deest;* utrum C. 17. *after* instans esse *pro* est BD; *ib.* esse *pro* esset BD. 18. intuitum *deest* AD; *ib.* cum quod AD; *ib.* inesse esset *pro* rem esse AD. 19. generaliter *pro* queritur AC; *ib.* verbum *pro* unum AD. 28. intelligibile *deest* B; *ib.* quolibet *deest* B; quotlibet D. 28, 29. temporis — temporis *deest* B. 30. aliquid temporis D. 31. quod *deest* ABC. 33. tempore *deest* BD.

deus in quolibet instanti temporis intelligit omne possibile, oportet quod omne possibile in quolibet instanti temporis habeat *esse* intelligibile sicud intelligitur, scilicet, a deo, quod idem est. Sed rem habere *esse* in tempore vel instanti est ipsam eodem mensurari, et per consequens *rem esse* per tempus vel instans est ipsam durare per idem; et omne *durare* presupponit suum *existere*. Ideo idem in sentencia est querere predictam questionem, et querere utrum deus intelligit rem, cum hoc quod ipsa non duret per tempus? Sic enim significant termini ex predictis. Licet ergo omne *esse* intelligibile sit *esse*, non tamen omne *esse intelligibile nunc* est *esse nunc*, ut a simili: licet omne *currere* sit *esse*, non tamen omne *currere ad ecclesiam* est *esse ad ecclesiam*. Extraneacio autem significacionis talium est solerter attendenda.

Because it is not known by God as having an existence measured by time; what it is, is one with God's One Thought.

The question amounts to this: Can God know anything that has not temporal duration? *To be intelligible now* does not imply *to be now*.

Talia autem eterna sunt in tempore concomitanter ad existenciam dei in tempore, qui dicitur equivoce, respectu existencie creature in tempore, ut patet tractatu de tempore. Et per idem quo conceditur omne tale possibile et non existens esse et non esse aliquando, concedi debet quod omnia talia sunt et non sunt alicubi; nec proficiunt nec causant aliquid, nec fuerunt nec erunt, sed intelligantur; quia *fore* et *fuisse* connotant esse in tempore.

If we can say that God exists in time, we can say that these possible entities exist in time as He does. And as they are and are not somewhen, so they are and are not somewhere; and all their being consists in being known.

Et, si queritur quid hoc est, ex quo est? videtur enim quod hoc sit hoc et per consequens hoc est aliquid, et sic existit; nam si hoc est non hoc, per idem hoc est non homo, et potest esse homo: ergo homo potest esse non homo. Et per idem sequitur quod quelibet creatura naturaliter prius sit non creatura quam ipsa sit creatura; et cum omne quod fuit vel erit est, patet quod sequitur hominem esse non hominem, et ita generaliter de omni contradictorio in connexo. Nam ilie homo eternaliter est vita in deo, et non eternaliter erat homo in deo; igitur

It may be asked if a given possible is itself. If it is, it exists actually. If not, then a man is not a man, but God, and every creature is likewise a not-creature.

2. quotlibet D. 3. scilicet *deest* BD. 4. ab eo *pro* a deo D; *ib.* 2m *pro* sed D; *ib.* tempore esse C; esse intelligibile D. 5. esse *pro* est D; *ib.* eodemmodo B. 7. disponit ACD. 8. per dictam C. 9. utrum *deest* AC. 11. ex predictis *deest* D. 11, 12. omne — omne *first* nunc *deest* B. 13. et *pro* ut B. 14. currere ad *deest* D. 15. Exnea mo D. 16. solercia AC. 19. create ACD; *ib.* intractatu B. 20. *after* tempore: cap. *and a blank space for a word* AC; *ib.* eo *pro* et D; *ib.* concluditur C. 21. *after* possibile eciam *pro* et BC. 22. aliquando *pro* alicubi BD. 23. profint A. 24. et *deest* D. 25. intelligibile *pro* in tempore D. 27. hoc est *deest* AC. 28. *after* si hoc *twice* D. 28—33. hoc per idem — et ita *deest* AD. 28. *after* idem homo *pro* hoc C. 34. incomplexo BCD; *ib.* erat BD.

eternaliter erat non homo in deo; et per consequens est non homo in deo.

I answer — supposing this possible to exist at any time — that it is a creature of this or that genus. If it never exists, then it has no self, but that of God.

Hic dicitur quod, quocunque | demonstrato quod umquam est creatura, conceditur querenti quid est hoc? quod est *hec creatura signandi generis*. Si autem pro nullo tempore habet existenciam creature, tunc dicitur quod *hoc est deus*, sicut et omne ens est deus; et hoc per consequens est res, ens, unum; et sic de similibus transcendentalibus supra genus et pro nominibus significantibus essenciam. Sic, quocunque intelligibili demonstrato, conceditur quod hoc est hoc, essencia divina sed non creatura vel aliquid signandum nomine generis connotantis differenciam vel qualitatem, nisi pro suo tempore habuerit existenciam creature. Et patet quod, demonstrando hominem, non est compossibile quod homo sit non homo, cum ante mundi constitucionem hoc est deus, et per consequens hoc est non homo tunc, vel pro illa mensura. Sed exinde non sequitur quod hoc sit non homo. A 76

A man is not a man. Yes, but when? When thought in eternity, he is God.

We must conceive creatures as essential accidents that inhere in God more closely than any accidents in their substance; thus ascending from the actual existence of things to their possibility as causable, and thence to their everlasting intelligibility in God.

Oportet enim concipere quod omnes creature sunt accidencia deo essencialiter inherencia que induit sicud vestimenta, quando producit eas ad existencias, et longe essencialius adherent sibi (si fieri potest) quam accidens respectivum inheret substancie; ut notum est ei qui scit ascendere ab existencia creature ad eius *esse* possibile in causis secundis, et ab illo tercio gradu ad quartum, qui est *esse* intelligibile vel causale in prima causa. Et in utroque illorum graduum nullum ens dicit prius vel ex equo aliquam essenciam preter deum, qui sit benedictus in secula seculorum. Amen.

Explicit tractatus de materia et forma Magistri Ioh. Vycleph.

3. *after* dicitur quod *deest* BD. 4, 5. hoc quod est *deest* BD. 5. f,tu *pro* signandi AC. 6. dicatur BD. 7. deus — deus *deest* B. 8. sic *deest* AD. 10. existencias; *in marg*. essencias B. 11. *before* essencia hoc et B; hoc ex C. 14. quod *deest* BD. 15. quod non B; *ib*. inpossibile B; possibile D. 16. *before* sit hoc *pro* homo D. 17. *before* deus scit *pro* est ACD. 18 et D. 22. vestimentum D; *ib*. ipsas BD. 23. quod *pro* quam A. 24. substancie tempore create ut non est ei dubium BD. 25. potenciale D. 29. ex equo *deest* AD; *ib. after* deum: etc. C. 29, 30. qui — seculorum *deest* AC. 30. Amen *deest* ABCD; suppl. E. 31. Explicit veritas de materia et forma *in red ink* B; Explicit etc *deest* CD. 31. *after* Vycleph, *in red letters:*
O Wicleff, Wycleff, negednomu ty hlawu zwycless
O Wycleff, Wycleff, indigno homini tu caput illustrabis A.

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